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Abstract
The thesis explores a 5-year period in the political  history of Spain. It  looks at a
series of political processes and projects, beginning with the 15M/Indignados social
movement.  These  projects  go  from  15M in  2011  to  the  creation  of  new  digital
platforms for participatory democracy for the city of Barcelona in 2016. The thesis
defends the idea that these cases add up to a cycle of political contention, which is
defined as “the 15M cycle of  contention”.  It  supports the idea that a core thread
throughout the cycle has been the challenging of the liberal representative model of
democracy  and some of  its  key  social  forms,  primarily  in  discourse,  but  also  in
practice. The cases within the cycle vindicated, and experimented with, alternative
forms and practices of democracy. Concretely,  they tried to move away from the
current liberal representative model, preeminent since XVIII century, towards a more
participatory one. The thesis also defends the argument that a key driver of these
democratic  experiments  has  been  “technopolitics”,  otherwise,  practices  and
processes  that  hybridize  politics  and  technologies  (particularly,  information  and
communication technologies).
The thesis focuses on three paradigmatic cases of the 15M cycle of contention: 15M
itself, a social movement born in 2011; the X party, a new party created in 2013 by
15M activists; and Decidim.barcelona, a digital platform for participation, launched in
early 2016 by the Barcelona City Council, designed by people involved in previous
projects within the 15M cycle. The first of these three cases covers the sphere of
social movements and civil society, the second, that of political parties, and the third,
that of the State at the municipal level. I look at the discourses and the practices of
democracy in these processes and projects,  and whether they innovate or not in
relation to pre-existing political forms in social movements, political parties, and the
State. In every case I look at the technopolitics deployed by the actors involved. For
analyzing such technopolitics, I look at three main elements: discourses, practices,
and technological infrastructures. These are used, respectively, as the main entry
into the semantics, the pragmatics and the syntax of technopolitics.
As a complementary view, I look beyond the cases and into the cycle. Concretely, to
the variations in discourses on democracy and technopolitical practices. I suggest
that the cycle as a whole can be conceived as: a) a process of “reassembling of
democracy”, a reassembling oriented towards a democratization of the political field
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(and society more broadly) beyond the liberal representative model; and b) as a case
of  “technopolitical  contention”,  in  which  political  struggles  have  been  organically
connected  to  technological  practices.  Since,  differently  from  traditional
democratization  processes  from  XVIII  century  onwards,  this  one  has  not  been
oriented  to  establish  but  to  challenge  the  structures  of  liberal  representative
democracy  (f.i.:  the  current  structure  and  centrality  of  representation,  traditional
political parties, Parliaments, etc.), I define it as an attempt at “alter-democratization”.
I also show that this alter-democratization process challenges not only the forms, but
also the ontology of liberal representative democracy, concretely, some of its key
subjective and collective forms,  as well  as its key modes of political  relation.  By
looking at civil society, parties and State institutions I try to map changes in various
areas of the political field in liberal democracies. In that sense, the cycle has pointed
towards (although has not always succeeded in bringing about) alternative political
ontologies and forms of life.
In  order  to  analyze both the cycle  and the three key cases under  study,  I  have
recurred to a multi-method and multi-disciplinary approach. I have primarily relied on
qualitative methods, such as participant observation, fieldwork, interviews, and digital
materials (blog posts,  journals,  etc.).  I  spent  more than 5 years as participant in
various 15M cycle projects. Secondarily,  I  have used quantitative methods: along
with fellow activists and researchers, in 2014 we ran a digital survey that gathered
1000+ responses among 15M participants. Finally, I have also used social network
analysis methods to map activity on social networks.
In terms of disciplines, I primarily draw resources from political science, sociology,
philosophy, and STS.
  
 
18
 
List of Tables
Table 1. Aspects and senses of representation..........................................................52
Table 2. Political ontology: liberal representative.......................................................61
Table 3. Political ontology: participatory......................................................................65
Table 4. Political ontology: deliberative.......................................................................67
Table 5. Political ontology: antagonist........................................................................70
Table 6. Political ontology: autonomist.......................................................................74
Table 7. Political ontology: synthesis..........................................................................74
Table 8. Models of politics of technoscience..............................................................79
Table 9. Parties, movements, state, communication..................................................99
Table 10. Synthesis of fieldwork during the research period....................................127
Table 11. List of interviews........................................................................................128
Table 12. Problems that drove participants to 15M..................................................140
Table 13. List of events 2011-2016...........................................................................150
Table 14. 15M: political ontology...............................................................................214
Table 15. X Party: political ontology..........................................................................256
Table 16. Decidim.barcelona: political ontology........................................................304
Table 17. 15M cycle and sociopolitical forms...........................................................337
Table 18. 15M cycle: hybrid and anarchic political ontologies..................................341
Table 19. 15M cycle: reassembling process.............................................................348
  
 
19
 
List of Figures
Figure 1. Types of networks.......................................................................................94
Figure 2. GDP growth...............................................................................................145
Figure 3. Percentage of unemployment...................................................................145
Figure 4. Percentage of unemployment among people under 25............................146
Figure 5. Perception of the state of the economy.....................................................146
Figure 6. Perception of politics.................................................................................148
Figure 7. Map of initiatives connected to 15M..........................................................160
Figure 8. May 15th DRY event on Facebook...........................................................164
Figure 9. Protester wearing an Anonymous mask at Puerta del Sol........................165
Figure 10. Tweet by hacktivist Isaac Hacksimov on May 15th.................................166
Figure 11. Corruptdrome..........................................................................................171
Figure 12. Map of Acampadasol...............................................................................186
Figure 13. 15M assembly and group structure in Madrid.........................................189
Figure 14. @Suysulucha´s streaming of the #25S...................................................194
Figure 15. Banner with the slogan “reality is your only weapon”.............................195
Figure 16. 15M retweet network...............................................................................196
Figure 17. 15M Facebook fanpage network.............................................................196
Figure 18. Multi-layered network..............................................................................196
Figure 19. Crowdsourced map of 15M camps.........................................................196
Figure 20. Tweet by the DRY official profile.............................................................197
Figure 21. May 15th DRY event on Facebook.........................................................198
Figure 22. Tweet by the DRY official profile.............................................................199
Figure 23. Tweet by the DRY official profile.............................................................199
Figure 24. Youtube video of the first eviction of acampadasol.................................201
Figure 25. Increase in size of the 15M network on Twitter.......................................202
Figure 26. Space in newspaper covers devoted to 15M..........................................202
Figure 27. Crowdsourced map of 15M camps.........................................................203
Figure 28. Website How To Occupy.........................................................................204
Figure 29. Activity of key 15M accounts on Twitter..................................................205
Figure 30. Facebook logo.........................................................................................206
Figure 31. N-1 logo...................................................................................................207
Figure 32. Structural analysis of the 15M collective identity.....................................210
Figure 33. Dynamic analysis of the 15M collective identity......................................211
Figure 34. X.net logo................................................................................................221
Figure 35. X party logo.............................................................................................222
Figure 36. X Party: debut video................................................................................223
Figure 37. X party: structure.....................................................................................237
Figure 38. X Party: wikiprogram...............................................................................239
Figure 39. X Party: program netiquette....................................................................244
Figure 40. X Party: program in co-ment...................................................................244
Figure 41. X Party: check-mate strategy..................................................................246
  
 
20
 
Figure 42. X Party: calendar for collaborative lists...................................................250
Figure 43. Titanpad for the text "Who can?"…………………………………………..261
Figure 44. Hackeemos: telegram.............................................................................264
Figure 45. Democomunes: territorial and thematic networks...................................265
Figure 46. Compas informal logo.............................................................................268
Figure 47. Decidim.barcelona homepage................................................................271
Figure 48. Civiciti: homepage...................................................................................272
Figure 49. Decidim.barcelona: processes................................................................283
Figure 50. Decidim.barcelona: process structure.....................................................283
Figure 51. Decidim.barcelona: proposals.................................................................284
Figure 52. Decidim.barcelona: map.........................................................................285
Figure 53. Decidim.barcelona: proposal sharing screen..........................................285
Figure 54. Decidim.barcelona: Twitter profile (@decidimbcn).................................286
Figure 55. Decidim.barcelona: github.......................................................................289
Figure 56. Metadecidim: inception...........................................................................291
Figure 57. Metadecidim: participatory process........................................................292
Figure 58. Metadecidim: event.................................................................................293
Figure 59. Metadecidim: map...................................................................................295
Figure 60. Metadecidim: multi-layered……………………………..…………………..295
Figure 61. Metadecidim: Twitter................................................................................295
Figure 62. Metadecidim: proposals..........................................................................296
Figure 63. 15M discourse: representation................................................................312
Figure 64. X Party discourse: representation...........................................................314
Figure 65. Decidim.barcelona discourse: representation.........................................316
Figure 66. 15M cycle discourse: representation......................................................318
Figure 67. 15M practices: representation.................................................................321
Figure 68. 15M practices: democracy & technopolitics............................................322
Figure 69. 15M practices: alter-democracy..............................................................323
Figure 70. X Party practices: representation............................................................325
Figure 71. X Party practices: democracy & technopolitics.......................................325
Figure 72. X Party practices: alter-democracy.........................................................326
Figure 73. Decidim.barcelona practices: representation..........................................328
Figure 74. Decidim.barcelona practices: democracy & technopolitics.....................328
Figure 75. Decidim.barcelona practices: alter-democracy.......................................329
Figure 76. 15M cycle practices: alter-democracy.....................................................330
  
 
21
 
Declaration of joint research
The present work includes results from joint research.
First, from Monterde, A., Calleja-López, A., Aguilera, M., Barandiaran, X. E., & Postill,
J.  (2015).  Multitudinous identities:  a  qualitative and network  analysis  of  the 15M
collective identity. Information, Communication & Society, 18(8), 930-950. From the
first I take images by Arnau Monterde (Figure 31) and Miguel Aguilera (Figure 32).
Many or most of the concepts, arguments and conclusions were primarily my own in
the paper.
Second,  from the  Encuesta  15M2014 and  from Monterde,  A.,  Calleja-López,  A.,
Blanche,  D.,  &  Fernández-Ardévol,  M.  (2017).  15M:  the  movement  in  its  third
anniversary. UOC working papers. From the #Encuesta15M2014 and Monterde et al.
(2017)  I  take results and the section on methodology in Appendix I.  All  partners
involved were equally responsible for the design and launch of the survey.
What is more important, the present work tries to complement works such as Toret et
al. (2015) and Monterde (2015), it leaves out some of their central findings and only
repeats some of their arguments or insights to the extent that is crucial for the central
argument here.
  
 
22
 
List of abbreviations
Barcelona en Comú BeC
Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions) CCOO
Convergencia i Unió CiU
Democracia Real Ya! DRY
Democracia y Punto (Democracy, Period) DP
Instituto Municipal de Informática IMI
Izquierda Unida (United Left) IU
Juventud Sin Futuro (Futureless Youth) JSF
No les votes (Don't Vote for Them) NLV
Office for Research, Development and Innovation in Democracy ORDID
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) PSOE
Plataforma  de  Afectados  por  la  Hipoteca  (Platform  of  Affected  by
Mortgages)
PAH
Partido Popular (Popular Party) PP
Resource mobilization theory RMT
Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union) UGT
  
 
23
 
Chapter 1. Introduction.
“We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers. Real democracy,
now!”; “They do not represent us!”
Slogans at the demonstrations on May 15th, 2011
“To me, what is most important is that an upgrade of the political dimension of life
has taken place. Like an upgrade, like in software, when you move to the superior
version […] It upgrades politics. Not completely. I mean, it's not finished, it's not a
solution, like completely designed, it's not something closed, but it is a change in the
situation.  It  is  an event  that  changes the situation.  Because it  is  accused of not
getting  results,  and  that  is  true  and,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  not  true,  because
everything remains the same, and everything is different.”
Margarita Padilla (2012)1
“We must move towards a system where the people may define how society works.
We could decide that what we want is to put a tax to transactions, that we want to
rise up the minimum wage, that we want to do something with renewable energies...
that, for me, is a step afterwards. Because they are concrete victories that are lost as
soon as they are gained. I believe we should focus on the essential: that they stop
deciding for us, that people begin to be the ones who decide how they want the
world to work. Moreover, I find amazing that, in the technological moment we are […]
politics remains like in XVIII century”.
Miguel Arana (2012)2
“We want the people to take the reins and decide what they want to do with Madrid”,
“We are in a democratic revolution”.
Pablo Soto3
“I called it Democracy 4.0 because I thought it would take 40 years to implement”.
Juan Moreno Yagüe4
1 Margarita is a software developer at the Dabne cooperative, 15M activist and author of books such
as “The toolkit for the struggle on the Internet”.
2 Miguel is co-founder of Labodemo, 15M activist, and innovation advisor at the Participation Council
of the city of Madrid.
3 Pablo is a software developer, 15M activist, and Participation Councilor of Madrid. His comments
come from two interviews after the launch of the new Open Government digital platform for the city of
Madrid (Cúneo, 2015; Riveiro, 2015).
4 Lawyer, 15M activist, and elected member of the Parliament of Andalusia in 2015 with Podemos.
  
 
24
 
1.1. A short introduction to a long cycle.
Yagüe thought it would take forty years, however, ideas similar to his democracy 4.05
were  ready  to  rule  in  a  bit  over  four.  This  could  only  happen  because  of  an
acceleration of historical and political time. The gate to that wormhole was the 15M
movement and the cycle of contention it opened. The key date was May 15 th  2011,
the  first  day  of  the  movement,  which  gave  it  its  name.  On  that  date,  a  citizen
demonstration hit 60 cities across Spain, and ended up igniting a series of direct
actions and multitudinous mobilizations. In the following years, these gave way to a
series  of  political  experiments  spanning from civil  society  to  political  parties  and
municipal  institutions.  I  believe  these  constitute  a  cycle,  the  15M  cycle,  which
remains open and transformative six years later.
This cycle has involved the reassembling of important aspects of democracy and the
modern polity. Modern liberal representative democracy, in crisis for the previous two
decades at  the  very  least  (Norris,  1999;  Pharr  & Putnam,  2000;  Tormey,  2015),
haunted by the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, has been challenged and
tinkered with in search of a more real one. Key innovations resulted from creative
entanglements of politics and technologies, which I generically label “technopolitics”.
It is because of this entanglement that I define this cycle as one of “technopolitical
reassembling of democracy”.
Since6 15M happened, other things became possible, not only possible but plausible,
not just plausible but feasible, not merely feasible but done. Many others did not 7.
The  core  aim of  this  thesis  is  to  disentangle  some of  the  defining  threads  and
displacements resulting from this cycle of contention, concretely, those connected
with its most innovative and key feature, its technopolitics, and with its main general
aim, its search of a more real democracy. I explore each of these matters of concern
in the following sections.
5 Very simplistically,  democracy 4.0 is a combination of  the existing representative system with a
digitally-enabled form of direct democracy. I explain this system in chapter 4.
6 This “since” could be understood in a threefold sense: as “thenfore”, because 15M is a day; as
“therefore” because 15M was an event that made historically and politically possible what came after
it; and “thereby” because 15M became a constellation of actors driving the process. The key is to
point to the performative role of 15M in what came after it which involved the constitution of something
like an event and a movement.
7 It  is  relevant  to  notice  that,  at  each  stage  of  the  15M cycle,  there  were  things  that  became
impossible, implausible, infeasible or unrealized, sometimes because of the very initial constitution of
15M and its tensions. There were no few internal and external conflicts about what should or shouldn't
happen, between different  views and groups in the 15M scene. That will  become manifest  when
analyzing the case studies, in the frustrated plans and ideas that will be discussed.
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1.1.1. Metaphors, displacements, movements
To start thinking through the historical and political displacement brought about by
this  cycle,  metaphors  can  be  a  good  starting  point.  Metaphors  (from the  Greek
metapherein)  displace  things,  usually  to  bring  them  together.  Revolutions,
movements  and other  transformative  political  processes may be thought  as  wild
political metaphors in action, swift displacements and coming together of what is and
what  may  be,  the  real  and  the  possible.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  metaphors
displace and bring forth the entangled realities into language. In this light, Marga
Padilla's quote above, tying software and politics, points to the convergence of those
two realities into technopolitics.  Her talk of a deep political  change in terms of a
software upgrade bespeaks (as Wittgenstein 1958 may put it) a “form of life”. In this
case,  an  emerging  lifeworld  that  both  displaces  and  intermingles  politics  and
technology, particularly, ICTs. These are collective worlds8, worlds of practices that,
in the case of 15M (as epitomized in Arana's or Yagüe's quotes), speak of a more
real democracy.
That such technopolitical worlds may move from being partially lived and partially
called  for  by  a  group  of  outsiders  and  activists  (specially  hacktivists  and
cyberactivists)  in 2011 to become the official  position of key public institutions in
2015 (such as the city  councils  of  Madrid  or  Barcelona),  to  be present  at  many
others institutions (such as Regional Parliaments and dozens of smaller cities), or
inscribed in programming and legal code (such as the participation platforms and
regulations of Madrid's and Barcelona's city councils),  is  a huge displacement,  a
political metaphor in practice, a semiotic-material movement, perhaps a “revolution”,
as Pablo Soto suggests in his quote above. The displacement from Real Democracy
Now's slogan on May 15th 2011 to Pablo Soto's declaration in September of 2015
may be both part and result of an “upgrade of the political dimension of life”, one that
begun with 15M.
1.1.2. From revolution to reassembling
Calls  for  and  projects  of  citizen  participation  and  Open  Government  (Lathrop  &
Ruma, 2010) had been on the institutional agenda of actors such as the European
8 Political displacements have a collective character, they are metaphors that become common; that
was particularly obvious in the case of 15M and the process it opened. To use other metaphors: 15M's
music had a thousand authors, but not a score, it was an open melody with a rhythm, the rhythmic
flow of multitudes improvising. It is because of this multitudinous character of the movement and what
came after it that I had to start with five quotations, at the very least.
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Commission (Kohler-Koch, 2001; Kohler-Koch & Rittergberg 2006) in the previous
decade, as an answer to the crisis of representative democracy mentioned earlier.
Furthermore,  5  years  after  May  15th 2011,  in  the  midst  of  what  Soto  calls  a
“democratic  revolution”,  some  people  may  have  the  ambiguous  perception  that
“everything remains the same”. This is the equivocal condition of metaphors, but also
of the history they contribute to forge. It may well be the signature of any revolution,
perhaps  one  suggested  by  the  term  “revolution”  itself9.  Initially  applied  to  the
translations  of  celestial  bodies  around  the  sky,  revolution  was  the  proof  of  the
compatibility of perpetual movement and perpetual stability, like in Copernicus  De
Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium. By noticing this ambiguity, I do not want to fall
into the reactionary, pessimistic “futility thesis”, as presented by Hirschman (1991),
suggesting that “it was all ineffective, nothing changed”, but rather to question what I
may define as the progressive, optimistic “fruitfulness thesis”, according to which “it
was all effective, everything changed”.  Against the notion of revolution, I prefer the
term “reassembling” to name a process that is transformative, and yet not violent and
ex novo as suggested by the modern idea of political revolution, but rather closer to
the 15M practice of assemblies, or to the notion as developed by Latour (2005).
Real  democracy  was  surely  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  frames  for  this
reassembling. However, there was not a single “ideology” in 15M, but rather there
were sets of sometimes incompatible discourses. Perhaps more importantly, at the
core of 15M there were innovative practices and processes10 of collective action. As I
analyze in the thesis, a generic label for these practices is not just “prefiguration” (the
enactment of the world that one is struggling for in the struggle towards it, as in the
anarchist interpretation, Graeber, 2013), neither was it mere “prophecy” (as in the
populist reading, Gerbaudo, 2016) nor the development and execution of a plan (like
in  the  traditional  Marxist-Leninist  formula)  but  rather  a  work  of  prefiguring  out.
Otherwise, much of 15M and what came after it has been about figuring out what
(real) democracy is and may be. It has been about how to articulate it in practice, as
it  is  reassembled,  as  a  slow  way  out  of11 the  current  political  and  economic
9 In my inquiry into 15M I will try to move beyond the revolution metaphor, and to take distance from
the linear (Judeo-Christian and Modern) as well as from the circular (ancient) views of time. I will do
so  through  the  metaphor  of  our  “Zeitgeist”:  the  network,  as  the  metaphor  of  a  multi-directional,
polycentric, and somehow “spatialized” becoming.
10 There was a “process” group, or an analogous one, to organize assemblies in every big camp.
11 This  means leaving behind the current  crisis,  but  also building from its  condition and from its
materials.
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predicament. The image of historical time12 changes as a result: it is no more the
linear progress of political modernity, but rather the non-modern and emergent time
of net-work, a continuous and contentious construction that connects and remixes
elements that the idea of revolution divided in old and new, past and future.
In standard historical terms, 15M is a social movement13 born on May 2011, in Spain.
Using  the  generic  term  for  movements,  revolutions,  and  other  processes  of
sociopolitical struggle, it is a case of “contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly,
2001). The series of processes and events that it gave way to amount to a “cycle of
contention”14, a multi-linear and multi-year process that is the main matter of concern,
the main “unit of analysis” of this work, its primary, although not exclusive, field of
exploration and mapping.
To  map  and  untie  the  central  elements  and  dynamics  of  this  contentious
reassembling I combine references coming from STS and non-modern perspectives
on history and time (Latour 2005; Pickering 1995, 2010) with the definitely modern
literature on “contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2006),
which has been used to understand both social  movements and democratization
processes (Tilly, 2007). Insofar as 15M has been considered a social movement, I
draw upon the tradition spanning from Marx to Mill, from Olson (1965) to Melucci
(1996), up to Castells (1996) or Bennett & Segerberg (2012, 2013). In synthesis: the
general shape of this cycle, its breaks and transitions, and its actors and relations
(as well as various literatures relevant for thinking it through), compose a first key
thread of this work.
1.1.3. The 15M cycle as a technopolitical reassembling
The analysis of this reassembling is tied to two concrete matters of concern (Latour,
2004a)  indicated  in  the  title  of  this  work,  as  well  as  in  the  quotations  above:
technologies and politics. More concretely, if the reassembling period 2011-2016 is
the  space-time  and  process  to  be  explored  in  this  thesis,  the  shapes  and
entanglements  of  “technologies”  and  “politics”  are  also  “things”  to  be  thought
(Heidegger,  1954).  To  put  it  in  broad  terms:  this  thesis  is  an  exploration  of  the
contentious and connected becoming of technologies and politics in Spain after 15M.
The  process  of  reassembling  can  be  thereby  characterized  as  a  cycle  of
12 The time of the Ancient Greek historein, of the narration of “what one has seen and heard”.
13 I provisionally use here the standard terminology, although I will be discussing it in later chapters of
this thesis.
14 Here I consciously use the notion in a heterodox way. For a discussion on the matter, see chapter 2.
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“technopolitical contention” (rather than simply “political contention”, as is usual in
the literature (f.i.: McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). This means technologies were key
for political construction and conflict during the cycle, so much so that the two cannot
be disentangled analytically. From n-1, an activist, digital social network to Decidim,
a digital political network launched by the Barcelona City Council and developed by
15M activists
In  order to  explore the various displacements,  entanglements and translations of
technology and politics involved in “technopolitics”, I recur to the abundant literature
in philosophy of technology, STS, and, to a lesser extent,  broader sociology and
political  theory.  The  political  condition  and  becoming  of  technologies,  and  their
relation to democracy, has been thoroughly studied by authors such as Langdon
Winner  (1986,  1992),  Richard  Sclove  (1995),  or  Gabrielle  Hecht  (1998).  The
technological condition and becoming of politics since the late XX century has, in
turn, been the object of attention of authors such as Manuel Castells (1996, 1997,
1998  2009),  Bruce  Bimber  (2003),  or  Wiebe  Bijker  (2006),  with  some,  such  as
Stephano  Rodotà  (1997)  and  Douglas  Kellner  (1997,1999,  2001),  systematically
using the notion of “technopolitics” for analyzing it. Particularly, I am interested in the
approaches that  help to look through the practical,  multi-agential  and multi-linear
couplings  and  becomings  of  technologies  and  politics,  such  as  Donna  Haraway
(1997),  whose  work  I  use  for  conceiving  the  various  aspects  of  technopolitics.
Finally, I get inspiration from the work of Andrew Pickering (1996, 2010) and Dimitris
Papadopoulos (2010) when it comes to think what, following the second, I may call
the “constituent ontologies of technopolitics”.
The exploration of technopolitics constitutes the second key thread of this thesis,
after the analysis of the 15M cycle of contention and reassembling.
1.1.4. The technopolitical reassembling of democracy as alter-democratization
That second thread is complemented by a third one, which is no more than the key
question at stake in 15M itself, as posed by the slogan of the demonstration on May
15th: real democracy. “Real democracy”, whatever it means, has been 15M's key
matter of concern, the concern that gave it its “tone”, that served as a referent for
any  other  associated  struggles,  either  economic,  cultural,  gender-related,  or
otherwise. Democracy has been the meta-question (Offe, 1985), so narratives and
conflicts around it composed a, if not “the”, master frame (Snow & Benford, 1992) of
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the  processes  opened  by  15M.  Differently  from  anti-cut  and  anti-privatization
struggles in the areas of healthcare and education, or against mortgage effects in
housing, which frequently resulted from a reaction and were oriented to stop market
or  governmental  action,  the  call  for  a  real  democracy seemed to  primarily  point
towards an horizon of open alternatives, one that both crossed and connected with
the rest of frames and demands. As Arana suggests in his quote above, the popular
desire of retaking personal and popular control over common life was at the core of
it.  That  desire  was  a  symptom  and  a  response  to  the  long-diagnosed  crisis  of
representation (Norris 1999; Hay, 2007).
A recurring  pattern  of  the  cycle  has  been  the  emergence  of  citizen  driven  and
technologically hyper-mediated initiatives. I  use the generic term “reassembling of
democracy”  to  indicate  how  these  initiatives  challenged  and  remade  different
foundational  coordinates  of  democracy  as  a  “civic  activity,  a  regime,  a  form  of
society,  and  a  mode  of  government”  (Rosanvallon,  2011:  225)15,  as  it  was
institutionalized in Spain during the transition to democracy in the 70s. The 15M
movement, and the ensuing cycle of contention16, has been considered the opening
of a new epoch in Spanish politics (Subirats, 2015a, b), the most relevant political
period since the transition back to democracy after Franco's dictatorship. Differently
from  forty  years  earlier,  the  result  this  time  has  not  been  to  catch  up  with
democracies  elsewhere,  but  rather  seems  to  be  pushing  democracy  forward,  to
places it may have not been yet. Democratic experiments such as those taking place
around  the  participation  councils  of  Madrid  and  Barcelona  and  their  new  free
software  digital  platforms  cannot  be  understood  without  looking  back  to  several
years of 15M cycle. The insertion of these experiments within the cycle, and all that it
implies,  differentiates  them  from  top-down,  market-based  “Open  Government”
(Lathrop & Ruma, 2010) projects and may make them more radically democratic.
These experiments seem to be situating the 15M cycle at the problematic forefront of
democracy  in  the  XXI  century.  This  forefront  is  marked  by  the  crisis  of  liberal
representative democracy in the last decades (Crouch, 2004; Keane, 2009; Tormey,
2015),  especially  under  its  neoliberal  predicament,  a  crisis  that  worsened in  the
15 As  noticed  by  Rosanvallon  (2011:  225),  democracy  “can  be  separately,  concurrently,  or
simultaneously a civic activity, a regime, a form of society, and a mode of government. Furthermore,
each of these four dimensions can be perceived in several different ways.”
16 As  I  argue  in  the  theoretical  section,  to  say  that  the  goal  and  crux  of  the  cycle  was  a
democratization does not mean that it always succeeded, that it was always a way forward, or even
most of the time. Democratization was both happening and at stake.
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aftermath of the 2008 global recession. In the face of such a representative crisis,
the 15M cycle can be interpreted as a case of re-democratization (Tilly, 2007) of an
emptied democracy, with one central difference: the aim of many actors has not been
the constitution or recovery of a more or less developed form of liberal representative
democracy, but rather the explicit challenge to and experimentation (sometimes, the
combination) with alternative models of democracy, such as the participatory,  the
direct, or the deliberative. This potential democratization process presupposes liberal
representative democracy, as well as its long-term crisis. It  aims to go beyond it,
towards alternative models, on the basis of factors such as technopolitics. It points, I
believe, towards what may be called a “technopolitical alter-democratization”.
For exploring the meanings of such a challenge, and the experiments opened up
since 15M (after, by, and because of it), I use two lenses: political sociology and
political ontology, the former serves me to look at changes in sociopolitical forms,
and the latter to look at changes in ontological ones. As a result, the first focus of
attention will lie on three key spaces or institutions of the modern polity as framed by
liberal  theory,  with  one chapter  devoted to  each:  social  movements  (chapter  4),
political parties (chapter 5), and the State (chapter 6).  The second focus of attention,
the ontological, will serve to outline the central features of what I call the “political
ontology  of  liberal  representative  democracy”,  and  will  attend  to  subject  and
collective  forms,  as  well  as  modes  of  relation.  In  order  to  articulate  this  double
approach  I  make  use  of  authors  that  have  outlined  the  various  forms  of
representative  democracy  (Held,  2006),  dissected  the  concept  of  political
representation  (Pitkin,  1967),  forms  of  social  movements  (Diani,  1992,  Melucci,
1996,  Tilly,  2004)  and  representative  government  (Manin,  1997),  conceptually
clarified the origins of parties and party systems (Sartori, 2005; Katz, 2006; Scarrow,
2006), and classified their types (Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Wolinetz 2006). Since
15M and the projects after it appealed to alternative forms of democracy, I map and
find their ties with the political ontologies of participatory (Pateman, 1970; Barber,
1984), deliberative (Habermas, 1996), and what are frequently labelled as “radical”
versions of democracy, be they antagonist (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 2005;
Mouffe, 2005) or autonomist Marxist (Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009). Mapping
these various models will allow me to situate conflicting positions towards democracy
within the 15M cycle itself, which will account for some of the dynamics in the 2011-
2016 cycle (as suggested by Touraine, 1981).
  
 
31
 
Democracy joins “technopolitics” and the “reassembling” as the third key analytical
and theoretical thread of this inquiry. So, to put it simply: this thesis explores the
coupled making and unmaking of both technopolitics and democracy in the cycle of
contention opened with 15M. This is not a full  story, but is indeed a key story to
understand the 15M cycle and to see its centrality for rethinking politics, democracy
and technology today.
1.1.5. Recapitulation and anticipation
In what was outlined so far, I have already pointed the key matters of concern of this
thesis  (reassembling,  technopolitics,  democracy),  and  the  space-times  of  study
(2011-2016, within which I include various cases). Now I want to point out some of
its motivations.
1.2. Motivation and justification
The motivation and justification of the present work has three connected sources:
historical, scholarly, and biographical. Its relevance resides, I believe, on both the
object of study as well as on the study itself.
I will touch upon the historical first. As I noticed in the introduction, 15M has opened
a new time in Spanish politics (Subirats 2015a, b). For many, the movement and the
political period after it has been the most relevant in the country since the restoration
of democracy in the 1970s17 (Subirats 2015a, b). This already gives both 15M and its
cycle a special prominence in Spanish political and social movement history. But its
relevance is not merely local or national. Differently from the transition to democracy
in the 1970s, when Spain was trying to catch up with polities elsewhere, this time the
technopolitical  experiments  in  the  reassembling  of  democracy  are  not  primarily
oriented to make up for delays in modernization, but are rather situating the country
at the problematic forefront of activist18 (chapter 4), party (chapter 5) and institutional
17 In 2016, less than five years after its inaugural moment, Madrid’s major (belonging to a 15M tied
citizen candidacy) approved to write down a plaque in Puerta del Sol (the site of the first 15M camp
and key square of the capital) with the Sol slogan “We were asleep, we woke up”.
18 15M has been considered a driving movement of the international cycle of contention opened in
2011, in which it was preceded by the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings in early 2011 and followed by
Occupy Wall Street in the US and internationally, in 2011 and 2012, YoSoy132 in Mexico in 2012, and
the  June  protests  in  Brazil  in  2013,  as  well  as  OccupyGezi  in  Turkey  in  2013  and  2014,
OccupyHongKong  in  2014,  etc.  (Tejerina  et  al.,  2013;  Gerbaudo,  2016).  Many  of  the  practices
generated in 15M, from the systematization of the camp form to many of the innovative uses of social
media, were taken by later movements. It probably was the first to have clearly global features and
orientation: camps or assemblies by Spanish emigrants fleeing the crisis were formed in dozens of
European and Latin-American cities, in some cases of considerable size (like in London) or directly
influenced local groups to camp (like in Syntagma Square, in Athens). Spanish emigrates were at the
root of Occupy in the US, connecting it  to 15M before its inception (Castañeda, 2012), and 15M
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(chapter 6) experimentation globally19. That has turned the 2011-2016 reassembling
process into a global referent for democratic innovation, especially for people on the
left  side  of  the  political  spectrum20.  When  a  growing  literature  asks  whether
democracy can be saved (Della  Porta,  2013),  and others even declared it  dead
(Keane 2009); when some say this is a time of post-democracy (Crouch, 2004), after
the coming of post-politics (Žižek, 1999; Rancière, 2001), or, more cautiously, others
diagnose the end of representation and the arrival of post-representation (Tormey,
2015), attempts to build a more “real democracy” since 15M surely have a special
historical relevance. Actually, many of the directions explored since 15M resemble
the ones Della Porta  (2013:  2) suggests as key for  “saving democracy” from its
representative death. The 15M cycle is, undoubtedly, historically relevant and worth
of attention.
Between the historical and the scholarly justification, I  believe the theoretical and
practical  critique  of  modern  democracy,  as  well  as  the  different  and  conflicted
experimentations  with  technopolitics  for  transforming  or  surpassing  it,  are  two
characteristics  that  merit  special  academic  attention.  Otherwise,  this  thesis  is  a
narrative and theoretical exploration of “how democracy looks like” in, and how it
may look like after,  the 15M cycle21.  The fact that the “look” moved from an anti-
representationalist (or representation-questioning) and an autonomist (or movement-
autonomy) oriented slogan such as “they do not represent us” into the emergence of
new  parties,  electoral  citizen  platforms  and  coalitions22,  as  well  as  State-based
activists were the first promoters of its main global day of action, on October 15 th 2011. The influence
on the Mexican YoSoy132 movement was equally remarkable.
19 A key factor for that experimentation, with all its limits, failures, and betrayals, has been time. Unlike
its  counterparts  in  most  other  countries  (US,  UK,  Mexico,  Brazil,  Turkey,  etc.),  its  metamorphic
impulse has lasted in time and its impacts have been broad and deep. The only referent that may be
compared  was Tunisia;  in  other  places  where  the  uprisings  of  2011 achieved  major  institutional
change, such as Egypt, the final winners were on opposite sectors of the Egyptian society, especially
the military, thereby cutting the potential process of transformation.
20 See  recent  articles  by  renowned  The  Guardian  journalists  on  Podemos  (Mason,  2016)  and
Barcelona en Comú (Hancox, 2016) as international referents of an emergent renewal of progressive
politics. On this, the current status of Spain as a global referent for progressive politics should be
taken as a referent no so much the transition of the 1970s (deeply questioned by 15M) but to the
much-discussed times of the II Spanish Republic in the 1930s, where zones of Spain, especially in
Catalonia, Aragon, and Andalusia held some of the most ambitious experiments with direct democracy
and anarchism.
21 Much of this work focuses on the critique of representative democracy articulated since 15M, which
has been the defining feature of the ongoing global cycle of contention, started in 2011 (Roos &
Oikonomakis, 2014), but nowhere as centrally and carefully articulated both in thought and practice as
in  the  Spanish  case.  In  Occupy,  for  example,  the  99%  gave  preeminence  to  the  dimension  of
economic inequality.
22 Of  these,  some  directly  aligned  with  15M,  such  as  the  X-party,  and  others  less  so,  such  as
Podemos, with intermediate cases, such as Barcelona en Comú or Ahora Madrid.
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institutional change23, makes it a particularly rich period for thinking transformations
in the very ontology of  democracy.  In  academic terms,  its  value holds for  areas
ranging from sociology and STS up to political science and philosophy, and so I bring
the four of them to bear on this study. Furthermore, because it connects theory and
practice, militant research with militant action, the thesis may be of value for both
sides, academic research and political action.
When it comes to the purely scholarly value of this thesis, most of it resides in the
exploration, mapping, theoretical situation, conceptualization, and discussion of the
critique of modern representative democracy and the associated experimentations
with technopolitics since 15M. Otherwise, a key value of the study builds upon the
interest of  the phenomena itself,  but its lines have forced me to  connect  to  and
innovate upon existing literatures. In relation to this, part of the value resides in the
variety  of  areas  of  scholarly  literature  that  I  draw  from  and  put  into  dialogue:
sociology  (specially,  social  movements  theory),  STS  (specially,  discussions  on
ontology, but also on technology and society), philosophy of technology (specially,
critical theory of technology), political science (especially, political philosophy), and
network science (specially, in relation to social media and networks). Another central
element  is  that  I  take  and  address,  but  also  aim  to  innovate  upon,  problems,
concepts and methods from those areas of knowledge.
Finally, or perhaps firstly, 15M transformed my life. I had never been systematically
involved in political projects, and my earlier political positions had some flavor of the
distant, modern or postmodern self. By May 2011, I had been a few months back in
Spain after a two years research stay in the US. In the face of the situation of the
country, I was ready to move, but in my small town in the South of Spain things
looked rather static. It was online that I first found my way into 15M, two months
before the demonstration. 15M and Occupy (Occupy London, concretely) offered me
a space of political transformation and action. My case was not singular: according to
an online survey launched by our research group (Monterde et al., 2017), 15M was
the first political experience for almost 20% of the participants. Only as a result of my
experience, only because it was a matter of concern, I decided to turn it into a matter
of  research.  This  is  a  long-diagnosed feature  of  contentious politics:  it  educates
people politically; sometimes, whole generations. As a tradition that goes back to, at
23 As is  the case,  even if  with  plenty  of  contradictions,  of  Barcelona's  and Madrid's  Participation
Councils.
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least, Rousseau suggests, the exercise of citizenship, politics and democracy is its
own finest school.
1.3. Research objectives, questions, and strategy
1.3.1. Research objectives
In order to address the motivations behind this research, the dissertation pursues the
following four objectives:
The first is to look, in detail and on a case by case basis, into the rethinking and
remaking of modern, representative democracies and their alternatives forms (direct,
participatory, deliberative, etc.), especially, in connection to technopolitics.
A second objective is  to  figure out  what  “technopolitics”  means in  theory and in
practice, mapping out its genealogy and its central features in the 15M cycle.
A  third  objective  is  to  provide  a  general  reconstruction  of  the  process  of
technopolitical  reassembling of democracy in Spain during the period 2011-2016.
This  third  objective  implies  two  sub-objectives:  a)  to  register  the  features  and
becoming of various actors in social  movements, parties and State institutions in
Spain; b) to follow the struggles and branching involved in this process.
A fourth  objective (which is  transversal  to  the previous ones and thereby,  unlike
them, is not articulated as a set of questions in the next section) is to contribute to
and innovate,  conceptually  and  methodologically,  upon  existing  social  movement
theory, political theory, and STS.
1.3.2. Research questions
In order to fulfill those objectives, I have articulated three main research questions.
These three main research questions outline three areas of interest, each of which
contribute  differently  (from  the  viewpoint  of  discourse,  practice  and  the  cycle,
respectively) to the three objectives above. It  is worth noticing that the aim is to
answer the 3 main questions, and not to answer in detail all of the sub-questions into
which they can be broken down. These sub-questions, nevertheless, help to orient
the investigation.
The  first  central  area  of  interest  concerns  discourses,  concretely,  those  on
representative  democracy  and  its  alternatives,  as  well  as  on  technologies.  The
central question is:
1.  What  are  the  key  discourses  on  democracy  and  representation  from 15M to
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Decidim.barcelona? and on technologies?
This question, in turn, involves three sub-questions:
1a)  What  were  the  democratic  models  (representative,  deliberative,  participatory,
autonomist, etc.) involved?
1b)  What  were  the  technological  models  (autonomist,  participatory,  technocratic,
etc.)
1c) Did they change in the period 2011-2016? If so, how and why?
The  second  area  of  interest  concerns  practices,  concretely,  technopolitical  and
democratic ones, and the second main question asks:
2. What are the key technopolitical and democratic practices and processes from
15M to Decidim.barcelona?
This question is sub-divided into three sub-questions that help to articulate it:
2a)  What  were  the  key  features  of  these  practices?  What  were  their  central
strengths, limits and challenges?
2b) What were the forms of organization and relationality?
2c) Did these factors (2a-b) remain or change in the period 2011-2016? If so, how
and why?
The third area of interest is the reassembling process itself, and the main related
question,  which  somehow  makes  the  previous  two  converge  into  a  general
landscape is:
3. How does the reassembling period 2011-2016 looks like from a historical, political,
and ontological perspective?
This core question connects to the issue of the “reassembling” and has different
ramifications:
3a) What were the key changes in social movement, party, and State/institutional
forms?
3b) What were the key actors, factors, and struggles involved in that becoming?
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3c)  Do  they  outline  new  forms  of  political  ontology?  If  so,  what  are  their  core
elements and how do they relate to previous models?
3d) What have been the characteristics of the process as a whole?
3e) Could it be understood as a cycle of technopolitical contention oriented towards
an alter-democratization? If so, how did it go?
1.3.3. Research strategy
I was involved in 15M before I begun to research it. Much of the driving questions of
this study derive from that situation. Although the materials, as well as many of the
methods and concepts, for this dissertation came to my knowledge and practice via
my experience in 15M (and Occupy Wall  Street),  in the present text I  carry on a
theoretically informed reconstruction. The 2011-2016 processes coming after 15M
were multi-linear  (I  will  focus on one,  but  other  lines of  action could have been
chosen,  and  other  initiatives  followed),  multi-eventual  (from  15M  to  the  local
elections of 2015), multi-actored (as already seen in the quotes at the beginning of
the introduction), multi-narrated (although with a predominant ritornello: democracy),
multi-level (reconstructing the personal, inter-personal, local, and State levels), and
multi-sphere  (I  will  focus  on  politics  and  technology,  primarily,  but  economics  or
research could have been equally worth of study).
The phenomenon of study and the objective of answering the questions formulated
above  have  justified  to  essay  a  multi-approach,  multi-method,  and  multi-source
exploration. I have tried to give some systematicity to it, though. To do so, I have
recurred to Donna Haraway's (1997) analytic threefold of  syntax, semantics,  and
pragmatics of technoscience. I can now briefly describe the approaches used to dig
into these three aspects of the cycle.
Syntax  corresponds  to  the  technological  and  organizational  structures  of  social
relations in the 15M cycle.  For deciphering 15M cycle syntaxes, I  have primarily
deployed an infrastructure approach (Bowker et al., 2009). It looks at the dynamics
below, around and above organizational and technological infrastructures, attending
to factors such as their materiality, their construction, their property regimes, their
functionalities  and  their  affordances.  I  look  at  them from two viewpoints:  that  of
politics of technology (otherwise, infrastructures as embodying different politics) and
that of technology for politics (otherwise, infrastructures as affording different forms
of political relations).
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Semantics corresponds to the meanings articulated in discourses within the 15M
cycle.  To  analyze  15M  cycle  semantics  I  have  used  a  discourse  approach
(Fairclough, 2013; Riessman, 2008) that looks at how 15M texts construct actors,
actions, situations and the cycle itself.
Finally, to study pragmatics, I have deployed two approaches: a practice one and a
network-systemic one. Pragmatics corresponds to the flow of practice emerging and
re-defining syntax and semantics. The practice approach (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina &
Savigny,  2001)  puts  the  focus  on  the  heterogeneous  world-making  in  which
embodied  and  material  action  plays  a  central  role.  Differently  from  the  typical,
human-centric  view  of  social  movements,  my  approach  to  practice  must  be
understood  in  the  light  of  posthumanist  views  (Haraway,  1997;  Pickering  1995;
Schatzki, 2001). On the other hand, the network-systemic approach (Barábasi, 2002)
attends to the interaction activity on digital networks.
This differentiation of three aspects (syntax, semantics, pragmatics) repeats itself in
every  chapter,  helping  to  structure  them,  and  has  been  crucial  for  providing
systematicity to the polyhedric approach essayed in this work24.  Otherwise, every
empirical chapter (4, 5, 6) includes three sections devoted to these three aspects.
From the viewpoint of research dispositives and resources, to build this “trinocular
approach”  (infrastructures,  discourse,  practice)  has  involved  to  hybridize  and
traverse between qualitative methodologies (thick description, fieldwork, conceptual
analysis,  discourse  analysis,  etc.),  quantitative  methods  (surveys),  and  network
analyses (which involve big data mining and visualization). 
From a broader research  methodos25 or  practice,  this  work has implied to essay
different research positions and dispositions, which are intertwined into what I call a
form  of  “movement  research”.  This  research  becoming  is  defined  by  multi-
perspectivism:  I  essayed  multiple  positions  (situated  analyst,  militant  researcher,
activist, interested observer, detached scholar, etc.). A key lesson from this implies to
recognize that both 15M as a movement and what came after it are constructs of the
analyst,  on the one hand,  and of  the actors,  on the other,  who they themselves
frequently  operate  as  analysts26 (Melucci,  1996).  The  research  network
24 Some of these approaches, though, are either connected (f.i.: our look to infrastructures connects at
points with the practice or the network approaches) or based on similar methodologies and epistemic
dispositives.
25 In the Greek sense of “way through”.
26 The concrete boundaries that the movement and the cycle take in this thesis result from analytical
choices (which begin by using the very categories “movement” and “cycle”), but also from dialogues
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@datanalysis15M (a critical data oriented research group based in Barcelona), to
which I belong, is an example.
If Robert Nisbet (1993) situated the French Revolution at the origin of sociology, and
Alain  Touraine  (1981)  aimed  at  transforming  it  around  the  notion  of  the  “social
movement”, the challenge was to take advantage of the 15M cycle of contention in
order to experiment with new hybrid research approaches and methods, as well.
1.4. Plan of the work
The dissertation is divided in 7 chapters. The first chapter is the present introduction.
The following two chapters serve as a theoretical and historical introduction to the
empirical  cases,  which  are  analyzed  in  chapters  4,  5,  and  6.  Chapter  8  is  a
conclusion.
Chapter 1. Introduction.  
Chapter 1 presents the general coordinates of the thesis. It defends the idea that the
15M social movement opened a cycle of technopolitical contention and reassembling
of democracy. Differently from the usual model of democratization, guided by the
liberal representative model, this one challenged representation and thereby could
be  considered  an  alter-democratization.  A  series  of  research  objectives  and
questions are posed, aimed at disentangling the becoming of democracy (looking at
sociopolitical forms and political ontology) and technopolitics (its syntax, semantics,
and pragmatics) during the 2011-2016 cycle, as well as the structure of the cycle
itself.
Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and methodology.
Chapter 2 lies down a series of theoretical coordinates and discussions that serve to
situate both this research and 15M projects. It is divided in five parts. The first is
devoted  to  politics,  and  outlines  various  models  of  democracy  (representative,
participatory, deliberative, etc.) and democratization (including what I define as alter-
democratization). Particularly, it outlines the liberal representative model, including
with fellow activists and researchers. Our analysis is an interested reduction of the daunting richness
and multiplicity of the 15M cycle and, at the same time, one more story that connects and dissolves
into  that  richness,  into  a  historical  becoming that  involves the  contentious becoming  of  its  living
interpretations. This work is not a mirror nor a picture but, at the most, a map that provides orientation
in a territory being formed and that it somehow recreates; it is also a palimpsest that combines both
practices and stories around it.
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forms of government and political  parties.  The second part is devoted to discuss
various  positions  towards  technology  and  technopolitics.  The  third  attends  to
sociological  theories  on  social  movements  (particularly  networked  social
movements) and contentious politics and suggests new coordinates to understand
both of them. Part 4 explores the STS literature that may be useful to think through
the reassembling process in the 15M cycle, with a particular attention to ontology.
Part 5 discusses methodologies and the research itself.
Chapter 3. Between crisis and critique: economic, political, and technological
conditions in the ongoing reassembling of democracy in Spain.
Chapter  3  serves  as  a  general  entry  to  the  case  studies.  It  reviews  various
discourses  on  the  political  and  socioeconomic  conditions  at  the  time  of  the
emergence of the 15M movement, and throughout the cycle. It suggests that a key
step in the formation of 15M was the displacement from a passive condition of crisis
to an active critical condition, and that such a step relied in a critical rendition and a
net-work that  was heavily mediated by ICTs and technopolitical  practices.  It  also
presents a simplified and somehow linear outline of key moments within the 15M
cycle.
Chapter 4. Becoming 15M: a networked movement of the squares from Real
Democracy Now! to the dismantling of the camps.
Chapter 4 discusses discourses, infrastructures and practices that played key roles
in  15M.  It  traces  various  strands  of  anti-representationalist  and  alter-democratic
semantics present in relevant DRY and camp discourses. It also notices how the
assembly model rose to be 15M discursive paradigm for democratic organization.
These discourses remained central references (usually for agreement, but also for
disagreement) for the whole cycle. Then I look at its syntax and show how another
organizative  model,  that  of  the  networked  assemblage,  was  both  equally  anti-
representational and (at least) equally important in practice as the assembly model.
Key 15M technopolitical practices are described. The chapter also outlines some of
the  challenges and changes these discourses and practices  brought  to  both the
social movement form and the modern liberal representative ontology. The concept
of multitudinous identities appears as central on both regards.
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Chapter 5. The X Party: making a 15M in the electoral space.
This chapter opens situating the X Party within the cycle of contention opened by
15M. After reaching the peak of opposition between 15M initiatives and the space of
political representation in 2012, the X party was launched in early 2013 and opened
a line of action that (re)turned towards the political arena: the so called “electoral
assault”. The semantics of the X party, its proposal for a new democracy, is studied
by looking at its political  program “Democracy, period”, as well  as to its own self
definitions as a party. Then I look at its syntax, otherwise, to its organizational forms
and  infrastructures,  and  show  how  these  symptomatically  differed  from  the
idiosyncratic  ones among earlier  15M projects.  Then I  look  at  its  pragmatics  on
issues such as media policy, program elaboration, or campaign funding. Afterwards I
outline some of the key challenges of the X party to the party form and to the liberal
representative ontology. With regard to the party form, I underline its proposal of a
networked  democratic  or  wikicratic  party.  With  regard  to  liberal  representative
ontology, I underline its construction of the networked expert citizen, its appeal to
federation, and it insistence on competences as central political unit.
Chapter  6.  Networking democratic  cities:  the rise  of  local  “governments of
change”,  common digital  infrastructures,  and  new codes of  technopolitical
participation.
After the success of the “electoral assault” at the local level on May 2015, which
brought citizen candidacies connected to the 15M cycle to power in big cities such as
Barcelona or Madrid, an “institutional moment” opened up. Crucially for our story of
technopolitics and democracy, some 15M technopolitical activists formed groups of
innovation in democracy in the Participation councils of those cities and created new
digital platforms for citizen participation. I analyze the discourses (semantics) and
practices (pragmatics) around Decidim.barcelona on two main fronts, technopolitical
participation  on  Decidim  and  technopolitical  production  of  Decidim  itself.  In  the
section  on  syntax,  I  confront  the  Decidim  model  of  public-common  digital
infrastructure for distributed democracy to the corporate open government model of
Civiciti, a platform developed by Spanish corporations Telefonica and Scytl. I show
how Decidim challenges traditional elements of the State form by constructing a half
complementary and half  alternative space to  representation.  I  also  underline  the
figures  of  the  technoacrat  and  the  recursive  citizenry  as  two  challenges  to  the
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ontological forms liberal representative democracy.
Chapter 7. Conclusions.
Recounts the trajectory of the thesis and synthesizes the responses that the work
provides to  the  three initial  questions of  the  research  concerning  the  shapes of
democracy (its old and new models, both in terms of sociopolitical forms and political
ontology), technopolitics (its syntax, semantics, and pragmatics), and the process of
reassembling and contention during the period 2011-2016. It also puts these in a
broader, theoretical perspective.
As a closing to this introduction, I want to notice that the structure of the empirical
chapters (4, 5, and 6), which repeats itself in all of them, is the following:
Part 1. Introduction.
Part 2. The case and the cycle. This section outlines the situation within the 15M
cycle at a given point in time, and situates the case to which the chapter is devoted.
Part 3. Semantics. Attends to actors’ key discourses.
Part 4. Syntax. Attends to central technological platforms and modes of organizing
Part 5. Pragmatics. Looks at actors’ practices.
Part  6.  Alternatives.  Analyzes the  changes or  challenges to  political  forms and
ontology by the case analyzed in the chapter.
Part 7.  Conclusions.  Recapitulates the case,  connects it  back to  the cycle  and
outlines what comes next.
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Chapter 2. Theoretical and methodological 
framework.
2.0. Structure of the chapter.
This  chapter  is  divided  in  five  parts:  1-Politics,  2-Technopolitics,  3-Sociology,  4-
History, and 5-Research. The work in the Politics part of this theoretical framework is
oriented to both reopen and map the various meanings and models of democracy. I
do this not only as an abstract theoretical work but as a historical reconstruction, as
well as a preparation for situating the organizations, narratives and practices of the
15M cycle.  Particularly,  I  discuss  some of  the  conceptions,  models  and  political
ontologies of democracy that have been in some cases denounced and, in others,
defended, explored and experimented with, during the 15M cycle. The first section
opens  with  a  discussion  of  the  modern  conceptions  of  “democracy”  and
“democratization”,  where  I  outline  the  challenges  that  the  notion  of  “alter-
democratization” poses to them. Then, I sketch the history, forms and key elements
of  liberal  representative  democracy  from  an  ontological  viewpoint.  This  part  is
oriented to outline a normative (Habermas, 1994), standard (Castiglione and Warren,
2006)  or  ideal-typical  (in  Max ’s  terms)  model,  which  underlies much of  modern
political ontology27. Afterwards, I present a number of alternative democratic models:
the participatory, the deliberative, the antagonist, and the autonomist.
In  the  second  part  of  this  theoretical  framework  I  elaborate  upon  the  notion  of
“technopolitics”  recurring  to  a  variegated  bibliography.  As  mentioned  in  the
introduction,  the second thread of  this  thesis  concerns the  coupled becoming of
politics  and  technology  since  15M,  as  it  intertwined  with  processes  of  alter-
democratization  and  reassembling  of  democracy.  In  this  theoretical  framework,  I
have  decided  to  essay  a  multi-disciplinary  approach  (STS,  media  studies,
philosophy,  etc.)  to  the  hybrid  concept  of  “technopolitics”,  rather  than  to  their
problematic components separately, politics and technology.
In the third part, “Sociology”, I attend to sociological and political theory, focusing on
27 Operatively, I will distinguish two declinations of the notion of ontology: in one of them the emphasis
falls upon the “logos”, thereby, upon the concepts and narratives on the being and beings of politics;
on the other, when speaking of practice, I will be emphasizing the “on”, the becoming of those being
and beings. This distinction is, obviously, only analytical, but it remains relevant for the purposes of
this inquiry. For reasons of space, I present a standard model or account of modern political ontology
in the form of a conceptual and partially historical disquisition on representative democracy. On the
other hand, my taking on 15M cycle’s challenges to that ontology will be first and foremost based on
practice.
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social movement and contentious politics. This third section can be divided in two
halves. In the first, I outline some of the main threads of analysis in sociology, social
movement  theory,  and  contentious  politics,  which  are  deployed  in  the  empirical
chapters to study 15M and the process of alter-democratization it opened. I include
discussions coming from media theory, as well. In the second half, I indicate some of
the novelties associated with networked social  movements such as 15M and the
wave of movements in the last years. One of the key conclusions is the emergence,
in the 15M cycle, of what I define as “contentious technopolitics” or the connection
between technological and political processes and struggles.
The fourth part, “History”, is also divided in two sections. In the first I make the case
for understanding the 15M cycle as a reassembling rather than as a revolution. In the
second I briefly discuss STS references that help to think through such reassembling
from an ontological perspective.
As a closing to the chapter,  I  outline the methodological approach of the work. I
notice  my  intention  of  focusing  in  explorations  rather  than  explanations,  I  also
comment on the various possibilities of  methodos beyond modern methodological
formats. Finally, I detail the methods and materials in this research.
Each  of  these  sections  builds  upon,  and  tries  to  contribute  to,  different,  albeit
sometimes overlapping, disciplinary literatures. Through all of them I try to dialogue,
primarily, with three different strands: that of political theory, particularly, democratic
theory,  that  of  sociology  and  social  movement  studies,  particularly,  ICTs  and
networked social movements, and, finally, that of Science and Technology Studies,
particularly, works on ontology.
2.1. Politics: the representative synecdoche and alternative political
models
2.1.1. 15M, democracy, and the representative synecdoche
Before  and  probably  beyond  anything  else,  the  15M  cycle  has  been  about
democracy; it has been democracy. This priority was already anticipated and framed
by the name of the platform coordinating the demonstration on May 15 th, 2011, that
served as a starting shot for the movement. Its name was “Real Democracy, Now!”;
before being “15M”, May 15th already was about democracy.
But what is democracy? And what is democracy now? In the empirical chapters of
this thesis I analyze 15M and post-15M concrete meanings for “democracy”, what
  
 
44
 
actors  said  and  made of  it  in  practice.  Since “the  history  of  democracy  itself  is
contained in the history of the word “democracy”” (Barber 1984: 195), I try to “hear
the struggle that is at stake in the word” (Rancière, 2006: 93), but also in the world,
because “the history of real democracies has always involved tension and conflict”
(Rosanvallon, 2008: 3).
Part of that political, wordy and worldly struggle around the meaning and practice of
democracy is anticipated in the May 15th demonstration slogan, which said “We are
not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers. Real democracy, now!”.
Two  aspects  are  worth  stressing  of  it:  politicians  stand  for  the  “representative”
character  of  contemporary  democracies;  bankers,  for  its  “market”  and  neoliberal
side. The banners denounced what I believe is a historical synecdoche of sorts: in
modernity, democracy has come to be seen and practiced in relation to two social
forms,  representation  (Pitkin,  1967;  Graeber,  2013;  Rosanvallon,  1995)  and  the
capitalist  economy (Polanyi,  1944).  As  a result,  modern  democracy has become
identified with liberal representative democracy. That  synecdoche speaks of wide,
Modern, systemic processes and struggles that have reduced the field of possibilities
that democracy and, more broadly, politics,  can embody. According to 15M cycle
initiatives that I analyze in the empirical sections, the second adjective or condition
(representation)  has  been  undermined  by  the  first  (liberalism):  socio-economic
liberalism would have first contributed to establish and then, especially in the last
decades, undermined representation. It did so, first, by limiting the role and reach of
politics  and  the  State  under  neoliberal,  corporate  globalization,  and  second,  by
making  it  dependent  and  encroaching—legally  and  illegally—into  it  (DellaPorta,
2013;  Held,  2006;  Lindblom,  1977)28.  Unsurprisingly,  for  the  last  three  decades,
different authors have spoken of the crisis of representation (for a synthesis, see
Tormey, 2015), and, following the representative synecdoche, many have identified it
with a crisis and even death of democracy itself (Keane, 2009).
According to 15M cycle diagnostics, representative democracy in Spain has become
a mere representation of democracy, and a reductionist and corrupt one at that 29. In
28 Barber (1984: 256) clarifies: “the relationship of capitalism to democracy may remain problematic
and controversial,  but  the relationship of the multinational,  monopolistic corporation to democracy
involves no such mysteries. The corporation is incompatible with freedom and equality, whether these
are construed individually or socially.”
29 That is a diagnostic shared by other contemporary movements about their own contexts: Occupy in
the US and the UK in 2011 and 2012, the Arab uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, protests in
Greece in the last years, #OccupyGezi in Turkey in 2013, the June protests in Brazil on that same
year, and a long list (Mason, 2012; Roos & Oikonomakis, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2016).
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two  of  the  most  chanted  slogans on  May 15th,  which  I  analyze in  the  empirical
sections, demonstrators denied the status of their elected representatives shouting
“they do not represent us!”, and denounced that “they call it “democracy”, but it is
not”. The struggle at stake in the word and the world were quite obvious from the
beginning  of  the  cycle.  My  hypothesis  is  that,  in  the  face  of  the  liberal  and
representative  synecdoche  reduction  of  democracy,  the  15M  cycle  essayed  a
critique, reopening and exploration of the modes of being of both democracy and
politics30. They did so through the innovative articulation of ICT mediated practices
and processes.  I  devote the following sections to  situate such diagnostic from a
theoretical standpoint.
2.1.2. Democracy and its becoming: traditional democratization and 15M alter-
democratization
2.1.2.1. Challenging democracy and democratization indexes
More than defining democracy, a relevant question for political science has been that
of finding, measuring, comparing, and explaining the causes of its coming to be, that
is, of democratization. Giving that “democracy is the appraisive political concept par
excellance” (Gallie, 1956: 184), this has frequently been a theoretically and politically
contested  task.  Nevertheless,  many  approaches  have  tended  to  share  some
conceptions of democracy. These conceptions usually were, firstly, procedural and
minimalist  in  character  (Collier  &  Levitsky,  1997),  and  secondly,  based  on  very
specific  elements  of  the  liberal  representative  model  hegemonic  from  mid-XXth
century  onwards,  such  as  competitive,  free,  fair,  and  frequent  elections  of  a
representative government by a wide franchise31. The appearance or disappearance
of these features has been considered an indicator that a process of democratization
or de-democratization was taking place32.
30 That triple endeavor of critique, reopening, and exploration was anticipated by movements such as
the alter-globalization, and is shared by other contemporary movements, such as Occupy Wall Street
or Nuit Debout (the sometimes called “Real Democracy movements”, Roos & Oikonomakis, 2014).
Unfortunately, I cannot attend to them here.
31 A classical list includes six institutions: “elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom
of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship”
(Dahl 1998: 85, Dahl 2005: 188–189, as resumed by Tilly, 2007: 10). As Tilly points out, these are a
list of discrete institutions and not “continuous variables”, so they don't allow to easily measure the
increase or decrease of democratic quality in established liberal democracies. Also, it omits the fact
that the performance of these institutions sometimes conflict, and their preeminence must be decided.
According to Collier & Levitsky (1997: 434), there is a “"procedural minimum" definition that presumes
fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective
guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association”.
32 Tilly  (2007: 13-14) proposes a measure for judging processes of democratization: “a regime is
democratic  to the degree that  political  relations between the state  and its  citizens feature broad,
  
 
46
 
Among theories of democratization, there have been different characterizations of
democracy and democratization, distinguishing it from other regimes (or situations,
governments,  and State  forms) as  well  as  differentiating subtypes of  it  (such as
parliamentary vs presidential), but they almost always take as a reference the liberal
representative model (Collier & Levitsky, 1997, Collier & Adcock, 1999), rather than a
multi-model approach more common in other areas such as democratic theory (f.i.:
Held, 2006). Although this trend has been changing, as reflected in the rise of new
indexes such as the “Varieties of Democracy Index”, the classical list of democracy
indexes promoted by  the Freedom House Index still  remains  predominant  (for  a
review  of  indexes  and  criticisms,  Doorenspleet,  2015)33.  Nevertheless,  when
analyzing 15M's calls for “real democracy”, the democratization that it called for and
that  it  may  have  given  way  to,  it  will  become  clear  that  these  definitions  are
inappropriate.
We  have  defined  the  15M's  cycle  of  contention  as  a  potential  case  of  “alter-
democratization”,  since  it  is  characterized  by  discourses  and  practices  involving
various combinations of participatory,  autonomist, deliberative, and other models of
democracy34, which, at the very least, stretch the liberal representative framework.
2.1.2.2. Challenging democratization actors and factors: connecting democratization
and contentious politics
The stretch has not been only definitional, though. In my understanding, the 15M
cycle has not  only challenged relevant features,  attributes,  or  practices of  liberal
representative democracy and democratization, but also the list of driving actors and
factors to look at in these processes. As shown by Rossi & Della Porta (2015: 9),
theories of democratization have usually focused on “economic preconditions, elites'
behavior, or the geopolitical situation”. As a paradigmatic example, “modernization
theory” had a structural character and focused on the economic preconditions of
democracy, always under the guidance of the liberal representative model: economic
development  brought  about  democracy  and  maintained  it  (Lipset,  1959),  while
working class struggles did little or even had a negative effect (Huntington, 1965,
equal,  protected and mutually binding consultation.  Democratization means net movement toward
broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation.” De-democratization entails a
movement in the opposite direction. Interestingly, Tilly recognizes what is left out of this view: issues
of welfare, law-abidance, or citizen empowerment.
33 This  is  something  especially  relevant  when  the  matter  at  stake,  deciding  whether  a  State  is
democratic or not, and to what extent, has implications for international relations, history books, and
international aid sectors.
34 I characterize these models later in this chapter.
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1991).  Historical  class  analyses  (Moore,  1966;  Bendix,  1964)  had  a  similarly
structural and economic purview: even if showing the relevance of classes as social
actors, they did not dig into the logics of social movements and contentious politics.
Differently,  “transitology”  has  attended  to  “transactional”  processes  among elites,
which  gives  more  room to  actors'  agency,  but  subordinates  the  roles  of  unions,
movements  and  contentious  politics  to  elite  (parties,  governments,  the  military)
bargainings  and  conflicts,  underlining  the  role  of  concrete  leading  figures.
Interestingly,  the  case  of  the  “negotiated  reform-negotiated  break”  during  the
Spanish transition to democracy in the 1970s has served as a model of sorts for this
approach (O'Donnell et al., 1986; Linz & Stepan, 1996)35.
Symmetrically,  Rossi  and  Della  Porta  notice,  social  movement  studies  have  not
attended much to democratization processes: they analyzed the role of movements
in established democracies rather than in their constitution. Since the late 1990s,
different  authors  (Bermeo,  1997;  Collier  &  Adcock,  1999)  and  the  tradition  of
contentious politics (Tilly, 2004; Tilly, 2007)36, have approached both literatures and
shown the relevance of mobilized grassroots actors in the constitution, preservation
and deepening of democracy.  Even the Spanish case has been re-presented as
resulting  from  “a  cycle  of  protest  intertwined  with  elite  transactions”  (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 186). Tilly (2007) has distinguished two views of the role of
social  movements  in  democratization.  A “populist  approach”,  which stresses how
social movements crucially nurture public spheres, spaces and settings for political
deliberation, or influence State power change, and an “elitist approach” (epitomized
by Huntington, 1991), for which successful democratizations are and must be top-
down,  since excessive mobilization usually  brings back authoritarianism as elites
fear drastic changes.
In his analysis of social movements from the XVIIIth to the XXIst century, Tilly (2004)
suggests that there exists a correlation between democratization and movements,
but in a majority of cases it is the former that nurture the latter, with others where
shared  conditions  and  processes  favor  the  two,  and  others  (less  frequent  and
limited) in which movements promote democratization. My empirical analysis of the
35 Linz & Stepan (1996) have developed a model of extended transition that attended to the features
of the previous regime, that of the actors, and the process aftermath; they also distinguished various
transition  axes:  political  regime  only,  regime  plus  economic  system,  or  regime,  economics,  plus
nation-State structure.
36 I expose this later, in the third part of this theoretical framework.
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15M cycle  shows how 15M and  what  came after  it  is  a  case  of  this  last  type.
Following  the  literature  on  the  promotion  of  democracy  at  the  transnational  and
national scale by the alter-globalization movement (Baiocchi, 2005; Santos, 2005;
Della Porta, 2013), my hypothesis is that 15M opened a process that I define as
“alter-democratization”. Otherwise,  the  15M  cycle  proposed  and  promoted  a
democratization of the political field and society more broadly that followed models
alternative to the paradigmatic model  of  democracy and democratization in XXth
century reality and academic research, namely, the liberal representative.
2.1.2.3. Challenging the viewpoint on democratization.
Analyzing the 15M cycle of alter-democratization implies, then, firstly,  to consider
alternative  definitions  of  democracy,  and,  secondly,  alternative  actors,  to  the
mainstream ones in democratization theory. This study also implies a third distancing
from classical approaches to democratization: instead of basing the analysis on elite
viewpoints—be that of representative political actors or that of scholars, who usually
represent  processes  according  to  their  own  definitions  of  democracy,  in  which
representative elites usually play key roles—I agree with Doorenspleet (2015) on the
need to “democratize” (and not only problematize) concepts and measurements of
democracy and democratization. The core idea, then, is to approach democracy and
democratization from the viewpoint of the  demos,  the  hoi polloi,  the many, rather
than only from that of the few, be they the political  or academic elites. Following
Doorenspleet’s  lead  beyond  her  own  word,  I  believe  that  her  call  for  a  shift  in
viewpoint and attention to actors' views cannot be based only on a change in the
type of survey questions, but rather in the appeal to a deployment of  alternative
methods, to an anthropology or ethnography of democracy (Paley, 2002).
What I discussed so far points towards a triple opening—even democratization—of
“democracy” in democratic theory: definitional, actorial,  and epistemic, opening its
definition and models, opening the array of actors bringing it about—making social
movements  central—,  and  reclaiming  the  epistemic  value  of  movement  actors’
viewpoints. Through this triple emphasis the “struggle at stake” in the word and the
world  becomes even  clearer:  democracy  is  the  construction  and  conflict  of  and
around democracy, which engulfs definitions, practices, actors and visions.
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2.1.3.  Democracy  and  representation:  historical  and  normative  political
ontology
Democracy  may  be  as  old  as  human  intelligence  itself  (Graeber,  2013),  and
representation may date back to the beginnings of human culture (Brown, 2009), but
their systematic hybridization into the main model of modern government is a rather
recent achievement37. In this section, I begin by clarifying the five central senses of
representation, which help to disentangle its various aspects. Then I sketch three
forms of representative government, in relation to their typical party forms, and point
out their critical transitions. Afterwards, I combine some of the key elements in the
previous three points, along with others, into an outline of what I may call the political
ontology  of  liberal  representative  democracy.  Finally,  I  sketch  other  models,
concretely,  the participatory,  the deliberative,  the antagonist,  and the autonomist.
Given the amplitude of this reconstruction, I will rely on a classical, historical-juridical
and conceptual narrative, rather than on one focused on practices of governmentality
(a la Foucault, 1997; Rose, 1999) to which I may punctually recur to. Otherwise, I
look  at  the  conceptual,  ontological  and institutional  forms of  representation.  It  is
these forms that have been submitted to situated critique and experimentation in
different projects of the 15M cycle.
2.1.3.1. The five senses of political representation
As  Hanna  Pitkin  (1967)  classically  showed,  political  representation,  and
representation  in  general,  have  multiple,  historically  earned  meanings.  Clarifying
these various senses of political representation will help in the reconstruction of the
various  takings  on,  attacks  to,  and  elaborations  on,  and  beyond,  political
representation within the 15M cycle.
In its first sense, delineated by Thomas Hobbes in the XVI chapter of his milestone
work  Leviathan,  representation  refers  to  the  authorization  of  a  person to  act  for
37 In the US, the term “democrat” was a term of abuse up to the 1840s (Graeber, 2013), and although
in  France  it  had  positive  currency  around  the  1790s,  it  was  only  one  more  adjective  to  refer
generically to people opposed to the Ancient Regime (Rosanvallon, 1995) rather than a name for
advocates of a concrete form of government. The men who claimed to have freed themselves and
their compatriots from all powerful, ontologically distant, absolute monarchs, deemed necessary to
establish  a  new gap  between governors  and  governed,  what  I  may call  the  “mediated  gap”  (or
“disjunctive  synthesis”,  Hardt  &  Negri,  2004)  of  representation  between  representatives  and
represented. As a government form, democracy seemed odd and old, fully and briefly developed only
in Ancient Greece. The latter gained definitive track in the 1840s, particularly with the first conquest of
male universal suffrage in 1848 (Rosanvallon, 1995). By mid-century, “democracy” was a mainstream
term to define the type of political order and government in both the US and France, but no change in
the underlying,  Republican,  representative structure of  the political  field (in constitutions,  decision
making  processes,  etc.)  guaranteed  this  shift  in  denomination  (Graeber,  2013),  beyond  the
progressive extension of the franchise.
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another,  with  the representative  being entitled to  act  with  few constraints—albeit
within  certain  limits—and  the  authorizing  party  bearing  the  responsibility  and
obligations derived from those actions38.  In  the case of  Hobbes’s writings on the
origin of the Commonwealth, the authorizers, individuals in the state of nature, are
constituted as one in the figure of the representative: the multitude becomes one in
the  person  of  the  Leviathan  (Hobbes,  2010:  72),  a  representative  invested  with
absolute  power.  The  modern  ideas  of  “the  representative”,  “the  sovereign”,
“representation”,  and,  more  importantly,  their  interrelations,  which  operate  as  a
model for discussion throughout the thesis, came to be associated and redefined
thanks to Hobbes’ work.
A  second  sense  of  representation  studied  by  Pitkin  is  representation  as
accountability. As a reaction to the authorization view, what she considers an equally
formal and partial view has been proposed, which suggests that representation takes
place  in  so  far  as  representatives  can  be  removed  from their  position—usually,
through elections. This approach does not define the representative's actions before
removal  takes  place39.  The  assumption,  nevertheless,  is  that  there  is  some
connection, and that the possibility of removal will  act as a deterrent against any
strong  disagreement  between  the  will  or  interests  of  the  represented  and  the
representative's actions.
The authorization and the accountability senses of representation are formal; they
focus on the actions preceding or following representation. To them, Pitkin contrasts
three senses of  political  representation  that  she considers  “substantive”  because
they appeal  to  aspects  of  representation relevant  in  and during its  exercise:  the
“descriptive”, the “symbolic”, and the “active” senses. The first two are focused on
the way representatives “stand for”  those they represent,  while the latter  defines
“representation as activity”, as “acting for”.
The descriptive sense of representation (the third in the list so far) metaphorically
presents representative people or institutions as mirrors, maps, painters or pictures
of  the  represented.  Some  authors,  Pitkin  notes,  speak  of  the  legislature  as  an
“accurate reflection of the community, or of the general opinion of the nation, or of
38 According to Pitkin, this theory of authorization combines and confuses four different actions: 1-the
attribution  of  the  action  of  a  person  to  another;  2-the  attribution  of  the  normative  consequences
derived from the attributed action; 3-receiving authorization for acting for another person; 4-to have
authority  over somebody. Only the third element,  according to her,  is essential  to the concept of
representation.
39 This is a falsationist view, a form of political Popperianism—or skeptical minimalism (Barber, 1984).
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the variety of interests in society” (ibid.: 61). As an alternative, others conceive it as a
representative sample of the nation, which can be constructed by statistical means
or by lot, in order to make it resemble or even be composed by the average citizen or
its  interests.  Under  this  aspect  of  representation,  correspondence  in  attributes
(background, thoughts, etc.) between representatives and represented is as or even
more relevant than the acting or doing of the former40. It is also assumed that being-
alike (a  usually  passive attribute)  implies to act-alike.  A barely  questioned link is
established  between  identity  resemblance,  feeling-and-thinking  resemblance,  and
action resemblance, be it potential (acting as people would act) or ideal (acting as
people  would  act  if  they  had the  knowledge or  expertise  of  the  representative).
Therefore, the key is to potentiate such resemblance, reflection or correspondence in
modes of being between representative and represented, in the hope of potentiating
them in the ways of acting of the former41.
A fourth meaning of political representation (a second form of “standing for”) is the
one Pitkin defines as “symbolic”. Here the framing metaphor is the flag. In symbolic
representation,  the  representative  entity  (not  necessarily  human)  points  not  only
towards some entities (to the people, the voter, the State, etc.) but also towards the
cultural codes and reactions (feelings, attitudes, gestures, words, etc.) of the relevant
audiences towards those entities, as well as to the relation between those various
elements.  Unlike the case of the descriptive sense of representation, it  does not
need to provide information about the symbolized entities.  The connection is not
statistical or epistemological but rather historical, psychological, and behavioral42. In
this fourth sense of representation the role of the audience is key: the symbols must
be recognized and treated as real by somebody, otherwise, they stop representing.
Usually,  the represented are also the audience of  representation,  but  that  is  not
40 This is the model of some “politics of recognition”.
41 As in the case of authorization, here there is a collapse of different aspects: being representative
(say, typical of a group), being elected as representative, and having a representative activity. Critics
(Pitkin,  1967)  point  out  that  proportionality  atomizes  opinion,  generates  factions,  prevents  the
constitution  of  majorities  and  impedes  operative  government—otherwise,  they  feed  inaction,  the
opposite of the function of representation, according to Hobbes. Pitkin also notices that following this
sense of representation there is no way of evaluating performance: whatever the average citizen or
the whole of the people would do is fine. Moreover, it would make of representation something too
dependent of a supposedly pre-existing reality that is not clear that exists: f.i.  people haven´t got
opinions on all matters Parliament legislates upon.
42 According to Pitkin, most symbolic politics must stand over political conflicts, like the King is over
party quarrel as symbol of the nation; but it is important to notice how left and right parties do, in many
countries, stand for or play the role of a symbol of the difference of interests or opinions or identities
within the nation, between classes, ethnic or ideological groups, etc.
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always the case (f.i.: flags in international relations). In some cases, Pitkin notices, it
is powerful leaders who, through symbols and affects, make people symbolize them
(and the nation): millions of people willingly going to war in the name of their country
or its symbol, the leader, are an extreme example of this.
For Pitkin, a common characteristic of the four senses of representation analyzed so
far is their limitation for guiding and judging the activity of the representatives. A fifth
sense, which she defines as “acting for”,  attends not  primarily to the moment of
authorization or removal, nor simply to the modes of being of representatives and
represented,  but  rather,  to  representatives'  action.  The  five  senses43 of
representation  move  along  what  she  defines  as  a  mandate/independence  axis,
which she understands as an irresolvable tension: while the strong mandate position
sees  the  representative  as  a  mere  agent,  a  delegate,  a  subordinate  actor,  the
independence position sees it as a free agent, administrator or expert who should be
just let alone to do its job. For Pitkin, the fifth sense of representation, the more
complete one, is embodied by a representative that, on the one hand, acts in the
interest44 of the represented, and, on the other, responds to their expressed desires,
otherwise, is “responsive”45.  
TABLE 1. ASPECTS AND SENSES OF REPRESENTATION
Aspect Sense of representation
Formal Authorization
Accountability
Substantive Standing for Descriptiveness
Symbolization
Acting for Action
43 Pitkin  (1967:  119) somehow tries to  bring the four  meanings enumerated so far  together  with
representation  as  activity  by  enumerating  multiple  expressions  and  analogies,  and  trying  to  find
similarities among them. On expressions, she notices: “we have been using the basic expression
‘acting for’ another, but besides that writers have used acting ‘in’ or ‘on behalf’ of others, acting ‘in
their  place’ or ‘stead’ or  ‘instead of’ them,  ‘supplying their  place,’ acting ‘in  their  name,’ ‘on their
authority,’ ‘for their sake,’ ‘in their interest,’ ‘in accord with their desires’ or ‘wishes’ or ‘wants,’ pursuing
their  ‘welfare’ or  ‘needs,’ so as to ‘please’ or  ‘satisfy’ them, or  acting ‘as they would have acted
themselves.’” When it comes to analogies, for Pitkin nor substitution (by an actor, an agent, a lawyer),
nor caring (by an administrator, an expert) nor subordination-delegation (by a deputy, a delegate, an
ambassador) can be considered as cases of political representation in this fifth, complex sense.
44 Pitkin (1967: 156) makes an interesting distinction between objective and subjective interests. While
the former can, in principle, be deduced from the conditions of the individual and the context—and
idea  that  comes from the  legal  sphere  on the  XV century—the  latter  appeal  to  psychology  and
appeared as a notion much later. Objective interests can then be sub-divided, they can be “attached”
to a person (f.i.: “it is in my interest all that preserves my life”) or “unattached” (f.i.: “it is in the interest
of economic growth to cut wages”).
45 Normally—she notices—there should be no conflict,  at  least  in the mid/long term. If  there is a
punctual deviation, the representative must rationally justify this and ultimately wait for the verdict of
the represented. The result of the process of addressing this deviation must be decided, according to
Pitkin, in practice, case by case.
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For Pitkin, each version or sense of representation speaks of an aspect of it, and is
connected with a set of practices. None of these can exhaust the possibilities neither
of the concept nor of the practice of political representation. This idea will be central
when  I  analyze  the  potential  meanings  of  15M  cycle  challenges  to  political
representation, narratively and practically.
On top of—or, rather, below—these five senses, as a first conclusion of what has
been said so far on representation, it is relevant to notice that representation is a
form  of  relationship,  and  it  is  composed  of  three  basic  poles  or  moments:  the
representing pole, the represented pole, and the process of representation itself—
with an eventual fourth element, the “audience”, which may or may not coincide with
the represented pole. The relational quality of representation and the ambiguity of
each  of  its  four  poles  means  that  its  “ontology  is  contextual”  (Pitkin,  1967,
Castiglione & Warren, 2006). Representation is a construction, and an ambiguous
one at that. This remark gives centrality to the field, of much interest to us, of the
practical ontologies of representation, central to my questioning of 15M and post-
15M practices46.
2.1.3.2. Three models and crises of representative government: democratic polities,
political parties, and party systems
If  above I have described its five senses, in this section I  summarize and better
define the political-institutional forms of representation. Otherwise, I outline a model
of  representative  government  and  political  parties.  These  two,  along  with  social
movements,  are  the  sociopolitical  forms  taken  by  15M  cycle  processes,  forms
challenged by those very processes. This section helps to outline a framework for
seeing the sociopolitical  structures that  the 15M cycle may be transforming,  and
thereby helps to situate and understand the cycle itself.
In his classic work on The Principles of Representative Government, Bernard Manin
(1997)  distinguished  three  forms  of  representative  government47.  He  uses  four
criteria  for  comparing them: bases for  election,  independence of  representatives,
relation  between  representative  institutions  and  public  opinion,  and  the  role  of
discussion in decision making (Manin 1999: 197). Following this fourfold (which I
46 Things get even more complicated when non-humans and materiality are included into the lot, as
the “construction” notion suggests and STS studies are showing, from Latour's (2004) Parliament of
Things and cosmopolitics to Brown's (2015) constructed and material representative democracy.
47 Our  primary  reference  throughout  this  section  is  Manin  (1997),  when  I  make  use  of  other
references, primarily Sartori (2005), I introduce a quotation in the sentence.
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may re-label as the axes of “inclusion”, “mandate/independence”, “social autonomy”,
and  “deliberation”),  he  distinguishes  Parliamentarianism48 (preeminent  from  late
XVIIIth century to the mid XIXth century), party government (predominant from the
1870s to the 1970s), and audience democracy (operative since the 1970s). Here I
focus  on  the  last  two  forms and  complement  his  narration  with  remarks  on  the
constitution of parties and party systems (Sartori, 2005; Katz & Crotty, 2005), and a
typology of parties (Gunther & Diamond, 2003) based on three differential criteria:
organizational, programmatic, and relational49.
Party Government
Even though “the emergence of party-organized politics was an unanticipated, and
even unwanted, side-effect of the liberalization and democratization of politics in that
century” (Scarrow 2006: 23), parties progressively became a respectable element of
the XIXth century polity in countries such as the UK and the US. According to Manin,
this was tied to the emergence of the “party government”  model,  which came to
predominate  in  liberal  representative  polities  from  the  second  half  of  the  XIXth
century till the last third of the XXth. This came to replace the late XVIIIth and early
XIXth century “Parliamentarian” model.
In  early  Parliamentary  democracies  such  as  England,  the  “right  to  opposition”,
“liberalization”, as well as “representation”, were first granted to the few, then slowly
and contentiously gained by the many, increasing the “level of inclusion” during the
XIXth century (Dahl, 1971: 4). This is one of the paradigms of liberal representative
“democratization”  process.  As  the  struggle  for  representation  intensified  and  the
franchise  grew,  the  gap  between  people  and  parliamentarians50 did  so  too.  The
emergent solution was to construct bureaucratic organizations able to organize the
recently enfranchised masses, new, organizationally wider and thicker parties: mass-
based  parties,  which  replaced  earlier  “notable”  parties.  The  process  legitimized,
involved and familiarized thousands of people with the party form in the second half
48 Parliamentarianism was defined by characteristics such as the census suffrage, the independence
of Parliament from public opinion, and of representatives from their weak “notable parties”, as well as
by the centrality of deliberation in Parliament.
49 Those three criteria appear subdivided. With regard to organization, a distinction is to be made
depending  on  whether  it  is  formal  or  informal,  thick  or  thin,  etc.  In  the  case  of  programs,  the
differences reside on whether they are well-defined, stable, and principled or rather diffuse, variable
and pragmatic; within the first group Gunther & Diamond (2003) distinguish between religion-based,
nation-based, class-based programs, among others.  With regard to relations,  their  key division is
between pluralist and hegemonic parties, between more or less loyal to the rules and permanence of
the polity as it exists.
50 In qualitative (elites vs commoners) and quantitative terms (multitudes vs the very few).
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of the XIXth century (Scarrow, 2006).
This  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  rise  of  the  rule  of  the  activist  and  the  party
bureaucrat:  the  vote  collectors  and  the  vote  seekers,  the  fund  raisers  and  the
organizers of these new mass forms of political association. This quickly turned into
and manifested the so called “iron law of oligarchy”, classically formulated by Robert
Michels (1915) by which “who says organization says oligarchy”. The organization of
mass  parties  involved  both  specialization  and  the  creation  of  elites  of  decision
makers and hierarchies: this was the only way to achieve efficiency in mass decision
and  action.  Parties  took  the  form  of  an  interactive  tripod  made  of  a  mass  of
supporters,  party  organizers,  and  a  body  of  notables  (Katz  2005),  partially
overlapping  with  V.O.  Key’s  (1964)  tripod of  “the  party-in-the-electorate,  the
professional  political  group,  the  party-in-the-legislature,  and  the  party-in-the-
government”.
With party government, party systems, which resulted from the competition between
different parties (Sartori, 2005), begun to crystallize. These systems have taken a
variety of shapes, from two party-systems (a predominant form in countries such as
the US and the UK) to extreme multi-party systems (Siaroff, 2000). Party systems
can be characterized on the basis of the number of parties with an ability to reach a
majority to govern, which defines the “fragmentation” of the political  field (Sartori,
1975/2005: 110), but also by other factors such as the structuration or the openness
to new relevant formations of that system (Mair, 2005).
According to Manin, the centrality of parties made itself felt in the dependence of
parliamentary action on party rule as well as in their penetration of society and public
discussion.  Representatives'  action  become  both  less  independent  than  in
Parliamentarianism, and yet not immediately attached to the people's will, opinions,
etc.  As  a  result  of  party  alignment  with  socioeconomic  cleavages,  and  their
penetration in society via party organizations and media, public opinion tended to
resemble parliamentary divisions. As a consequence, political opposition was not so
much  framed  in  terms  of  inside-outside  of  Parliament  but  rather  of  majority-
opposition, left and right, etc. under a party logic51. Finally, deliberation was displaced
to the interior of parties themselves or to conversations between them, usually out of
Parliament and without necessarily involving public opinion.
51 Inverting Manin's image, the Marxist narrative suggests that the party (specially, socialist parties)
are the expression of the class division of society.
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The  long  period  of  party  government  saw  an  explosion  in  the  types  of  parties.
According to Gunther & Diamond, a wide variety can be found between mass-based
parties, in terms of their basic ideology (primarily galvanized around class, nation, or
religion)  and  their  tolerance  towards  diversity  (depending  on  whether  they  are
pluralist or hegemonic).  So, the period between late XIXth century and mid XXth
century saw the emergence of class-mass (mixture of class and pluralist), Leninist
(class and hegemonic), pluralist nationalist (nationalist and pluralist), ultranationalist
(nationalist  hegemonic),  denominational  (religious  and  pluralist),  and  religious
fundamentalist parties (religious and hegemonic).
Audience democracy
The third model of representative government or polity, that Manin calls “audience
democracy”, emerges in the 1970s and is marked by the crisis of the mass-party
model and the rise of mass media (TV, especially). This is the period that various
authors (Touraine, 1981; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Melucci, 1996) have identified with
the rise of new social movements, along with an increasing economic diversification
and  fragmentation  of  previous  social  classes  and  thereby  the  classical  Marxist
analysis and narrative. This connected to the rise of neoliberalism as a mainstream
system and discourse,  which  particularly  affected  the  role  and standing of  mass
class parties in the West after the 1970s.
The rise of TV brought about the rule of media and media experts, the attention to
electoral spectacles and offers, as well as the centrality of concrete representatives
(Manin, 1997). This is the birth time of organizationally thin “electoralist party” genre,
which  includes  the  “personalist”  and,  more  relevantly,  the  “catch-all  party”
(Kirchheimer, 1966)52, both of which run on broad and adaptable (rather than neat
and  ideological)  programs,  oriented  towards  aggregating  the  broadest  possible
constituencies for winning elections (Gunther & Diamond, 2003).
According to Manin, under audience democracy there is a growing independence of
the representative from popular mandates, since campaigns messages and even
political programs are broad enough for maneuvering and conceived as a marketing
52 The personalist party is oriented to facilitate the promotion of a very specific person into public
office,  to  the  point  that  the  party  is  sometimes  created  or  completely  remade  ex  profeso,  as  it
happened with  Berlusconi's  Forza  Italia.  Catch-all  parties  are  leader-oriented,  but  not  so  leader-
focused  or  even  leader-based.  Gunther  &  Diamond  (2003)  also  list  the  “programmatic”,  which
although sharing the “thin organizational model” gives weight to the ideological program, which is not
only election but also government oriented, and usually relies upon and aims to mobilize a narrower
constituency.
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tool. The party also detaches itself from the activist constituencies more typical of
mass parties. Public opinion and constituencies are constituted through mass media
(what implies an encroachment of media into the public sphere, in Habermas 1980'
terms) and explored in focus groups and polls, that, reported by media, influence
public opinion again.
All  of  this opens up alternative media—and, I  may say, objectifying,  sociological,
rather than political—spaces of public representation, outside of both parties and
parliaments. Usually opaque negotiations between institutions and group interests
(particularly, lobbies), on the one hand, and media debate, on the other, become
central  venues for  political  discussion and the  ever-rarer  deliberation,  with  “new”
social movements operating as counterpoints.
Crises and alternatives to representative government
Manin's  three  “models”  (Parliamentarianism,  party  government,  audience
democracy) are models that predominate at a given time but that always appear
combined, rather than as full-blown systems of government. No less important than
these  models  are  the  historic  breaks  that  mark  shifts  in  predominance  between
them, which Manin finds tied to “crises of representation” (Manin 1997: 195). During
the  transition  from  Parliamentarianism  to  party  democracy,  the  growth  of  the
franchise  represented a considerable  organizational  problem,  and along the new
subordination of representatives to mass parties, it ignited arguments about the gap
between  representatives  and  the  people  (debates  around  authorization,
accountability,  “acting  for”,  in  Pitkin's  terms),  about  decline  in  parliamentary
deliberation (debates around representatives' “acting for”), as well as about the value
of choosing representatives with worker-background rather than elites of talent and
wealth  (debates  around  increased  “descriptiveness”  or  “resemblance”  of
representatives).
Manin  suggests  that  similar  quandaries  emerged  in  the  transition  to  audience
democracy, many of whose characteristics seemed like a return to Parliamentarist
forms. The shift in socio-economic cleavages undermining the stability of party bases
forced parties to appeal to a more heterogeneous and mutable constituency moving
through  a  media  rich  environment  and  prone  to  be  moved  by  media-savvy,
charismatic  representatives,  increasingly  independent  from  party  structures  and
membership (a hypertrophy of the symbolic aspect of representation, with a decline
of internal accountability): these factors were at the roots of the emergence of the
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catch-all party. At the same time, the displacement of deliberation towards usually
private  media  outlets,  or  the  use  of  focus  groups  and  closed  surveys,  mark  an
informalization, when not an impoverishment, of public deliberation, of the role of
representatives and their relation with the represented.
There is something completely missing from the picture of the crisis-and-transition
periods provided by Manin: the counter-history of alternatives. For instance, during
Manin's crisis-and-transition from party government to audience democracy, which
was related to the proliferation of catch-all parties in the US and Europe (including
the cases of the Spanish Working Socialist Party and the Popular Party in Spain, as
noted by Gunther and Diamond 2003: 186), a number of processes took place: from
the  counterculture  to  the  calls  of  the  New  Left  for  a  participatory  society  to
democratize  not  only  government  and  the  State,  but  also  the  economic  realm
(Pateman, 1970; Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Barber, 1984).
The combination of these participatory demands with a new strand of new social
movements,  especially  environmentalism,  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  the
“movement-party”  genre  (Kitschelt,  1989),  paradigmatically  exemplified  by  the
German Green Party in the 1980s and 1990s53. Differently from class mass-parties,
the ideological program of the Greens and similar left movement-parties in the 1980s
and 1990s was markedly “post-materialist” rather than economic-centered (Kitschelt,
1989:  62),  uniting  heterogeneous  constituencies  in  their  “negative  consensus”
against  both  markets  and  bureaucracies,  promoting  solidarity  and  participatory
institutions  outwards  and  inwards,  organizing  around  minimally  formal,  anti-
hierarchical, decentralized grassroots networks with an assembly profile (ibid: 64-
66),  and  prioritizing  complex  “constituency  representation”  over  electoral
competition. Kitschelt (2006: 280) has defined them as “coalitions of political activists
who  emanate  from  social  movements  and  try  to  apply  the  organizational  and
strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition”. From the
calls  for  a  participatory  democracy  to  grassroots  movement  parties,  these
alternatives  within  audience  democracy  serve  to  think  (for  similarities  and
differences) some of the party initiatives after 15M.
Especially  in  moments  of  crisis  of  modern  representative democracy,  actors and
authors  have  called  for,  and  sometimes  experimented  with,  a  re-appropriation,
53 Even if other parties had already taken this form in their initial stage, such as Labor in the UK
(Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 188). Here I leave out of consideration the “post-industrial extreme right
party”.
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relativization or abolition of representative politics (Graeber, 2013; Tormey 2015). As
shown below, some 15M cycle initiatives follow a similar pattern: they diagnosed a
contemporary crisis of representation and called for alternatives. However, the issue
is whether projects and possibilities in the 15M cycle point towards a fourth model of
representative government (after the parliamentarian, the party democratic, and the
audience democratic) or, rather, towards alternatives to representative government
and the liberal representative ontology, more broadly. Another option is that they do
both. A complementary issue, then, becomes that of registering the existence, depth
and breadth of transformations, if any.
In order to see whether a form of alter-democratization has come about since 15M,
and to define the profile of such a process, I had first to outline the sociopolitical
forms of liberal representative democracy (parties and representative government; I
analyze social movements in part 3 of this chapter).
I move now to a second set of features, namely, to characterize the normative or
standard model of the political ontology of liberal representative democracy.
2.1.3.3. The normative political ontology of liberal representative democracy
In order outline the break in terms of political ontology that initiatives within the 15M
cycle may embody (or not), a referential frame is required. In this section I elaborate
what, using Habermas (1992) or Castiglione & Warren (2006) adjectives, I may call a
“normative or “standard” account of the modern, liberal and representative political
ontology. Since I have explored “representation” as a concept as well as a set of
sociopolitical forms, I focus here first on the liberal pole, and then come back to the
representative one. In order to elaborate such a sketch, I rely upon the work of key
authors in the tradition of democratic theory and STS54.
Ontology: basic elements
As Barber (1984) resumes beautifully, the liberal ontology is starred by atomized
individuals that, be they more creative and autonomous (in the anarchist model of
Nozick,  1974),  fearful  and  aggressive  (in  the  realist  or  Hobbesian  model),  or
moderate and skeptic (in the minimalist and legalist55 model of Locke and Popper),
bring into politics a set of usually fixed and competing interests. Above all, they bring
their interest to preserve their life, their freedom and, in the case of Locke, especially,
54 I  do not  pretend this sketch to be complete,  since it  has been built  in  a situated manner and
“afterwards” so to speak, that is, after witnessing the main questions around representation posed
within the 15M cycle.
55 Barber uses only “minimalist”. I prefer to add “legalist”, following Held (2006).
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their  private  property. These  three  result  either  from  the  individual's  natural
endowment or from his work on Nature. Property is presented as something “he”
becomes owner of, and entitled to, previously to any exchanges with society or the
State, by work only.
Following the  classic  Hobbesian image,  in  their  natural  state  individuals  enjoy  a
natural freedom and live a selfish life that is unchallenged up to the moment they run
into another individual, which usually results in collision (a sort of collision of atoms)
and conflict. The frequency and violence of the encounter varies among these three
models,  with  Nozick  been  the  most  optimistic,  and  Hobbes  the  less  so.  In  the
foundational liberal argumentation, this situation appeals, logically and ontologically,
to  a  peace  covenant,  the  now  classical  social  contract,  which  since  Hobbes'
Leviathan marks, for the liberal and much of the modern political tradition, the step
from Nature to Society, the emergence of a new order, that of the State and political
representation. In the tradition of Hobbes and Locke (shared with Rousseau and
others),  for  individuals,  that  covenant  means,  primarily,  to  surrender,  delegate or
contribute some or all of their natural rights to the collective as a whole, represented
by the sovereign. By this shared gesture and agreement,  the multitude becomes
one, a whole, in the figure of the representative, in the representative body, be it a
committee of one person (monarchy), a few (oligarchy), the whole (democracy), or a
mixture of them56.  From then on, the relations between the irreducible individuals
become, firstly, regulated by law57, a law whose legitimacy derives from the consent
of those affected by it, and, secondly, less physically violent, since the legitimate use
of violence (to use Max Weber's later classical formula) becomes the prerogative of
a single actor, the State. The State can then be defined by its securitarian, tolerant-
legalist,  or  minimal  character,  depending  on  whether  the  model  is  Hobbesian,
Lockean, or Nozickean58. Individuals keep pursuing their interests (safety, property,
freedom, etc.), that still implies conflict, but now it takes the form of a regulated and
rightful competition under the supervision and ruling of the Law59 established by the
56 The former is Hobbes' favorite formula while the mixed government option, which facilitates the
possibility  of  people  to  challenge  the  rule  of  the  executive  power,  was  preferred  by  Locke,
Montesquieu and Jefferson.
57 The liberal tradition insistence in “law”, from Locke, via Montesquieu up to modern democracies,
which became to ground the legalist model of democracy (Held 2006), has its roots in Ancient times,
especially in the tradition of the Roman republic.
58 The position advocated by Robert Nozick (1974) can be considered a good representative of a
strand of the neoliberal mindset.
59 The liberal tradition insisting in the centrality of “law”, that flowed from Locke, via Montesquieu, into
the legalist model of democracy (Held 2006), has its roots in the framework of laws in Rome.
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sovereign, the representative of the people, who is also responsible for executing it,
or ensuring their execution.  This protective, negative, approach to the State is, for
some, the essence of liberalism (Pettit, 1997: 175). The relation between individual
and State is primarily based on negative freedom, non-interference, the inviolability
of the private realm.
In the process of constituting Society, a third, crucial element in the political ontology
of liberalism, emerges between the individual and the State: the sphere of the market
and civil  society.  The aggregation and management of  individual  interests at  the
collective level  are the main tasks of  the market  in the (primarily,  economic and
private) realm of civil society and of government in the political, representative and
public  one.  In  the  ontology  of  liberalism,  the  sphere  of  the  market  is  to  be
safeguarded and expanded, in order to promote the rights of individuals, while the
sphere of government is to be limited and controlled, in order to ensure those rights.
Reduced to its bare minimum, this could be the basic building blocks of the liberal
representative ontology.
TABLE 2. POLITICAL ONTOLOGY: LIBERAL REPRESENTATIVE
Political
ontology
Subject
form
Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Key political
elements
Liberal
representative
Selfish,
calculating
individual
Market/
civil society/
representative
government
Representation,
competition,
aggregation
Private interests
& rights
This standard—albeit historically shifting—model will be a  referential frame (rather
than “inertial”, as suggested in Barber, 1984), for situating and understanding some
of the key 15M cycle critiques and offshoots from the viewpoint of political ontology.
After characterizing the political ontology of liberal representative democracy, there
are new tokens to be looked at in order to situate a potential alter-democratization:
subject forms, collective forms, and modes of relation. This could be considered a
more neatly “ontological” approximation to 15M cycle initiatives. In combination with
the exploration of sociopolitical forms, I believe to have a rich frame to look at 15M’s
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process of reassembling and alter-democratization.
2.1.4. Alternative political ontologies
So far, I have been circling around the liberal representative political ontology that
has  underline  the  main  model  of  modern  democracy.  Much  in  this  model  was
challenged in  discourse and practice by 15M initiatives.  But  from where  did  this
critique speak? The meaning of democracy does not lie before or beyond its various
models and shapes. It is from the viewpoint of a concrete constellation that one can,
at some point, denounce one or another form of democracy as a “fake”, in the way
15M did,  when  it  criticized  the  Spanish  political  order  and  declared  “they  call  it
democracy, but it is not”. In the following sections I touch upon different models of
democracy, as well as upon their basic ontological elements. I do it in much less
detail,  since  they  represent  alternatives  to  the  currently  preeminent  liberal  and
representative model.
2.1.4.1. Two traditions of republicanism
Republicanism  was  an  inspiration  for  different  key  actors  in  the  constitution  of
modern,  liberal  and  representative  States.  Two  traditions  can  be  found  within
classical  republicanism,  though.  The  first,  which  Held  (2006:  37)  defines  as
“developmental  republicanism”,  derived  primarily  from Ancient  Greece 60 and  was
defended  in  modern  times,  among  others,  by  Rousseau.  This  tradition  puts
“emphasis  on  the  intrinsic  value  of  political  participation  for  the  enhancement  of
decision-making  and  the  development  of  the  citizenry”.  In  this  tradition,  liberty
(positive or ancient liberty, in terms of Isaiah Berlin and Benjamin Constant) is the
possibility  to  participate  in  the  political  and  to  reach  political  self-fulfillment  as  a
citizen,  something  necessary  for  being  a  full  human being,  famously  defined by
Aristotle as zoon politikon. Different from the liberal one, this tradition begins with the
“whole”, the Republic, with the “citizenry as a collective actor that reflects the whole
and  acts  for  it”  (Habermas,  1994:  8).  It  presupposes  and  nurtures  the  idea  of
interdependent and solidary citizens aiming at their common good, rather than that of
competing individuals only integrated by either the State or the market (Habermas,
1994).  It  portrays  citizens  enjoying  and  exercising  positive  freedom,  through
participation in a civic state.
On the other hand, “protective republicanism”, first  outlined in ancient Rome and
60 For the sake of simplicity, I omit here the various differences between the Athenian and the Roman
ideals of State, government and citizen.
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renewed by Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Madison, with “its primary stress on the
instrumental value of political participation for the protection of citizens' objectives
and  interests”  (Held,  2006:  37),  brought  about  a  weaker  (although  not  liberal)
paradigm of freedom as non-domination61.  According to Pettit (1997: 175) “on the
republican construal, the real enemy of freedom is the power that some people may
have  over  others,  whereas  on  the  liberal  understanding,  asymmetries  in
interpersonal  power  are  not  in  themselves  objectionable”. Even  though  many
American and French Enlightened men and revolutionaries shared republican ideals
and forms tied to protective republicanism, such as the mixed constitution—reframed
as division of powers by Montesquieu or the “check and balances” model  of  the
American Republic—, the rising liberal discourse on which they narratively grounded
it  became  increasingly  independent  of  those  ideals,  as  it  relied  on  an  ontology
pivoting around possessive individuals, private interests and, crucially, freedom as
non-interference.  This  tended  to  fall  short  both  from  the  “protective  republican”
emphasis  on  the  citizen,  participation  in  the  res  publica,  and  non-domination
(Constant,  1988;  MacPherson,  1962;  Pettit,  1997),  and  even  more  from  the
“developmental republican” ideal of the full citizen, community, and politics as self-
fulfillment (for the distinction, Held, 2006 and Pettit, 1997).
The 70s saw the liberal-protective and the developmental versions of republicanism
to occupy complete opposite camps of the political field, particularly in the US. On
the one hand, authors such as Robert Nozick, which I have already mentioned, and
Friedrich Hayek, called for a radical minimization of the State and public intervention,
in favor of private life and market economics (Held, 2006) giving base to political
neoliberalism. These positions were to be defended by politicians such as Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Since this approach is mostly a derivation from the
original liberal and representative tenets, I will not devote time to it here. Rather, I will
focus on an opposed approach born around the same time, and sometimes as a
response, in relation to the so called New Left. It was a view of a participatory society
close to the developmental version of republicanism outlined from Ancient Greece to
Rousseau and even Marx (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984, Held, 2006). Thanks to this
61 According to Pettit (1997: 170), this is “the freedom that goes with not having to live under the
power of another”,  which he convincingly distinguishes from the liberal  idea of noninterference or
negative freedom (as posed by authors such as Berlin, 1969). According to Pettit (1997: 175), right
wing liberals tolerate power imbalances and left wing primarily reject them as they affect to other
values such as equality or welfare.
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alternative approach, since the 1960s, “the word 'participation' became part of the
popular political vocabulary” (Pateman, 1970).
2.1.4.2. Participatory democracy
“‘Participatory democracy’ was, from the early 1970s to (at least) the early 1990s, the
leading counter-model on the left to the ‘legal democracy’ of the right” (Held, 2006:
209). Barber (1984: 113) synthesizes nicely this view:
“Strong democracy is a distinctively modern form of participatory democracy. It rests
on  the  idea  of  a  self-governing  community  of  citizens  who  are  united  less  by
homogeneous  interests  than  by  civic  education  and  who  are  made  capable  of
common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory
institutions rather than their altruism or their good nature”.
This involved a critique of both liberal representative democracies and totalitarian
socialist  States.  According  to  Barber  (1984:  119)  while  “liberal  democracy
understands politics as a means of eliminating conflict (the anarchist disposition),
repressing  it  (the  realist  disposition),  or  tolerating  it  (the  minimalist  disposition),
strong democracy also aspires to transform conflict through a politics of distinctive
inventiveness  and  discovery”.  Differently  from  “consensualism”  as  well,  strong
democracy emerges and nurtures from conflict.
Pateman's hope (1970) is that,  by bringing participation to proximate, but always
wider spheres of life, society as such will be changed. She follows Cole (1920: 12) in
calling to  apply democracy “not  only  or  mainly  to  some special  sphere of  social
action  known  as  "politics",  but  to  any  and  every  form  of  social  action,  and,  in
especial, to industrial and economic fully as much as to political affairs”. This is a
sense of democratization clearly distinguishable from the one that defines the liberal
representative endeavor.
A crucial thesis of the participatory tradition resides in the relation between citizens
and  institutions,  as  stated  by  Barber  (1984:  152):  “politics  becomes  its  own
university,  citizenship  its  own  training  ground,  and  participation  its  own  tutor.
Freedom is what comes out of this process, not what goes into it.” Participation is a
school of democracy, aimed at creating and transforming both modern citizens and
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institutions as they are62.
This  self-transformation  has  an  ontologically  collective  character.  Participatory
democracy  creates  “publics”  able  of  public  deliberation,  decision,  and  action,
debunking  both  the  myth  of  atomic  individuals  creating  society  contractually  (or
aggregating interests to find public interest, a fallacy of composition), as well as that
of a given organic community supra-ordinated to its members. Politics generates
identities, rather than presupposes them, freeing humans from historical or biological
determination. In synthesis, “community, public goods, and citizenship thus ultimately
become three interdependent parts of a single democratic circle whose compass
grows to describe a true public” (Barber, 1984: 133-4).
Barber  (1984:  206)  warns,  though,  that  “democratization  conducted  within  the
confines of thin democracy work only to further polarize elites and masses while
cloaking  oligarchic  manipulation  in  a  mantle  of  popular  sovereignty”,  this  “new
politics” (ironically, a frequent expression used in Spain to define post-15M politics)
undermines the strengths of  liberal  representation  (brokering,  compromises,  etc.)
without improving the citizenry, its insight, judgment or responsibility.
I  want  to  outline  now the  ontology  of  the  republican  and  participatory  model  of
politics.
TABLE 3. POLITICAL ONTOLOGY: PARTICIPATORY.
Political
ontology
Subject
form
Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Key political
elements
Republican,
Participatory
Active
citizen
Citizenry/
community/
publics
Participation,
contestation
Political practices
and citizen rights
2.1.4.3. Deliberative democracy63
In the 90s, what has been defined as a “deliberative turn” (Dryzek, 2000) took place
in democratic theory. As posed by Held (2006: 231):
62 In  Barber's  (1984:  154-155)  words:  “Masses make noise,  citizens  deliberate;  masses behave,
citizens act;  masses collide and intersect,  citizens engage, share,  and contribute.  At  the moment
when "masses" start  deliberating, acting, sharing, and contributing, they cease to be masses and
become citizens. Only then do they "participate."”
63 On top of the materials coming from Habermas (1994) and Gutmann & Thompson (2004), this
section (specially, several quotes and references) has been built on the basis of Held (2006). The
term “deliberative democracy” seems to have been coined by Joseph M. Bessette (1980), although its
earlier predecessors seem to be works, as early as the 70s, by John Rawls and Habermas.
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“a spectre haunts contemporary democratic politics, namely, that while entrenching
the  accountability  of  rulers  to  the  ruled,  and extending  the  scope of  the  demos
across  all  facets  of  public  life,  politics  could  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  possible
denominator - to governance by the masses who are neither well informed nor wise”.
That fear is not new, nor modern, but rather ancient: it was the same fear of Socrates
and  Plato  towards  mob  rule.  The  most  common  answer  among  deliberative
democrats  such  as  Jürgen  Habermas  has  been  to  summon,  back  to  Socrates,
dialogue and reason, logos, or, in a more contemporary formula: dialogical reason.
A key difference with the previous model lies in the fact that deliberative democracy
may, in principle, be fully compatible with representation. According to Gutmann &
Thompson (2004: 4) “deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions
made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they
would impose on one another”64. The key is, according to them, the “reason-giving
requirement”. What legitimates political decisions and laws is not the “predetermined
will” of the individuals, their fixed interests, but rather “the process of its formation,
that is,  deliberation itself”  (Manin, 1987:  351).  The deliberative approach aims to
inform opinions, to reveal and test interests, and to shift those opinions (sometimes
even interests) by “no force except that of the better argument” (Habermas, 1976:
108). Habermas (1994) has nicely presented a view of deliberative democracy, but in
relation  to  the  two  previous  alternatives  (liberal  representative  and
republican/participatory):
“In the liberal view, the democratic process takes place exclusively in the form of
compromises between competing interests. Fairness is supposed to be granted by
the general and equal right to vote, the representative composition of parliamentary
bodies, by decision rules, and so on. Such rules are ultimately justified in terms of
liberal basic rights. According to the republican view, democratic will-formation takes
place in the form of an ethical-political  discourse; here deliberation can rely on a
culturally  established  background  consensus  shared  by  the  citizenry.  Discourse
64 Furthermore,  they  suggest  that  “deliberative  democracy  makes room for  many  other  forms  of
decision-making (including bargaining among groups, and secret operations ordered by executives),
as long as the use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a deliberative process.”
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theory takes elements from both sides and integrates these in the concept of an
ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making […] In the final analysis, the
normative content arises from the very structure of communicative actions” (1994: 6).
 
These differences have also implications for political ontology, that is, for the kinds of
beings,  relations,  and processes existing in  politics.  According to  Habermas,  the
Republican view begins with a macro-subject, the political community, which helps to
define individuals,  whereas,  in the liberal  view, the order is the reverse,  and the
source  of  order  and  law  derive  from  atomic  individuals  and  their  interactions.
“Discourse  theory  works  instead  with  the  higher-level  inter-subjectivity  of
communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the
informal networks of the public sphere” (1994: 8). In this way, civil society turns from
a market-first space into the basis of “autonomous public spheres”, independent from
both the market and the State administration. Although public opinion “cannot rule of
itself”, it orients the exercise of State administrative power.
According to Habermas—in what may be an excessively legalistic view of the liberal
representative ontology—, while in the liberal model the constitution operates as the
last ground of the whole, and in the republican-participatory it is the sovereign, active
citizenry,  his  portrait  presents  “the  image  of  a  decentered  society”65.  Against
participatory  democracy,  Habermas  suggests  that  the  political  system is  not  the
center  nor  the  “formative  model”  of  society,  “but  just  one  action  system among
others”, even if, through law, it connects to the rest.
I synthesize now the ontology of the deliberative model of democracy.
TABLE 4. POLITICAL ONTOLOGY: DELIBERATIVE.
Political
ontology
Subject
form
Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Key political
elements
Deliberative
Rational,
dialoguing
citizen
Public
sphere
Deliberation, dialogue,
communication
Public, dialogical
reasons
65 Against participatory democracy, Habermas suggests that the political system is not the center nor
the “formative model” of society, “but just one action system among others”, even if, through law, it
should connect to the rest.
  
 
68
 
2.1.4.4. Antagonist democracy
An alternative approach is the one outlined by Ernesto Laclau's (2005) populism and
the “democratic agonism” defended by Mouffe (2006) against deliberative democrats
such as Habermas. For Mouffe,  deliberative democrats insist  on the centrality of
rational  deliberation,  or  even consensus,  in  the hope that  it  will  serve to  secure
democratic institutions. But although agreeing on the aim, she disagrees on strategy,
which should not be to substitute “the dominant “means/ends rationality” by another
form of rationality, a “deliberative” and “communicative” one, but rather to work in the
“constitution of an ensemble of practices that make the constitution of democratic
citizens possible.  This is not a matter of  rational  justification but  of  availability of
democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity” (Mouffe 2006: 10). She frontally
opposes the postulation of rational  subjects (be they utility  maximizers,  as in the
liberal political ontology, or dialoguing consensus seekers, as in the deliberative one)
and stresses the relevance of passions, and the need to nurture those that favor
democratic institutions and projects. Crucially in my view, she calls to displace the
discussion  from  issues  of  rationality  and  legitimacy,  like  is  usual  in  Habermas,
towards “practices and language games”66. That means to attend to and to care not
so much for arguments and ideal speech situations but rather for passions and forms
of  life.  These  are  not  mere  empirical  factors  to  be  taken  into  account  while
tendentially aiming at ideal communicative situations, but rather the ontological fabric
of politics.
According to Mouffe, the political is defined by antagonism, by Carl Schmitt's friend-
enemy divide, and politics is the practical task of constructing order in the face of it.
To  Mouffe  (2006),  the  defining  feature  of  democratic  politics  consists  in  turning
antagonism into agonism, and the enemy (which, by Schmitt's definition, is the one
that may kill me, and that I may kill) into an adversary, a legitimate enemy67. This
transformation of antagonism into agonism is at the root of democratic tolerance. It
connects  with  a  view of  democratic  consensus as  “conflictual  consensus”,  since
different  groups  interpret  core  democratic  values  such  as  liberty  and  equality
66 These will be two basic, although not excluding, lenses through which I look at 15M and post-15M
projects.
67 That is “somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put
into question […] with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to
the ethic-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree on the meaning
and implementation of those principles and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved
through deliberation and rational discussion” (Mouffe, 2006: 15).
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differently. Any consensus is temporal, and, moreover, it is tied to a concrete political
hegemony.  A key  question  for  both  Laclau  and  Mouffe,  then,  is  that  of  how  a
hegemony is constructed.
Criticizing (not unlike Habermas above) methodological approaches focused either in
individuals or in social wholes68, individual-centered political ontologies such as the
liberal, for which collectives are mere aggregates, and whole-centered ones such as
the republican, which pose communities and republics at the center of the political
order, Laclau & Mouffe (2001) suggest that their approach “is grounded in privileging
the moment of political articulation”. Any group results from articulation, and more
precisely,  from the  articulation  of  demands.  Demands  are  Laclau's  basic  unit  of
analysis,  equivalent  to  traditional  “interests”,  but  without  a  fixed  form nor  being
anchored on a stable subject. Rather, interests (specially, collective ones) result from
articulation. In the process of articulation, actors discursively tie demands of various
groups,  obliterating  some  of  their  differences  and  linking  them,  finding  their
similarities, into “equivalential chains”69. As part of this process, a concrete actor or
group can make a claim to be representing the whole of society: that amounts to an
attempt at establishing a hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: xiii). This “hegemonic
universality”, contaminated by particularity and “always reversible”, is the only one a
political collective can reach. Social and political ontology are thereby limited and
unstable, as hegemony is always open to decay.
Any hegemony is tied to  the construction of  what Antonio Gramsci  defined as a
“common sense”, or shared coordinates on the social and the political. On the other
side of the spectrum there is what Gramsci called an “organic crisis”, what Laclau
defines as a “conjuncture where there is a generalized weakening of the relational
system defining the identities of a given social or political space” (Laclau & Mouffe,
2001: 136). If the constitution of a hegemony is tied to the construction of a “common
sense”, an “organic crisis” is tied to its unravelling.
Laclau (2005: 171) accounts for a central category in political theory, that of “The
68  Laclau's critique points first to sociological approaches, rather than to traditions of political thought.
69 Although I  cannot  stop on this  point,  I  will  come back later  to  Laclau & Mouffe's  (2001:  130)
distinction between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic  poles of  discourse,  as well  as the one
between logic of difference and equivalence: “the logic of difference tends to expand the syntagmatic
pole of language, the number of positions that can enter into a relation of combination and hence of
continuity with one another; while the logic of equivalence expands the paradigmatic pole—that is ,
the elements that can be substituted for one another—thereby reducing the number of positions which
can possibly be combined”. The logic of equivalence is one of simplification, the logic of difference,
one of expansion and complexity of the political space.
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People”, in terms of these analyses: he explains that “an ensemble of equivalential
demands articulated by an empty signifier is what constitutes a 'People'”. The People
is a central weapon of political discourse, but not always a given group can make a
claim to represent it: “popular struggles only occur in the case of relations of extreme
exteriority between the dominant groups and the rest of the community” (Laclau &
Mouffe,  2001:  133).  In  popular  struggles  (unlike  in  “democratic”  ones,  which  are
limited to a specific issue), the whole of society divides in two political camps: The
People and its enemy, usually, an elite. But the identity and attributes of The People
are up for grabs, like the constitution of society and politics are.
Here, a table synthesizing some of the key ontological tenets of the antagonist model
of democracy.
TABLE 5. POLITICAL ONTOLOGY: ANTAGONIST.
Political
ontology
Subject form Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Key political
elements
Antagonist Common
man, Agonist
citizen
The People Antagonism, agonism,
articulation, hegemony,
conflictual consensus
Demands, affects
2.1.4.5. Autonomist democracy
The  trilogy  of  Empire  (2000),  Multitude  (2004),  and  Commonwealth  (2009),  by
Michael  Hardt  &  Antonio  Negri,  provides  an  autonomist,  networked,  commons-
oriented  counterpoint  to  Laclau  &  Mouffe's  insistence  on  hegemony,  agonist
democracy, and discursive populism70. Although several elements of their analysis
would be worth of attention, it will be the notion of “multitude” that will be at the core
of my taking.
“Multitude” is the term used by Hobbes to refer to a group of people in the state of
Nature before becoming a Commonwealth, subjects of a State, otherwise, people
before the step of representation. The conceptual step of representation, as a form
of organizing the collective in  which a few act  in  place of  the rest,  grounds the
emergence of  figures  such as  “The People”  and “the  nation”  in  modern  political
70 It is important to notice how these works were written around two decades after Hegemony and
socialist  strategy,  coinciding  with  the  rise  of  networked  social  movements  such  as  the  alter-
globalization movement rather than with the new social movements.
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thought.
In Hardt and Negri's diagnostic, the represented, sovereign People, and the nation,
appear as decaying forces under globalization. In ways connectable to Castells's
(1996,  1997,  1998) theses about  the network society  and communication power,
Hardt  &  Negri  (2004:  xii)  describe  a  world  where  globalization  is  tied  to  the
expansion of the rule and “network power” of States, transnational and supranational
actors (such as corporations, the IMF, or the European Union). They establish a new
form of sovereignty and order, Empire, characterized by capitalist extraction, control
and conflict at a global scale. Simultaneously, globalization processes are tied to the
growth of worldwide networks of cooperation and collaboration from below. These
networks are the basis of the emergence of the multitude, which looks beyond the
existing  globalization  towards  a  more  radical  democracy71,  “in  which  we  are  all
together permitted, able, and willing to rule” (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 378).
The promise of the multitude for such a democracy, according to Hardt & Negri, is
based on two conditions. The first is economic, and results from the fact that new
forms of production and commodities, what they call “immaterial labor”72, nurture a
“commons”, that is, a form of collective production and appropriation alternative to
the modern private and public models; furthermore, these new forms dissolve strong
identities, rigid labor structures and the uniformity of earlier social groups, including
the old masses, nations or working classes. The second condition is political: the
forms  of  articulating  such  commons  and  the  multitude  itself  are  increasingly
democratic,  that  is,  result  from  peer  to  peer  networking,  which  Hardt  &  Negri
describe as decentralized and autonomous, respectful of diversity and encouraging
creativity73.
To bring about a “global democracy” beyond current forms of representation, poverty,
and war, the marks of “Empire”, is the project of the multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2004:
269-270). But in order to reach that it is necessary to mobilize affects, such as the
existing “desire of democracy”, and even more importantly, “indignation […] the raw
71 In Hardt & Negri's (2004: xvii) reading: “Whereas Hobbes moved from the nascent social class to
the new form of sovereignty, our course is the inverse-we work from the new form of sovereignty to
the new global class.  Whereas the nascent bourgeoisie needed to  call  on a sovereign power to
guarantee its interests, the multitude emerges from within the new imperial sovereignty and points
beyond.”
72 Hardt & Negri (2004: 108) define it as “labor that creates immaterial products, such as knowledge,
information, communication, a relationship, or an emotional response”.
73 This  second point  was present in the insistence on democratic  and autonomous processes of
decision making, as well as creative direct action, in the alter-globalization movement (Graeber, 2009;
Della Porta, 2013).
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material of revolt and rebellion” (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 236). Negri & Hardt (1999)
interpret affect74, through a sometimes optimist reading of Spinoza, as a “power to
act”  (obliterating the  fact  that  affect  can also  diminish that  power,  as  noticed by
Grattan, 2011). The joyful affects of the multitude must be catalyzed, guided by the
desire of democracy. In Hardt & Negri´s work affect plays a central role, similar to the
one played by interests in the liberal representative political ontology, or dialogical
reasons in that of deliberative democracy.
But what is “the multitude”? Hardt & Negri  counterpose the multitude to classical
political metaphors, forms of collective subjectivity and the body politic, such as The
People, the mass, the working class, the crowd and the mob. Here I recapitulate all
of them, since they amount to a valuable—albeit narratively abstract—morphological
taxonomy of political collective subjects. The first, crucial difference is the one Hardt
& Negri  (2004: 99) establish between The People, the crucial  subject in Laclau's
proposal and much modern thought,  and their own proposal.  In modern thought,
“The People” unifies, via representation, a usually diverse population into a single
identity,  that  of  subjects  of  the  State,  members  and  body  of  the  nation,  which
become the represented sovereign of the modern political ontology75; differently, the
multitude is  internally  diverse,  composed of  singularities  which  are  irreducible  to
sameness.
Hardt  &  Negri  also  distinguish  the  multitude  from the  masses,  in  which  internal
differences remain, but clumped and indifferent (Hardt & Negri, 2004: xiv). I may add
that, throughout modernity, the very notion of “masses” has evoked heaviness and
inertia: matter motionless on its own, a double motionlessness, without and against
movement.
Then Hardt & Negri question another common target of criticism since the 1970s,
namely, the working class. Albeit by definition more “active” than the masses, the
“working  class”  has  become an  exclusive  notion  for  referring  either  to  industrial
74 In  their  work,  affect  plays  a  central  role,  similar  to  the  one  played  by  interests  in  the  liberal
representative political ontology, or dialogical reasons in that of deliberative democracy.
75 According to Hardt & Negri (2004: 99): “The people is one. The population, of course, is composed
of numerous different individuals and classes, but the people synthesizes or reduces these social
differences into one identity. The multitude, by contrast, is not unified but remains plural and multiple.
This  is  why,  according to the dominant  tradition of  political  philosophy,  the people  can rule as a
sovereign power and the multitude cannot. The multitude is composed of a set of singularities-and by
singularity  here  I  mean  a  social  subject  whose  difference  cannot  be  reduced  to  sameness,  a
difference  that  remains  different”.  In  an  earlier  passage  they  precise:  “different  cultures,  races,
ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations; different forms of labor; different ways of living; different
views of the world; and different desires” (Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv).
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laborers, to distinguish them, not only from capitalists, but also from other laborers
and social actors in general, or for referring to waged laborers, to distinguish them
from poor people, unwaged laborers, etc.  Differently,  “multitude” is an open and
inclusive concept, as open as networks, according to Hardt & Negri, since both lack
categorical76 boundaries and are, in principle, easily and infinitely reconfigurable and
extensible. The working class and its representative incorporation in Marxist theory,
the mass class party, ended playing central roles in XIXth-XXth liberal representative
democracies,  and even more in authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet  Union.
Differently, multitude points towards radical democracy.
Finally, Hardt & Negri (2004: 100) differentiate the multitude from other social forms
that  have  been  recently  the  object  of  much  attention  in  social  theory,  crowds
(Surowiecki, 2005) and mobs (Rheingold, 2003): they suggest that these types of
collectives  are  indifferent  aggregates,  unable  to  recognize  what  they  have  in
common, incoherent and passive to the point of needing leadership and being prone
to manipulation, Differently,
“the multitude, designates an active social subject, which acts on the basis of what
the singularities share in common. The multitude is an internally different, multiple
social  subject whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or,
much less, indifference) but on what it has in common” (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 100).
This clearly differs from collective forms discussed in earlier sections77.
Economically,  their  appeal  to the commons goes on to challenge the hegemonic
(neo)liberal status quo. Hardt & Negri (2004: 204) state that “the common does not
refer to traditional notions of either the community or the public; it is based on the
communication  among singularities and emerges through the  collaborative social
76 “Categorical” should be understood here both as depending on a category and as non-changeable.
77 This  distinction is  particularly  relevant  in  the case of  antagonist  approaches.  Even if  Laclau &
Mouffe are convinced democrats and pluralists, the populist gesture has a clear anti-pluralist charge,
situated at the core of the hegemonic strategy. This is a basic point because, according to Laclau, a
central element of the populist strategy is precisely for a part or party to claim universality, to claim to
stay for the whole. The gesture tends to apply not only externally, in the alignment of The People
against the elite, but also to be repeated internally, so that groups, struggles and identities within
movements or parties are ranked, subordinated, and hierarchized, when not reduced, into discursive,
but also very practical, chains of equivalences. That is precisely what multitudes deny: the possibility
or desirability of reducing difference to sameness and to a single order. Instead, using Deleuze´s and
Guattari´s  notions,  we may say multitudes aim to avoid trees and definitive  ranks,  to  circumvent
hierarchies and unified representatives. Actually, rather than back to unity, they try to push freedom
and difference beyond pluralism, through multiplicities.
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processes  of  production”.  They  find  and  call  for  “post-systemic”  forms  of
organization:  “a  transparent  and  democratic  self-organizing  network  of  plural
subsystems,  each of  which  organizes the  norms of  numerous private  (or,  really,
singular) regimes” (idem: xv). It is through their “communication, collaboration, and
cooperation” that they generate common norms and common wealth.
TABLE 6. POLITICAL ONTOLOGY: AUTONOMIST.
Political
ontology
Subject
form
Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Key political
elements
Autonomist Singularity Multitude
Autonomy, networked
collaboration and
communication
Affects, immaterial
labor, commons
2.1.4.6. A synthesis of models
In this section, I just present the result of my review of models of democracy so far.
The table is a small  overview of the key elements of different models of political
ontology.
TABLE 7. POLITICAL ONTOLOGY: SYNTHESIS.
Political
ontology
Subject
form
Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Key political
elements
Liberal
representative
Selfish,
calculating
individual
Market/
civil society
Representation,
competition,
aggregation
Private interests &
rights
Republican,
Participatory
Active
citizen
Citizenry/
Community
Participation,
contestation
Citizen practices &
rights
Deliberative
Rational,
dialoguing
citizen
Public sphere Deliberation, dialogue,
communication,
consensus
Public, dialogical
reasons
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Antagonist
Common
man, Agonist
citizen
The People
Antagonism, agonism,
articulation, hegemony,
conflictual consensus
Demands, affects
Autonomist Singularity Multitude
Autonomy, networked
collaboration and
communication
Affects, immaterial
labor, commons
2.1.4.7. Recent theoretical developments around the liberal representative ontology,
in brief
Castiglione and Warren (2006) have opened up the meaning of representation to
encompass an “ecology of representative practices”, within which social movements
can be partially  situated,  going  beyond the  individual-  and State-centrism of  the
standard model of representation since Hobbes. This attention to broader ecologies
and systems is not exclusive of recent representative theory, but also appears in the
deliberative literature. The case of Habermas, above, is paradigmatic. More recently,
Mansbridge et  al.  (2012)  have appealed to  a  “systemic approach to  deliberative
democracy” and spoken of socially distributed “deliberative systems”. I may think of
others: “participatory systems”, “representation systems”, etc. integrated into what
may be called “ecosystems of democracy”, or just of ecologies of political practices.
These ecosystems would include as subsystems other systems or ecosystems. One
may say the 15M cycle enriched the ecosystem of democracy previously existing in
Spain with alter-democratic discourses and practices.
2.2.  Technopolitics:  the  coupled  becoming  of  technology  and
politics
In a structural homology with the previous section, this one is oriented to outline what
“technopolitics” (as above with the case of “democracy”)  may mean, and to map
some traditions and approaches for thinking about it78.
In the last years “technopolitics” has come close to be a buzzword in Spain 79 in some
78 It will take much less than what it took to do so for politics and democracy, though. This is due to
two main reasons: the first is that the focus of the present work lies mostly on the technopolitical
becoming  of  the  old  politics  rather  than  on  the  technopolitical  becoming  of  the  old  technology,
otherwise, I attend much more to the shifts in politics and political ontology rather than to those in
technology  and  technological  ontology;  the  second,  connected  to  it,  is  that  there  has  been less
theoretical reflection and elaboration (and, thereby, differentiation of traditions, schools, debates, etc.)
on technology than on politics. As we will see, this is no coincidence but rather a bias whose roots can
be traced back to the beginning of Western thought.
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activist  and  political  circles.  A  variety  of  actors,  usually  from  an  analytical
perspective, have used the term as an adjective to qualify different 15M processes,
actors and organizations (Sánchez, 2013a, Gutiérrez, 2017), strategies, tactics, and
more (Toret et al., 2015). It has become a key term in the rising research literature
around 15M (f.i.:  Serrano et  al.,  2014).  It  has been matter  of  some dispute,  but
mostly  it  has  become a  comfortable  umbrella  term to  name the  hybridization  of
technology and politics, especially since 2011.
As suggested by the quotes in the introduction, like in Marga Padilla’s metaphor of
an “upgrade of the political”, and as I show in the empirical analysis, the 15M cycle
has involved narratives and projects that implied a technological becoming of politics
(networked social movement organizations, campaigns, political parties, etc.), while
others  brought  about  a  political  becoming  of  technologies  (reappropriation  of
commercial  social  media for  collective action,  development of  alternative political
platforms, etc.). The double, usually converging, becoming of technology and politics
I  just  mentioned  may  be  a  provisional  definition  for  “technopolitics”  as  a
phenomenon. A relevant aspect is the iteration of these becomings: struggle around
the politics of concrete technologies may affect their uses and associated political
practices, which may, in turn, involve further rounds of technologies and uses.
2.2.2. Technology and politics in STS: a first approach to technopolitics
My  exploration  of  technopolitics  begins  with  STS  and  its  critique  of  usual
understandings of technologies. Bijker (2006: 683) suggests that the “standard view”
of technology today, inherited from the Enlightenment, sees it, similarly to science,
as “objective, value-free, and discovered by specialists. Technology, similarly, is an
autonomous force in  society  and technology’s  working  is  an  intrinsic  property  of
technical machines and processes.”
Far from this neutral  and substantialist view, STS has long theorized the relation
between technology and politics.  Some STS authors have concluded that ‘‘it is too
weak  a  position  even  to  see  technology  and  politics  as  interacting:  there  is  no
categorical distinction to be made between the two’’ (MacKenzie, 1990: 412–13) and
that “all technology is political and all politics is technological”80 (Bijker, 2006: 701).
79 As an illustration of this, the Socialist party has organized workshops on “Technopolitics” attended
by its Secretary General at the time (Rubalcaba, 2013), or books by usual contributors to mainstream
newspapers such as Antonio Gutiérrez-Rubí (2014).
80 This goes against the grain of much more usual “boundary work” carried on by actors (primarily,
experts and politicians, but also plenty of activists) and analysts oriented to separate political and
technological matters, spacetimes and processes (a clear example of this are Collins & Evans 2002,
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But general positions on the matter, such as these, have been (Brown, 2015) and will
be problematized here, for three reasons: the first, that it is only within a concrete
setting  (as  Bijker  himself  2006  reclaims)  that  one  can  decide  whether  the
identification of technology and politics is strongly or weakly justified; the second,
that what really matters is “what politics” and “what technologies, how, by whom”;
and third, because much 15M activist work—as the quotes in the introduction to this
thesis already suggest—had a teleo-technopolitical edge, that is, it explicitly aimed at
framing and working technology and politics together. This requires not only to attend
to the concrete cases of empirical technopolitics but also account for this normative-
proactive aspect. Technopolitics did not merely happen but was thought and acted
upon:  there was not only a  de facto  technopolitics (being played out)  but also a
reflexive (being thought and debated over) and a deliberate technopolitics (in the
sense of being worked for and, sometimes, decided upon through deliberative action
and  interaction81).  That  is  clear  in  chapter  6,  with  regard  to  the  digital  platform
Decidim.barcelona.
In spite of Mackenzie's and Bijker's calls to dissolve all boundaries, for exposition
purposes, I maintain the distinction. From the viewpoint of the role of technologies in
politics, I am interested in how STS insists on the heterogeneous material practices,
involving humans and nonhumans, that bring about any political system. In this they
clearly  depart  from  most  approaches  coming  from political  science  and  political
theory, which tend to share a human-only-focused (humanist) narrative, and, in many
cases, an idealist tone too, which attends to the concepts and narratives of other
theorists only. Differently, STS approaches usually attend both to non-humans and to
materiality, questioning positions according to which “anyone can be an actor. Only a
citizen can be a political  actor” (Barber, 1984: 126).  For instance, Mitchell  (2011:
109) has suggested to “think of democracy not in terms of the history of an idea or
the emergence of a social movement, but as the assembling of machines”. I try to
essay these three possible approaches in the thesis.
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  role  of  politics  in  technology,  my  narrative  oscillates
between  the  critical  theory  of  technology  position  (Feenberg,  1999)  and  the
constructivist  one (Latour,  1987,  1992,  2002;  Pickering,  1995,  2010).  It  presents
2008,  but  also  15M  related  processes).  The  separation  has  usually  favored  subsequent
instrumentalist and de-politicizing positions: technologies are conceived as mere “tools”; experts are
mere “technical truth tellers” (Foucault, 1984).
81 For the threefold “de facto”, reflexive, and deliberate, see Fisher (2007).
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technologies  as  assemblages  of  means  and  ends,  politically  contentious  and
emergent in their becoming, and at various points re-situates the human in those
processes in a posthumanist manner. This position goes primarily against the usual
instrumentalist view of technology, in which the human appears as a self-conscious
subject  controlling  a  tool  that  is  value-neutral  and transparent  to  its  well-defined
goals. Beyond blurring the boundaries in a classical STS fashion, or evaluating this
predicament with general techno-pessimist or techno-optimist evaluations, the key is
to follow what concrete technopolitics have been aimed for, built and practiced, how,
and  by  whom.  This  is  what  I  would  name  as  a  “techno-critical”  and  “techno-
alternative” position.
2.2.2.1. A STS framework for the politics of technology in projects within the 15M
cycle
According to Papadopoulos, five positions can be found in STS for analyzing the
politics  of  technoscience.  I  believe  these  five  positions  are  useful  to  outline  the
politics of technology, and resemble the various models of democracy and politics
we analyzed in the previous part of this chapter. According to Papadopoulos, a first
position is a “formalist” view based on the political ontology of democratic liberalism,
that recurs to a contractualist framework to assign (experts in) politics and (experts
in) technology to concrete, well-demarcated places in sociotechnical processes. The
crucial  task  is  to  find  a  normative  framework  for  expertise,  which  draws  new
boundaries and assigns clear places to various, sometimes new, types of experts.
This position is advocated by authors such as Collins and Evans (2008, 2010).
A second viewpoint portrayed by Papadopoulos, a “participatory” view approach to
politics in technoscience,  based on a republican82 political  ontology, appeals to  a
potentiation of civil society and its presence in sociotechnical processes. According
to Papadopoulos, its key lies in stressing the value of deliberation and the inclusion
of the public, as advocated by authors such as Lengwiler (2008), Irwin and Michael
(2003), or Wynne (2005).
Third,  Papadopoulos  distinguishes  a  “posthumanist  assembly”  view  based  on  a
governance political  ontology (Latour  1993,  2004;  Callon,  1987;  Law, 2004;  Mol,
2002),  where there is no central  political  actor  a priori.  It  stresses the productive
relations between heterogeneous (human and nonhuman) actors and has a clear
82 Papadopoulos uses the term “communitarian” but, as I noticed when discussing modern political
ontologies, communitarianism is a derivation from a broader republican view, which I believe is closer
to the positions he describes.
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and key anti-foundationalist character.
Fourth,  Papadopoulos  situates  a  “grounded”  approach  to  the  politics  of
technoscience,  based  on  an  antagonist  ontology,  which  stresses  the  role  of
contentious politics in technoscience, and has situated experience and action as its
key focus.  Here  he situates  authors  such as  Donna Haraway (1997)  or  Andrew
Feenberg (1999).
As  a  complement  and  an  alternative  to  the  first  three  positions  (formalist,
participatory,  posthumanist  assembly),  which  play  within  a  “constituted”  political
order, he appeals to a fifth approach, a constituent politics of technoscience, tied to
the creation of alternative forms of life83, based on the constitution of “new socio-
material realities” in relation to new languages and “skilled practices”. These bring
about  what  Papadopoulos  calls  “alter-ontologies”,  which  I  find  a  very  valuable
concept  to  think  through  some  of  the  experimentations  in  democracy  and
technopolitics essayed during the 15M cycle84.
TABLE 8. MODELS OF POLITICS OF TECHNOSCIENCE.
Politics Key Process Political ontology
Formalist
Normative
definitions of
expertise
Contractualism Democratic liberalism
Participatory
Deliberation and
inclusion of the
public
Invigoration of
civil society
Communitarianism
Assembly Anti-
foundationalism
Relational
productionism
Governance
83  “Technologies as forms of life” is a formula first used by Winner (1986).
84 To  complement  the  mapping,  I  recur  to  his  indirect  synthesis  of  the  central  strength  and
weaknesses  of  the  first  four  positions  (Papadopoulos,  2011:  194):  “Constituent  politics  in
technoscience cannot but emerge out of the different accounts of politics already existing in STS.
They draw from the formalist approach its democratic sensibility towards non-contributory experts,
from participatory politics its bottom-up citizen perspective on science, from assembly politics the
agency of nonhumans, and finally from grounded politics – of which constituent politics are obviously
a direct continuation – the importance of a situated view of complex asymmetrical lifeworlds and the
transversality  of  neglected  experiences.  At  the  same  time  constituent  politics  evolve  from  the
limitations  of  these  approaches:  the  neglect  of  the  conflicts  which  underlie  technoscientific
controversies in the formalist approach; the reduction of public deliberation to the extent to which
given institutions allow participatory politics; the ignorance towards radical divergences which do not
comply with relational networks of governance in assembly politics; the reification of the experiences
of marginalized actors in early notions of grounded politics.”
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Grounded Situated action Contentious
politics
Social and ecological
antagonism
Constituent Creation of new
forms of life and
ontologies
Socio-material
production
Autonomist
Four of the five positions can be reconnected to the models I outlined earlier. The
formalist, to the liberal representative ontology, the participatory, to the republican,
the grounded to the antagonist, and the constituent ontology to the autonomist.
2.2.3. Between technoscience and a grammar of technopolitics
In order to dig further into the notion of technopolitics, I recur to Donna Haraway's
(1997)  threefold  articulation  of  technoscience  into  “syntax”,  “semantics”,  and
“pragmatics”.  I  believe that  many aspects  of  15M technopolitics can be grouped
around these three axes85.  However,  differently  from Haraway,  I  do not  take this
threefold  as  defining  an  “anatomy  of  meanings”  but  rather  as  an  “anatomy  of
practice”, an anatomy of the practice of technopolitical  contention within the 15M
cycle.
Within the rubric of “syntax” I primarily attend to two aspects of technopolitics within
the 15M cycle: first, to the politics of (infra)structures86, otherwise, to discourses and
practices  involved  in  the  construction  of  infrastructures  (f.i.:  n-1  or
Decidim.barcelona), second, to infrastructures for politics, otherwise, to the regimes
of relationality, action and appropriation resulting from such infrastructures. Although
these two aspects are intertwined, I focus on the former and leave the second (f.i.,
the  analysis  of  affordances  of  social  networks  such  as  Facebook  or  n-1  as
developed by Gil, 2012) for a later work.
Within the rubric of “semantics” I attend to the discourses generated by actors within
the  15M cycle.  Otherwise,  I  look into  15M cycle discourses on what  democracy
should be and how to get there.
Finally, within the rubric of “pragmatics” I look into the democratic and technopolitical
practices deployed by 15M cycle actors. These intertwine, but can analytically be
distinguished from, the previous two. Technopolitical  practices frequently combine
85 With the possible addition of a fourth (which may count as a specific subset under pragmatics):
prosody.
86 I use this formula as an abbreviation of “organizational structures and technological infrastructures¨.
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various  infrastructures  and  can  generate  new,  hybrid  regimes  of  relationality.
Perhaps more interestingly, the attention to both discourse and practice serves to
frame a recurrent issue within the cycle: the relation between what people say and
what they do beyond speech.
2.2.4. Technopolitics: a problematic conceptual genealogy
After briefly exploring useful STS insights into the relation of technology and politics,
I  will  now  briefly  recount  different  takings  on  the  concept  of  “technopolitics”.
“Technopolitics” is a polysemic and problematic word. Its uses have diverged widely.
Here I present only a very resumed synthesis of those uses. I can distinguish the key
areas  in  the  development  of  the  notion  that  are  relevant  for  understanding  the
various  dimensions  and  projects  of  technopolitics  within  the  15M  cycle:
technological  regimes,  citizenship,  democracy,  communication,  and  contentious
politics.
A key aspect covered by the concept is that of the construction of technologies and
sociotechnical systems. The concept of “technopolitical regimes” (Hecht, 2009: 56-
57) points to
‘‘linked  sets  of  individuals,  engineering  and  institutional  practices,  technological
artifacts,  political  programs,  and institutional  ideologies acting together  to  govern
technological  development  and  pursue  technopolitics  (a  term  that  describes  the
strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact
political goals)’’87.
In a similar way, Langdon Winner's (1986: 54) noticed that “in our time, techne has at
last  become politeia--our  instruments  are  institutions in  the making”.  Taken as  a
whole,  according  to  Winner,  technologies  amount  to  a  “second  constitution”,
superimposed  on  the  political-juridical  one.  As  this  technopolitical  constitution
emerges,  new  forms  of  citizenship  may  be  required.  Winner  (1992:  335)  has
advanced these arguments calling for “forms of citizenship appropriate to this way of
being”, stressing that “citizen deliberation and action ought to be encouraged” (ibid.).
The potential transformations of democracy, as noticed by Stefano Rodotà (1997)
may  be  deep.  In  his  “Technopolitics:  democracy  and  the  new  technologies  of
87 As suggested by Nahuis & Van Lente (2008), different STS approaches allow not only to explore
technopolitics, but also to map technopolities, otherwise “social regimes” tied to technologies.
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communication”  he  stresses  the  relevance  of  a  crucial  possibility  opened  by
technopolitics:  while  both  representative  and  traditional  direct  democracy  are
episodic,  information  and  communication  technologies  open  the  possibility  of  a
“continuous democracy”88, in which “the voice of the citizenry can rise up at any time
and from any place and take part in the daily political concert”  (Rodotà, 1997: 4,
translation is mine). He also quotes Berardi (1996: 116, translation is mine) affirming
how “the network is not an instrument of democracy (it may well be so, but in an
absolutely marginal way). The network is rather the paradigm of a model of a new
democracy,  a  democracy without  references to  the center”.  According  to  Rodotà
democracy  may  become  “electronics  plus  participation”89.  Nevertheless,  the  key
innovation  resides not  in  the technologies but  in  the  collective perception of  the
process, the multiplicity of  technical  instruments and their  integration,  all  of  them
converging and nurturing a digital logic that pervades politics: this is what Rodotà
understands by the generic term “technopolitics”.
In a similar way, Pierre Lévy (1997: 66) noticed that “the technopolitical problem of
democracy in cyberspace is to provide a community with the means to develop a
collective  voice  without  the  need  for  representation”.  He  described,  with  some
techno-utopian  tones,  some  key  performances  of  what  he  calls  “real  time
democracy” in cyberspace, where
“together citizens would elaborate a diverse political  landscape that was not pre-
constrained by the gaping molar separation among different  parties.  The political
identity of the citizens would be defined by their contributions to the construction of a
political  landscape  that  was  perpetually  in  flux  and  by  their  support  for  various
problems (to which they give priority), positions (to which they would adhere), and
arguments (which they would in turn make use of). In this way, everyone would have
a completely  unique political  identity  and role,  distinct  from any other  individual,
coupled with the possibility of working with others having similar or complementary
positions on a given subject, at a given moment.”
At  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  Douglas  Kellner  (2001:  182)  generically  defined
technopolitics as “the use of new technologies such as computers and the Internet to
88 Something similar to what, in a positive light, Levy calls “real time democracy”, and others have
called “real-time politics”, with a negative emphasis on surveillance (Agre, 2002).
89 The formula echoes Lenin’s presentation of communism as “Soviet power plus electrification”.
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advance political goals”90. He noticed that “to some extent, politics in the modern era
has always been mediated by technology […] What is new about computer  and
information-technology-mediated  politics  is  that  information  can  be  instantly
communicated  to  large  numbers  of  individuals  throughout  the  world  who  are
connected  via  computer  networks”.  He  stressed  their  possibilities  for  the
empowerment of excluded voices and to nurture radical democracy, characterized by
a  strong  and  inclusive  participation91.  To  him,  it  is  key  to  develop  a  “radical
democratic media politics” which includes a critique and a democratization of, as well
as the development of alternatives to, the current media system, both public and
private92, to “democratise computers and information” (Kellner, 1999).
In a similar line, technopolitics has been associated, especially since the 2000s, with
contentious politics. In his text “Hacklabs, the collective assemblage of technopolitics
as  a  social  reality”,  Xabier  Barandiaran  (2003),  a  hacktivist  who  participated  in
Internet struggles heading to 15M, 15M itself, and later came to be coordinator of the
Decidim project (see chapter 6) suggests hacklabs, hackmeetings and the hacker
attitude as a
“a  way of  (collectively)  experimenting  the  limits  of  the  codes and machines that
surround us,  in  order to  re-appropriate their  possible  and sociopolitically  relevant
uses;  inserting  them in  the  autonomous  social  processes  where  we  situate  our
practices  (okupied and  self-managed  social  centers  and  grassroots  social
movements)”.
I take this as a form of what I would define as “technopolitical autonomy”, a collective
(grassroots) reappropriation and production of technologies and politics93. This view
90 He  added  “the  use  of  computer-mediated  technology  for  technopolitics,  however,  opens  new
terrains of political struggle for voices and groups excluded from the mainstream media and thus
increases  potential  for  intervention  by  oppositional  groups,  potentially  expanding  the  scope  of
democratization.”
91 According to him, radical democracy “defines democracy in terms of strong participation, including
that of individuals and groups previously excluded, which requires both access to information and to
the  media  of  debate  and  discussion,  and  thus  makes  possible  an  expansion  of  the  terrain  and
substance of democratic participation” (Kellner, 1999: 102).
92 Kellner's  insistence  on  radical  democracy,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  on  media  politics,
anticipates many issues to be discussed under the umbrella of 15M's technopolitics, especially on
chapter 4.
93 While for “technological autonomy” the key resides on generating one's own technologies according
to one's own rules, “technopolitical autonomy” involves political forms as well technological ones.
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was brought to 15M94.
Already in the 2011 cycle of contention, in their analysis of the 15M movement, Toret
et al. (2013: 20, translation is mine) defined technopolitics as “the tactic and strategic
use of digital tools for collective organization, communication, and action […] The
capacity of connected multitudes, of networked brains and bodies, to created and
self-modulate  collective  action”.  Like  Barandiaran's,  this  definition  is  tied  to  an
autonomist and antagonist approach to democracy, but differently from the former´s
approach, this time technopolitics goes beyond the alternative scene of occupied
centers to open itself to the social majorities that took part in 15M.
2.2.4.1. Technopolitics resumed
As this resume illustrates, technopolitics has been constructed differently across time
and positions. In the empirical chapters I try to characterize the shifting shapes that it
took  in  practice,  within  the  15M  cycle.  When  looking  at  it,  I  build  upon  the
discussions here:
1-I cross, rethink, and look at the multidirectional entanglements between, abolish
boundaries between, or look at the co-production of politics and technology (each of
these options actually imply a different conception of technopolitics);
2-I attend to humans and nonhumans;
3-I look at its syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
2.3.  Sociology:  from  social  movements  to  contentious
technopolitics
As I noticed in the introduction, the three key matters of concern of this thesis are
democracy, technopolitics, and the 15M cycle. The 15M movement was the central
event in the cycle attended in this study. Furthermore, social movement literature
provides key tools for understanding the cycle itself.  In this part  I  dig into social
movement  and contentious politics  literature  (as  well  as  media  theory,  in  a  less
intensive way) to provide a conceptual framework to understand the 15M cycle, as
well as some of the sociopolitical transformations (in this case, in movements and
contentious  politics)  it  has  brought  about.  In  order  to  do  so,  I  first  present  key
theories on social  movements and then see how recent  “networked movements”
94 The tandem of occupied and self-managed social centers plus hacktivists will be relevant for the
emergence of the movement, especially in Madrid. They were also behind the construction and later
diffusion of relevant 15M practices and platforms such as n-1, among many others (for a synthesis,
Alcazan et al., 2012).
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may be breaking with some of what were considered their basic tenets. I select key
social movement elements (according to the social movement literature) that may be
suffering  a  transformation  in  networked  social  movements  such  as  the  15M
movement:  collective  identity,  frames,  and  organization.  These  will  serve  me  to
analyze the movement in chapter 4. I then discuss in detail the notion of "networked
multitude", which I find valuable to understand 15M, and see how it connects with
those systemic changes in networked social movements. In relation to it, I propose a
complex  “technopolitical  approach”  to  15M,  which  involves  looking  at  syntax
(infrastructures),  semantics (discourses),  pragmatics (practices),  and multi-layered
assemblages involving digital and physical spaces. I suggest the need of conceiving
15M as a “networked movement of the squares”,  which may be classified as an
anarchopopulist or citizenist (to use Gerbaudo's 2016 formulation) within the wider
genre  of  networked  movements.  Perhaps  more  crucially,  I  believe  the  cycle  it
inaugurated requires to move from earlier notions of “contentious politics” to that of
“contentious  technopolitics”,  in  which  technological  contention  appears
indistinguishable  from  political  contention:  technology  becomes  political,  politics,
technological.             
2.3.1. The “classical view” of social movements
In order to clarify key aspects of the social movement form, it is worth to start with
Mario Diani (1992: 13) descriptive definition, according to which “a social movement
is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or
organizations, engaged in a political  or cultural  conflict,  on the basis of a shared
collective identity”.
According Charles Tilly (2004: 3-4), social movements emerged in the second half of
the XVIIIth century, as an interactive synthesis of three pre-existing forms of political
action: campaigns, repertoires, and displays of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers,
and commitment)95.
95 The full passage clarifies: “1. a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target
authorities (let us call it a campaign); 2. employment of combinations from among the following forms
of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn
processions, vigils,  rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and
pamphleteering  (call  the  variable  ensemble  of  performances the  social  movement  repertoire);  3.
participants' concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment
on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call  them WUNC displays)”.  Although Tilly's
dating of the origin is based on this definition, the path he outlines has a broader acceptance, and
thereby  is  somehow independent  from it.  WUNC  stands  for  “worthiness:  sober  demeanor;  neat
clothing;  presence  of  clergy,  dignitaries,  and  mothers  with  children;  unity:  matching  badges,
headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing and chanting; numbers: headcounts,
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A campaign goes beyond any single event and combines different elements ranging
from petitions to demonstrations. It also goes beyond the actors involved 96. It is in the
interaction between the three mentioned elements that a social movement emerges.
Tilly goes on to characterize movements as contentious politics since
“they emerged as a form of contentious politics—contentious in the sense that social
movements involve collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with
someone  else's  interests,  politics  in  the  sense  that  governments  of  one  sort  or
another  figure  somehow  in  the  claim  making,  whether  as  claimants,  objects  of
claims,  allies  of  the  objects,  or  monitors  of  the  contention”  (Tilly  2004:  3,  from
McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001).
On this last respect, movements involve “three parties: a group of self-designated
claimants, some object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind”. On top of that, Tilly
(2004: 12) clarifies that “social movements combine three kinds of claims: program,
identity,  and  standing”97.  Each  of  them,  and  their  salience,  vary  from one  actor,
phase, or social movement, to another. They have varied historically, along with their
interactive ensemble, the movement form.
2.3.2.  Collective  action  from  resource  mobilization  theory  to  contentious
politics
2.3.2.1. Resource mobilization theory, political process and repertoires
As a social  form, social  movements are a paradigmatic case of collective action.
Opposed  to  collective  behavior,  which  does  not  imply  any  form  of  rationality,
normativity or even intentionality, or collective/social choice, which results from the
signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, filling streets; commitment: braving bad weather;
visible  participation by the old  and handicapped;  resistance to  repression;  ostentatious,  sacrifice,
subscription, and/or benefaction” (Tilly 2004: 4).
96 Tilly (2004: 6-7) has noticed that “analysts often confuse a movement's collective action with the
organizations and networks that support the action, or even consider the organizations and networks
to constitute the movement”. Following Touraine and Melucci, he criticized how this implies to take
"the  movement"  as  a  single  unitary  actor,  thus  obscuring  both  a)  the  incessant  jockeying  and
realignment  that  always  go  on  within  social  movements  and  b)  the  interaction  among  activists,
constituents, targets, authorities, allies, rivals, enemies, and audiences that makes up the changing
texture of social movements.”
97 He specifies that “program claims involve stated support for or opposition to actual or proposed
actions  by  the  objects  of  movement  claims.  Identity  claims  consist  of  assertions  that  "we"-the
claimants-constitute a unified force to be reckoned with.  WUNC (worthiness,  unity,  numbers,  and
commitment)  performances backup identity  claims.  Standing claims assert  ties and similarities  to
other political actors, for example excluded minorities, properly constituted citizens' groups, or loyal
supporters of the regime. They sometimes concern the standing of other political actors, for example
in calls for expulsion of immigrants or their exclusion from citizenship”.
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aggregation of choices by rational actors, collective action appears as “the effort to
produce collective goods”  (Tilly  1978:  27).  A long XXth century social  movement
tradition opened by Mancur Olson (1965) sees a problem with this: in a group large
enough, people can benefit from the result of the effort while not contributing to it,
that is, actors in the group can “free ride”. According to the work of Olson, to free ride
is rational for actors as the collective effort may not succeed, and others may be not
contributing. If everyone is a selfish, calculating actor, how is it that collective action
and goods actually  exist?  If  social  movements  are forms of  collective  action,  as
Olson suggests, how are they possible? Olson provides three answers: a) Coercion
and group pressure, b) the abundance of some actors of certain goods, which would
neutralize  the  calculus,  and  c)  “selective  incentives”98,  what  actors'  leading  the
pursue of the collective good would enjoy on top of the collective good itself.
Oberschall (1973) stressed the availability and mobilization of resources as the key
factor  behind  collective  action99.  McCarthy  and  Zald  (1977:  1217–1218)  defined
movements  as  “a  set  of  opinions  and  beliefs  in  a  population  which  represents
preferences  for  changing  some  elements  of  the  social  structure  and/or  reward
distribution of a society”. According to them, leading activists are entrepreneurs that
create  social  movement  organizations  that  answer  to  this  “demand”,  not  unlike
companies do with demands in the economic realm. They are the suppliers, and
collective action is the product for which consumers are willing to pay100. Resources
are  “anything  from material  resources—jobs,  incomes,  savings,  and  the  right  to
material  goods  and  services—to  non-material  resources—authority,  moral
commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry” (Oberschall, 1973: 28).
This is the core of Resource Mobilization Theory. Leaders and strong organizations
emerge  as  resource  mobilizers.  In  order  to  mobilize  anyone  else  into  collective
action, they need to mobilize resources first.
As a complement to the RMT, and particularly in the 1980s (McAdam, 1982), the
98 When some suggest that these incentives are personal joy derive of some aspect of collective
action, there is a clear stretch of the image of the selfish, interested individual. Others suggested that
some sort of collective authority (a government) is the most frequent factor contributing to override
this problem.
99 Unlike  collective  behavior  positions,  resource  mobilization  is  able  to  account  for  the  usual
emergence  of  movements  in  times  of  economic  growth  and  political  freedom:  as  opportunities,
resources and benefits increase, and constraints and costs diminish, collective action increases.
100 McCarthy  and  Zald  describe  the  emergence  of  “social  movement  industries”  and  a  “social
movement sector”, in which different social movement organizations mobilize and usually compete for
resources  (human  and  material),  trying  to  bring  non-adherents  to  the  movement  and  to  their
organization, to survive in time, to increase their power, etc.
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“political  process” (PP) approach emerged. One of its key tenets is the notion of
“political opportunity structures” proposed by Peter K. Eisinger, “such factors as the
nature of  the chief  executive,  the mode of aldermatic election,  the distribution of
social skills and status, and the degree of social disintegration […] the climate of
government responsiveness and the level of community resources” (Eisinger, 1973:
11). Eisinger anticipates that protests will be higher in polities with a combination of
opportunities and constraints, decreasing if the polity is or becomes too closed or too
open to participation: the former represses social movements, the latter suppresses
the need of them.
Charles Tilly (1995: 26) has proposed the notion of repertoires of contention to refer
to  “a  limited  set  of  routines  that  are  learned,  shared  and  acted  out  through  a
relatively  deliberate  process  of  choice.  This  is  another  relevant  element  to  both
understand  movements  and  appreciate  changes  in  their  forms.  Repertoires  are
learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take
shape as a result of political propaganda: they emerge from struggle”. The idea is
that,  in  movements  and social  struggles,  people  begin  to,  and thereby  learn  to,
articulate discourses, demonstrate, stage parades, sign petitions, use social media
for campaigning, etc. There are concrete repertoires available at a concrete historical
period, which both enable and constrain the choices of protesters.
2.3.2.2. Frames
Since the  mid-80s,  a  crucial  addition  to  the  RMT and PP traditions  was that  of
“framing”101, the contentious and active process of meaning making by actors in and
around  social  movements.  I  use  this  notion  (and  others  associated  to  it,  with
modifications  such  as  those  noticed  below)  when  looking  at  15M  cycle  actors’
discourses. According to Benford & Snow (2000: 614), framing “implies agency and
contention  at  the  level  of  reality  construction”.  They  “simplifying  and condensing
aspects of the world out there” (2000: 614), and orient action, “mobilize potential
adherents  and  constituents,  to  garner  bystander  support,  and  to  demobilize
antagonists”  (1988:  198).  Perhaps  narrowing  down  the  notion  excessively,  they
conclude that they are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and
101 Up  to  that  point,  these  issues  had  been  “discussed  descriptively  and  statically  rather  than
analytically and dynamically […] or they were dismissed as being largely irrelevant to the development
of social movements, as in the early resource mobilization literature” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613).
They were subsumed under the “ideology” label. Ideology serves as “constraint and resource” for
framing and collective action frames, which in turn renew, innovate upon, or go against it (Benford &
Snow, 1992, Benford, 2000).
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legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO)”
(ibid.).
Snow  &  Benford  (1988)102 distinguish  three  “core  framing  tasks”:  diagnostic,
prognostic,  and motivational.  Diagnostic  framing consists  in the identification and
attribution of problems and responsibilities. Prognostic framing is the development of
potential solutions or plans for action. Motivational framing tries to foster “consensus
mobilization” and “action mobilization” (Klandermans, 1984), otherwise, to get the
agreement of as many people as possible and convince them to act. In my analysis,
I break down “prognostic framing” (which is, I believe, a misnomer, since prognostic
is  a  merely  anticipatory  statement)  into  two  different  discursive  functions:  the
normative/ideal, that speaks of an ideal state of things, the “what” to be achieved in
collective action, and the prescriptive/practice one, that turns around how to get to
such a state, and, more broadly, concerns the “what to do”.
Frames  sometimes  connect  to  or  build  up  into  “master-frames”  (such  as  those
around “rights”,  “choice”,  or  “democracy”),  frames that  stand out  for  their  “broad
interpretive scope, inclusivity,  flexibility, and cultural resonance” (Benford & Snow,
2000: 619).
Any  framing  process  faces  processes  of  counter-framing  (Benford,  1987),  from
outside and from within what is framed as “the movement”. These disputes are multi-
actor, from activists to mass media, governments or general citizens.
2.3.2.3. Cycles of contention
Another crucial notion for my analysis generated within the RMT and PP tradition,
particularly in the work of Tarrow (1989, 1994, 1995), is that of cycles of contention. A
cycle  of  contention  is  a  period  of  heightened  contention  and  protest,  in  which
“information  flows  more  rapidly,  political  attention  heightens,  and  interactions
amongst  groups  of  challengers  and  between  them  and  authorities  increase  in
frequency and intensity” (Tarrow, 1994: 146).
Frames are what the cycle “is about”, the cycle is the case-by-case becoming of the
frames.  According  to  Tarrow  (1994),  four  reasons  define  the  end  of  a  cycle:
exhaustion,  institutionalization,  factionalism,  and  repression  or  social  control.
According to Snow & Benford (1992) loss of resonance of master frames too.
102 They vary in problem identification and direction-locus of attribution, flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity
and  exclusivity,  interpretive  scope  and  influence,  and  resonance.  Resonance  is  a  particularly
interesting concept, since according to Benford & Snow depends on credibility and salience.  
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2.3.2.4. Contentious politics: from social movements to democratization
An even more crucial concept for my analysis is that of contentious politics. Since
the 1990s, authors such as by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly have joined together in a
research  agenda  devoted  to  systematize  and  analyze  a  variety  of  phenomena
usually  studied  separately,  such  as  revolutions,  strikes,  demonstrations,  social
movements,  wars,  democratization,  and more.  Grouping them under  the label  of
“contentious politics”, these authors refer to “episodic, public, collective interaction
among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a
claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if
realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (McAdam, Tarrow &
Tilly,  2001:  5)103.  In  one sentence,  this  new agenda looks for  the “explanation of
contentious politics by identifying crucial  mechanisms and processes104 within and
across episodes” (idem, 84). Interestingly, they call to connect the study of social
movements with that of other political processes (Tilly, 2004). They also suggest to
look for their general patterns and analogies, rather than for causal mechanisms. For
the present work, it is the attention to processes of democratization and their relation
to  movements  that  holds  more  promise.  As  I  mentioned  in  the  part  1  of  this
theoretical framework, the literature on democratization dismissed social movements
until fairly recently, and the same did social movement theory with democratization
processes.
Crucially,  though, I  believe it  is necessary to open up the concept of contentious
politics and that of cycle of contention to hold more than traditional, discontinuous,
movement and WUNC displays. Contention and construction are at the core of all
the projects that I analyze in the empirical chapters. Even when 15M activists went
on to form political  parties (such as the X Party,  analyzed on chapter 5) or new
institutional  infrastructures  (such  as  Decidim.barcelona,  analyzed  on  chapter  6),
103 The first trait  stands for its political character, the second, for its contentiousness. Since these
processes must be episodic, regular and well-established political processes are excluded, and since
they must be public, organizations such as companies, churches or clubs are discarded as well. The
generality of the definition fosters the extension of the content and thereby the possibilities for finding
differences, similarities, connections and other relations among a variety of political forms.
104 Among the mechanisms they include:  a)  collective attribution of  threat  and opportunity,  which
“involves (a) invention or importation and (b) diffusion of a shared definition concerning alterations in
the likely consequences of possible actions (or, for that matter, failures to act) undertaken by some
political  actor”  (95);  social  appropriation,  the  “active  appropriation  of  sites  for  mobilization”  (44);
brokerage “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their
relations  with  one  another  and/or  with  yet  other  sites”  (26);  certification  and  decertification,  the
“validation of  actors,  their  performances,  and their  claims by external  authorities”  (121);  category
formation, “a set of sites that share a boundary distinguishing all of them from and relating all of them
to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary” (143).
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many  of  the  core  people,  discourses,  practices,  and  political  enemies  were  the
same. These initiatives clearly composed a “cycle”, which I have labelled as “the
15M cycle”. Dividing it by declaring an “institutionalization” break implies to cut with
an analytical sword the Gordian knot of an entangled and shifting, contentious and
constructive,  becoming.  What  I  call  “the  15M  cycle”  of  contentious  and
technopolitical  reassembling  of  democracy  in  Spain  is  more  complex  than  a
“movement and its impacts” (as framed by Gerbaudo, 2016, and Monterde, 2015), it
is a transforming but continuous process that cuts across the divisions between civil
society and State, movements and institutions, individual and collective, as well as
between different  projects and initiatives (f.i.:  15M, the X party,  or the Offices  of
innovation in Democracy in Madrid and Barcelona) always mutating and bringing
different problems and possibilities. In the Anglo-Saxon model (Goldstone, 2001), the
strategy (and the aim) of movements is usually to change minds and mobilize civil
society  to  press  institutions  to  adopt  their  demands,  thereby  adapting  to,  and
adopting more or less unchanged, institutions as they are. Instead, in the 15M cycle
we see a wish, from the early 15M period, to remake those institutions, sometimes,
from their constitutional ground up105, when not to build others as alternatives.
2.3.3. Old and new social movements
As a movement, 15M has exhibited original features. As a reference for comparison,
I  resume  here  some  aspects  of  an  earlier  genre  of  movements:  new  social
movements.  In  the late  1970s and 1980s,  authors such as Touraine  (1981)  and
Melucci  (1980)  used  the  later  widespread  formula  “new  social  movements”  for
labelling movements such as the student, ecologist, indigenous, feminist, LGBT, or
hippie, which, since the 60s, were not articulated in and around economic narratives
and  goals  nor  around  the  subject-figures  of  the  worker  and  the  factory,  in  the
traditional Marxist fashion, but rather in and around cultural narratives and goals, a
variety of identities (gender, race, ethnicity, age, etc.) and spheres (media, culture,
knowledge, etc.). These shifts were related to the progressive decline of (already a
century old)  mass class  parties and the rise  of  other  party  formats  such as  the
electoralist “catch-all” (already in the 60s), and the movement-parties (particularly,
from the 80s onwards), which I analyzed in the “political section” of this theoretical
105 This radicality helps to differentiate 15M projects, and even its already milder and institutionalized
offshoots (such as Podemos or the local candidacies) from other examples of the so called “new
politics” after 15M, such as the softly reformist, liberal party Ciudadanos.
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framework.
Struggles around “identity”, which became common at the time, nurtured a strand of
studies based on Melucci's central notion: “collective identity”.
2.3.3.1. New social movements and collective identity106
In conceptual terms, a key contribution from the “new social movements” tradition to
the social movement literature, was to open an alternative paradigm to the “strategic”
or RMT one107: the NSM and collective identity paradigm108 (Cohen 1985). Influenced
by Touraine,  Alberto  Melucci  (1988,  1995,  1996)  was the main proponent  of  the
“collective  identity”  concept.  Melucci  (1996:  63-66)  suggested  that  identity,  as  a
choice of what to be, implies an “incalculable” that outflanks Olson's liberal logic of
calculation in collective action: it  becomes the very condition for any cost-benefit
analysis.  The  new  social  movements  tradition  stressed  dimensions  of  social
movements under-attended by the Anglo-Saxon tradition: culture, emotions, informal
relationships, and, identity. Identity was analyzed from the micro to the macro level
(Flesher  Fominaya,  2010;  Opp,  2009;  Polletta  & Jasper,  2001;  Snow,  2001).  He
provided a system- and network-friendly definition of collective identity by presenting
it as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups
at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field
of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place” (Melucci, 1995: 44–
45).
Criticisms have been raised, suggesting that the concept has been ‘overextended’
and ‘forced to  do too much analytically’ (Polletta & Jasper,  2001:  284–285).  The
result would have been a ‘slippery concept’ (Flesher Fominaya, 2010: 394), merely
“orienting”, giving heuristic value rather than causal or “empirical informativeness” to
Melucci's work (Opp, 2009). Later I comment upon my rethinking of this notion in
relation to ICTs and 15M (Monterde et al., 2015).
2.3.4. Views of networks in the social movement literature
Work  on  various  types of  networks  has  been frequent  within  the  RMT tradition,
revealing the relevance of friends' networks (Snow et al. 1980, McAdam 1982) or
segregated communities and “catnets” (or category based networks) in cases such
106 Most  of  our  elaboration  on  collective  identity  here  is  based  on a paper  that  we  co-authored
(Monterde et al., 2015).
107 It also influenced by research on frames (Benford & Snow, 2000).
108 Voices  coming  from the  Anglo-Saxon tradition  have  tried  to  make of  it  just  another  factor  in
individuals' calculations, from a RAT viewpoint (Opp, 2009), while others merged it with frame theory
(Benford & Snow, 2000 for a synthesis).
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as the civil rights movement (Tilly, 1979). Their “network argument” (Crossley, 2002)
went against Durkheimian styled assertions that root social movements in a state of
social  atomization  and  anomie.  Crossley  (2002:  97)  goes  on  to  suggest  that
networks are both at the origin, but also at the end, of movements, and interpret
previous literature as suggesting that “movements are networks”.
2.3.5. Recent debates on social movement studies: the centrality of ICTs, new
media, and technopolitical practices
In the last decade, deep innovations, challenges, or revisions in social movement
practice  and theory  have taken place.  The trend has accelerated since 2011.  A
crucial development in this period has been the rise to popularity of the internet in
the 1990s, a plethora of cultural practices associated to it, and the correlative rise of
the “network metaphor” to social prominence.
For my purposes, a key impact was a modulation of the “social movements” formula.
Jeffrey  Juris  (2004)  defined  the  “global  justice  movements”  of  the  2000s  as
“networked social  movements”,  a  formula that  has spread (Castells  2012).  More
recently,  Bennett  &  Segerberg  (2012,  2013)  have  grouped  emerging  forms  of
collective action as “digitally networked activism”. Toret et al. (2015) and, especially,
Monterde  (2015)  have  used  the  expression  network-movement  to  stress  the
relevance of the “network”, putting it on the same foot with the “movement”. For a
variety  of  reasons109,  obvious  in  the  empirical  chapters,  recent  movements  are
“sociotechnical”.
But the number of changes brought to social movement theory by ICTs, networks
and the sociotechnical practices associated to them have gone much further than the
general label: different authors analysing movements in the last fifteen years have
found and debated new logics of action and organization (Juris 2004, 2008; Bennett
&  Segerberg  2012,  2013),  framing  (Bennett  &  Segerberg,  2013),  relationality
(McDonald 2002), identity (McDonald, 2002; Monterde et al. 2015), as well as the
previous notion of “network” in social movement theory. I touch upon each of these in
turn, to outline some of the differential characteristics that seem to be associated
with networked social movements, such as 15M, which may be stretching previous
forms.
109 Pervasiveness of techniques and technologies, to the point where they appear as ever-present
nodes in  every  collective  action  network;  second,  their  presence  in  the  narratives,  symbols  and
imaginaries of these movements, shared many collectives, protests and projects—from anonymous to
demo4.0.; third, the relevance of advanced forms and logics of networking (Juris 2008)
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2.3.5.1. The new meaning of “networks”
dA key difference the meaning of “networks” in earlier movements and XXIst century
ones has to do with the rise of “networks” to social prominence as a technological
reality (the Internet), as an epoch tied to it (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001; Lessig,
2002;  Sassen,  2002),  as  well  as  an  onto-epistemic  transcendental  (Newman,
2010)110.  Related  to  these,  there  has  been  the  rise  to  prominence  of  “network
approaches”,  of  which  I  can  distinguish  two  key  ones:  the  “formal”  (or  syntax-
centered) approach epitomized in network science and the “practical” (or pragmatics-
centered) one deployed in actor network theory.
                          
The formal is the preeminent one in the literature in network science (Barabási 2002;
Newman, 2010). It puts the focus on the “net”, that is, on the “shape” or “form” of
concrete objects  or  phenomena111.This  approach goes back to  the  early  roots of
network  science  in  Leonhard  Euler's  graph  theory,  and  is  primarily  applied  to
structures and organization. The image below resumes three main types of networks
classically  distinguished  by  Baran  (1964)112:  centralized  (or  mono-centric),
decentralized (or polycentric), and distributed (or a-centric). It also synthesizes some
basic aspects of many communication networks today. A second formulation of the
110 An example of this is Barabási's (2002: 16): “Computers linked by phone lines, molecules in our
body  linked  by  biochemical  reactions,  companies  and  consumers  linked  by  trade,  nerve  cells
connected by axons, islands connected by bridge...Whatever the identity and the nature of the nodes
and links, for a mathematician they form the same animal: a graph or a network".
111 As indicated by Juris (2008: 316, ff 22), this emphasis on networks as forms and technologies has
been subjected to different criticisms, for giving a “sense of rigidity, order and of structure” instead of a
“sense of unevenness of the fabric and the fissures, fractures and gaps that it contains and forms”
(Barry 2001: 15), or for excessively underlining digital relations, with less or little regard for embodied
ones (McDonald 2006).
112 The relevance of this distinction lies in the fact that this was one of the first strong argumentations
for the ideal architecture of what later became the internet.
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“network  approach”  comes  from  STS.  Latour  (2005:  132)  suggests  a  double
difference to rethink the network metaphor: first, an inversion of elements, to think of
work-nets, in order “to see the labor that goes on in laying down net-works”; second,
to think of actor-network as a method to study things that may not have a network
shape113.  In  a  similar  direction,  Thacker  (2004)  has  contraposed  an  “Eulerian”,
geometric,  structural,  static view of “networks”,  to a “Bergsonian”,  temporal,  fluid,
living view.
Something similar to  those two views can be found in social  movement studies.
From an anthropological viewpoint, Juris (2008: 316) has essayed a critical, practice
oriented and complex reading of the network metaphor. In a rounded formula on the
triple presence of networks in XXIst century networked movements, he affirms that
“anti-corporate  globalization  movements  involve  an  increasing  confluence  among
network  technologies,  organizational  forms,  and  political  norms,  mediated  by
concrete networking practices and micropolitical struggles” (Juris 2008: 2)114. On the
other  hand,  Bennett  &  Segerberg  (2012)  outline  what  I  may  call  social  network
science approach115 which attends to net forms on social movements, usually tied to
social media. I try to combine those two approaches, pragmatics/practices (which
tend to cover the ANT or Juris' approach) as well as syntax/infrastructures (which
covers the social networks science approach).
As I show in the empirical chapters, the advance of sociotechnical networks towards
the core of sociopolitical realities bring about transformations in these forms (and
vice versa). In the analysis of the 15M cycle I  look at cases ranging from social
movements to State institutions.
2.3.5.2. Transformations of communication, societies and politics
Different  analyses  have  shown  the  centrality  of  information  and  communication
technologies  and  networks  in  politics  and,  specifically,  contemporary  contentious
politics. Bruce Bimber (2003: 8) has stressed the relevance of information (its costs,
how  it  is  produced,  circulated  and  distributed),  more  than  “communication”  or
“technology” as such116, for democracy and politics more broadly. According to him,
113 Latour notices how a building or a concert can be described in actor-network ways without having a
network-form at all, and vice versa, a network shaped circuit, object or the like may be described in
other ways than as a network.
114 Juris also speaks of the “network metaphor” but without unfolding the conceptual possibilities of the
expression.
115 A combination of sociology, media studies, and network science,
116 He suggests information regimes and revolutions have been key for the constitution of different
political periods in the US. He states the relation as follows: “A set of technological changes becomes
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the communication and organization of information has shaped modern politics in the
US, which he divides in four regimes punctuated by information revolutions. Each
regime is defined by the relations between information (f.i.: costs), organizations (f.i.:
hierarchies),  and  democratic  structure  (f.i.:  political  actors  and  institutions).  The
revolutions from one into another have been marked by regime disruption resulting
from  “technological  developments,  institutional  change,  or  economic  outcomes”,
which result in new opportunities to communicate politically and organize collective
action (Bimber 2003: 18). He situates several information revolutions in the US polity
that  broadly  align  with  Manin's  reconstruction  of  periods  of  representative
government: a) in the 1820s and 30s, an information revolution based on the rise of
newspapers  and  postal  services  gave  way  to  a  national  system  of  political
information and prepared the emergence of (notable) parties; b) from the 1880s to
the 1910s,  coinciding with the industrial  revolution,  there was an increase in the
number  of  political  actors  and information,  increasing  the  costs  of  processing  it,
which favored the constitution of interests groups (as Bimber suggests) but also, and
more  crucially  (I  may  add)  bureaucratic  mass  parties;  c)  from the  1950s  to  the
1970s, tv broadcasting can be tied to the emergence of catch all parties, while the
fragmentation of information (f.i.: via cable tv) was related to pluralism and group-
based politics and (I may suggest) new social movements; finally, d) from the 1990s
to  the  present,  the  internet  revolution,  Bimber  suggests,  the  internet  information
regime  will  contribute  to  the  emergence  of  post-bureaucratic  organizations,  a
tendency that can be found in the case of social movements and NGOs (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2013) or, in chapters 5 and 6, in political parties such as the X Party or
even municipal institutions such as Decidim.barcelona.
Dispelling  any  trace  of  determinism,  I  coincide  with  Bimber  that  information
conditions are only a factor among others bringing about these changes, and that the
multiplication of information has not coincided with an increase in traditional political
engagement  but,  rather,  as  I  show  in  chapter  3,  with  a  crisis  of  democracy,
particularly, in its representative form. Nevertheless, I believe it is useful to deploy
Bimber’s  schema  on  information  regimes  and  revolutions  as  a  complement  to
revolutionary  when new opportunities or  constraints  associated  with  political  intermediation make
possible altered distributions of power. These new capacities and possibilities are a function of the
political and social context in which technology evolves” (Bimber, 2003: 22). The shifts would have
depended not simply on technologies, but on wider socio-economic processes such as the industrial
revolution;  technologies  change  frequently,  without  necessarily  bringing  about  changes  in  these
regimes.
  
 
97
 
Manin’s  schema of  types  of  representative  government.  In  the  concrete  area  of
contentious politics, the centrality of information and communication is remarkable.
Much depends on the ability of activists to generate and process information, as well
as to communicate with various publics. From Kellner's technopolitics to Bennett &
Segerberg's  connective  action  and  digitally  networked  activism (which  I  analyze
below), this is increasingly clear.
According  to  Kellner  (1999),  modern  politics  has  always  been  technologically
mediated. To him, the difference of recent technopolitics and earlier forms of activism
resides  in  the  possibilities  afforded  by  the  web  for  things  such  as  increased
multimedia interactivity, archived discussion, and, more importantly, for moving from
a  one-to-many  broadcasting  model  of  communication,  which  was  also  initially
synchronous117, centralized, controlled by the State or big corporations, and usually
reflecting elites' views (be those of the owners, managers or sponsors), towards a
“computer-mediated  communication  [that]  is  highly  decentralized  and  makes
possible  many-to-many  communication”  (Kellner,  1999:  103).  Under  this
communication model,  anyone can circulate messages to many people, who can
then  resend  them,  multi-directionally,  without  the  necessary  filtering  of  big
corporations  or  the  State.  This  undermines  their  power,  and  means  “political
communication  is  more  decentered and varied in  its  origins,  scope,  and effects”
(ibid.),  according  to  Kellner.  As  shown  in  chapters  4  and  6,  many  of  these
possibilities  will  depend  on  factors  such  as  the  ownership,  governance  and
affordances of the infrastructures on which such processes take place.
Manuel  Castells  (2009a)  has  built  upon  this  intuition  about  the  many-to-many
communicative  structure  enabled  by  the  internet  and,  later,  social  media.  This
generates  a  phenomenon  he  defines  as  mass  self-communication:  “mass
communication  because it  can potentially  reach a  global  audience […]  it  is  self-
communication  because  the  production  of  the  message  is  self-generated,  the
definition  of  the  potential  receiver(s)  is  self-directed,  and the  retrieval  of  specific
messages  or  content  from  the  World  Wide  Web  and  electronic  communication
networks is self-selected” (55). Although I find value in Castells' notion of mass self-
communication, after Hardt and Negri's critique to the notion of the masses, and in
the face of the structure of communicative networks in 15M that we have analyzed
before (Toret et al. 2015, Monterde et al. 2015) and analyze again in chapter 4, I
117 Until tape- and video-recording were developed.
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prefer the notion of “multitudinous self-communication” as an alternative way to think
the complexity of communication in 15M and beyond. I agree with Castells (2009:
55)  that  the  central  novelty  of  contemporary  communication  systems  in  the
interaction and combination of interpersonal, mass, and mass self-communication.
Andrew  Chadwick  (2013:  4)  has  developed  the  idea  of  the  combination  of
communication models with his notion of the “hybrid media system”, that is “built
upon interactions among older and newer media logics—where logics are defined as
technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms—in the reflexively
connected fields of media and politics”118.  Media logics are “co-created by media,
political actors, and publics” (20). Hybrid media systems are ensembles exhibiting
various media logics (Dahlgren, 2009), where any media can be better understood in
relation to the rest. The patterns of these interactions are complex, field and case
specific, and empower or disempower various actors in different ways at different
times, in relation to shifting media practices119 and struggles. Chadwick stresses the
continuing predominance of powerful actors, such as media corporations or political
parties, which try to both adapt to and co-opt new media logics and actors. In this
sense,  studies  (Dahlgren,  2009)  have shown how the  recent  becoming of  mass
media has ambiguous relations with democracy.
In terms of my narrative of movements, technologies, and democracy, a key question
at stake is whether these dynamics, steered by new actors, could pose a challenge
to the representative regime in government and media under audience democracy.
Whether  a  new  form  of  representative  government  or  a  rather  a  new  form  of
networked democracy, with both new possibilities and new limits, could be emerging.
118 Media logics as “the imperatives that shape the particular attributes and ways of doing things within
given media and even within specific genres […] pertains to the procedures of selection, form, tempo,
informational density, aesthetics, contents, modes of address, and production schedules” (Dahlgren,
2009: 52).
119 According to Couldry (2012: 37, emphasis in the original):  “A practice approach starts not with
media texts or media institutions but from media-related practice in all its looseness and openness. It
asks quite simply: what are people (individuals, groups, institutions) doing in relation to media across
a whole range of situations and contexts? How is people’s media-related practice related, in turn, to
their wider agency?”.
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TABLE 9. PARTIES, MOVEMENTS, STATE, COMMUNICATION.
PARTY
GOVERNMENT
1850s-1960s
C AUDIENCE DEMOCRACY
1970s-2000s
C NETWORKED
DEMOCRACY
2010s
Types of Party
Mass Parties: class
mass; Leninist;
pluralist
nationalist…
Electoralist parties:
personalist;
catch-all party;
movement party
?
Types of
movements
Worker's & civil 
rights movements
New social movements:
ecologist, feminist,
indigenous
?
Types of State Bureaucratic
representative
Neoliberal representative
vs Social-democratic ?
Relations
Society-Parties-
State
Party penetration of
society and the
political system
Media politics and society,
personalism ?
Information &
communication
technologies
Press, Radio TV Internet,
social media
Model and
practices of
communication
Mass
communication
One to many
Mass
communication
One to many
Multitudinous self-
communication
Many to many
One to many
Peer to peer
2.3.5.3. Distinguishing 15M technopolitics from cyberactivism and clicktivism
The recent international wave can only be understood in relation to social media and
the internet. A strand of heated debates around movements in the last ten years had
to do with the relevance, role and results of the deployment of social media (Sullivan,
2009; Ghonim, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Gladwell, 2010; White, 2010). Some positions
not  only  relativize  the  role  of  TICs,  but  frequently  reduce  most  internet  related
activism  to  “clicktivism”,  further  despised  as  “slacktivism”  (Morozov,  2009).
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Nevertheless,  the  literature attributing a  remarkable relevance to  social  media  in
movements  such as 15M and Occupy is  abundant  (Bennett  & Segerberg,  2012,
2013; Gerbaudo, 2012, 2016; Toret et al., 2015; Monterde, 2015) and includes those
that suggest negative effects (Zuckerman, 2014). Rather than reconstructing in detail
debates around the relevance of social media in movements such as 15M, today
difficult to doubt, in the following sections I dig into some of the debates around their
types, roles (first) and their results (second).
The generic category of “digitally networked activism” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012,
2013)  includes internet-supported and internet-based activism (Vegh,  2003).  15M
movement’s technopolitics is a case of the former, which involves both online and
networked offline actions, while cyberactivism limits itself to digital spaces. It is in the
former, and not in the latter (a situation drastically different of the one described in
Earl et al.'s 2010) that has been at the center of the innovation in recent networked
movements,  markedly 15M, both in  practice as well  as in the ensuing academic
literature.
The  practices  associated  with  15M  technopolitics  have  been  differentiated  from
those associated with cyberactivism and, especially, clicktivism (Toret et al., 2015).
“Clicktivism” should be situated within the lower threshold position of internet-based
activism, has been used to label a subset of online, usually low-engagement, set of
political practices: discrete acts, situated online, impulsive, non-committal, relying on
non-specialist knowledge, easily replicated, and engaging with a political object, as
defined by Halupka (2014). Clicktivism (signing an online petition, or liking a post on
Facebook)  would  be  an  ideal  type  of  the  lowest  point  of  a  gradient  in  which
cyberactivism (online advocacy,  organization,  and action,  from creating an online
petition to mail bombing or culture jamming) would occupy a middle ground, up to
hacktivism, whose strong forms of action (f.i.: data breakages) remain beyond the
normal scope of cyberactivism. Halupka (2014) has called to stop moral dismissals
of clicktivism as “slacktivism”120 (Morozov, 2009; White, 2010), and try to analyze its
multiple,  not  only negative,  possibilities.  I  add the need to distinguish them from
cyberactivism, and these from technopolitics, in movements such as 15M. As the
120 These  authors  tend  to  see  in  this  only  a  desire  for  instant  (self)  gratification,  to  feel  moral
justification without the requirement of actual engagement (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Thereby, clicktivism
would primarily be a force reducing engagement and solidarity to minimal (even non-existent) forms,
undermining “engagement culture” by potentiating very easy yet rarely effective political action (we
could see here some of the traces of  the “technology culture” feared by Borgmann, 1999), if  not
apathy.
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data from our survey (Monterde et al., 2017) show, clicktivist practices played a role
in 15M, but usually along within an ecosystem of technopolitical practices.
2.3.5.4. A post-organizational turn? Organization in networked contentious politics
A key question in social movement theory, recrafted with the advent of networked
movements, is that of organization. The reduction of the costs of participation and
organization brought about by digital media makes possible new forms of “organizing
without organizations” (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Nunes, 2014). This goes against RMT
approaches  (Zald  &  Ash,  1966)  that  made  of  leaders  and  social  movement
organizations  (SMOs)  key  actors  ensuring  the  operativity  and  sustainability  of
movements and campaigns in the long term.
As a challenge to this tradition, Bennett & Segerberg (2013) have distinguished three
ideal  types  of  organizing  in  contemporary  social  movements.  The  first,  most
traditional  one,  gravitates  around “organizationally  brokered networks”,  which are
characterized  by  a  strong  organizational  coordination  of  action,  communication
centered on collective action frames, with organizations managing individual action
and  expression,  and  form  coalitions  through  bridging  based  on  high-resource,
brokering leaders and organizations, which appear in the foreground. A second type
of  organizing  form,  “organizationally  enabled  networks”,  are  defined  by  a  loose
organizational  coordination  of  action,  their  communication  is  centered  on  action
frames that are personal and inclusive, but generated by organizations, which also
play a role in the moderation of individual action and expression, operating in the
background,  linked  in  loose  networks.  Finally,  “crowd-enabled  networks”  are
characterized  by  little  or  no  formal  organizational  coordination  of  action,
communication centered on emergent, inclusive, personal action frames, with higher
personal  expression  on  social  networks,  and  forms  of  organization  frequently
independent, when not opposed, to involvement of formal organizations.
Crowd-enabled  networks  are  the  paradigmatic  case  of  “organizing  without
organizations”.  In  the  context  of  connective  action,  the  classical  problem  of
organization is reposed by authors such as Bennett, Segerberg, and Walker (2014:
234) as a matter of “how crowd organization is produced”. One of their answers are
“stitching  mechanisms  […]  These  elements  of  peer  production  include:  the
production, curation, and dynamic integration of various types of information content
and other resources that become distributed and utilized across the crowd” (ibidem).
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I believe others, such as multi-layered practices, are equally important, as I show in
chapter 4.
2.3.5.5. Thinking through networked multitudes121
I find the notion of multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2004) to be the most fruitful to think the
kind of collectives operating behind the 2011-2016 cycle of contention. According to
Hardt & Negri (and here they follow most Western literature until the early 2000s 122)
masses,  crowds,  or  mobs  do  not  run  assemblies  nor  deliberate123,  nor  do  they
coordinate  across  cities  and  States.  People  under  those  social  forms  are  not
empowered  singularities  expressing  themselves  and  countering  established  and
formal, as much as emerging and informal, forms of representation. But that is what
plenty of participants involved in 15M did124. Furthermore, early slogans by DRY and
camped participants already showed a rejection of reductive identification with earlier
identities such as “the working class”, “The People”, or “the Left” 125.
I  speak  of  “networked  multitudes”  to  speak  of  15M collectives  and  networks  of
them126. The adjective “networked” makes explicit its character as an active social
subject,  as well  as  the  various mediations  (primarily,  but  not  only,  technological)
involved in its composition. One of its key challenges is “for a social multiplicity to
manage to  communicate  and act  in  common while  remaining  internally  different,
without reducing it to a unity (like the masses) or a single identity (like the people)”
(Hardt & Negri, 2004: xiv). This aspect has been explored by 15M in practice127.
Previous works have talked of network-systems (Toret et al., 2015) and networks of
networks  (Bennett  &  Segerberg,  2013)  to  define  the  inner  structure  of  these
multitudes. I prefer the notion of “assemblage”, or “wholes characterized by relations
of exteriority” (De Landa, 2006), made of heterogeneous components, which are not
121 “Multitudes”  because  of  doubts  about  the  portrayal  of  a  unitary  and  somehow  ready-made
multitude by Hardt & Negri (2004), to recognize their plurality, multiformity and required construction.
122 In  the  last  years  there  has  been  new,  more  nuanced  and  positive,  to  the  concept  and  the
phenomenon of crowds. See, for instance, Surowiecki (2005) or Gerbaudo (2012, 2016).
123 This is what Barber (1984: 154-155) said of citizens to distinguish them from masses.
124 The same has been found in Egypt during the Arab Spring, or Turkey during OccupyGezi (Tufekci,
2014).
125 In its aim of reaching transversality, the Real Democracy Now manifesto for the demonstration on
May 15th said “some of us are more progressive, others, more conservative”.
126 Toret et al. (2015) have used the term “connected multitudes” (earlier used by Pérez de Lama,
2006), I prefer the adjective “networked” to emphasize the work that goes in their articulation, and to
connect with a more systematic vocabulary.
127 If  Hardt  and  Negri  have  been  criticized  for  their  scant  or  misconceived  development  of
organizational and communicational matters (Laclau, 2005; Dyer-Whiteford, 2007), this challenge of
organization is one of the central ones addressed by the sociology of social movements and collective
action. My hypothesis is that a crucial element in and since 15M (apart from general critical conditions
that I comment on chapter 3) have been technopolitical practices.
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“purified” (Latour, 1993) into systems-and-environment (as suggested by Luhmann,
1995), nor reduced to a network-form (as in a network-centered approach). Since
these components are only externally related, they can be plugged and unplugged
from a give whole, and plugged into a different one, while both that whole and its
components  remain  able  to  operate,  even  if  they  operate  differently  as  their
respective compositions vary. The associations between components and with their
assemblage are “contingently  necessary”,  performative and historical,  rather  than
logically or internally necessary. I take the “network of networks” formula to define
the structures of communication within  the multitude (a syntactical  concept),  and
“assemblage”  to  appeal  to  speak  of  it  in  broader  performances  (a  pragmatic
concept)128. From an analytical perspective, units in this study take two basic forms:
singular and collective assemblages129.
2.3.5.6. Transformations in movements: identity, framing, organizations
In previous sections I have mapped the terrain of social movement theory, then, the
increasing centrality of  information and media in society,  along with their  general
relevance for politics and social movements. Then, I have noticed their increasing
role in activism, and their associations with new forms of collective action such as
cyberactivism.  Finally,  I  noted  how  the  reductions  of  costs  of  participating  and
organizing may be bringing about new forms of “organizing without organizations”, or
transforming preexisting ones. According to a growing literature, the changes reach
the very core of collective action, social movements, and the theories around it. In
the following sections I analyze, in turn, the new forms of identity, framing, logics of
organization, and power in relation to recent networked movements. As I show in
chapter 4, 15M has exhibited many of these features.
Networked challenges to RMT and collective identity
The  traditional  logic  of  collective  action  was  presented  by  Olson  as  facing  the
challenge of its very possibility: why would people act collectively to reach common
goods when they may free ride instead. There were two central  answers to that
question: one suggested it depended on the extra benefits granted to actors able to
mobilize  resources  and  coordinate  action  for  everyone  else,  these  became  the
128 More broadly, I will use the notion of “assemblage” collective formations in 15M, and “network” to
refer to their organizational structures.
129 Although we believe, with De Landa (2006), that any collectivity (or assemblage) can be taken as a
singularity, and that any singularity can be seen as a collectivity (or several of them), we will generally
stick to the common word use in social movements literature.
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leaders  of  strong  organizations,  which  were  required  for  the  achievement  of
collective action (Olson, 1965); the second answer suggested it was the construction
of  collective  identity,  the  symbolic  and  affective  identification  with  a  (thereby
constructed) group, what either suspended cost-benefit analysis or favored collective
action in the calculation (Opp, 2009). But ICTs bring about a drastic reduction of the
costs  of  organization  and participation,  posing  a  challenge to  RMT and bringing
about  the possibility  of  “organizing without  organizations” (Earl  & Kimport,  2011);
similarly,  it  brings  about  challenges  to  traditional  collective  identity  theory,  either
because it makes less necessary to build collective identities and easier to create
personalized ones (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Bennett & Segerberg suggest that
what they call the “logic of connective action” (defining feature of digitally networked
activism) breaks with the traditional logic of collective action tied to “high levels of
organizational  resources and the formation of collective identities”.  In chapter 4 I
show the challenges to collective identity brought about by 15M.
From collective identity and frames to connective identity and personalized frames in
connective action
A key corollary of ICT-related practices and the ensuing connective action has been
the  relativization  of  collective  identities  and  action  frames.  Similarly,  Bennett  &
Segerberg's  (2012,  2013)  analysis  of  movements  such  as  15M  and  Occupy
emphasize the rising centrality of personalized communication and action frames,
which they characterize as being “symbolically inclusive”  (allow easy inclusion of
personal  reasons  for  mobilization)  and  “technologically  open”  (facilitating  sharing
among friends and trust networks). This implies, again, a relativization of the role of
collectivity (in this case, collective action frames) in recent movements, of which 15M
is taken as a paradigmatic case (Bennett & Segerberg 2012: 755).
However,  in approaching the discussion over the actuality of “collective identity”, I
build upon a previous work where we tried to move beyond the dilemma between
new forms of connective action and collective identity (Monterde et al., 2015).
Rather than suggesting that collective identity simply dissolves with the coming of
ICT-enabled practices, in the paper we empirically supported the idea that a (digital)
“systemic”  dimension should  be added to  Snow's  list  of  dimensions of  collective
identity130,  in  order  to  attend  to  the  technology-based,  informational  and
communicational circuits from which identity emerges in networked movements. On
130 As  we  noticed  there,  Snow (2001)  has  shown  that  collective  identities  are  multidimensional,
involving emotional, moral, and cognitive aspects.
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this  we  partly  followed  Melucci's  network-  and  technology-friendly  definition  of
collective identity131. We took a network analysis approach to such a dimension, and
deployed it to understand the collective identity of the 15M movement at the social
movement “scale”. I show and discuss some of the results on chapter 4.
Differently from that paper, here I believe what emerges out of these communication
net-works  could  be  labelled  a  “connective  identity”.  I  leave  aside  Bennett  &
Segerberg's  (2012,  2013)  emphasis  on  “personalized  action  frames”,  which  they
believe somehow replace collective identity in new forms of connective action, and
on which my approach is agnostic132. Connective identity is one that emerges out of
interaction, activity, and channels of communication in a digital medium. This notion
tries to stress the network dimension, and gives a digital and informational reading,
to  the  traditional  sense of  collective  identity  in  social  movement  theory133. In  the
paper, we also proposed a new label for the type of identity characteristic of 15M:
“multitudinous  identity”,  which  exhibits  many  of  the  characteristics  associated  to
Hardt and Negri’s multitude.
Organization, power, and leadership in social and networked movements.
I  already touched organization and identity,  frames.  A connected issue is  that  of
power.  The  question  of  “power  in  movement”  (Tarrow,  1994),  the  power  of
movements (outwards) and within movements (inwards), is a recurrent one in the
literature. Networks, which have traditionally played a role in the analysis of social
movements, have a crucial  role in the configuration of their internal  and external
power (Kahler, 2009; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; 2015). Analyses that attend to the
outward-power of movement networks look at how they intervene in agenda setting
131 Quoted in my exposition of elements of social movement theory, above.
132 Here I build upon Bennett & Segerberg's terminology and tie it to the identity notion. It is the kind of
identity that emerges out of the activity on a circuit of digital communication. To approach it more to
Bennett & Segerberg's original meaning, the frames being circulated should be personal rather than
collective ones.
133 Before closing this point, I want to make some points on “connective” and “collective” identities:
first, that in a Latourian sense, all identities are collective, as they emerge from the performances of
shorter or longer networks of humans and nonhumans; second, that calling something “connective”
tries to stress both its essentially relational and its digital character (this latter point differentiates it
from earlier cases of collective identity construction in social movement theory); third, that it can be
generated by both collective and singular digital actors, even if, in 15M, the former were preeminent;
fourth, that it can result from, and support, the circulation of both collective and personalized action
frames; and, fifth, it is thereby agnostic with regard to the type of frames, actions and even identities
built on top of it (they may be collective or connective, in Bennett & Segerberg's sense, depending on
various factors, such as the types of frames). With regard to this last point, it is worth noticing that
frames are in many cases directly correlated to network structure, and different sub-networks are tied
to different approaches to reality, generating a networked, ontological multi-perspectivism (Regattieri
et al., 2014). All of this is part of the conceptual network associated connective identities.
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processes,  achieve policy changes,  or  transform people's  beliefs,  minds,  or lives
(Sikkink,  2009;  Keck  and  Sikkink,  1998).  According  to  Castells  (2009)  the
proliferation  of  “digital  networks  of  communication”  is  transforming  power  in
technologically  developed  societies,  particularly,  with  the  emergence  of  counter-
hegemonic communicative networks such as those of movements' radical alternative
media and technopolitics (Kellner, 1999). They challenge the power of established
actors.
But  networks,  including  movements',  construct  internal  forms  of  power  as  well.
Thereby,  a  different  thread  of  analysis  focuses  not  on  their  external  activity,
performances  and  results,  but  on  their  structure  and  relations  to  the  actors
composing  them.  On  this  regard,  Castells  (2009)  has  distinguished  “networking
power”,  which  can  derive  from  the  ability  to  construct,  program  and  reprogram
networks and their goals (this is what “programmers” do), or from the connection of
different networks, their goals and resources (this is what “switchers” do) (Castells,
2009: 42-45). But positions such as those of “programmers” and “switchers” may be
shared by various actors and vary with the structure of the network, so that, recalling
Latour, Castells suggest that ultimately “the power holders are networks themselves”
(idem: 43). Crucially,  as noticed by different  authors (Cowhey and Mueller,  2009;
Bennett  &  Segerberg,  2012,  2013),  networks  are  not  immediately  horizontal  or
egalitarian. Actually, the opposite is frequently the case (Barabási & Bonabeu, 2003).
As I noticed above, a relevant question in the literature has been that of how the
structure (of power) within movement networks relates to the outward power of the
network  (Bennett  &  Segerberg,  2013;  Sikkink,  2009;  Diani,  2015).  Bennett  &
Segerberg (2012, 2013) logics of connective action challenges the RMT (up to Diani,
2015)  idea  that  powerful  networks  rely  on  centralized  structures  and  deliberate
construction by purposeful and resourceful actors. Contrarily, they have shown how
networks with  diffuse,  flexible  and decentralized structures (on the internal)  have
equally powerful impacts (on the external).
To  assess  power  in  relation  to  network's  organizational  structure,  Bennett  &
Segerberg have proposed the notion of “power signatures”. With that they refer to
“the  degree  to  which  recognition  (prestige  and  influence)  is  concentrated  or
dispersed among actors in a network”134(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013: 152). Bennett &
134 As they themselves recognize, other structural properties, from network centrality, to betweenness
or structural holes are better proxies for detailed mappings of political opportunities, resources, or
other aspects (Monge & Contractor, 2003).
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Segerberg distinguish four types of signatures in movement networks: power law,
moderate variation of power law, dispersed, and disorganized (156).
For  Freeman  (1972),  when  informal  elites  cover  themselves  with  the  “myth  of
structurelessness”, the appeal to “leaderless structureless organization” (to which,
she suggests, they usually recur) “there can be no attempt to put limits on the use of
power”135 (idem.: 157). Movement “structurelessness” in a media environment—she
notices—makes well-known movement members end up playing the role of unofficial
and unaccountable spokespeople.
But  although some of  Freeman's criticisms and proposals are pertinent,  informal
structures  have  shown  their  potential  to  stir  both  movements  and  revolutions
(McAdam, 1982; Goldstone, 2001). Gerbaudo (2012) has noticed that, in spite of all
the stress on “horizontality” and “leaderlessness”, there were leaders in 15M and
Occupy;  perhaps  because  of  this  stress,  they  were  “reluctant  leaders”  or  “anti-
leaders”.  Tilly  (2004: 13) has suggested that  social  movements have traditionally
depended on “political entrepreneurs for their scale, durability,  and effectiveness”,
but  that  a  good part  of  their  work has been to  “disguise”  that  effort  by favoring
images of “spontaneous” collective action. Reasons for doing this are multiple, from
Freeman's internal power plays to external image and narrative (to evoke ideas of
popular  empowerment  and  self-organization,  because  of  distrust  of  mainstream
media,  etc.),  from  political  conditions  (strong  repression)  to  ideology  (stress  on
horizontality,  anti-authoritarianism,  and  the  like).  Frequently,  these  reasons  and
conditions combine.
Social  media  enables  informal  and  flexible  forms  of  sociotechnical  organization,
thanks to the personal character of communication within them (specially, in the case
of Facebook) generating “diffuse spheres of friendship and intimacy characterised by
a  vibrant  emotionality”  (Gerbaudo,  2012:  14).  But  here  leadership  and  power
asymmetries reappear (Gerbaudo, 2012) as a result,  among other factors, of the
strongly  asymmetrical  architecture  of  participation  of  spaces  such  as  Facebook
fanpages (Van Dijk & Poell, 2013).
This portray seems to both transform and maintain traditional elements of leadership
in social  movements,  based on concrete figures,  this  time not  public leaders (or
unofficial spokespeople) in mainstream media, but networked ones in social media.
135 In terms of the tradition of Weber and Habermas, this is not a “rational” or “legitimate” power. Its
shape and limits are set up by other mechanisms.
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Trying to enrich this view, we (Toret et al., 2015; Monterde et al, 2015) have stressed
the collective and temporally distributed character of leadership of 15M and post-
15M actors in social media. Furthermore, key profiles were collective ones. There
were several ones driving the dynamic at any point in the configuration of the 15M
communication  networks  on  Twitter,  and  that  these  leading  constellations  varied
across  times,  into  what  has  been  defined  as  “temporally  distributed  leadership”
(Toret et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the collective control of these profiles was also a
source of problems and power struggles, as I analyze in chapter 4.
As  time  passed,  though,  different  media  spokespeople  emerged  within  the  15M
cycle. Positions towards representation and organization changed too. I comment it
on chapter 5.
2.3.6. Framing contentious technopolitics in the networked movements of the
squares
2.3.6.1. A binocular view onto multi-layered assemblages
I have touched upon matters of collective organization, frames, identity, and power.
An unaddressed feature of recent movements, key in defining their shape as well as
their action and communication power, is the creative and continuous hybridization of
online and offline practices and spaces.  For Toret  et  al.  (2015) this was the key
difference of technopolitics against those other forms of digitally networked activism.
The  interplay  between  dynamics  in  social  media,  urban  spaces,  as  well  as
mainstream mass media, gave 15M, and also later experiences in the 15M cycle of
contention, an idiosyncratic morphology that hybridized online and offline spaces.
The concept of “multi-layer” tries to capture that (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, 2013,
2014;  Toret  et  al.,  2015).  It  suggests  a  number  of  differentiated136 and  yet
connected137 spaces. The formula “multi-layered networks” is frequently used in the
literature trying to analyze complex networks (Boccaletti et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, for the purposes of visualization, I describe such multi-dimensional,
heterogeneous networks as a series of bidimensional orthographic projections. This
is what I may call a “systemic” or “panoramic” approach (Latour, 2005), applied to the
understanding multi-layered networks at the core of much action, information and
136 These are independent spaces, and there are locked-in differences among their associative and
interactive regimes, f.i., between different social media (such as Facebook and Twitter), or between
them and urban spaces.  So much so that  some have defined social  media  as “walled gardens”
(Berners-Lee, 2010), which are growing increasingly isolated.
137 An interesting aspect of this is that there is no pure, original or independent space, be it digital or
physical, thereby avoiding both physio-centrism (or physical co-presence) and techno-centrism.
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communication activity in the 15M cycle, especially suited to understand the “macro”
scale of whole networks and assemblages. Such activity involves intra-network (f.i.:
within Facebook) and inter-network (f.i.: between Facebook and Twitter) dynamics.
A first element in the construction of a panorama of a multilayered technopolitical
assemblage is a basic “technopolitical score”. It is a visual schema of the various
layers pervaded by the action, information and communication activity in 15M cycle
processes. Since 15M, numerous, new sociotechnical networks were articulated on
the  internet,  primarily  on  social  media  (with  sublayers  such  as  Facebook  and
Twitter),  as well  as on multiple  spatial  locations (such as squares, activist  social
centers, universities, etc.). They intermittently interacted with mainstream media (tv,
radio, press). All  of these fields would appear as layers from an “elevation view”.
Using the “technopolitical score”, it is possible to analytically break down, register
and visualize different indexes of individual or collective activity (depending on the
actor on decides to choose). Activity operates in different layers in different ways and
at different moments, which help to visualize the multidimensional magnitude of a
given action or event.
Recurring to a second typical,  architectural  analysis,  one can take a “plan view”,
which  outlines  the  networks  of  interaction,  either  structural  (stable)  or  functional
(eventual), of a given layer. After outlining these two views, a challenge comes into
view: that of how the actors, networks or actions are connected or circulate across
layers (or not), and how these layers are thereby connected so that the whole multi-
layered  network  of  networks  and  its  powerful  performances  can  hold.  Bennett,
Segerberg, & Walker (2014) have shown the relevance of “stitching mechanisms”
connecting  different  layers  to  be  relevant  for  the  maintenance  of  what  they
categorize  as  “network-enabled  crowds”.  But  I  believe  that  a  complementary
approach could be more relevant. A central factor keeping multi-layered networks
together  are  actors'  practices.  But  that  implies  to  move  away  from  talk  of
“mechanisms”  and  the  “panoramic  approach”.  I  believe  it  is  more  interesting  to
articulate a second, alternative approach, in order to dig further into the complexity of
movements: that is what I call  the “practice approach”—inspired in STS literature
(Schatzki,  Knorr-Cetina  &  Savigny  2001).  This  approach  attends  to  human  and
nonhuman actors' situated performances. It primarily relies not on macro, network-
images but on narrative and experience. It cannot be registered in social network
activity indexes. In relation to it,  I  propose the notion of “multi-layer practices” to
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define  another,  probably  more  relevant,  process  of  composition  of  these
multitudinous  networks.  A typical  example  of  this  type  of  practice  is  that  of  a
participant  operating  on  one  or  several  social  media  while  in  a  protest.  These
practices  are  particularly,  although  surely  not  exclusively,  relevant  at  times  of
collective action on the streets. A provisional definition would group these practices
as “actions involving (including or connecting) people, things, and technologies in
more  than  one  medium  or  place”138.  These  practices  circumvent  any  definitive
distinction between digital and analogical, online and offline, so their relations have
not  been simply of  feedback between activity  in  digital  networks and in physical
demonstrations,  or  even  only  of  concomitance  between  digital  and  analogical
networks of  squares (Martínez Roldán,  2011),  but  rather a plethora of variations
involving alignment for action, amplification, registration, conflict, distance, criticism,
and more. Among them it  is worth stressing too what I  defined as “multi-layering
practices”: actions in a given media promoting action in a different one. The notion of
practice serves  to  clearly  avoid  the  potential  reification  of  processes  in
systemic/panoramic  approaches.  They  stress  the  variety  of  discrete  actors,  their
heterogeneity and problematic associations, their human and non-human conditions,
and the relevance of performance, rather than simply representing their modelized,
usually informational, traces.
Participants, and surely core activists, recurred to what I may call a “technopolitical
module or kit for self-organization” (Toret et al.,  2015), basic not only to organize
their own participation but also that of the collectives they belonged or founded. Such
a kit was part of what I would call a technopolitical habitus, and contributed to nurture
and define the syntax of the multi-layered assemblage.
Streams  of  practice,  syntactically  articulated  by  these  kits,  sometimes  involved
multiple  people,  and  thereby  the  streams of  practice  converged  into  streams  of
collective action139.
The streams of  action (be it  individual  or  collective)  operate syntagmatically  and
paradigmatically, they can multiply the number of components not only within a given
138 Under  current  conditions,  almost  any type  of  action that  acts  in  two  places  at  once involves
technological mediation and usually happens in, at least, two different layers (say, the urban space
and the digital space).
139 It is worth noticing that, following Latour (1993), I consider all actions collective. By that I mean that
all involve humans and nonhumans. Yet, in order to distinguish an action in which a human mobilizes
multiple  non-humans,  from  those  in  which  various  humans  are  directly  involved  and  have  to
coordinate among themselves, I maintain the expressions “action” and “collective action”.
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technopolitical  regime, such as that of  relations in  one or another  layer but  also
across them into hybrid syntax.
Multitudinous, multi-layered dynamics are at the base of “augmented events” (Toret
et  al.,  2015),  in  which  a  concrete  set  of  actions  are  discursively  and practically
connected  to  thousands  of  others  by  thousands  of  other  actors  across
heterogeneous media, which point towards them. Involving not only both multiple
spaces and multiple times (past and future).
After outlining some of the possibilities of both the panoramic and the practical view,
I have what I may call a “binocular view”, an approach that, using the perceptual
metaphor, allows to see things in three dimensions140. The technopolitical score (in its
multiple  versions and perspectives)  and the  streams of  action  (and their  related
notions)  compose  the  “technopolitical  model”.  One  whose  first  view  (the
panoramic/systemic)  is  both complemented141 and challenged by the second (the
practical), and is thereby an internally processual model (as well as externally, by the
variation of its contents).
To these two I may now add a third: the narrative or discursive approach (Fairclough,
2013;  Riessman,  2008),  which  attends to  the  texts  and narratives  generated by
movement actors. It opens up the exploration of the discursive construction of the
movement, its actors, its enemies. A key point is how the semantics of a movement,
particularly  clearly  presented  in  discourses,  connects  with  new  technopolitical
syntaxes and pragmatics. Discourse is surely the main entry point into frames.
The discursive approach adds up to the sharpness of the stereometric analysis of
technopolitical action. Furthermore, I can now recover Haraway's threefold of syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics. Some of the complex aspects of the emerging syntax of
technopolitics would foremost be opened by the panoramic or systemic approach;
140 More interestingly, it allows to see them in more than those, as the practical view remakes the
various panoramic views, and vice versa.
141 It  is  worth  noticing  that  both  approaches  have  several  things  in  common:  they  question  the
alternative primacy of either wholes (collectivities, blurring individuals) or parts (individuals, reducing
wholes); at the same time, they connect them to and add inferior, superior, and intermediate “scales”
(primarily,  interaction,  but  also  assemblages  of  parts  and  wholes,  dividualities  below  the  old
individuals,  etc.);  moreover,  both  approaches  turn  all  of  these  “units”  and  “scales”  into  ongoing
outcomes of processes rather than ready-made realities (f.i.  Luhmann 1995 for the system theory
case; Schatzki 2001 for the practice one). Perhaps one of the key disagreements among them lies on
their positions concerning the possibility of something like an identity and a system to emerge or not:
obviously, systems theory believes it does while practice theory seems sometimes at odds with it—as
an  example,  for  the  case  of  social  movements,  Juris  (2008).  As  a  result,  the  two  approaches
composing the binocular view I just mentioned generate patterns of interference among themselves,
sometimes they potentiate each other, other times they neutralize or question each other, and still
others display their respective powers alternatively—in a gestalt switch of sorts.
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technopolitical semantics, by the narrative/discursive approach; the two would then
be revisited and redefined in pragmatics, that is, in relation to the practice approach.
This threefold, this trinocular approach, is a key analytical assemblage for analyzing
the 15M cycle. It operationalizes my general technopolitical approach, and bridges
over frequently fragmented research approaches.
2.3.6.2. Multi-layered assemblages and contentious digital networks
In  order  to  further  explore  the  structure  of  multi-layer  assemblages  that  define
collective action in the 15M cycle, I want to make some comments on two of those
layers: social media and urban spaces.
Even if  the  squares were  morphologically  characteristic  of  the  15M cycle  at  the
movement stage, digital networks proved more enduring and relevant in the long run:
they allowed the mutation of the cycle of contention (as shown by Monterde, 2015),
and have continued playing relevant roles in its representative or institutional stages.
So, more than the so much remarked camps, what proved enduring during the cycle
were its technopolitical networks. The relevance of digital net-works was particularly
prominent both in the formation of movements before 15M and after the end of the
camps.
2.3.6.3. Technopolitics and contentious spaces: digital.
Facebook and n-1 as infrastructures for politics.
Urban and virtual sites were created or recreated through, as well as integrated into,
collective action in the 15M movement. In order to analyze the technopolitical syntax
of Facebook and n-1 (as technologies for politics) and its connection to 15M, I rely
and build upon a previous study that, to my understanding, appropriately captures
some its key elements. According to Gil (2012), the two most relevant dimensions of
these platforms when it comes to the formation and maintenance of the movement
were,  on  the  one hand,  their  capacity  to  enable  a  self-organized  and  emergent
mobilization, and on the other, their contribution to its maintenance in time. According
to Gil, the first of those two dimensions are dependent on two key sub-factors: the
capacity for diffusing information142 and the capacity to transform cyber-participation
into  real  participation143. In  15M,  platforms  potentiating  self-organized,  emergent
142 Capacity  for  information  diffusion  concerns  the  potential  number  of  people  reached  by  the
movement's messages and the speed with which they are so. The optimal case of diffusion of a
message is that of the “viral effect”, in which a large cross-section of a network is reached in a short
period of time as a result of the decentralized activity of the users.
143 I  believe information diffusion is key not  only for the enabling of  self-organized and emergent
mobilization  but  also  for  the  maintenance  of  the  movement  in  time:  it  is  a  structural  aspect  for
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mobilization are especially prominent for moments and processes of public display of
WUNC, while those favoring organization become preeminent in times of latency.
That said, both operate and combine at all times.
According to Gil such diffusion depends on three factors: the size of the networks of
contacts144, the size of the total virtual community145, and the design of the platform146.
Here I can make an addendum: the internal structure of a given network of contacts
is a factor as relevant, in principle, as its size (in many case, much more so). It is
worth noticing that  by pointing these factors I  go beyond the attention to  design
affordances  by  pointing  to  the  emerging  affordances  that  result  from the  actual
shapes of  the circuits  and communities of  users that  collective action processes
generate.  Furthermore,  as underlined by Gerbaudo (2016),  it  is  necessary to  go
beyond  the  view  of  digital  platforms  in  terms  of  mere  “diffusion”  or  “costs  of
organization”  into  “induced  configurations”  or  “emerging  symbolic  and  practical
cultures”.
As noted by Gil, these Facebook and n-1 networks differ greatly with regard to their
functions, size, material resources, number of users, the types of relations they allow
to their users, the economic and social benefits they produce, the level of privacy
they offer users or the territorial area influenced by them.
2.3.6.4. Technopolitics and contentious spaces: urban.
The  “square  stage”  of  15M only  occupied  a  few  months.  However,  camps  and
squares  occupy  a  core  place  within  the  15M imaginary  and  practice.  Since  my
narrative tries to span the whole cycle, I do not stop to analyze their dynamics in all
the detail they may deserve. Camps and squares were only one of the embodiments
of the politics of space and place related to the wider technopolitics in Spain in the
15M cycle, even if they were the paradigm of its “autonomist” possibilities.
Recently,  some  researchers  (Halvorsen,  2012)  have  stressed  the  relevance  of
information systems (Luhmann, 1995) and was a core feature of 15M networks since 2011.
144 A key aspect of social media such as Facebook and n-1 is the creation of relational networks
between users, networks of contacts to whom a user sends and from which it receives information.
These  networks  are  built  on  the  base  of  multiple  criteria,  from  common  interests  to  personal
relationships. In the case of 15M, networks are, in principle, based on shared political-activist and
interpersonal interests (with the latter being closely connected to the former).
145 A second key factor for diffusion is the size of the platform community, which amount to the total
number of users that may potentially receive a given message, otherwise, the width of the potential
audience and, thereby, the maximum potential reach of messages.
146 Finally, there is the platform design. Gil notes the speed and easiness for making visible, publishing
and resending messages, the multiplicity of message forms; information goal-alignment; varieties of
content in messages, of shorter or longer type; register of support of a given message in the platform,
as well as among the users' contacts.
  
 
114
 
“territoriality”  in  Occupy,  as  territories  were  relevant  for  its  autonomous and pre-
figurative politics, implied the taking, delimitation and defense of geographical areas,
and helped to disturb flows and instaurate counter-temporalities (Adams, 2011) in
specific city locales. As a consequence, Halvorsen reclaims the “multiple spatialities
of  activism”,  which  involve  creating  networks  but  also  “(re)creating  particular
territories”.
Manuel Castells (1996) has distinguished between a traditional “space of places”,
and  an  informational  “space  of  flows”.  For  Castells  (1996:  204),  “space  is  the
material  support  of  time-sharing  social  practices”,  the  former  is  defined  by  the
boundaries  of  physical  contiguity,  while  the  second  is  built  upon  “technological
infrastructure of information systems, telecommunications, and transportation lines”.
In the network society, the latter over-imposes itself on the former. One may imagine
that, in multi-layer dynamics, there are multiple cases of emplaced flows, that is, the
urban reassembling of online networks and activities, or flowing emplacements, with
the broadcasting of local actions all over the world.
As Sennett (1978) noticed early on, under neoliberalism space becomes a space of
transit and consumption, rather than of community building. These processes may
have  been  accelerated  with  the  advent  of  neoliberal  informationalism  (Castells,
1996).  With  others  (Martínez  Roldán,  2011;  Gerbaudo,  2016)  I  believe  recent
movements have been an attempt at recovering both public and physical space, but
unlike Gerbaudo (2016) I do not believe this recovery should be understood as a
simple attempt at overcoming or getting the dispersion generated by the Internet, but
rather as the construction of new multi-layered spaces (as suggested by Monterde,
2015). These spaces are the spatial correlate of “augmented events”.
Critical theories of space
As  noticed  by  Lefebvre  (1991),  “space  is  political”,  in  the  case  of  this  study,
technopolitical. Furthermore, his suggestions on a “science of formal space” implies
his comment applies not only to physical, but even more to digital network spaces 147
and multi-layered ones, that hybridize digital and physical spaces via technopolitical
practice.
147“The science of space, therefore, must be assessed at several levels. It can be taken as a science
of formal space, that is to say, close to mathematics; a science that employs such concepts as sets,
networks, branches, lattices. However, the science cannot be situated at this level; it cannot remain
formal.  Critical  analysis  defines  how  and  according  to  what  strategy  a  given  space  has  been
produced; finally, there is the study and science of the contents, that is, of the contents which may
resist the form or the strategy: namely, the users.”
  
 
115
 
David Harvey has suggested to combine Lefebvre’s idea of a dialectics of space148
with a renewal of the notion of utopia. Harvey (2000: 161) aims to recover “utopics
as spatial play”, where “the infinite array of possible spatial orderings holds out the
prospect  of  an  infinite  array  of  possible  social  worlds”,  while  remaining  critically
aware  of  its  authoritative149—when  not  authoritarian—consequences.  However,
utopias, as other spatial forms, have usually been driven or hijacked by the logics of
the State or those of Capital. Harvey denounces the ruling utopianism: neoliberalism.
Tweaking  Foucault's  (1984)  terms,  it  is  possible  to  see  15M  cycle  spaces  as
emerging in the tension between isotopies (normalized settings tied to the system or
worlds we inhabit,  continuously in the process of being reproduced), heterotopies
(settings  and  ontologies  “other”  built  in  the  shell  of  the  old  ones),  and  utopies
(settings  and  ontologies  “other”  that  emerge  as  “horizons  of  becoming”  for  the
previous two ones in 15M narratives and practices), played and displayed in multiple,
situated and fragile, and sometimes contradictory ways.
2.3.7.  From  new  social  movements  to  networked  social  movements:  from
contentious politics to contentious technopolitics
After summarizing some of the debates in the literature on collective action, identity,
power, and organization, there seems to be room to affirm that there are relevant
differences  between  networked  movements  and  earlier,  old  or  new,  social
movements. Furthermore, some of the discussions so far allows me to suggest—a
hypothesis explored in the empirical chapters—that the cycle of contention opened
by  15M  has  exhibited  relevant  variations  with  regard  to  previous  forms  of
“contentious politics”. As a recapitulation, I want now to clarify some points on this
regard.
When referring to the wave of movements since 2010, I will be using the collective
label  “networked  movements  of  the  squares”.  With  that  I  attempt  to  reflect  the
generic centrality of net-work as a sociotechnical practice, not only for the present
148 To dig into these various types of space, Lefebvre offers a conceptual triad: he first situates spatial
practice,  which  produces  and  reproduces  a  society's  space.  It  is  the  “perceived”  space,  which
emerges in the close relation between daily routine and urban reality. Differently, “representations of
space” are “tied to the relations of production and to the 'order' that those relations impose, and hence
to knowledge,  to  signs,  to  codes,  and to  'frontal'  relations”  (Lefebvre,  1991:  38).  Actors such as
scientists, planners, urban planners, or social engineers, fuse (or over-impose) this “conceived space”
to the perceived and the lived spaces. Then there are “representational spaces”, “space as directly
lived through its associated images and symbols” (idem, 39). There is a conflict, a dialectics between
“the perceived, the conceived, and the lived”.
149 The spaces some actors create usually remain operative for other actors for long periods of time—
to put it with a formula attributed to Winston Churchill, “we shape our buildings and afterwards our
buildings shape us”.
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cycle, but, retrospectively, for the global justice or alter-globalization movement (Juris
2004),  which may count as the first  strong case of a broad genre of “networked
movements”,  be they social  or political  in character.  Networking may be the core
feature a social movement family populating, in spite of their differences, a cultural
epoch  of  contention  (Mattoni  &  Trere,  2014),  defined  by  elements  such  as  the
centrality  of  the  Internet  and  the  emergence  of  connective  action  (Bennett  &
Segerberg, 2012).
With this formula, I complement Gerbaudo's (2016) ideal-typical and simple label of
“movements of the squares”,  with the “square” operating as a differential-specific
feature of the present  cycle within the broader “networked movement”  genre150;  I
believe the  “square”  nicely  stands for  a  space that  is  decidedly  urban,  physical,
public, and problematically political151. Finally, I recur to a practice and organization
centered formula, because these have taken priority over discourses and frames in
terms of innovation within the current wave of protest.
A complementary argument of this thesis is that, when technopolitics moves to the
center,  contentious  politics  becomes  “contentious  technopolitics”.  Technological
opportunities  become  almost  as  crucial  and  dispute  as  political  ones,  or  rather,
intertwined with them, conditioned by and conditioning them. This turns technologies
150 One of the most recognizable features of the international protest cycle begun between late 2010
and 2011 has been the proliferation of camps on squares all over the world. This has been sometimes
presented  as  a  distancing  from  previous  “networked”  movements  and  logics  (Gerbaudo,  2012;
Halvorsen, 2012; Juris, 2012). It also has made some (Gerbaudo, 2016) generically characterize the
movements included in it as “movements of the squares”. The squares were a crucial element in a
given period within the cycle of contention in Spain: the opening one, which coincided with the height
of the 15M movement. And yet, even then, as I show in chapter 4, activity in camps and squares
cannot  be understood if  detached from broader technopolitical  practices,  processes,  and circuits.
“Technopolitics” has been a more relevant and enduring element of the 2011-2016 cycle of contention
in Spain. Thereby, after this elaboration, I can say formulas such as “networked movements” (Juris,
2004) or “network-movements” (Monterde, 2015) appropriately reflect their structure as networks of
networks. But these movements are “technopolitical” in their performances, for their remaking of the
spaces,  subject-object  fields  of  politics  in  relation  to  technologies  and  vice  versa.  Beyond  their
networkism or their assamblearism, beyond their online or their offline, it is necessary to stress their
complex technopolitics as a crucial feature. This feature was later adapted to and adopted to the
political  field  new  parties  and  institutions,  it  has  been  part  and  parcel  of  the  ongoing  cycle  of
technopolitical contention in Spain. As I just mentioned the crucial, long-term pattern is not the square
camp. Actually, after its failure in the long run, it has been challenged as an optimal protest form.
Differently,  the  technopolitical  (not  just  networks,  but  networks  plus  other  mediascapes  and
urbanscapes) becoming has proven to be essential for the cycle, especially in 15M. Camps died early,
the square did so too as well. Assemblies have been maintained for longer, and taken on board of
emerging parties such as Podemos and the municipal candidacies. Networks are still operative, both
structurally and functionally. Spatial fetishism no better than the network fetishism sometimes nurtured
by  network  analyses.  For  this,  I  believe  technopolitical  analysis  will  remain  key  for  studies  on
networked movements, as well as in politics more broadly.
151 This applies even if only through re-politicization did squares become “agoras” again, or even if, in
many cases, the camp space was a park, or even private property.
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into key sites of and resources for conflict and construction by traditional and new
actors.
The “technopolitics” of the 15M cycle can be better understood in light of the formula
used above (“networked” and “squares”), with the organizational dimension at the
center of their articulation. As the cycle moved from activism to institutional politics,
so the technopolitical ecologies, cultures and practices within the 15M cycle ended
up including forms of collective action beyond Bennett's and Segerberg's digitally
networked activism, involving institutionalized collective action, and what I may call
digitally networked partidism and institutionalism.
2.4.  Making  and  unmaking  history:  from  political  revolution  to
ontological reassembling through contentious technopolitics
2.4.1.  From  technological  and  political  revolution  to  technopolitical
reassembling
The cycle  of  production  of  always  new and  obsolescent  generations  of  artifacts
greatly accelerated in the XXth century (Bulow, 1986). It went hand in hand with the
frequent  use  of  the  term  “revolution”  in  advertisement.  As  the  term  “revolution”
becomes recurrently used, so it becomes meaningless (Marquard, 1986). Ironically,
it regains its original meaning of “recurring cycle”, now not under the image of the
trajectories of natural stars (De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, like in Copernicus)
but of the technical production cycle of always new and always obsolescent artifacts
(ever less new and ever more quickly obsolescent, for the sake of profit, Graeber,
2015). The revolutionary becomes practically indistinguishable from the upgrade, as
Marga Padilla's quote in the entry of this thesis suggests. The early labelling of the
events around May 15th as #SpanishRevolution is an interesting example of this;
rather than granting the legitimacy of the term in a representative sense, otherwise,
rather than legitimizing it as “a revolution”, it does something more revealing. The
hashtag points, first, to the enduring performative value of the notion, and, second, to
the technopolitically mediated character of the concept of revolution in the current
predicament.  The  technopoliticization  of  revolution,  be  it  based  on  fashionable
narrative or innovative practice, was also suggested by contested narratives around
15M antecedents,  such  as  those  naming  the  Egyptian  uprising  as  a  “Facebook
revolution”,  or  announcements  that  nowadays  “the  revolution  will  be  Twittered”.
Revolution or not, what happened on May 15th was called so by its participants,
under a hashtag form, and (not less symptomatically) in English language.
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The literature around the definition of revolution is, in itself, a growing and growingly
debated area of research (Goldstone, 2001). As an overused concept, I find limited
value in digging into it. Consequently, the inquiry into whether 15M is a revolutionary
or reformist movement plays no role in my research. I believe and show that the
cycle of technopolitical contention opened by 15M achieved a number of relevant
transformations  and  reassemblings  of  democracy,  but  I  will  not  spend  time
distinguishing  whether  they  were  reformist  or  revolutionary.  Transformation  and
reassembling  (in  the  sense  of  Latour,  2005),  less  historically  and  normatively
charged concepts, makes them more productive notions than the traditional pair of
revolution and reform to think through the 15M cycle of contention.
That said, there is another classical debate related to revolution, at the center of
much activist discourse in the 2000s, namely, that of the seizure of State power. The
question of whether taking the power of the State, be it through force or through the
vote, is necessary for deep social transformation, became a matter of particularly
heated debate after the publication of John Holloway's 2002 work “Change the world
without taking power: the meaning of revolution today”. According to Holloway, true
transformation should be approached as a matter of abolishing “power over” and
liberating  “power  to”  (which  he  identified  with  collective  human  life  freed  from
property and capitalism into alternative forms of doing things), rather than reaching
power over the social embodiment of “power over”, that is, the State apparatus. To
the traditional Leninist insistence on the need of taking the Winter Palace, the source
of  political  power,  the  experience  of  the  Mexican  Zapatistas  seemed to  show a
revolutionary way away from the State, fixed hierarchy, and political representation.
Looking at the conditions in the network society, Castells (2009: 412) has suggested
that it is by “reprogramming the communication networks that constitute the symbolic
environment”  of  people’s  minds how insurgents  can bring “new information,  new
practices, and new actors into the political system”.
Positions  around  these  quandaries  were  diverse  within  15M,  they  varied  across
actors and across times. Their positions towards State power shifted. They moved
from a more Zapatista-like (autonomist) position towards a more Leninist one, and
back. How these shifts took place is an object of attention in the empirical chapters.
They illustrate  a wider  matter:  social  transformation  frequently  involves collective
self-transformation, changing with experience, adaptation.
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2.4.2. Reassembling as political ontology
Like other movements, 15M had the potential—in spite of numerous narrative and
practical closures on this regard—to feed into the alter-globalization conviction that
“another  world152 is  possible”.  From  the  conviction  that  things  must  change,
movements reopen the question of how and why the world and things are as they
are, and why and how they could and should be different.  Insofar as it  concerns
“world-making and unmaking” practices, it goes beyond shifts in “worldviews” into
ontology (Pickering, 2010; Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013).
The present work situates itself within the heterogeneous yet growing constellation of
STS works  attending  to  ontology.  A number  of  distinctions  are  mandatory  here,
though. Authors included in that “constellation” (Marres & Lezaun, 2013; Woolgar &
Lezaun, 2013) have distinguished different approaches to ontology within STS and in
relation to the tradition of ontological reflection. A first one, sometimes defined as
“theoretical ontology” (Marres, 2013), is characterized and dismissed as an abstract
discourse on what is (ens), on the kinds of beings, structures, and relations in the
world. To mark a distance with the theoretical tradition, the label “empirical ontology”
(the correlate of Latour's 2004 “experimental metaphysics”) has been proposed as a
tag  for  an  approach  characterized  by  the  conviction  that  to  think  through  the
structural makeup of the world requires to attend to the practices where much of it is
settled down. Such an exploration must be empirical in character. The call is to follow
the actors' practices of world-making.
The third ontological approach distinguished in the literature (Woolgar and Lezaun,
2013),  the so-called “experimental  ontology”,  is characterized by attending to the
“deliberate investment of non-humans with moral and political capacities” (Marres,
2013:  423)  This  would  be  understood  as  ontology,  and  thereby,  politics  and
morality153, “by design”, so to say. While the primary consequence of the empirical
approach is to find politics in different socio-material settings and therefore brings
about a “politicization of ontology”, the experimental one attends to the translation of
political forms and categories in ontological terms, otherwise, an “ontologization of
politics”.  Given  the  centrality  of  spaces  and  software  in  the  movements  that  I
152 “World” is a crucial category in the rhetoric of movements, as well as in the tradition of ontology, but
—to my mind—it has not been thematized in STS discussions on ontology. I try to do so at different
points in this work. As I mention below, for this I recur to the philosophical tradition.
153 We use the term here knowing culture cannot be designed.
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research here, I explore the possibilities of this third type of ontological discourse154.
In general, I recur to the three types of discourses on ontology. With them I try to
outline some key ontological features brought about by the 15M cycle. I do not aim to
present a full-blown ontology, however.
2.4.2.1. Different ontological positions and constituent politics
Discourses on politics as a constituted phenomenon, as a normative ideal, continue
being  centered  on  the  traditionally  modern  characters:  “citizens”,  “nations”,
“dialogue”, “political systems”, etc. Even STS studies in “empirical ontology”, which
have  focused  on  finding  politics  in  socio-material,  “non-Political  settings”,  have
frequently done so following obsolescent models of the political (Marres & Lezaun,
2013). Exceptions such as Latour have done something different, namely, they have
offered alternative narratives, but  at  the cost  of  leaving practices out of  question
(Pickering,  2009;  Marres,  2011).  Even  authors  situated  within  the  “experimental
ontology”  banner  seem  interested  in  tinkering  and  recording  the  tinkering  with
previous  categories  within  political  frameworks  that  are  not  further  questioned—
liberal  representative  democracies—even  if  the  range  of  fields  of  attention  is
extended (the home, a ship,  etc.,  Marres & Lezaun,  2013).  Very few (Pickering,
2009;  Papadopoulos,  2011)  address both discourses and practices,  appealing to
ontology as a horizon of constitution of new thought and new realities, otherwise, as
a  form  of  “constituent  politics”. Within  the  STS  literature,  Pickering  and
Papadopoulos  are  the  two  who  more  clearly  play  into  the  rebellious  and  even
revolutionary positions155 with regard to existing ontologies of technoscience. They
154 I do so realizing the commonality and potential un-interestingness of it all, as one gets farther from
“hard science”. There is not much discussion about the changeable condition of technological entities
or moral norms. It is only the connection between both, and the stress on the different objects they
outline what gives it a stronger appeal. Not even after these precisions do these cases hold as strong
challenge to common views of ontology and knowledge as classical studies on scientific practice
posed.
155 Given the multiplicity of positions within the constellation of STS works using the word “ontology”,
some distinctions may be in order. In order to make them, I will use the classical categorization of
different  forms of  social  constructionism (Hacking,  1999),  although it  is  necessary to  include the
double level mentioned above: the one concerning narratives, and the one concerning non-narrative
practices. Michael Lynch's (2013) position, with his insistence on the historicizing of ontological topics,
focused on “ontological talk” or “ontopics”, could be considered “historicist”. In spite of his remarks on
the inherent normativity of the “ontological turn”, Woolgar & Lezaun's (2013) views seem to range
between ironism and reformism with regard to both narratives and practices (according to them, one
can preserve a cosmopolitical irony with regard to worldviews, but is obliged to make a cosmopolitical
choice among worlds).  He seems to have rather little  to say on alternative practices.  Reformism
seems to be the strongest position one could attribute to Marres & Lezaun with regard to the practices
they  describe  in  their  works  (Marres,  2013;  Marres  &  Lezaun,  2011)  and  their  STS discourses.
Interestingly,  what  Hacking  called  the  “unmasking”  position  is  the  target  of  criticisms  by  several
authors within the “ontological” constellation” (Latour, 2005; Woolgar & Lezaun, 2013). In the case of
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criticize different discourses and practices of world-making, appeal to the need of
alternatives, and even compose them into sketches of alter-ontologies.
2.4.2.2. Pre-figuring out democracy
The attention of the analysis is situated not only on the shapes of 15M collectives
and projects, but also in their possibilities and relation to democracy and its potential
political ontologies. As suggested above, “democracy”, as a word and as a world, is
contingent and conflicted. Consequently, the portray of positions outlined in the part
1 of this chapter attempts to give a historic-philosophical setting against which to
situate 15M cycle experiments. Following an old anarchist adagio, a central 15M aim
was to experiment with how to “build a new world in the shell of the old”, a  real
democracy, now. Thereby the study casts new light on the notion and practice of
“prefigurative politics”.  The expression “prefigurative politics”  usually refers to  the
work of “building a new world” in a way that tries to anticipate and resemble what is
to come. But this thesis shows how 15M's prefigurative politics was also a process of
figuring and pre-figuring out, of finding out how and what the worlds desired (as well
as the ones confronted and brought about) are. In practice, there was no ready-
made world  to  be projected out.  Unsurprisingly,  the country  has been dubbed a
“laboratory of democracy”156 (Sandiumenge, 2015a) after 15M. Combining the first
and the second meaning (prefiguration as anticipation of the democracy to come,
and prefiguration as figuring out what democracy is and should be in practice) one
gets  Barber's  (1984)  vision  of  democracy  as  a  form  of  living  crossed  by
experimentation, by processes of figuring things out by an ever-wider array of actors
in a richer array of ways.
2.5. Research and methodology: rethinking methods and sociology
As suggested above, if revolution can be tied to the origin of sociology, movements
may be a good starting point to question and find new ways of going about it.
Latour, his transformative zeal focuses on the level of political discourse, but even there one could not
call  his position “rebellious”—after all,  he self-describes as “non-critical”  (actually, Latour 2013: 65
seems to appeal to a therapeutic position, simply calling for an alignment of practice and discourse-
theory about it, whatever these two are).
156 Three characteristics can be emphasized, one is that experimentation was exploratory, rather than
guided  or  ran  as  a  theory  test,  the  second is  that  it  was ran,  sometimes in  quasi  real-time,  by
networked multitudes (rather than by inert masses or mobs, or well represented “peoples”), third, it
was  done—most  of  the  time,  and  not  without  plenty  of  dysfunctions—in squares,  opencast,  and
digitally networked.
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2.5.1. From explanations to explorations
Rather than a work of explanation or interpretation—the traditional Diltheyan pair—
my research tries to move between thick description (Latour 2005) and exploration.
Otherwise, it follows practices of world-questioning and world-making within the 15M
cycle, of self and alter making and unmaking, of transformation and experimentation.
This approach is  tied to  a shift  in  research and narrative orientation.  My inquiry
attempts to invert or, rather, divert the path (the methodos) of traditional inquiry: it
does not primarily go from the phenomenon towards the conditions or causes that
may account for it,  but rather tries to see projects associated to 15M as offering
alternative ways of looking to and acting in the world, primarily, in the political and
technological  fields.  They  are  presented  as  openings,  as  ontological  theaters
(Pickering, 2010), rather than as fixed and defined units that should be explained in
terms of a fixed and ready-made order. I approach these movements and projects
not  only  as  topics  but  also  as  sources  of  (rather  than  as  “resources”  for157)  my
research. Rather than focusing on the process of unifying and clarifying what they
are I try to highlight their multiplying potential for what the world is.
Rather than assuming a fixed ontology, epistemology or methodology to explore a
(presumably)  unified movement I  try  to  see what  it  enacts and proposes.  In  the
words of Lefebvre (1969: 103)
“What  matters  is  not  to  propose  a  theory  of  the  movement,  but  to  show  the
movement in its true character and elaborate the elements of a theory. There is a
movement; there are therefore theoretical needs and requirements. A theory of the
movement has to emerge from the movement itself, for it is the movement that has
revealed,  unleashed,  and  liberated  theoretical  capacities.  No  contribution  to  the
elaboration of such a theory can lay claim to being an established doctrine; it can
never be more than a limited contribution”.
2.5.2.  Methods  and  movements:  from participant  observation  to  movement
research
In order to achieve such as purposed, I had to choose a peculiar method. Methodos,
in  Ancient  Greek,  is  “the  way one goes through”.  “The way”  is  also  the English
translation for the Chinese Tao. In both cases, “the way” includes what is understood
157 “Sources” can be understood here as a number of flows wherefrom the research emerges, while
“resources” appeal to the idea of a ready-made equipment or stuff to be used in it.
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by “method” since Bacon and Descartes, but only as a concrete and limited variation.
The word “Tao” also speaks of the wider worlds in which any method operates. In its
fuller  sense, the notion of  methodos helps to think the situated pathways of this
research. Those pathways were open in walking through “occupied” and “indignant”
territories,  offline and online.  That  walking,  as the Zapatistas say in  their  adagio
“caminando,  preguntamos”  (walking,  we ask  questions)  is  tied  to  the  practice  of
asking questions. The questions resulted from my collaborations with those I found
along those paths and territories. A good part of this research has gone along that of
others and, in that sense, this research is others’ too. In being others’ and others, it
speaks, walks and asks differently on different passages158.
This does not mean there is no method, but rather that there are several of them.
And  not  exactly  methods,  but  methodoi,  approaches  and  dispositives  whose
deployment is tied to different settings, processes, reasons, conversations, or actors
along the research path. From the methods of quantitative data mining to those of
qualitative  ethnographic  work.  Rather  than  “grounded”,  surely  rather  than  a
sedentary tone, this inquiry has a nomadic character.
I  first found and put myself into the stream of practice and then figured out what
questions were relevant.  I  was enmeshed in  15M activities long before I  started
researching the movement. I took part in early demonstrations and assemblies, and
weeks later I begun to think in doing research on them. This has been sometimes
called “observing participation” (Kaminski, 2004), and refers to participants in a given
process or group that shift their disposition towards it, as its name indicates, towards
an  observing  position.  It  partially  connects  to  the  so  called  “militant  research”
(Colectivo Situaciones, 2003), where the researcher gets its situated (practical and
theoretical) hypotheses oriented by and towards the construction of an “alternative
sociability” related to those of the subaltern. It is also oriented to connect to the ways
struggles read themselves, but always from a position of questioning, of wondering
and wandering, rather than from the frequently fixed positions, in and on the world, of
the academic researcher or the classical XXth century militant. This approach both
158 Perhaps the right  words to put  my research strategy are not  mine,  but  those of  Deleuze and
Guattari in One Thousand Plateaus (161), when they advise: “lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment
with  the  opportunities  it  offers,  find  an  advantageous  place  on  it,  find  potential  movements  of
deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there,
try out continua of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is
through a meticulous relation with the strata that  one succeeds in freeing lines of  flight,  causing
conjugated  flows to  pass  and escape and  bringing  forth  continuous intensities  for  a  BwO [body
without organs].”
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plays with and questions the frequent appeal to “critique” of social realities in the
social sciences, which is based on a fixed set of principles and models of reality, on
the bases of which realities are unmasked or evaluated.
Surely, one of my positions (as every position, a fully relational one) has been that of
participant  observer  (Spradley,  1980),  moving  between  a  passive  and  a  fully
engaged  participation.  But  observation  has  been  only  a  possibility  of  my
participation,  and  my  participation  has,  in  turn,  been  only  one  possibility  of  my
research and activist engagement with the 15M cycle. Participant observation, which
would be closer to the ancient sense of theoria (Gadamer, 2004), points only to one
set of potential performances. This research has implied to go far from theory and
even from research itself: it has been only a part of a wider stream of practice.
As  noticed  by  Monterde  (2015),  the  blurring  of  the  inside  and  outside  of  the
movement  brought  about  by  new  participation  modes,  has  a  correlate  for  the
positions  of  the  researcher  itself,  that  cannot  be  easily  represented  and located
either inside or outside. This can be productively connected with the call of Deleuze
& Guattari (1987), as well as of militant research, not to be “inside”, within the limits
of the boundaries imposed by social or sociological representation, but to “work in
the immanence” of action in which those boundaries, the setting of subjectivities and
objectivities, is decomposed and recomposed.
More than a safe stay in “participant observation” or “militancy” positions, I have tried
to both recognize and explore various modes, positions and perspectives, trying to
avoid an “original position” or definitive perspective. I shifted between positions at
various times and for a variety of reasons. Multiple modes and positions mean that,
depending  on  the  passage,  my  performances  can  be  defined  as  “descriptive,”
“normative”,  “militant,”  “investigative,”  “interventive”,  or  otherwise.  They  do  not
proceed in a strict cumulative or progressive sense, but rather as different exercises
of possibilities and impossibilities159.
I would define this as a form not of militant, but of “kinetic” or “movement” research, a
research  in  movement.  Such  an  approach  is  not  fixed  by  any  concrete  ethic-
159 The  inspirations  for  this  way  of  approaching  research  are  many,  ranging  from the  “rhizome”
metaphor (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) to the notion of “possibility” in Kundera’s the Art of the Novel.
On a similar vein, Routledge (2004) points out, quoting Sun Tzu (1988, 125): “Adaptation means not
clinging to fixed methods, but changing appropriately according to events, acting as is suitable”. In this
case, a factor eventually (that is, in connection to the events) taken into account in that adaptation
was the exercise and the will to exercise different possibilities.
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epistemic position160. This breaks the unity of the research gaze and the method in its
Cartesian or “scientific” sense. It speaks of a shifting methodos, multi-positional and
therefore alternating, becoming other. Ultimately, it points towards the relevance of
that  “alter”,  the  diverse  others  with  which  research  put  me in  contact  with,  who
changed me.
2.5.2.1. Researching with others: networked participation and research
I  learned much of what I  know about politics and technopolitics from actors. The
actor-researcher positions appear only as “moments” in a wider, hybrid becoming of
shared research and life. I tried to maintain both critical (Latour, 2005) and militant
proximity  with  regard  to  actors161,  many  of  which  were  actually  friends  of  co-
researchers.
I joined them in activist and research endeavors. One of these was the construction
of the datanalysis15M research network, a network of activist-researchers interested
in contentious politics and network science, based in Barcelona. I also became a
member  of  the  Networks,  Movements,  and Technopolitics  research group  at  the
Internet Interdisciplinary Institute of the Open University of Catalonia. As part of my
participation in both of these collectives I have carried on collaborative, extensive
and  multi-method  research  on  both  15M  and  Occupy.  The  results  of  those
endeavors,  such as a paper  on collective identities (Monterde et  al.,  2015)  or  a
survey (Monterde et al., 2017) are used in this study. Much of my knowledge of, and
data  for,  network  analysis  also  comes  from  those  collaborations.  This  gives  a
different meaning to “participation” in both collective research and movements, as
suggested  by  the  Colectivo  Situaciones.  Both  epistemic  and  political  affinity
intertwined, never without tensions and differences, like in friendships.  
2.5.2.2. Analyses in and on movements
Political actors are continuously generating themselves and the movement, through
views  and  narrations  (Snow  &  Benford  2000)  on  what  precedes,  surrounds,
160 As De Jong (2012) has interestingly pointed out with a more limited intention “A researcher is
supposed to ‘choose’ a position prior to conducting fieldwork research […] I argue, however, that the
ethics  regarding positioning  should  be approached as a  continuous dynamic  process  in  which  a
theoretical approach influences a researcher’s position which in turn may influence the theoretical
approach.”
161 The potential charge of falling into the “ideology”, “viewpoint” or even the “world” of actors can only
be sustained if  one takes only a few viewpoints all  oriented in about the same direction, thereby
allowing some form of “consensual naturalization”, or if  one assumes there is such a thing as an
“ideology” (or several) speaking over and through them. Surely, there is much caution or, better, care
to be taken on the part of the researcher, to the point of becoming a complementary thread to the one
concerning the object and its possibilities.
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confronts,  or  follows  them.  They  self-analyze  (Tilly,  1978;  Touraine,  1981)  for  a
variety  of  reasons,  which  go  from  public  outreach  to  strategizing.  The  15M
movement  involved thousands of  participants with  university  studies (72% in  the
case of the 15M 2014 survey) and a research training. Objectifying self-analysis has
played  a  prominent  role  in  15M as  a  generation  of  researchers  enrolled  in  the
movement. They have done so in a plurality of languages, a polyglossia that I try to
reflect in my own text, trying to combine different materials (interviews, texts, images,
datasets) forms of experience and writing styles (agitating, recording or recalling,
advertising, research), etc.
This thesis should not be thought under the metaphorical coordinates of a mirror that
reflects what the 15M cycle was, but rather under the metaphor of the palimpsest,
the  collage,  or  the  more  recent  etherpad162.  The  cycle  is  rather  the  result  of  an
iterative and collaborative construction than the presupposition the work.
As a general rule, the structure of the text-work follows the style of nomadic and ANT
research (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Latour, 2005), following the phenomena without
paying much attention to disciplinary boundaries.  At  the same time, it  plays with
disciplinary references and differences.
2.5.3. Methodologies and research approaches
The methods, in the traditional sense, deployed in this work come from the traditional
repertoires of anthropology, political science, sociology, and STS, as well as from the
more recent areas of digital humanities and network science.
2.5.3.1. Fieldwork
The key dispositives in  my research was fieldwork.  I  may say that  the fieldwork
became  indistinguishable  from  life.  I  spent  five  years  of  life  in  the  field.  I  was
immersed even as I was writing down this text, and I will remain there after finishing
writing. “The field” included both offline and online spaces. Much of the material I
used came from online sources. This is a timetable of my work 
162 Etherpads are web-based, real-time, collaborative editors.
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TABLE 10. SYNTHESIS OF FIELDWORK DURING THE RESEARCH PERIOD.
2.5.3.2. Conversations and interviews
In depth interviews have long been a central tool in the ethnographic toolkit, as a
way to enter into the lives and worlds of actors in their own terms. Semi-structured
interviews hold particular value on this regard. Although I cite interviews in all of the
cases and periods studied, I preferred to take notes after fluid conversations rather
than to set up those conversations to answer my predefined questions. I tended to
let  those  long  and  variegated  conversations  throw  the  answers,  as  well  the
questions, to me. I ran interviews for each of the different studied cases, but I also
relied  on  interviews  that  many  key  actors  had  already  given  for  different
documentaries (specially 15m.cc) or researches (such as Monterde, 2015), which
frequently published them under creative commons licenses. As I changed the focus
of my thesis, I had to discard a good number of interviews that I ran between 2011
and 2016. In the end, I have worked with material from around 30+ interviews, 10 of
which were carried on by me (the rest are mostly taken from the 15m.cc database,
and my collaborator Arnau Monterde's thesis).
Here a list of 20 key interviews used in the thesis:
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TABLE 11. LIST OF INTERVIEWS.
Name Initiative Year Source
Alonso, Julio Ley Sinde, Nolesvotes 2011 15M.cc
Arana, Miguel 15M, Podemos, 
Ayuntamiento de Madrid
2011 15m.cc
Dans, 
Enrique
Nolesvotes, Ley Sinde 2011 Nolesvotes.wiki
Franco, 
Marta
15M, Ahora Madrid 2011 15M.cc
Galli, Ricardo Nolesvotes, Ley Sinde 2011 Nolesvotes.wiki
Grueso, 
Stephane
15M 2011 15M.cc
Huerga, 
Héctor
15M 2012 Me
Jurado, 
Francisco
15M, Partido X, 
Podemos
2012, 
2013
Me, Arnau Monterde
Levi, Simona X.net, 15M, Partido X 2013 Me, Arnau Monterde
Padilla, Marta 15M 2011 15M.cc
Padilla, Pablo 15M, Podemos 2011, 
2014
15M.cc, Arnau Monterde
Salgado, 
Sergio
15M, X Party 2012 Me, Arnau Monterde
Sánchez, 
Manu
Periodismo Humano, 
15M
2011 15M.cc
Sánchez 
Almeida, 
Carlos
Ley Sinde, Nolesvotes, 
15M
2011 Me
Soto, Pablo Ley Sinde, 15M, 
Podemos, Ahora Madrid
2011 15M.cc
Toret, Javier DRY, Partido X, 
Barcelona en Comú
2012, 
2013
Me
Vázquez, 
Daniel
Ley Sinde, 15M 2011 15M.cc
Zapata, 
Guillermo
15M, Ahora Madrid 2011 15M.cc
Zulo 15M 2011 15M.cc
Many of the conversations I refer to, though, took place online, so they overlap with
the following set of materials. They were automatically archived as digital material by
the platforms on which they took place.
2.5.3.3. Digital material
I  have profusely recurred to digital  contents in order to gather the materials that
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ground this research. A key material on this regard has been social media contents,
ranging from messages on Twitter and Facebook to images and videos in those or
other platforms,  such as Youtube and Livestream. An earlier  technology that has
remained crucial has been email, of which I have analyzed dozens, if not hundreds,
of  thousands.  Instant  messaging  services  such  as  WhatsApp  and  Telegram
(promoted as a privacy friendly alternative to the former in 2014) have been very
relevant  too,  particularly,  from  2013  onwards.  Many  of  these  texts  are  written
conversations, and exhibit their aliveness and style, but also the multiple defining
characteristics of both digital and written media. I  also include in this category of
digital content a variety of blog posts, meeting notes, open group discussions, etc.
that  were  posted  in  a  variety  of  platforms,  from  commercial  ones,  such  as
WordPress, to alternative activist platforms such as n-1.
2.5.3.4. Surveys
The  survey  #Encuesta15M2014,  which  I  launched  along  with  collaborators
(Monterde et al., 2017) had 51 questions concerning the respondents' participation in
15M,  their  previous  experience  in  social  movements,  their  use  of  ICTs  during
protests, the role of emotions, the evolution of the movement, and its impacts. My
analysis is focused on respondents that participated in the movement (1014 of the
total, which amounts to 76,8% of the sample), which seems a significative sample in
order to illustrate the opinions and experiences of 15M participants.
2.5.3.5. Big data, network science and social network analysis
On top of traditional  qualitative and quantitative methods and data,  new network
analysis  methods  and  big  data  have  gained  traction  with  the  advent  of  digitally
networked activism. In principle, the formula “big data” refers to “data sets that are so
large  or  complex  that  traditional  data  processing  applications  are  inadequate.
Challenges  include  analysis,  capture,  data  curation,  search,  sharing,  storage,
transfer, visualization, querying and information privacy” (Big data, 2016).
Social  network  analysis  data  serves  to  explore,  analyze  and visualize  these  big
datasets, and find the networks of relationships between the actors that generated
such data.  This  is  at  the basis  of  my panoramic/systemic approach to  15M and
contentious technopolitics more broadly. The three basic social media under study
were Twitter, Facebook, and the Web.
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2.5.3.6. Secondary and tertiary sources
For the present work, I have used different types of secondary sources. One of them
are  scholarly  publications  in  a  variety  of  disciplines:  sociology,  political  science,
philosophy,  network  science,  biology,  engineering,  and  more.  Another  set  are
handbook and encyclopedic articles, which include references to the Wikipedia and
may  count  as  tertiary  sources.  On  the  other  hand,  I  recurred  to  hundreds  of
newspaper articles from mainstream media in  Spain,  the UK and the US, which
covered, sometimes in detail, multiple events of the 2011-2016 cycle. Some of this
blur  the boundary between secondary and primary source.  In  a  similar  direction,
further into the primary, I recurred to dozens of texts found on political blogs and
wikis online, connected to the movements themselves in a variety of ways, ranging
from reporting to militant research. Probably the paradigmatic case on this regard, a
source of  primary,  secondary,  and tertiary materials  is  the project  15M.cc,  which
includes interviews, a documentary, a 15M encyclopedia (www.15mpedia.org) and
other valuable materials.
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Chapter 3. Between crisis and critique: 
economic, political, and technological 
conditions in the ongoing reassembling of 
democracy in Spain.
3.1. Introduction
This  chapter  is  oriented  to  give  a  general  sense  of  the  mid  and  short  term
socioeconomic  and political  situation  of  Spain  and the  global  scene before  15M
emerged. The chapter begins with an outline of the general features of the mid-term
crisis  of  liberal  representative  democracy  as  constructed  in  the  political  science
literature (Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Tormey, 2015). I connect this crisis to
the rise of neoliberalism, and I list some symptoms, and their probable causes, as
stated in the existing literature. Coming closer to the present, I reconstruct the short-
term crisis that preceded 15M in its double nature, socioeconomic and political. Then
I  outline the origin,  unfolding and crash of  the Spanish economic (primarily,  real
estate) bubble in the 1998-2008 period. After that I move into the political crisis in
Spain, where the State, like in the US, came to the rescue of big banks and other
actors responsible  for  the economic meltdown. Furthermore,  these rescues were
quickly followed, already in 2010, by a new austerity discourse and logics, which
accused of profligacy to governments such as that of the Spanish State, which had
been an example of the opposite up to the hard hit of the crisis. Then I dig into a
particular feature of the Spanish case: the extremely high level of corruption of the
political system, especially, of the Popular Party, which played a crucial role in the
boom  and  bust  of  the  financial  and  real  estate  bubble.  I  reconstruct  how  the
economic  crisis  feeds  into  an  increasing  political  crisis  from  2011  onwards.
Afterwards I list some specific 15M motivations, and then attend to the shift  from
crisis to critique among the citizenry, otherwise, the transformation of a condition of
crisis into a critical condition. A crucial element there was the counter-framing of the
situation, against normalizing and people-blaming strategies led by key political and
economic actors. Then, I outline the “chronic and evolving critical condition” that has
underlined the cycle of  contention opened by 15M, which has fed back with  the
processes and projects emerging from it. I close the chapter with a synoptic view of
the cycle, from Nolesvotes to the scenario by late 2016, enumerating the key cases
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that I will analyze, and why.
3.2.  The  crisis  of  liberal  representative  democracy:  mid-term
narratives
According to various authors, representative democracy has passed through periodic
crises (Manin, 1997; Rosanvallon, 2011: 3). The last one may have been ongoing for
the last two decades, at the least (Rosanvallon, 2008), and seems to be felt across
the “ideological and methodological spectrum” (Tormey, 2015: 15). So much so that
the crisis of liberal representative democracy has been identified with the crisis of
democracy itself (Keane, 2011; DellaPorta, 2013). Different authors have denounced
the technocratic tendencies and the neoliberal  hegemony in this same period as
heralding a stage of post-democracy (Crouch, 2004) or post-politics (Žižek, 1999;
Rancière, 2001),  while  others,  in a more limited way,  have used the term "post-
representation"  to  refer  to  the emptying of  power and meaning of  representative
institutions,  by  dynamics  ranging  from  globalization  and  the  dismantling  of  the
welfare  state  to  citizen  disaffection  and  dis-empowerment  (Brito  Vieira  and
Runciman, 2008; Keane, 2009; Rosanvallon, 2011; Tormey, 2015).
The readings of “post-representation” are multiple, though, connected with different
political readings of the crisis and the potential ways out of it, from those that give
conjunctural  readings to  those  that  tie  it  to  the  transformations  of  modernity,  its
subjectivities and modes of sociality (Tormey, 2015). Relevantly, the various attempts
at potentiating participation and deliberation in the last decade have been considered
insufficient to revert these tendencies (Keane, 2011; Tormey, 2015).
Interestingly, rather than taking the way of retreat into post-political inaction or the
acceptation  of  post-democratic  technocracy,  15M actors  seemed to  inaugurate  a
process of radical democratization of politics, a re-politicization of their own lives and
their life in common. That process is 15M, and the cycle of contention it gave way to.
As  I  mentioned  in  chapter  1,  democracy,  and,  particularly,  liberal  representative
democracy, is nowadays both more successful and more questioned than ever. As
the quantity of countries that fit some of its basic traits increases, so its quality has
been said to shrink where it is considered as already consolidated.
3.2.1. Representative symptoms of a crisis
Political  scientists  use  different  variables  to  check  the  health  of  representative
democracy,  among  them  “voter  turnout,  membership  of  political  parties,  trust  in
  
 
133
 
politicians, and interest in mainstream electoral politics” (Tormey, 2015: 16).
Studies  show be no  definitive  pattern  in  voting  turnout163.  But  when  it  comes to
membership in political parties, the numbers are clear: the decline is marked, with
mainstream parties' affiliates declining from 25-30% of the electorate to 2-3% in most
developed democracies (Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Hay, 2007; Whiteley, 2011).
This has made parties ever more dependent on corporate money, in turn raising the
suspicion of co-optation among their electorates and shrinking constituencies—for
debates on the need of public funding of parties (Van Biezen, 2004). According to
Manin (1997), a typical strategy of electoralist parties in audience democracies, in
part responsible and in part caused by these tendencies, is to compensate the lack
of grassroots with the nurturing of political personalities reaching people via mass
media. But that goes hand in hand with an emptying out of parties as spaces of
“participation in representation” and collective identification, a weakening of the role
of  political  programs,  and thereby of  the  sense of  meaningful  political  choices164
(Della Porta, 2013). As a consequence, research indicates a shrinking capacity of
parties to mediate between civil society and State institutions, as they did for a good
part of XIXth and XXth centuries (Manin, 1997).
According to  numerous accounts  (Dalton  2004;  Flinders  2012;  DellaPorta 2013),
this,  in  turn,  affects  a  third  variable  (after  voter  turnout  and  party  membership):
confidence in the political class, parties and government is also collapsing. Some
authors indicate that even where politicians are approachable figures, such as in
Australia or Northern European countries, they are still untrusted (Dalton 2004), and
wonder whether the double-face of the political  system (the need to  act partisan
while in elections or the opposition, and non-partisanly while in government) may
have to do with this mistrust (Rosanvallon, 2011; Tormey, 2015).
Finally, the literature (Street 2001; Meyer and Hinchman, 2002; Corner and Pels,
2003)  also  suggests  that  a  fourth  variable,  interest  in  mainstream politics,  is  in
decline too, except when elections or crises happen, as can be appreciated in media
coverage. Programs on politics have been forced to turn into “infotainment”.
163 Voter  turnout  has been steadily  declining in  State  elections of  European countries in  the last
decades (Lane & Ersson, 1999). In the US, the pattern has been more varied, with a decline that
receded  in  the  2000s,  and  a  relatively  stable  turnout  in  younger  democracies  such  as  Spain's.
Numbers have tended to be worse on both supranational (for instance, European Union) and sub-
national (regional or local) elections. Differences aside, the general lesson seems to be that turnout
rises  when something  seems to  be  at  stake  for  the  electorate—even though that  lesson  failed,
precisely, in the State elections in Spain on December 20th 2015.
164 In terms of Weber, rational legitimation recedes in favor of a charismatic type.
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Different  analyses  have  been  rather  pessimist  with  regard  to  the  quality  of
democracy in advanced economies (Diamond and Morlino, 2005), including citizen's
declining satisfaction with the working of political institutions (Pharr & Putnam, 2000).
Other studies suggest that, while “reasonable satisfaction” increases when a range
of meaningful options are available for choosing at elections, these choices are not
frequent (Wessels, 2011). Ultimately, studies noticed that political apathy becomes a
central feature of attitudes towards representative politics in places such as the US
(Eliasoph, 1998) and across most Western democracies (Tormey, 2015).
3.2.1.1. Some features of the neoliberal melting of representative democracy
According to DellaPorta (2013: 23), neoliberal globalization undermines democracy
and people's trust in it by catalyzing three central shifts of power: from representative
organizations (such as parties) and institutions to executive powers, emptying party
politics  of  its  meaning;  from  State  to  market,  emptying  out  public  policy  and
government,  more broadly;  and from nation states to  “international  governmental
organizations”  such as  the  EU,  the IMF or  the  World  Bank,  which empties  both
nation States and democracies of much of their legitimacy and power. According to
Offe (2011: 457):
“causal narratives on the crisis of democracy include economic globalization and the
absence of effective supranational regulatory regimes; the exhaustion of the left-to-
the-center political  ideas and the hegemony of  market-liberal  public philosophies,
together with their anti-statist implications; and the impact of financial and economic
crises  and  the  ensuing  fiscal  starvation  of  nation  states  which  threatens  to
undermine their state capacity”.
These analyses seem to point towards the limitation of democracy by representation
and the undermining of representation by neoliberalism suggested in chapter 2.
Looking  at  15M  accounts,  it  seems  Spain  has  been  no  different  from  other
representative  democracies.  But  looking  at  media  and  academic  reports,  the
situation of Spain in the period 2008-2016 has been particularly bad, as it was one of
the countries worst hit by all the various waves and dimensions of the crisis.
3.3. The economic crisis: short-term narratives  
According to multiple reports (Duménil & Lévy, 2011), 2008 marked the beginning of
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a deep economic crisis that came to shake the neoliberal hegemony. Here I focus on
the Spanish case. I present a series of media and academic accounts that help to
construct a general narrative on the economic and political conditions in Spain that
preceded and underlined the 15M cycle.
3.3.1.  The origin,  unfolding,  and crash of  the Spanish bubble  in  the period
1998-2008
In order to reconstruct the origin, unfolding, and crash of the Spanish bubble in the
period 1998-2008 I rely on two analyses by actors situated in the critical left and
close to projects of the 15M cycle: López & Rodríguez (2010), Madrilian activists
associated to autonomous projects and 15M, as well as Montiel & Naredo (2011),
the second later became Podemos Secretary General in the Valencian Community.
Both have resumed the origin of the Spanish crisis in this way: on 2008, a housing
bubble,  tied  to  a  decade  old  development  model,  exploded.  According  to  that
narrative, the model had been set up by the government of the right wing Popular
Party in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and was perpetuated by the center-left
Socialist Party between 2004 and 2007. The cycle made the Spanish economy fly
and crash in a decade.
López & Rodríguez, 2010 note that after the inclusion of Spain in the European
Union in 1985, “convergence” with Maastricht's neoliberal economic union involved,
along with the reception of EU development funds, the implementation of policies
ranging from the  liberalization  of  previously  public  sectors  to  the  tight  control  of
public deficit and wages, up to the adoption of the Euro in 1999. According to their
account, in 1998, as part of those broad neoliberal policies, and in order to solve the
shortage and high prices of housing, the right wing Popular Party declared a law on
land that liberalized real estate development165. As exposed in López & Rodríguez’s
reconstruction, between 1998 and 2007, peak year of the cycle, the housing stock
rose by 30%, and construction came to amount directly (not to say indirectly) up to
13,3% of total employment in Spain (compared to 6,7% in Germany or 8,5% in the
UK). In the meantime, housing prices, far from falling, skyrocketed.
Montiel & Naredo (2011) have pointed that, since Franco's times, in Spain, housing
is seen as a safe investment, stable like bricks, one you can live in. Economists
165 The law change paradigms: from requiring to authorities (local, regional, national) to justify why to
classify a given land as “developable”, now the key was to justify and delimit what terrain was “not
developable”.
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closer to official circles (Arellano & Bentolila, 2009)166, have suggested that economic
growth,  to  a  good  extent  due  to  the  housing  bubble,  fed  back  with  growing
employment and immigration (usually working on, and requiring, housing), as well as
sharply  declining  interest  rates  in  borrowing  resulting  from  the  adoption  of  the
Euro167, reinforced with inter-bank competition that lowered credit requisites, when
not promoted, borrowing. All of that pushed annual inflation in housing up from 1% in
the period 1995-1997 to 18% in 2003-2004, to an average of 10% per year in the
period 1995-2007, with a revaluation of houses up to 191% in the period 1997-2007
(the second highest in the OECD). According to López & Rodríguez (2010), these
dynamics both promoted and were promoted by investment and speculation:  the
adoption of the Euro (and European unified interest rates) encouraged international
investment  as  well  as  national  borrowing  during  the  period.  National  and
international banks, and, especially, regional saving banks, got wide exposition, via
credit, to the housing sector.
López & Rodríguez indicate that, in the midst of this economic growth, real wages
(as  Piketty  2014  has  shown also  for  other  countries,  especially  with  the  rise  of
neoliberalism)  tended  to  remain  stagnant,  thanks,  among  other  factors,  to
successive  labor  reforms;  thereby,  improvements  in  life  status  were  primarily
covered via credit and revaluation of stocks, especially, housing.
According  to  Arellano  &  Bentolila  (2009),  although  warnings  of  housing  over-
valuation were out since 2002, the right wing Popular Party (from now on PP), which
denied the existence of a bubble, and the Socialist Party (from now on PSOE), which
recognized it late and did too little, contributed to its building up. According to them,
three reasons for the reluctance to act strongly seemed to be the fact that the bubble
pushed unemployment rates to  historical  lows, it  benefited the median voter (via
homeowner's  property),  and,  crucially,  it  represented  a  key  source  of  taxation,
indirectly  (via  income  taxes)  and,  more  crucially,  directly  (via  legal  and  illegal
“taxation” of real estate transactions). Illegal taxes were at the base of much of the
corruption that begun to hit the news after 2008, feeding into a radical political crisis.
As noted by Montiel & Naredo (2011), in late 2007 housing prices began a decline,
166 Manuel Arellano and Samuel Bentolila are professors at the Center for Monetary and Financial
Studies, created by the Bank of Spain.
167 As a result of the adoption of the Euro and the economic growth, interest rates dropped from 11%
in 1995 to 3,45% in 2003-2005, which were even lower in real terms due to the inflation associated
with growth and the shift to Euro.
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connected to a number of causes, including a saturation of demand (in Spain there
were  hundreds of  thousands of  both  overvalued and empty  houses at  the  time,
waiting for a buyer). In 2007-2008, the subprime mortgage crisis unfolds in the US,
impacting  lending  worldwide,  and  triggering  a  rise  of  interest  rates  in  Europe,
pushing mortgage fees up, and triggering a “liquidity crunch” among both lenders
and borrowers. Many real estate developers begun to halt their activity, what in turn
troubled them, as well as common people, in paying their debts for real estate assets
now in decline.
By 2008 the situation hit the news. A crash in the housing sector was aired in the
media:  huge  drops  in  sales,  drops  in  prices,  and  the  crash  of  big  real  estate
developers (such as Martín-Fadesa, the biggest crash of Spanish history) (Cinco
Días, 2008),  a tendency that continued in 2009.  This first  and strongly impacted
unemployment. Official statistics (INE, 2011) suggested that, in the following period,
Spain moved from 7,93% of unemployment in the second quarter of  2007 up to
20,64% in the second quarter of 2011, with rates among young people rising even
more dramatically, up to 45% in the ages 16-24168.
3.4. The political crisis: short-term narratives
3.4.1. The State comes to the rescue but ends in austerity
I follow Rodríguez & López (2010) and media reconstructions of the ensuing State
reactions. According to them, the rise in unemployment took place in spite of the
countercyclical,  stimulus  of  the  Socialist  Party,  launched  to  stimulate  economic
activity, in late 2008 and 2009, the so called “Plan E”, which followed Keynesian
principles.  In  spite  of  some  temporary  effects,  struggling  citizens,  faced  with
unemployment, a devaluing of their assets (houses) or deeply in debt, begun to feel
the harshness of the crisis.
As these narratives point out, since 2008, the State accounts ran continuous deficits
as unemployment soared along with the need to pay unemployment benefits, while
economic activity and thereby tax collection plummeted. The situation worsened as
the process came to affect banks dramatically. Starting in 2009, a series of banks,
and  especially,  regional  saving  banks  that  heavily  financed  housing  in  previous
years, started a process of partial crashes and State-steered fusions, with State and
EU-backed support or bailouts lasting several years (Serrano, 2013b). In 2009 Spain
168 With rates between 45% (16-24) and 26% (24-29) on the second semester of 2011, up from 21,3%
and 11,3% respectively, in 2008 (Rocha Sánchez, 2012).
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was the OECD country that provisioned the most money to save the banking sector,
2% of its GDP, four times the quantity employed by the US and six that of the UK. In
2010, the risk premium169 of Spanish debt begun to rise steadily170. Along with the
“risk premium”, international credit rating agencies, under heavy criticism for failing to
warn of the risks of troubled assets that brought about the subprime bubble, begun
to  play  a  central  role,  along  with  “the  markets”,  in  the  Spanish  political  and
mediascape (Belío, 2013).
According to international critical economist, Mark Blyth (2013), as a response to this
situation, in 2010, another neoliberal idea, a “dangerous one” one that was to drive
much economic policy in the following years, begun to gain force, first in international
and EU circles, then in Spanish ones. That idea was economic austerity171.
The notion  that  States  had overspent  was blasted through economic media  and
official EU institutions (such as the ECB). According to Blyth (2013) this resulted from
a  generalization  from  the  Greek  case  when,  actually,  for  cases  like  Spain,  the
opposite was true, especially up to the crisis (Murado, 2010). The first social welfare
cuts of a long series begun in May, 2010, under the Socialist government (Garea,
2010),  quickly  followed  by  liberalizing  labor  reforms  that  potentiated  precarity
(Guamán, 2011). The 2010 social cuts were the biggest in the history of Spanish
democracy up to that moment.
3.4.2. The corrupt fabric of the indebted man
From  different  media,  including  governmental  ones,  a  narrative  reconstruction,
inaugurated by the PSOE and potentiated by the PP, especially after the access to
power of the latter in late 2011, said that Spaniards had lived over their possibilities
and  thereby  needed  to  tighten  their  belts  (as  suggested  by  the  Government
spokesperson, Socialist José Blanco (Recuero & Delgado, 2011), or by the president
of the Valencian Community, Popular Albert Fabra (El Mundo, 2012).
169 The risk premium is the interest rate a country pays to investors buying its State bonds, relative to
the rate paid by Germany, in considered the safest bond of a EU country.
170 This resulted from worsening conditions nationally (from all the elements mentioned, especially
increasing  State  debt  resulting  from  taxes-expenditures  imbalances  and  bank  bailouts)  and
internationally, particularly, perceptions about struggling EU countries such as Ireland, Italy, Greece,
and Portugal (Medialdea & Sanabria, 2014).
171 In Blyth's terms (2013: 2), austerity is “a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts
through the reduction of  wages,  prices,  and public spending to restore competitiveness,  which is
(supposedly) best achieved by cutting the State’s budget, debts, and deficits. Doing so, its advocates
believe, will  inspire “business confidence” since the government will  neither be “crowding-out” the
market for investment by sucking up all the available capital through the issuance of debt, nor adding
to the nation’s already “too big” debt”.
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For critical voices of the left, such narratives were a product and mechanism of a
“fabric of the indebted man” (Lazzarato, 2012), persuading people into subjectivities
suited for  accepting austerity,  in  this  case justified as the proper  punishment for
collective excesses, deciphered as moral failures. For other critical voices (López &
Rodríguez, 2010; Krugman, 2009, 2011), this narrative downplayed or obliterated
references to crucial elements of the situation, such as the ones mentioned above:
from land laws triggering the housing bubble,  to labor  reforms tied to  real  wage
stagnation in years of sharp growth, the role of Eurozone imbalances and money
flows, or its poor institutional design, which prevented key mechanisms of economic
control  at  the  State  level,  such  as  interest  rates,  while  preventing  welfarist  tax
redistribution.
Simultaneously, by the late 2000s, mainstream media (strongly partisan in Spain,
Palau & Davesa, 2013; Baumgartner & Chaqués Bonafont, 2015) were flooded with
news  of  corruption  cases  involving  PSOE  and  PP,  whose  representatives
alternatively dismissed accusations and accused each other of being responsible for
the widespread corruption that was progressively unearthed. Media begun to outline
a  portray  in  which  corruption  touched  every  layer  of  the  political  system,  local,
regional  and  State,  as  well  as  many  other  institutions,  public  and  private.
Furthermore,  corruption  scandals  were  usually  directly  connected to  the  housing
bubble itself, fueling and fueled by it (Villoria, 2008; Villoria & Jiménez, 2012).
3.5. Surveying 15M motivations
3.5.1. The socioeconomic crisis as a political crisis and revelation
As  economic  conditions  worsened,  political  measures  made  life  harder  for  an
increasing number of people, and political corruption was progressively revealed, in
2010 and 2011, the economic and social crises took a new form: a political one.
According  to  the  Center  of  Sociological  Research,  levels  of  disapproval  of  the
political class rose steadily: from February 2010 onwards, and for the following few
years,  it  became  the  third  biggest  problem  of  the  country  according  to  public
perception, after unemployment and economic problems (only leaving that place with
the arrival of “corruption and fraud”, in February 2013). The levels rose from 19,3%
on December 2010 up to 22,1% in May 2011 and over 24% in June, the two months
of peak activity of the 15M movement172.
172 These percentages of respondents correspond to people marking “Politicians in general, political
parties and politics”  in  a  multi-question survey ran by the Center  of  Sociological  Research on a
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As I show in chapter 4, 15M anticipated many of the perceptions that were later to
become much more common among the general population with regard to economic
and political issues. For instance, as I just mentioned, “corruption and fraud”, crucial
for activists even before the beginning of the movement, became second in the list of
big problems in the years 2013, 2014, and 2015. Campaigns such as Nolesvotes
and 15M itself diagnosed a fake and corrupt democracy as centrally related to the
economic crisis, not only in the response to it, but in its very emergence.
According to an online survey we ran on 2014 (Monterde et al., 2017), these were
the key ones for people who participated in the movement
TABLE 12. PROBLEMS THAT DROVE PARTICIPANTS TO 15M
Factor Percentage of respondents (%)
Lack of democracy 88,8
Corruption       77,6
Economic crisis 66,6
Social cuts 64,2
Unemployment 53
Housing 46,4
Others 28,9
No reason 0,5
DK/NA 0,4
The survey suggests that “lack of democracy” and “corruption”, two key elements of
the  political  crisis,  were  more  relevant  to  15M  participants  than  the  economic
situation. On this, 15M anticipated many of the worries that were to rise, months
later, among the general population.
3.6. Between crisis and critique: the movement from a condition of
crisis into a critical condition
The double crisis (socioeconomic and political) outlined so far seems to amount to
what Antonio Gramsci (1971) defined as an “organic crisis”, namely, a process of
weakening  of  an  established  sociopolitical  hegemony,  the  debilitation  of  the
commitment of  wide majorities to the constituted order,  its  ruling groups, and its
common sense. But, as suggested by RMT, a crisis may, by itself, may remain an
inert condition. The multi-factorial socioeconomic crisis sweeping Spain since 2008
and  its  related  political  crisis,  as  well  as  the  growing  discontent,  were  crucial
monthly  basis.  Data  available  at  www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-
Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html. The Center for Sociological Research is
an “autonomous center, dependent on the Ministry of the Presidency”.
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conditions, but not sufficient ones, for the emergence of 15M.
A relevant  political  opportunity  was  constructed  around  the  local  and  regional
elections due on May 22nd,  2011. As repeated by numerous actors (as shown in
Monterde,  2016),  the  demonstration  on  May  15th  was  oriented  to  display  and
galvanize the discontent with the situation, which no actor was canalizing (this lack
was another element of the opportunity), around a relevant political date. The period
of preparation for May 15th was one of construction of new subjects, collectives, and
networks, especially, on social media (Toret et al., 2015). The months before, during
and  after  15M  witnessed  what  I  may  define  as  a  multitudinous  movement,  a
displacement, from organic crisis to organized critique, from a situation of massive
crisis  into  a  multitudinous  critical  condition.  Activist  initiatives  gave  to  the  multi-
factorial crisis a critical discursive rendition, a framing that they also promoted, that
they themselves embodied in practice. In chapter 4 I explore this transition.
In broad terms, this relation between crisis and critique could be put into words by
playing with a well-known Kantian formula: conditions without renditions are blind,
renditions without conditions are empty. Against the possibility of a silent crisis being
brutally “solved” by the mechanisms of the system in crisis (to put it in Klein's 2007
terms, via “shock doctrine”, austerity plans, silencing of exploitation and dissent, and
the like—basically, the strategy of the European Union and the Spanish government,
especially since the electoral victory of the right-wing Popular Party in late 2011), or
that of  a vociferous critique disconnected from broad constituencies and material
reality (perhaps the type of critique that allegedly has “run out of steam”, according to
Latour, 2004a), otherwise, against mere crisis and mere critique, what can be found,
especially  since  2011,  in  Spain,  is  the  construction  of  a  “multitudinous  critical
condition”: the critical rendition by many of a critical condition for many. This required
the rendition of that double crisis, socio-economic and political, as a critical condition
—in a passive sense, as something people were suffering—, and the deployment of
that rendition as part of the articulation of a shared critical  condition towards the
situation—in an active and practical sense, as something people should exercise.
The  displacement  from  crisis  to  critique  is  tied  to  affective  mobilization173,  the
construction  of  what  I  may  call  “critical  affects”,  such  as  “indignation”,  but  also
“empowerment” and “hope” (Toret et al., 2015). In social movements, frames do not
173 Melucci (1996: 71) was among the first in pointing “there is no cognition without feeling and no
meaning without emotion”.
  
 
142
 
mobilize if  they do not move, they have no effectiveness without affectivity.  From
conditions  and  crisis  to  critique (which  involves critical  renditions  and  affects)  in
relation to a critical organization.
As I analyze in chapter 4, this discursive rendition and organizative articulation, first
articulated by a number of initiatives in the months preceding May 15 th—initiatives
such as Don't Vote for Them, ATTAC, Futureless Youth, HforHousing, and up to 200
more—culminated  in  Real  Democracy  Now  and  the  organization  of  the
demonstration on that day. The convergence of those various groups was a critical
networked multitude, a multitude with a critical mass, able to act in over 60 cities and
connect them via social media. It surely was to change and even dissolve in the later
cycle, but many of its discourses and frames remained.
3.6.1. 15M counter-framing: elements of a critical rendition
Although I get into more detail in the empirical chapters, I briefly outline some of the
main  lines  of  the  critical  rendition,  the  critical,  discursive  counter-framing  of  the
situation, galvanized around 15M.
To the general presentation of the crisis as a fate of the economy, first, and as a
logical result of collective moral flaws, later, 15M contraposed a completely different
assemblage  of  frames.  Noticing  the  benefits  for  corrupt  politicians,  real  estate
developers and bankers in the face of increasing popular poverty and unemployment
(which I mentioned in earlier sections), a diagnostic (re)framing in one of the most
frequent 15M slogans was: “no es una crisis, es una estafa” (it is not a crisis, it is a
fraud).
People had to break away from their self-blaming (we have lived beyond our means)
and  inert  pessimist  views  (this  is  the  generation  that  will  live  worse  than  their
parents),  usually  blasted  through  mainstream  media  and  government
representatives:  “before  collective  protest  can  get  under  way,  people  must
collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group
action” (McAdam 1982: 51).
This diagnostic reframing appeared already tied to a denial  to play a role in that
fraud, as the banners heading the demonstrations on May 15 th clearly stated, “no
somos mercancías en manos de políticos y banqueros” (we are not commodities in
the hands of politicians and bankers). These slogans transmitted several ideas: the
first, that people had been, and were being, cheated, that they had been enrolled, in
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a wide range of dispositions, from convinced to forced, to play a game that was
ultimately to their detriment (it is a fraud); the second, that they already had realized
it;  the  third  was  the  rejection  of  it  all,  their  rejection  to  become commodities  or
puppets in the hands of political and financial elites.
In the face of such a discredited system, which was leaving people out (crisis and
unemployment) and then asking them what they did not have (via private or public
debt), which turned its austerity measures directly against the small (by European
standards) Spanish welfare state, 15M participants shouted “no somos antisistema,
el sistema es anti-nosotros” (we are not against the system, the system is against
us). Most participants were not earlier militants (Monterde et al., 2017), convinced
promoters of alternatives, but people more or less adapted to the system, which felt
it stopped working for them. These conditions have remained in the following years
of the triple crisis (economic, political,  social),  with levels of youth unemployment
sky-high. Statistics and media portrayed thousands of people “idle”, unrepresented,
suffering, and yet competent, including “the best educated generation” of the history
of the country (Cavero, 2011). A generation for which media sanctioned narratives
anticipated an inevitable worsening of their life conditions, a generation that would
“live  worse than the  generation  of  their  parents”.  Collectives  such as  Futureless
Youth answered to these prognostics with emboldening slogans such as “Homeless,
jobless, pensionless, fearless”.
Against  a  struggling  population  and  youth,  there  were  the  financial  and  political
elites. “No hay pan pa tanto chorizo174” (there is no bread for so many sausages),
said a popular 15M slogan to characterize these very elites, their corruption and their
established “kleptocracy” (Monedero, 2011). On this adversarial framing, 15M did not
make much difference between right wing and center left parties. After the cuts and
reforms of the Socialist Party during 2010 and 2011, with numerous corruption cases
and similar neoliberal policies to those of the PP, the 15M slogan “PSOE, PP, la
misma  mierda  es”  (PSOE,  PP,  the  same  shit  it  is)  was  indicative  of  a  general
rejection of the political  establishment,  which came to be popularized with  terms
such as “bipartidismo” (bipartidism) and “PPSOE” (combining the acronyms PP and
PSOE),  and whose alternation  in  power  was compared with  the forged “political
turnism” of conservatives and liberals between 1881 and 1923.
With  a  worsening  economic  situation  and  party  image,  coinciding  with  widely
174 “Chorizo” is a Spanish term to refer to thieves.
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unpopular  policies,  the  standing  of  representative  democracy  itself  is  put  under
question. Ultimately, as the double culmination of this critical rendition of the political
crisis, the two central 15M slogans said: “no nos representan” (they do not represent
us) and, finally, “lo llaman “democracia”, y no lo es” (they call it “democracy”, and it is
not).  These chants,  sung on May 15th and repeated periodically  in  the  following
years,  had a wide social  echo.  Against  this  critical  rendition,  the utopic  call,  the
propositive  framing  of  the  movement,  was  for  a  “democracia  real,  ya!”  (real
democracy, now!).
3.6.2. The becoming of the double crisis 2011-2016
3.6.2.1. A long economic crisis
So far, I have focused on narratives around the conditions that set up the scene in
which  the  15M  movement  emerged.  But  the  cycle  has  run  way  beyond  the
movement. In the period 2011-2016, the triple crisis did not go away. At many points,
and in various senses, it got worst. Bad economic data and news of corruption cases
were a continuous and recurrent feature of the socio- and media-scape.
To resume the 2011-2016 trajectory,  I  recur to the usual  referents:  statistics and
chronologies.  With  them  I  try  not  to  “prove”  or  “explain”  anything  but  rather  to
“illustrate”, to cast and register an impression of some of the problems, scandals,
and worries that tainted the period. I list key news and data on three factors: public
perception  of  problems,  economic  performance (unemployment,  especially,  youth
unemployment, and GDP growth), as well as political-institutional corruption cases
and  controversial  decisions.  These  three  coincide  with  the  motives  of  15M
participants that I have listed above.
From a technical perspective, the “economic recession” begun in Spain in 2008 and
lasted until 2014. It was a long, “double dip” recession. If numbers fit expectations,
Spain will not recover its GDP previous to the crisis until 2017 (Mars, 2015).
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FIGURE 2. GDP GROWTH. PERIOD: 4TH QUARTER 2007-4TH QUARTER 2016. 
SOURCE: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS (INE).
Unemployment rose dramatically, and it has remained very high, especially for those
under 25, long after the country was technically out of the recession.
FIGURE 3. UNEMPLOYMENT (% OF ACTIVE POPULATION).  PERIOD: 3RD QUARTER 2004-4TH QUARTER 2016.
SOURCE: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS (INE). 
         FIGURE 4. PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG PEOPLE UNDER 25. PERIOD: 3RD QUARTER 2004 –    
                                4TH QUARTER 2016. SOURCE: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS (INE).  
.
Since 2013 (El Mundo, 2013) the Popular Party in government insisted in the idea
that  the  country  was  getting  out  of  the  crisis.  According  to  different  estimates,
perceptions around economic performance begun a tendency to improve, as well.
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FIGURE 5. PERCEPTION OF THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY (RANGE 0-100)175 INCLUDING “ECONOMIC
CONFIDENCE” (BLUE), “PRESENT SITUATION” (RED), AND “EXPECTATIONS” (GREEN). PERIOD: 1996-2017.
SOURCE: CENTER FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH (CIS).
Macroeconomic data confirmed the diagnostic with regard to the technical end of
recession,  but  the  general  portray  was  more  complex.  A  first  aspect  of  this
complexity concerns the alleged causes for the macroeconomic improvement. Even
for the macroeconomic, GDP element, several accounts have been given: when it
comes to external factors, variables such as loans from the ECB—with their budget
strings attached—, low interest rates in Europe, the low price of the Euro and oil,
have been stressed; internally, cuts in wages and workers' rights and benefits have
been noticed as crucial. Between 2007 and 2014, average salaries dropped 22,2%
(Ruiz & Alba, 2016). Different reports point out that reduction in unemployment has
gone hand in hand with the rise of precarious jobs (temporal, partial time jobs, etc.),
and  related  to  the  growth  of  long  term unemployment  and  people  dropping  the
search  of  employment,  thereby  losing  their  social  benefits  (UGT,  2015;  CCOO,
2016).  
A synthetic resume of the ensuing growth of poverty and inequality can be found in a
widely publicized report by Intermon Oxfam (Ruiz & Alba, 2016). The report shows
that, in 2014, a record 13,4 million people (29,2% of the Spanish population) were on
the verge of poverty or social exclusion, 2,3 million more than in 2007. In 2015, 1%
of the population concentrated almost as much wealth as the poorest 80%. In that
year,  the 1%'s lot  grew 15% while that of  the other 99% dropped by 15%. That
175 The range 0-100 is broken down as follows: “0” equals “very bad”, “25”, “bad”, “50”, “average”; “75”,
“good”, “100”, “very good”. The present situation index is built on the bases of answers to the question
“Concerning  the  general  economic  situation  of  Spain,  how  would  you  rate  it:  very  good,  good,
average, bad, or very bad?”. The expectation index is built on the bases of answers to the question:
“And, do you think that, in a year, the economic situation of the country will be better, equal, or worse
than now?” The economic trust index is built averaging the previous two indexes.
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appears directly correlated with the mentioned increase of precarity, the permanence
of high unemployment, the shrinking social benefits, as well as the rise in wages for
the privileged few.
According to Intermon, a complementary factor is the low taxation to big patrimonies
and companies,  summed to their  high fiscal  evasion and avoidance, which have
accelerated  during  the  crisis,  and  the  general  weakness  of  redistribution
mechanisms. That makes the effective fiscal pressure in the Spanish State one of
the  lowest  in  Europe,  8,2  points  below  the  Eurozone  average.  As  a  result,  the
country ranks second among the countries with highest growth in inequality in the
period 2007-2014, 10 times the European average, and 14 times that of Greece.
This came to break the tendency since the 80s, leaving people “impoverished and
more unequal” (Ruiz & Alba, 2016: 4).
3.6.2.2. A long political crisis
Then, along with these socioeconomic data, there has been a continuous political
crisis,  articulated discursively by mainstream media and 15M cycle initiatives.  Its
main driver has been the emergence and unfolding of corruption cases. From 2007
onwards, when some big cases involving major parties and institutions (such as the
PP and the royal family) begun to surface, the flow has not stopped. After 2009, the
number accelerated: the “Gürtel case”, opened on that year, remained open as of
late  2016,  involving  dozens  of  Popular  Party  members,  especially  in  Valencia,
Madrid and Galicia, who were bribed by a network of companies in exchange for
public assignments. In 2013, a line of this case evolved into the “Bárcenas case”,
which  in  the  following  years  showed  how  many  of  those  bribing  funds  (and
potentially, from other illegal practices) were funneled into a “B accounting”176 (Pérez,
2015). On 2015, a judge considered proven that the Popular Party had been using a
“B account” since, at least, the 1990s. Treasury reports indicate that the Popular
Party used these unreported funds to pay for things ranging from bonuses to high
profile  party  members  to  the  restyling  of  its  headquarters  in  Madrid,  or  political
campaigns. In October 2014, new judicial operations such as Púnica (ElPaís, 2016)
uncovered a similar bribing network associated to members of the Popular Party,
and some from PSOE and IU (United Left),  spanning cities in  Madrid,  Valencia,
Castile and León, and Murcia. PSOE members were also on trial in dozens of cases
throughout the Spanish geography, the most remarkable one being the “ERE” case
176 That is, unreported to the tax authorities and receiving money from illegal operations.
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(Ley et al.,  2016).  Opened in 2011, it  involved members of the PSOE within the
Andalusian regional government, members of the unions, CCOO, and UGT, as well
as dozens of individuals and companies,  in cases of  fraudulent early retirement,
formation  courses,  funding  to  companies  not  undergoing  an  ERE  (labor  force
adjustment  plan),  over-inflated  fees  to  government-workers  intermediaries
(insurance companies, firm lawyers, unionists, etc.), and a variety of other offenses
and felonies amounted to an estimate of several hundred million euros. Members of
the royal family were also involved in similar practices: since 2010, the “Nóos” case
revealed how the King's son in law used a corporate plot to channel money to tax
havens, money received from inflated bills for a variety of (sometimes non-) existent
works to public institutions (Pinheiro & Cortizo, 2017). The King himself was at the
center of different scandals, from the revelation of his personal wealth, coming from
dubious sources, to his favors to different individuals, through his (misbehaviors in a
time of hardship (Anderson, 2014). So much so that he had to abdicate on June
2014 with a level of approval of 3,72 out of 10 in May (only slightly above the 3,68 of
a year earlier, the lowest, coinciding with the imputation of his daughter in the Nóos
case) (Medrano, 2014), symptoms of the rampant organic crisis.
FIGURE 6. PERCEPTION OF POLITICS177 (RANGE 0-100) INCLUDING “POLITICAL CONFIDENCE” (BLUE), “PRESENT
SITUATION (RED), AND “EXPECTATIONS” (GREEN). PERIOD: 1996-2017. SOURCE: CENTER FOR SOCIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH (CIS).
As  these  charts  indicate,  the  perceptions  around  politics  were  much  lower  and
177 The present situation index is  built  on the bases of  answers to  the question “Concerning the
general political situation of Spain, how would you rate it: very good, good, average, bad, or very
bad?”. The expectation index is built on the bases of answers to the question: “And, do you think that,
in a year, the political situation of the country will be better, equal, or worse than now?” The political
trust index is built averaging the previous two indexes.
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needed much more time to recover than the ones on economics. Actually, the lowest
political point coincides with the “Púnica” case, in late 2014—the other two lowest
points coinciding with the first revelations of the “Bárcenas” case, in early 2013, and
mid-2016, with new corruption revelations around the PP and the second elections in
6 months.  Similar coincidences can be found looking at the survey on “the biggest
problems of the country”178.
Nevertheless, after several years of free fall, bipartisanship, as measured by vote
intention, got some respite after 2015, as part of the initial enthusiasm for the new
electoral force Podemos lost some steam. In the General elections on December
20th, 2015, the results left a fragmented parliament which was unable to compose a
government179.
The  lack  of  inter-party  agreements,  in  turn,  forced  the  call  of  new  elections,
celebrated on June 26th, 2016.  The crucial  difference,  for  these elections 180,  has
been the coalition  of  Podemos and IU (United Left),  into  an electoral  candidacy
called  Unidos  Podemos,  whose  votes  combine  also  those  of  Podemos regional
“confluences” with other political forces—the strongest regional confluence being En
Comú Podem, in Catalonia. The results, though, were similar181, but the slight rise of
the Popular Party allowed them to form a government. Mariano Rajoy was invested
President on October 29th.
3.7. An overview of the 15M cycle (2011-2016): from NoLesVotes to
the post-general elections 20D
In order to situate the processes that I analyze in this thesis, I present now a brief
outline of the 2011-2016 cycle, including key actors and events of my narrative. In
doing so I follow and enrich an earlier chronology by Monterde (2015), who himself
used a variety of materials182. Like in his reconstruction, I am interested in stressing
“technopolitical” details. For simplicity reasons, the timeline is a single one, although
178 Data retrieved from 
www.cis.es/opencms/-Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html
179 The right wing Popular Party got 6.215.752 votes, 28,72% of the total, and 123 parliamentarians;
the Socialist Party, 5.530.779 votes, 22,01%, of the total, and 90 parliamentarians; Podemos and its
regional  confluences  reached  5.189.333  votes,  20,6%  of  the  total,  69  parliamentarians,  and
Ciudadanos (a liberal-right party, born in Catalonia and growing during this period within the national
arena) came fourth, with 3.500.541 votes, 13,93% of the total, and 40 parliamentarians.
180 The official data for the two elections can be retrieved at 
www.resultados2016.infoelecciones.es/99CO/DCO99999TO.htm?lang=es.
181 The Popular Party got 6.906.185 votes, 33,03% of the total, 137 parliamentarians; the Socialist
Party, 5.424.709 votes, 22,66% of the total, 85 parliamentarians; Podemos and its allies, 5.049.734
votes,  21,1%  of  the  total,  71  parliamentarians,  and  Ciudadanos,  13,05%  of  the  total,  32
parliamentarians.
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the processes mentioned are better described as multi-linear, multi-dimensional, and
could be reshuffled in multiple ways.
TABLE 13. LIST OF EVENTS 2011-2016
Date Story
January
27th, 2011
The hashtag #Don'tVoteForThem is used in a Twitter message for
the first time.
February
11th, 2011
Badfare  State  is  born.  They create  local  groups calling  for  non-
partisan mobilization against bipartidism and for participation.
February
15th, 2011
Don'tVoteForThem  launches  manifesto  and  web,  as  the  “Sinde
Law” is approved in Parliament.
February
20th, 2011
The  “Coordination  platform  of  groups  promoting  citizen
mobilization”  (later  Real  Democracy  Now!,  from  now  on  DRY)
creates is Facebook fanpage.
March  1st,
2011
The “Coordination platform” launches a call  for demonstrating on
May 15th 2011.
March  16th,
2011
First  tweet  from the  Real  Democracy Now (with  new name)  on
Twitter:  “Democracia  real  ya!  El  #15mayo  todos  a  la  calle!  No
somos  mercancía  en  manos  de  políticos  y  banqueros
www.democraciarealya.es  (Real  Democracy,  Now!  On  #May15
everyone to the streets! We are not commodities on the hands of
politicians and bankers www.democraciarealya.es.
March,
2011
Formation of first DRY nodes.
April, 2011 First face-to-face meetings of DRY nodes in big cities.
182 I  base  the  reconstruction  on  chronologies  used  in  15Mpedia,  the  15M encyclopedia,  several
Wikipedia entries (“Protestas Sociales en España 2011-2015”), projects such as Timeline 15M, and
bibliography on the topic (Castells, 2012; Monterde, 2015).
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April  7th,
2011
Futureless  Youth  demonstration,  under  the  slogan  “homeless,
jobless,  pensionless,  fearless”,  gathers  between  2000  and  3000
people  in  Madrid,  finishes  with  clashes  with  the  police  and  is
reported in mainstream media.
May  12th,
2011
DRY press release announcing the demonstration on May 15th.
May  14th,
2011
The  hashtags  #alacalle15M  and  #15Mpásalo  become  Trending
Topics on Twitter.
May  15th,
2011
Over 130000 people attend demonstrations in over 60 cities with
the slogan “Real Democracy, now! We are not commodities in the
hands of politicians and bankers”.
After the demonstration, several people stay to sleep in Puerta del
Sol,  Madrid.  They create the account @acampadasol  on Twitter,
with  the  first  tweet  around  7pm  “Acabamos  de  acampar  en  la
Puerta del Sol de Madrid, no nos vamos hasta que lleguemos a un
acuerdo.  #acampadasol” (We just  camped in  Madrid  Puerta del
Sol, we do not leave until we reach an agreement”).
May  17th,
2011
On the early morning of May 17th police evicts the incipient camp in
Puerta del Sol. Calls are launched on social networks to meet at
8pm on Puerta del Sol and other 30 big city squares across the
country.  The  multiplication  of  camps  begins.  Hashtags  such  as
#SpanishRevolution, and #YesWeCamp used on Twitter.
May  19th,
2011
The Central Electoral Commission prohibits the camps and calls for
their eviction before midnight of the 20th, as they may interfere with
the reflection day. Thousands gather in squares across the country.
Hashtags  such  as  #juntaelectoralfacts,  #Nonosvamos  (We  don't
move), #Notenemosmiedo (We have no fear).
May  20th,
2011
Camp  count  grows  from  around  166  up  to  480,  on  different
accounts,  with  the  proliferation  of  camps abroad,  usually  set  by
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young Spanish emigrants of the crisis.
May 21st,
2011
Reflection Day.  Thousands of  people defy the prohibition by the
Central Electoral Commission in the night may 20-21st. On Twitter,
the hashtag #EstoEsReflexión (This is reflection) becomes trending
topic.
May 22nd,
2011
Local and regional elections in Spain.
May  24th,
2011
Decision  to  extend  the  Sol  assembly  and  activity  to  the
neighborhoods.
May 27th,
2011
Eviction of the camp at Plaza Catalunya, in Barcelona. Images of
police  brutality  cope  mass  and  social  media.  A few  hours  later
thousands  of  people  retake  the  square  and  rebuild  the  camp.
Hashtags such as #BcnSinMiedo (Bcn fearless) serve to galvanize
the spirit.
June 6th,
2011
The camp at Sol is lifted after a long-discussed assembly decision,
and moves definitely towards the neighborhoods. To indicate this
the hashtag on Twitter is #Nosmovemos (We move). The remaining
camps will do the same in the following days or weeks.
June  15th,
2011
A demonstration with the name “Aturem el Parlament”  surrounds
the Catalan Parliament (the president arrives on helicopter), to stop
the approval of the regional budget including (more) strong social
cuts.
June  19th,
2011
Demonstration against the Euro Plus Pact in over 60 cities, which
mobilized several hundred thousand people.
June  20th,
2011
Indignant marches towards Madrid depart from 8 different points of
the State territory, which arrived on July 23. Demonstration abound
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in the months of June, July, and August in cities such as Madrid and
Barcelona for a variety of topics, from housing to health, education
or the visit of the Pope Benedict XVI.
August
28th, 2011
Demonstrations in different cities against the first amendment to the
1978  Spanish  Constitution  since  its  writing.  PSOE and  PP had
agreed  to  modify  its  Article  n.  135,  to  ensure  that  payments  of
public debt will be prioritized over other concerns in State budget
assignation.
September
17th, 2011
Demonstration to Occupy Wall Street takes place. A few thousand
demonstrators fail  to approach NYSE and camp at Zucotti  Park.
The protest was to spread to other US cities in the following weeks.
October
15th, 2011
A Global  Day of  Action under the slogan “Together for  a  Global
Change”.  Demonstrations  take  place  in  up  to  950  cities  in  82
countries.  Several  thousand  demonstrators  fail  to  occupy
Paternoster Square in the City of London and set up a camp in the
nearby square in front of the Saint Paul's Cathedral.
November
15th, 2011
Eviction  of  Occupy  Wall  Street  camp  at  Zuccotti  Park.  In  the
previous  and  following  weeks,  systematic  evictions  of  Occupy
camps by police forces take place. Attempts at reoccupying in NYC
fail.
November
20th, 2011
General and regional elections in Spain. In the midst of a worsening
crisis and social  cuts,  the PP wins the general elections with an
absolute majority; they also gain a majority of regional governments
to which elections had been called.
February
15-24th,
2012
High school student mobilization triggers massive demonstrations
in the Valencian Community,  the “Valencian Spring”, named after
the  Arab  Spring  and  tweet  saying  «Vos  tenim  preparada  una
#PrimaveraValenciana,  que  vos  aneu  a  cagar!»,  ¡Os  tenemos
preparada  una  #PrimaveraValenciana,  que  os  vais  a  cagar!»
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(We've got a #ValencianSpring for you you'll shit your pants).
February
28th, 2012
Saint  Paul's  Cathedral  Occupy  camp  evicted,  the  longest-lived
among the big camps of the Occupy cycle.
March  29th,
2012
General strike with post-15M forms of action and criticism of union
by 15M actors.
May 12-15th,
2012
15M first anniversary,  with the new forms of action (such as pot
banging or  building  occupation  for  evicted  families),  definition  of
15M  demands  approaching  different  social  sectors  (healthcare,
education, housing, etc.), and massive demonstrations.
May  15th,
2012
15MpaRato, a judicial initiative by 15M and free culture activists to
jail  the ex-IMF director  and ex-Minister  of  the Economy Rodrigo
Rato and other bankers, is launched.
July, 2012 Call  on  Facebook  to  “Occupy  Congress”  on  September  25
launched by the platform “¡En Pie!”.
September
25th, 2012
Around 50000 people demonstrate around the Spanish Congress,
heavily repressed by police forces.
November
14th, 2012
General  strike  coordinated  with  other  countries  in  Europe.  15M
initiatives  such  as  “Toma  la  Huelga”  (Take  the  Strike)  call  for
alternative strike repertoires.
December
16th, 2012
March against the privatization of healthcare in Madrid, visibilization
of  the  “White  Tide”.  An  informal  citizen  referendum  about  the
privatization  of  healthcare  in  Madrid  gathers  around  500000
signatures in 3 days.
January  8th,
2013
The X party, mostly composed by 15M activist, is launched, with a
program “Democracy, full stop”.
February
2013
Popular Legislative Initiative (PLI) on mortgages, foreclosure and
other housing issues reaches Congress with more than 1500000
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signatures,  tripling  the  requirement;  new  protest  repertoires
“escraches” (public shaming of representatives voting against the
PLI).
May  9th,
2013
Toque a Bankia (Nudging Bankia). Decentralized direct action using
a crowdsourcing mapping and action application, oriented to block
Bankia offices, ATMs and phone lines.
September
29th
The  Green  Tide  (movement  for  public  education)  organizes  the
biggest  demonstration  on  the  Balearic  Islands  in  decades,  with
80000 attendants.
January  10-
17th, 2014
Riots and demonstrations in Gamonal, a neighborhood of Burgos,
in  Castilla  y  León,  against  an  urbanistic  project,  which  receive
strong support in social networks and other cities.
January
16th, 2014
Podemos,  a  new  party,  leaded  by  media  commentator  Pablo
Iglesias,  including  members  of  the  Anticapitalist  Left  and  15M
activists, and inspired by Latin American bolivarian revolutions, is
launched.
February,
2014
“Movement  for  democracy”  or  “Democratic  Tide”,  an  initiative
oriented to promote a constituent process is launched in Madrid,
including  core  15M  activists  for  the  squatting  building  Patio
Maravillas.
May  24th,
2014
European Elections, Podemos obtains 1250000 votes and 5 seats,
the X party, 100000 and no representation.
June, 2014 Amidst personal scandals King Juan Carlos I  abdicates on June
19th. Multiple initiatives call for a referendum on the form of State
(monarchy or republic), including online petitions and an informal
citizen “real referendum now!” are organized, gathering the support
of hundreds of thousands.
June  26th,Guanyem  Barcelona,  a  citizen  platform  oriented  for  the  local
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2014 elections  due  on  May  24th,  2015,  leaded  by  Ada  Colau,  ex-
spokesperson for the Anti-eviction platform PAH and 15M figure, is
launched.
October  17-
19th, 2014
Podemos celebrates its Citizen Assembly, as part of a two-months
long internal constituent process.
January
31st, 2015
March of Change, demonstrations organized by Podemos with over
300000 attendants.
March  9th,
2015
Ahora Madrid (Madrid Now) is created after a process that ran from
Municipalia (itself  tied to the Movement for Democracy),  through
Ganemos and—after the confluence with Podemos in Madrid.
March  22nd,
2015
Regional elections in Andalusia. The Socialist party in government
retains power, Podemos gets a third place, which is read as a slight
disappointment of expectations.
May  24th,
2015
Municipal  elections  and  regional  elections  in  13  Autonomous
Communities. Citizen candidacies win the elections or (via pacts)
the government of  dozens of cities,  including Barcelona, Madrid,
Zaragoza, Cadiz, Santiago de Compostela, A Coruña.
Podemos and  another  rising  party,  Ciudadanos,  alternate  in  the
third and fourth place of most regions, after the Popular Party and
the  Socialist  Party,  becoming  key  for  the  formation  of  several
governments.
September
7th, 2015
Pablo Soto, Participation councilor of the city of Madrid, presents
Decide.madrid, the new digital platform for participation of the city.
September
27th, 2015
Regional  elections  in  Catalonia.  Presented  as  a  “plebiscite”  on
independence, the independentist platform Junts pel sí (Together
for “yes”) wins with ample, but not absolute, majority.
December
20th, 2015
State  elections  in  Spain.  The  right  wing  Popular  Party  gets
6.215.752 votes, 28,72% of the total, and 123 parliamentarians; the
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Socialist  Party,  5.530.779  votes,  22,01%,  of  the  total,  and  90
parliamentarians;  Podemos and its regional  confluences reached
5.189.333  votes,  20,6%  of  the  total,  69  parliamentarians,  and
Ciudadanos came fourth, with 3.500.541 votes, 13,93% of the total,
and 40 parliamentarians.
February
1st, 2016
Gala  Pin,  Participation  councilor  of  the  city  of  Barcelona,
announces the launch of Decidim.barcelona, the digital platform for
participation of the city.
March  31st,
2016
People occupy La Republique square in Paris after a demonstration
against  the Labor  Law promoted by  the  Socialist  government  in
France. Occupations pop up in dozens of squares in other French
cities.  This is the last networked movement of the square of the
global cycle so far, named Nuit Debout.
May  3rd,
2016
After the failure of the main parties to agree on the composition of a
government,  the King of Spain calls new elections on June 26 th,
2016.
May  23-
28th, 2016
Foundational meeting of the Democomunes network, during the
Democratic Cities event in Madrid.
May  15th,
2016
For the 5th anniversary of 15M, demonstrations are called all over
Spain and the world for a “GlobalDebout”, a call that resulted from a
connection between 15M and NuitDebout activists.
June  26th,
2016
In  the  General  Elections,  the  Popular  Party  increases  its  vote
percentage  and  with  6.906.185  votes,  33,03% of  the  total,  137
parliamentarians; the Socialist  Party,  5.424.709 votes, 22,66% of
the total,  85 parliamentarians; Podemos and its allies,  5.049.734
votes,  21,1% of  the  total,  71  parliamentarians,  and Ciudadanos,
13,05% of the total, 32 parliamentarians.
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October
29th, 2016
Mariano Rajoy, leader of the Popular Party, is invested as Prime
Minister of Spain.
November
25-26th,
2016
MetaDecidim,  the  participatory  process  to  redesign
Decidim.barcelona, gathers 300 people in what may be one of the
biggest non-technical participatory processes for the redesign of a
public digital platform for participation.
3.7.1.  The  composition  of  a  chronic,  mutating,  and  multitudinous  critical
condition
In  sociological  approaches,  it  is  common  to  provide  general  views  on  the
socioeconomic composition of social movements. What is of interest to me is not so
much to provide a view of the 15M movement or the cycle as a statistical aggregate
(from a molar  viewpoint,  to  use Deleuze & Guattari's  term) but  rather  to  see its
composing multitude of initiatives, collectives, and networks. These are always more
diverse,  with  diverse  social  compositions  depending  on  the  projects  and  the
collectives (immigrant  people in  la  PAH, retired people in  Yayoflautas,  etc.).  The
literature  of  social  movement  studies  provides  a  fine  tool  for  differentiation.  A
threefold distinction suggested by various authors (Gamson, 1991; Stoecker, 1995)
is that between a “wider social movement community or solidarity group” of social
support,  a  “social  movement  layer”  identified  with  the  movement  itself,  and  an
“organizational layer” composed by concrete actors and groups within it. It is worth
noticing that the “solidarity group” may not be a “group”, much less a “community”, if
by that it is understood a collective with a shared identity or “we feeling”. I devote the
thesis to analyze, primarily, the organizational scale183, where discrete actors can be
located, one that should not be confused with that of the “solidarity group” or that of
the “social movement”. I provide here a general glimpse into these other two.
There have been different studies that provide some insights on the width of the 15M
movement’s “solidarity group”. The movement received high levels of public support
for its demands (81% of the population in May 2011, 78% in May 2012, and 72% in
May  2014)  and  slightly  lower  percentages  of  people  feeling  sympathy  for  the
183 To avoid the risk of reification, I prefer to understand social movements as processes (perhaps
even  as  campaigns,  like  Tilly  2004)  or  as  assemblages  of  collective  performances,  whose
construction  and  configuration  is  defined  by  social  actors  other  than  those  “within”  the  social
movement itself; otherwise, I prefer to think it as a scale of performance rather than as a “layer” or an
object with an identity.
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movement itself (66% in May 2011, 68% in May 2012, and 56% in May 2014) with
public  rejection  ranging  from 22% to  33%,  and  concentrating  among  right  wing
voters (Ferrándiz, 2014).
When it  comes to  the  “social  movement  scale”,  seen  from a  “molar”  viewpoint,
studies suggest that between 0,8 and 1,5 million people were intensely involved in
the movement, while 6 to 8,5 million affirm to have taken part in it in some way, such
as demonstrating, visiting assemblies, or the camps, between May and July 2011 (El
País, 2011). By definition, such a huge number of participants involved a wide cross-
section of society.  Nevertheless, the standard participant in the demonstration on
May 15th, mobilizations and square camps in the following months was that of a 20-
something to  30-something person,  with  a level  of  education above the Spanish
average, since most (around 70% in various surveys) had university studies (Calvo
et al, 2011; Arellano et al., 2012; Likki, 2012; Monterde et al., 2017). Although most
of them had a better economic situation than the Spanish average and perceived
themselves as doing better than most (66%), they saw the future especially bleak
(70%) and felt  unjustly deprived in comparison with elites (76%) (Likki,  2012).  In
spite to its rejection of left-right divides and its appeals to transversality, standard
participants  were clearly  in  the left  or  far  left  of  the political  spectrum,  with  little
affiliation with existing political organizations (parties and unions) but engaged with
politics and its transformation (Calvo et al, 2011; CIS, 2012; Likki, 2012; Monterde et
al., 2017).
However, as Marga Padilla suggests in the quote of the introduction, 15M was not a
solution, it was not something closed, but rather something generative, an upgrade
that changes the situation, that opens it up to new possibilities. Such a “perceptive
upgrade” connected to millions of people, but it was still very much up for grabs. It
opened a cycle of contention and construction. As the political and economic crisis
continued,  hundreds of  15M-related initiatives emerged between 2011 and 2016.
The following image has been frequently used to represent some of the ramifications
of 15M. In spite of the limitations of its star-like, centralized shape, its gives a sense
of the sheer number of initiatives of the cycle.
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I will analyze only a reduced number of all these. Connecting with the main lines of
the dissertation, I will focus on those that most clearly embody the dispute around
democracy and representation, in relation to technopolitics, in what I consider the
three stages of the cycle (movements, parties, State institutions). This implies an
obvious reduction and simplification of both 15M and the political cycle it opened.
Nevertheless, the chosen cases are clearly central to understand the technopolitical
becoming of democracy in Spain in the period 2011-2016. I devote a chapter to each
of them:
-  DRY,  15M and  the  camps,  studied  in  Chapter  4.  The  relevance  of  the  Real
Democracy  Now  and  15M  for  the  cycle  of  technopolitical  democratization  has
already  been  explained.  When  it  comes  to  the  concrete  examples  or  moments
selected for analysis, I  followed a variety of  criteria,  such as their advances and
questions raised in relation to technopolitics and democracy, in discourse or practice;
their  influence  in  later  processes,  actors  or  events;  their  relevance  according  to
various analyses by academic and non-academic actors;  or their role in my own
trajectory.
- The X Party, studied in chapter 5. In this chapter, devoted to the period that runs
  
 
FIGURE 7. MAP OF INITIATIVES CONNECTED TO 15M. 
SOURCE: AUTOCONSULTA.ORG, 2014.
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from the eviction of the camps in June 2011 until the European Elections on May
2014, I focus on two cases or moments184 that were crucial from the viewpoint of
democracy,  representation,  and  technology:  the  multitudinous  direct  action  on
September  25th,  calling  to  “Surround  the  Congress”,  and  the  first  party  initiative
coming from the 15M milieu that had a relevant media impact, the X party. If “25S
Surround Congress” first embodied the moment of a higher tension between 15M
and  the  institutional  space  of  political  representation,  the  latter  represented  the
culmination  of  180  degrees  turn  of  the  cycle  back  to  the  representative  space.
However, it was a turn that claimed wanting to “make a 15M” inside it. I took part in
both of these initiatives. I look to the X Party rather than to other cases, such as
Podemos,  for  several  reasons:  firstly,  the  X  party  was  the  one that  opened  the
electoral  turn,  secondly,  15M  played  an  even  bigger  role  in  the  discourse  and
practice of the X Party than in Podemos, thirdly, democratic proposals were much
more central  and innovative in the X Party than in Podemos, finally,  the X Party
connects more closely with Decidim, the case analyzed in chapter 6.
- The network of cities of change, the institutional assault, and the new digital
platforms for democracy, studied in chapter 6. The choice of Decidim.barcelona
and the “network of rebel cities” is based on their direct connection to the 15M cycle
and their  innovations in  digitally  mediated participation.  In  this  case,  though,  the
scale  is  municipal  and  inter-municipal,  rather  than  that  of  the  nation-state.  The
experiments in the Participation councils of  cities such as Barcelona and Madrid
already have a strong institutional weight, and thereby represent what probably is the
most  interesting  case  of  the  whole  study  from  the  viewpoint  of  technopolitical
democratization.
184 I  refer laterally to two initiatives that were no less relevant: 15MpaRato, to jail  ex-IMF director
Rodrigo Rato, and the PAH (the platform of mortgage victims).
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Chapter 4. Becoming 15M: a networked 
movement of the squares from Real 
Democracy Now! Todismantling of the camps.
4.1. Introduction
This chapter explores the key case of the cycle of technopolitical contention studied
in this thesis: the networked social movement 15M. Part 2 begins by briefly noticing
the  connections  of  the  movement  with  the  economic,  political,  and  social  crises
ongoing in  Spain in  2011 (analyzed in  more detail  in chapter  3) as well  as with
previous activism, which 15M clearly exceeded in magnitude.
The analysis then moves into 15M’s technopolitics by looking at its semantics (its
discourses)  (part  3),  its  pragmatics  (its  practices)  (part  4),  and  its  syntax  (its
infrastructures) (part 5). In order to disentangle some central aspects of 15M actors’
discourse,  section  3.1  analyzes  key  texts,  which  show a  tension  between  alter-
representationalist185 positions,  which  called  for  improvements  in  representative
democracy, anti-representationalist ones, which attacked representation, and alter-
democratic  ones,  which  reclaimed  alternative  democratic  institutions,  sometimes
opposed to,  and autonomous from, representative ones. These threads aimed at
amending the established order, frontally rejecting it, and proposing alternatives, will
run through the 15M cycle.
Then the exposition moves into some key 15M practices (part 4). This part is divided
in  two  halves,  which  attend  to  the  two  most  paradigmatic  organizational  forms
essayed in 15M. Section 4.1. focuses on the most publicized one in 15M discourse
and the general media imaginary on the movement: the assembly form. Section 4.2.
focuses on a different model, which was as, if not more, relevant in practical terms,
and is object of attention of a growing analytical literature (starting with Toret et al.,
2015): what I call  the “networked assemblage” involving urban spaces and digital
networks.  Section  4.1.  describes  practices  of  anti-representationalism  and  alter-
democracy  during  the  camp  period,  which  centrally  involved  practices  of  mass
assembling and camping in the squares of big cities like Barcelona and Madrid in
May and June of 2011. Section 4.2. looks at the technopolitical practices at the core
of 15M networked assemblages emerging around the camps. These technopolitical
185 In general, I use the formula “representational” rather than “alter-representational”, I do so in order
to avoid confusion.
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practices  involved  urban  and  digital  spaces  (4.2.1.  and  4.2.2.),  and  will  prove
relevant for later stages of the cycle.
In part 5 I briefly analyze two paradigms of technopolitical infrastructures: Facebook,
which  nicely  embodies  a  corporate  technopolitical  paradigm,  and  n-1,  which
embodies an autonomist technopolitical paradigm.
Part  6  is  devoted  to  analyze  the  implications  of  the  discourses  and  practices
analyzed in parts  3 and 4 for social  movement forms and political  ontology.  The
technopolitical practices and processes described in section 4.2. brought about new
forms non-representational collective identity, as I show in section 6.1. These new
forms  challenged  traditional  forms  (representation,  strong  and  centralized
organizations,  leaderships and identities) in  social  movements.  Then,  section 6.2
recapitulates  15M technopolitical  challenges  to  the  liberal  representative  political
ontology both  in  discourse and practice.  The chapter  closes with  a  synthesis  of
earlier sections that set up the stage for the following chapters.
4.2. The case and the cycle186
15M has been a networked social movement through and through. For many, social
networks were their entryway into it. That was my case, and from our 2014 15M
survey it seems this trajectory, from digital and social media out and onto streets and
squares, was common among participants in the demonstration on May 15th, 2011.
In early April, 2011, I ran across a call to demonstrate on May 15th. I found it reading
digital  news  of  a  demonstration  that  had  taken  place  a  day  earlier  in  Madrid,
organized by a collective called Futureless Youth (Gutiérrez & Santaeulalia, 2011)187.
I  searched for the May 15th call  on Facebook, and there I  found the organizers
fanpage188. The initiative was exactly what I was hoping for since 2009, when I was
following news on the socioeconomic and political crisis in Spain, while living in the
US, lamenting the total lack of mass social mobilization.
186 The origins of the 15M movement have been recounted in several works, among others, Gerbaudo
(2012),  Toret  et  al.  (2015),  Monterde  (2015),  and  Monterde  et  al.  (2017),  thereby,  I  rely  on  my
experience and those works for purposes of historical reconstruction, to which I do not devote much
time. I also rely on them, at multiple points, for sociological purposes, and orient my analysis on areas
less assessed by these works. Among these is the attention to matters of representation and alter-
democracy.
187 The attention by mass media to this call was catalyzed, among other things, by a demonstration on
April 7th organized by the collective Futureless Youth, which gathered around 2500 protesters and
ended with conflicts with the police.
188 The fanpage can be found at https://www.facebook.comAsociacionDRY. Accessed November 20th,
2016.
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The  fact  that  I  found  the  site  on  Facebook  was  no  coincidence.  From its  very
beginning, in March, the initiative behind the May 15th demonstration, first under the
name  of  “plataforma  coordinadora  de  grupos  pro-movilización  ciudadana”
(coordinating platform of groups for citizen mobilization), later under the heading of
Real Democracy, Now! (from now on abbreviated “DRY”), was primarily organized
via  social  media  such  as  Twitter  and  Facebook,  through  different  groups189 and
fanpages (Alsedo, 2011; Tibisay & Covadonga, 2011).
        
The DRY event on Facebook included a list of local demonstrations planned for May
15th in different cities all over the State, as well as a link to the official website. The
list grew in time, as the dynamics on social networks and the local nodes multiplied.
With local and regional elections due on May 22nd190, the demonstration on May 15th
was oriented to galvanize and publicly display the discontent with the situation of
economic crisis and political ineffectiveness and corruption of the country, to move
from a passive condition of crisis into an active critical condition (as described in
chapter  3).  A key  mediator  was  a  critical  rendition  elaborated  by  a  number  of
initiatives in the previous months, including Don't Vote for Them, Futureless Youth,
189 First  as  a  “coordination  group”  https://www.facebook.comgroups/coordinacionciudadana.  This
coordination  group,  which  remained  “closed”,  accepted  only  either  spokespeople  from  other
collectives or bloggers known for their denunciation of social problems. Accessed November 20th,
2016.
190 Elections were taking place in thirteen out of the seventeen regions (autonomous communities) of
the State, and all towns countrywide.
  
 
FIGURE 8. MAY 15TH DRY EVENT ON FACEBOOK.
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HforHousing, and up to 200 more, which converged in DRY and the organization of
the demonstration on May 15th.
DRY succeeded in  appealing  to  and connecting  wider  and  more  heterogeneous
constituencies than these earlier  activist  initiatives (Alonso,  2012).  On May 15th,
around  130.000  people,  according  to  DRY s  Press  release  191,  hit  the  streets  in
demonstrations in 60 cities all over the country. The demonstration was a huge and
unexpected success (for journalists, Rodríguez, 2011, as well as for the police and
organizers themselves, Jurado, 2014), the first of such a magnitude to happen in
Spain without the support of a party or union. As shown in Toret et al (2015), the
practices learned in earlier hacktivist  and cyberactivist struggles around copyright
laws (especially in the period 2006-2011), were crucial in this process.
Under the effects and affects generated by such a joyful surprise, inspired by Tahrir
(key square of the Egyptian revolution earlier that year), and with the elections of
May 22nd in mind, a few stayed overnight at Puerta del Sol, “the first forty of Sol”
(Sánchez, 2011a).
191 The  press  release,  of  May  17th,  is  available  in  DRY s  official  website,  
www.democraciarealya.es/prensa/. Accessed November 10th, 2016.
  
 
FIGURE 9. PROTESTER WEARING AN ANONYMOUS MASK AT
PUERTA DEL SOL, ON MAY17TH. 
SOURCE: @ACAMPADASOL
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FIGURE 10. TWEET BY HACKTIVIST ISAAC HACKSIMOV ON MAY 15TH
EVE. “POPULAR ASSEMBLY IN SOL NOW! THEY DON´T LEAVE. IN
MADRID LIKE IN EGYPT #DON´TVOTEFORTHEM”.
The police attempt at evicting the campers at Puerta del Sol, carried on the night
from  May  16th  to  the  17th,  generated  a  series  of  massive  mobilizations  and
“retakings” of the square in the following days. By May 17th the camping practice
was being replicated in  squares all  over  Spain and the movement had begun.  I
analyze some of its key characteristics in the following parts of this chapter.
Camps were dismantled in June 2011. Numerous networks, many of them rooted in
social media, remained operative. They allowed the emergence of new initiatives,
direct  actions  and demonstrations  in  the  following  months  and years.  They also
contributed to pass on many of the discourses and practices forged at this time,
helping to coalesce the 15M cycle of technopolitical contention around democracy. At
its  peak,  the  15M  movement  involved  dozens  of  squares  statewide  and  digital
networks that  mobilized thousands of  people in a  matter  of  minutes.  The critical
conditions  of  the  country,  the  capacity  of  DRY and 15M discourses to  articulate
aspects  of  the  discontent  with  them,  the  new  available  information  and
communication  technologies  (CMT,  2011),  deployed  in  creative  technopolitical
practices and processes, as well as the political opportunities and the contentious
becoming around 15M (from statewide elections and earlier uprisings in the north of
Africa or Iceland, to police evictions and politicians’ dismissal) contributed to it. Many
of these factors, discourses and practices remained both operative and mutating in
the  following  years,  galvanizing  what  this  thesis  defines  as  the  “15M  cycle  of
contention”.
4.3. Semantics/Discourses
15M posed a challenge to the liberal representative model of democracy. That is
particularly  clear  in  the  discourses  on  representation  gathered  around  the
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demonstration on May 15th. This discursive critique of representation combined its
core attention to political representation with a diagnostic of its ties to the economic
field and, even more, the field of media. As a complement, 15M actors also outlined
a discursive ideal of a direct and deliberative democracy in practice, in the form of
the assembly.  This is a pattern that repeatedly appears in the discourses of key
actors  of  the  cycle:  they  essayed,  first,  a  diagnostic  critique  of  representative
democracy,  second,  a  normative  proposal  of  alternatives  to  it  and,  third,  a  self-
referential  discourse  on  how practice  should  look  like  on  the  way  there.  In  this
section, I analyze each of them in turn.
4.3.1. The critical diagnosis on representation and the double (representational
and anti-representational) reading of “they do not represent us”
4.3.1.1. A discursive precedent to 15M: the Don’t Vote For Them manifesto
On  February  15th 2011,  the  same  day  that  the  so  called  “Sinde  Law”  against
copyright infringement passed in Congress, a web-manifesto192 and a wiki193 were
launched, calling not to vote for the parties supporting the bill: PSOE, PP, and CiU (a
Catalan  nationalist,  right  wing  party).  Nolesvotes  (Don´tVoteForThem,  from  now
abbreviated  NLV194)  was  a  cyberactivist  campaign  oriented  to  intervene  in  the
electoral space, concretely, in the local and regional elections dated for May 22nd
2011, with a punishment vote for the parties that had supported the passing of the
Sinde Law. The first version of the NLV Manifesto195, launched in mid-February, 2011
put  the  emphasis  on  both  political  corruption  and  the  Sinde  Law.  For  activists
involved, the approval process of the Law was key in a shared experience of the
flaws of the representative system in Spain196 (Dans & Galli, 2011; Alonso, 2012).
After the tremendous online support for the first version, a second version of the
document  was  issued  in  mid-March  (Dans  &  Galli,  2011).  It  started,  again,
denouncing the levels of corruption, but this time it did not focus on the Sinde Law,
but  rather  quickly  moved  to  criticize  the  “perpetual  alternation  of  political
organizations  clung  to  power  for  decades  (PP,  PSOE,  EAJ-PNV,  CiU)  without
permeability to new ideas, without allowing the active participation of the citizenry,
192  The web is accessible at www.nolesvotes.com. Accessed November 15th, 2016.
193 A wiki is a web application for collaborative production of content.
194 NLV is the acronym of the Spanish No Les Votes (Don't Vote for Them).
195 The  two  versions  are  available  at  https://docs.google.comdocument/pub?id=139G8EL1OOR-
RtfhTstHb7qekZvBoJTz1oCImbGa_I48. Accessed on November 19th, 2016. Here I only summarize
them.
196 As  the  WikiLeaks  cables  revealed  at  the  time,  these  flaws  included  the  submission  to  US
diplomacy and entertainment industry (Elola, 2010).
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suffocating  all  possibility  of  democratic  regeneration.”  Active  participation  and
democratic  regeneration  were  later  to  become two key milestones of  discourses
within  the  15M  cycle,  the  former  usually  closer  to  the  most  participatory  (alter-
democratic)  views,  and  the  later  to  those  appealing  to  milder  (alter-
representationalist) improvements upon the existing liberal representative system.
Then,  the manifesto attacked the Spanish electoral  law,  on the charges of  over-
representing  voters  of  certain  parties197 and  concrete  “media-  or  economically
powerful  minorities”  while  under-representing  the  rest,  muting  “the  ideological
diversity  of  Spanish  society”.  It  also  denounced  the  “professionalization  of  the
particracy  (partitocracia)”,  promoting  the  rise  of  those  “managing  influences  and
imposing the discipline of the hierarchy” rather than of “the best”198. The attack on
party democracy is not directed against its elitism but rather towards its inability—or
counter-productivity—for selecting the right elite. This meritocratic emphasis rose or
fell at different moments within the 15M cycle; interestingly enough, it was usually
emphasized  by  initiatives  closer  to  hacktivism,  free  software  and  free  culture
activism, such as the X party, analyzed in chapter 5.
But  the  Manifesto  moves  on,  denouncing  how  big  parties  recur  to  “closed  and
blocked lists”199 and “to the fear campaign, to ask for the ‘useful vote’ so that the
adversary—with  whom it  alternates  in  power—doesn’t  win.”  On  top  of  that,  the
Manifesto  denounces  that  closed  lists  make  it  virtually  impossible  to  appeal  to
individual representativeness and responsibility.  NLV denounces how, under party
democracy, there is an identification of representative actions and party interests, the
representative is “of” the party200.
In  a Rousseauian fashion,  the Manifesto denounces how elections are the “only
space of participation” and the “blank check” practice, which allows governments to
197 For different reasons, ranging from the structure of electoral districts to D'Hondt method, in the
Spanish system, the parties´ ratio of representatives per number of votes is much higher for the two
traditional parties, PP and PSOE, and the nationalist ones.
198 This point has a meritocratic tone that will be much less present in texts by Real Democracy Now!
and the camps, but which will come back with the X party.
199 Under the current Spanish electoral system, defined in the LOREG, the usual practice is for parties
to provide a closed, ordered electoral list for each administrative district (local, provincial, regional or
state, depending on the election) and the voter choses the lot, rather than discrete individuals.
200 Given certain rules operating in the Spanish Parliament, such as the “party discipline vote”, by
which the party can sanction anyone voting against the line marked by the organization for a given
parliament voting, one can indeed say that the representative is primarily representative of the party.
Following the “No les votes” argumentation, one could even say that, under its current form, Spanish
parliamentary representation (not a strange case of party democracy on this point) is “of the party, by
the party and for the party,” twisting Abraham Lincoln’s famous motto.
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not  attend  to  the  “popular  will”  in  the  period  between  elections201;  otherwise,  it
denounces  the  temporal  reduction  of  representation  to  its  formal  aspects,
authorization and accountability, both targeted primarily at parties, not to individual
representatives. In contrast, the Manifesto underlines (taking the Sinde Law as an
example)  that  party  and  private  interests  do  operate  every  day in  governmental
decision making.
This point on political temporality closes the circle opened with the comment on the
“perpetual  alternation”  in  power  between  PSOE and  PP,  which  appealed  to  the
images of the XIX century “turnismo” in Spanish politics202. Blank check and turnism,
along with the punctuality of elections, appear in the Manifesto as cornerstones of a
chronopolitics enabling (and reinforcing) widespread corruption of democracy, based
on, and feeding into, people’s apathy. As an alternative, most initiatives in the 15M
cycle speak of the possibilities of a more continuous democracy, be it in the form of
social movements, parties or State institutions.
In  the  two  Manifestos,  along  with  the  flaws  of  the  representative  system—
unperceived or  dismissed for  years—there was a strong denunciation of  political
corruption. More than a list of numbers, it was an image that served to make the
case. One of the most original techno-imaging devices, a case of semiotechnics, a
technosymbol of the campaign, was the “Corruptdrome”: a Google based map that
charted  the  cases  of  political  corruption  trials  (open  or  closed)  throughout  the
country203
201 Exactly what Madison hoped for and what Rousseau classically defined as the “slavery of the
people” during the period of the legislature
202 This  was  a  XIX  century  mechanism  of  agreed  alternation  between  a  conservative  and  a
progressive party in power.
203  Inserted in the nolesvotes.com website right before the Manifesto, it performed a syntactic and
semantic connection between the representation of corruption and the corruption of representation,
between  an  economically  corrupt  and  an  institutionally  flawed  representative  space.  The
Corruptdrome  as  a  linked,  machine-like,  operating,  reference  dispositive  to  which  anyone  could
contribute. On the base of the Google-view of Spain, a sousveilling# collective built another, open and
real-time image of the state territory. It was a lasting image of #Nolesvotes, which remained being
updated in later years.
  
 
170
 
FIGURE 11. CORRUPTDROME. SOURCE:  HTTP//WIKI.NOLESVOTES.ORG/
Resuming: corruption, bipartidism, an inegalitarian electoral law, particracy, closed
electoral lists, useful vote, blank checks and turnism. These were the explicit targets
of  the  Manifesto,  the  semantic  field  of  a  diagnosis  and  an  antagonism  under
construction204.  It  defined, from a certain perspective and history, a morphology of
representation, a set of  conditions, actors,  flaws and dynamics of that system: it
discursively  framed the  political  forms that  “No les  votes”—and later,  other  15M
projects—opposed.  Different  versions  of  this  critique  will  recur  in  later  texts,
campaigns and actions tied to 15M. The text outlined particularly well some of the
dysfunctions of the Spanish representative system, as perceived by an increasing
amount of  the population205.  Certainly, it  casted a very acid look on the shape of
representation in Spain at the beginning of the new millennium.
The critical jump to the street
The “NLV” manifesto outlined a diagnostic framing. In “the jump to the street” (to put
it in Sánchez Almeida’s words206) in the demonstration on May 15th, 2011, the critical
204 It defined, from a certain perspective and history, a set of conditions, actors, flaws and dynamics of
that system: it discursively framed the political forms that “No les votes”—and later, other 15M projects
—opposed.
205 Already since the Spring of 2010, surveys by the Sociological Research Center (ascribed to the
Ministry of the Presidency) ranked the political class as the third main problem in the perception of the
population.  In 2011, the percentages of respondents pointing it  as major problem increased from
17,8% in February to 20,2% in March, 21,5%, in April, 22,1% in May and up to 24,7% in June. (Data
available:  www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html,
accessed December 10th, 2015).
206 Sánchez Almeida (2013, July). Personal interview. 
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edge grew. At demonstrations such as the one in Seville that day, which I attended,
along  with  slogans  such  as  “lo  llaman  democracia  y  no  lo  es”  (they  call  it  a
democracy, but it’s not) or “no es una crisis, es una estafa” (it’s not a crisis, it’s a
fraud), from time to time people chanted “que no, que no, que no nos representan!”
(no, no, they don't represent us!).  This  motto amplified and radicalized the “NLV”
logic: it announced a critique that went beyond denouncing different flawed practices
and structures of the representation system, or a call for an anti-bipartidist (anti-PP
and  anti-PSOE)  vote  in  the  elections  due  on  May  22nd;  rather,  it  presented  a
questioning of political representation in a wider sense (at least, in the interpretation
of key DRY activists such as Su Notissima207; see Jurado, 2014). Although the anti-
bipartidism discourse  maintained  most  of  the  attention,  the  extended  critique  of
representation didn’t distinguish among parties, and even included the unions. In its
manifesto and its official definition as organization, DRY declared itself “non-partisan
and non-syndical”. This rejection connected to the discredit of parties and unions as
representatives of the interests of citizens208 and workers209. The DRY platform was
presented  as  a  space  for  making  politics  alternative  to  the  mediation  (or
mediatization)  of  political  action  embodied  by  those  parties  and  unions.  In  their
mainstream versions (PP, PSOE, CCOO, UGT210), those organizations had become
machines of transforming participation into fake representation211.
207 Nota is a PhD student in Law at Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville, he is co-director of the
LIPPO (Investigation Laboratory of Political Practices) and is currently investigating the foundations of
democracy and the changes brought about by TICs. “Nota” is Andalusian slang for “guy”, and “Su
Notissima” is a nickname that invests the term some of the respectability of a judge, usually called “Su
Señoría” (form of referring to a judge in court, equivalent to “your honor” in the Anglo-Saxon tradition)
and a notary (notario). Both of these positions are usually filled in Spain by graduates in Law. I met
Nota on Facebook, as he was the administrator of the two Real Democracy Now! groups in Seville. I
started a virtual correspondence with him that has ended in different encounters and collaborations.
208 A poll by Metroscopia in March 2013 showed that up to 80% of the respondents believed that
Congress does not represent them, a result that is practically identical when they were asked if it
represented the rest  of  Spaniards (Ferrándiz,  2013).  Several  polls  by  the  Center  of  Sociological
Investigation since 2011 showed that Spaniards perceived politicians as one of their biggest worries
(CIS, 2011).
209 Different polls confirmed this. According to a Metroscopia study (published as a post in the most
read generalist national journal with the heading “less respect to those who rule”) in July 2011, the
unions were one of the least valued institutions (Lobera, 2011). With even worse evaluation, by this
order: bishops, bankers, parties and politicians.
210 CCOO is the acronym for Comisiones Obreras (Workers' Commissions); UGT is the acronym for
Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union). These are the two biggest unions in Spain.
211 Take some of the symptoms of the political crisis: politicians and politics appeared as one of the big
problems of the country by 2010, furthermore, 51% of Spaniards thought PP and PSOE only followed
their own interests and did not represent the rest of society, with only 19% thinking they represented
the interests of the majority of the population, and 9 in 10 thinking they were far from the people and
needed to be brought closer (Bravo, 2011). With a broader view, among 15M participants, “lack of
democracy” appears as the most widespread motivation for demonstration (Monterde et al, 2017).
Unions  and  political  parties’  mediations  are  not  only  a  way  of  generating  identities  or  sense  of
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4.3.1.2. The double reading of “they do not represent us”: representationalism and
anti-representationalism
The slogan “they do not represent us”, probably one of the key ones in 15M, can be
read in different ways, though. The interpretation depends on the various senses of
the subject, the object, and the verb of the sentence. The “they” and the “us” mark
the slogan as an exercise in political antagonism. Nevertheless, both poles remain
undefined, giving it an open character. It may be that the “us” are those shouting the
slogan, or those demonstrating, or those agreeing, or people in general. On the other
hand,  it  may be that the “they” refers to a group of politicians,  concretely,  those
embodying and representing the corrupt  status quo, or it  may be talking of their
parties; more broadly, it may also be talking of all politicians and all parties, or even
including  other  representatives  such  as  Union  leaders,  and  unions  themselves.
Finally, it is not clear what is meant by “representing” there, whether it is “being alike”
or “acting for”212, and, if so, what should be the attributes, opinions, or interests to be
reflected  or  cared  for  by  representatives.  As  expectable,  there  were  different
interpretations  by  different  actors  at  different  times,  usually  connected  to  the
becoming of political contention.
In spite of this complexity, I believe there are two key readings that came to define
the  15M  cycle  of  contention,  from  May  15th  to  Decidim.barcelona213:  a
representationalist  (or  alter-representationalist)  reading,  which  asks  for
improvements and thereby remains within the semantic field of representation, and
an  anti-representationalist  one,  which  frequently  aims  to  go  beyond  it 214 (into
participatory democracy) or out of it (in autonomist models215) into alter-democracy.
The former is conservative, the latter, transformative, with regard to representation.
Anti-representationalism surfaced in  other  slogans of  that  demonstration  on May
15th,  as  well  as  in  the  manifestos  that  were  to  emerge  from the  camps in  the
following days. Slogans such as “democracy is not voting every four years”,  “our
dreams do not fit in your voting polls”, or “they call it democracy, but it is not”, heard
belonging through cards, affiliations, contributions and retributions, but also for imposing orders, of
constructing a representable and controllable body, a strong unity around flags, secretary generals,
and aggregated numbers and opinions.
212 See chapter 2 for a presentation of the various sense of representation.
213 Decidim is the digital platform for participation, analyzed in chapter 6.
214 Some of these possibilities can be hinted by proposals associated to them already in the NLV
manifesto: while some called for putting an end to corruption, or reforming the electoral law, others
pointed  to  the  need of  a  more  participatory  democracy,  15M brought  this  latest  call  to  a  rather
autonomist-anarchist position in practice.
215 See chapter 2 for a definition of these alternative models
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and read in the camps, point in this direction.
The  distinction  between  representationalism and  anti-representationalism can  be
used to group many of DRY’s normative proposals for May 15th. The first block of
DRY  proposals  for  the  May  15th  demonstration216,  entitled  the  “Elimination  of
privileges of the political class”, called for anti-corruption and transparency measures
(elimination of political immunity, imprescriptibility of corruption offenses, publication
of  representatives'  finances),  along with  others that  would make politicians more
representative (in Pitkin's “descriptive” sense, see ch. 2) of the general population:
absenteeism control, equation of their salaries, taxation and retirement benefits with
the average among workers, transparency in personal accounts, etc. Further in this
direction,  in  the  seventh  block  of  proposals,  entitled  “Citizen  liberties  and
participatory democracy”, there is a call to “modify the Electoral Law to guarantee a
truly representative and proportional system”. All of these proposals clearly fall within
the representationalist reading.
It is also possible to find a set of anti-representationalist and alter-democratic points
in DRY's document of proposals for May 15th (DRY, 2011a). Here, the “they do not
represent  us”  points  beyond  the  semantic  field  of  the  representation  game.  The
objection  was  towards  politicians  and  parties  in  general,  as  embodiments  of
representation.  On  the  mentioned  block  of  “Citizen  liberties  and  participatory
democracy”, DRY’s proposals stressed the need for referendums whenever there is
an  important  decision.  Still,  in  DRY there  seemed to  predominate  proposals  for
amending the existing institutions of representative democracy than for replacing it
with something new. This was a direct connection to No les votes, a connection also
evident  in  the  fact  that  the  first  proposal  on  “citizen  liberties  and  participatory
democracy” was “no to the control of the Internet. Abolition of the Sinde Law”.
More clearly, projects such as democracy 4.0.,  defended by lawyer Juan Moreno
Yagüe and DRY activist Su Notissima (see Jurado, 2014 for an elaboration of his
argument in favor of de-representation), advocated for the combination of the current
form of representative democracy with a digitally enabled direct democracy system.
Afterwards, they brought this proposal to later initiatives within the cycle (f.i.: the X
Party). The proposed alternative to the “they do not represent us” was not a retreat
into  the  anti-politics  of  authority,  be  it  political  (authoritarianism)  or  technical
216 The document can be accessed at www.democraciarealya.es/documento-transversal/. Accessed
on November 17th, 2015.
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(technocracy), but rather a more participatory and real democracy.
4.3.1.3. The discursive critique of representation and economics
Some of the slogans on May 15th added a crucial element of economic critique to
the discourse on the crisis of representation. For instance, after “take the street” and
“real democracy now”, the third slogan in the heading banners of May 15th was “we
are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers”. That slogan clearly
outlines the core of the neoliberal representative model: the association of political
and economic interests that expropriates agency from people for profit, turning them
into commodities to be used.
Then the camps arrived, and the discourse on the crisis of representation remained
strongly  present  and  further  tied  with  the  economic  critique.  The  manifesto  of
Acampadasol217 (the camp at Puerta del Sol square, in Madrid), published on May
16th, calls for “a new society that puts lives above political and economic interests”,
in  a  double critique of  the political  and economic vectors  defining  the  neoliberal
representative  model  of  democracy. Similarly,  in  the  Declaration  at  Acampada
Barcelona (2011) (the camp at Catalunya square, in Barcelona), published on May
21st, it is affirmed that “we feel crushed by the capitalist economy, we feel excluded
from the present political system which does not represent us”. In the same direction,
the slogan “it's not a crisis, it's a fraud”, put into circulation a different form of naming
and constituting the very essence of the economic and historical conjuncture. The
interpretation of the crisis as a somehow objective fact, as a neutral, quasi-natural,
economic process, was diagnosed and denounced itself  as a fraud,  a fraud that
covered the wider fraud of wealth extraction through the mechanisms of finance and
corrupt politics.
4.3.1.4. The discursive critique of representation and mass media
The emerging 15M critical discourse on representation not only touched upon politics
and economics, and their representations, but also over media representation. The
issue of how things are portrayed in the media was a relevant one during camp
stage. This is so because movements are, among other things, media phenomena
(as noted in chapter 2). Pitkin's “descriptive” sense of representation, the question of
whether  media  contents  “are  alike”  what  they  represent,  is  relevant  here.  The
diagnosis on media by many 15M actors was insinuated in slogans such as “y luego
217 The Manifesto is accessible at www.madrid.tomalaplaza.net/manifiesto-2/. Accessed on November
10th, 2015.
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diréis que somos cinco o seis” (and latter you will  say we are five or six),  while
another one went “televisión, manipulación” (television, manipulation).
However,  the most interesting responses to the various threads of the discursive
critique of representation, from the political to the media, were played out in practice.
Otherwise,  not  in  slogans  and  proposals  but  in  the  forms  of  organization  and
practices enacted after May 15th, in the camps and beyond. In part 5, devoted to
pragmatics,  they  are  analyzed  in  some  detail.  The  practice  of  anti-
representationalism and alter-democracy were defining features of the 15M stage of
the cycle, initiated with DRY and deepened in the May-June camp period.
4.3.2. Beyond the represented subjects of the modern political ontology
Around  May  15th,  the  discursive  critique  of  representation  just  analyzed  was
combined with  the  emergence of  (names of)  political  subjects  that  were  not  the
classic ones of the modern political  discourse and ontology. Terms such as “The
People”,  “the  nation”,  “right  or  left  wingers”,  “individuals”  (closer  to  the  liberal
vocabulary) or “the working class” (on the left side). These terms had one thing in
common: they were meant to name a collective entity defined by a collective identity
that could be represented either by the State and State representatives (Parliament,
government,  bureaucrats,  etc.)  or  by  a  party  and  party  representatives.  They
resulted  from a  multitude  constituted  as  one through the  representation,  as  first
suggested by Hobbes in Leviathan.
The most frequent expressions in texts calling for the demonstrations on May 15th
(like the DRY manifesto), in texts coming from places such as Puerta del Sol (see
the AcampadaSol  declaration),  and those writing  massively  on  social  networks 218
(Toret et al., 2015) rarely include traditionally modern concepts such as “the nation”,
“The People” or “the working class”. Some did, but most did not 219. This extended to
other  symbols220 and  was  associated  with  DRY and  15M  apparently  successful
218 In the vocabulary analysis by Oscar Marin Miró in Toret et al.  (2015), which resulted from the
analysis of hundreds of thousands of tweets between April and June 2011, the expression “el pueblo”
(The  People)  does  only  rarely  appear,  while  others,  such  as  “gente”  (people)  do  so  extremely
frequently. One of the potential reasons for why these two terms appear so prominently could be the
frequency of expressions such as “many people” or “we are thousands of persons”, but the texts of
the time suggest the preeminence of these concepts in more formal texts too.
219 There could be many explanations for this fact, from the lack of previous political experience to the
dismantling of class consciousness by neoliberalism (Graeber, 2013). A simpler one could be that they
were associated with the discourses, practices and organizations that those very demonstrations and
camps were trying to call into question.
220 In the demonstration of May 15th, party or union banners or flags were generally absent. This
reflected the “nonpartisan” and “non-union” nature of the DRY platform and the call itself. The current
national flag, symbol of the nation, was missing too (as noted by Gerbaudo, 2016). This was tied to
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attempt at “transversality”221.
This avoidance went hand in hand with the use of alternative, wider notions such as
“personas” (persons), which was a term of choice for collective “self-definition” in the
15M vocabulary. This emphasis was, in texts such as the DRY manifesto, associated
to the appeal to an “ethical revolution” oriented to recover human dignity. Concretely,
the  DRY manifesto  for  the  demonstration  on  May  15th  starts  “We  are  normal,
common persons222.  People like you”.  It  soon sets up a “transversal”  or  “beyond
differences” vocabulary:
“Some  consider  ourselves  more  progressive,  others  more  conservative.  Some
believers,  others  not.  Some of  us  have  well  defined  ideologies,  others  consider
ourselves apolitical… but we are all  concerned and outraged (indignados) for the
political,  economic and social  panorama that we see around us.  Because of the
corruption of politicians, businessmen, bankers… because of the helplessness of the
common citizen”
This gesture could be read in various ways. An interpretation á la Jacques Rancière
(1999) points to the erasure of the separating names generated by and for social
policing; a reading a la Laclau (2005) connects such erasure with the construction of
a people (see chapter 2),  which is then confronted with an elite of  bankers and
politicians. And yet, the only time when the expression “pueblo” appears in the DRY
manifesto is, precisely, when they refer to the word “democracy”223.
In the case of the Acampadasol manifesto, the beginning is similar. To the heading
question of “who are we”, the answer is “we are persons who have come here freely
and  voluntarily,  after  the  demonstration  [on  May  15th]  we  decided  to  meet  and
continue  reclaiming  dignity  as  well  as  political  and  social  consciousness.”  The
the peculiar history of the current Spanish flag, which is associated within the current political culture
of the left, as well as Basque and Catalan nationalism, with Franco's dictatorship.
221 Both DRY and the camps aimed, with considerable success, at “transversality”, otherwise, they
appealed to and mobilized a wide and heterogeneous constituency. According to Lobera & Sampedro
(2014), the movement got higher levels of support than rejection across multiple categories such as
sex, age, job situation, type of city and region.
222 In this translation, I try to maintain the word “persons” for the word “personas” even though the
most common translation into English is “people”. In the same way, there is no word difference in
English between “gente”  and “pueblo”,  which are both  translated through the word “people”.  The
defining element is the article “the” preceding its more political sense.
223 In a sentence that  is not etymologically strict,  the manifesto says:  “Democracy starts with the
people (demos = people; cracy = government) therefore the government must be of the people.” A
shortened version of the famous Lincoln motto of a government “of”, “by” and “for” the people.
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relevance of the terms “people” and, especially, “persons” was sometimes intended
(as in the texts by DRY and Acampadas) and other times less so (as in the Twitter
vocabulary),  but  the lack of  centrality  of  notions such as “The People”,  the total
absence of terms such as “the nation” (and its individual correlate “Spaniards”) or
“the working class”, the rejection of “left” and “right” divisions224, and the discursive
critique of the notion of “representation” that I just analyzed, display a clear pattern of
relativization  of  basic  notions  of  modern  political  ontology.  It  is  also  true  that
expressions such as “citizen” or “common citizen” appear in those texts and some
point towards “citizenism”225 (Gerbaudo 2016). Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that
“citizen” is not the key nor the most innovative term nor in DRY’s nor in the camps’
manifestos; “person” and “persons” are.
At  the  level  of  narrative,  another,  connected  notion  at  the  time,  used  by  15M
participants and analysts Fernández-Savater (2012) and Padilla (2013) was that of
the  “anybody”,  the  idea  that  “anybody”  could  be  “15M”226,  and  that  15M  was  a
movement of the “anybodies”. “Anybody” is an interesting notion because it speaks
of an individual and, at the same time and very specifically, of none.
4.3.2.1. The discursive critique of represented subjects and economics
The discursive rejection of common discourses of representation of political actors
had also an economic dimension. The most conspicuous case is the mentioned DRY
slogan “we are not commodities in the hands of politicians and banksters”227. This
slogan was a multitudinous rejection of what was perceived as an externally applied
identity228. There was both a contestation and a creative representation of a bankers-
politicians axis as, in turn, representing and, more widely, turning the citizenry into a
commodity. This slogan was beyond the suggestions in the “NLV” campaign about
the  connection  between  the  economic  and  the  political  system.  It  was  an  anti-
representationalist  objection  to  the  political  model  of  (neo)liberal  representative
224 Several clear examples of this can be found in Sánchez (2011c) where he cites DRY tweets and
comments noticing “those are ideals that divide those that are at the bottom of the pyramid”.
225 For the purposes of this argument, citizenism can be understood as political position similar to
populism, in which the opposition between the people and a political or economic elite is substituted
by an opposition between the citizenry and those same elites.
226 References in popular culture to this kind of idea are especially clear in a film popular in 15M
networks, The fight club, and, somehow, in others such as V for Vendetta.
227 The bankers come here to occupy the role of the “culture industry” in the cyber-activist struggles
around  the  Sinde  Law  as  the  reference  enemy,  considered  another  overrepresented  minority
supported by politicians in detriment of public interests.
228 This shout, along with the “they do not represent us” slogan, can be understood in terms of the
Deleuzian critique of representation (Tormey, 2006) as saying “we are not what you say”, or further,
“we are not what you make of us”.
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democracy and the way it constructs subjects; the rejection by DRY activists, and
those supporting the demonstration, to be represented and treated like commodities.
This  critical-economic  view  of  representation  can  be  found  elsewhere  too.  For
instance, in calls to circumvent the division of the representative field on the basis of
an economic deconstruction: “to enter in “right” or “left” is a semantic debate. While
political marketing is paid by the banks there will be neither” (Democracia Real Ya,
2011a). Other DRY tweets go further and suggest “those are ideals that divide those
that are at the bottom of the pyramid” (Democracia Real Ya, 2011b), anticipating
another key form of alternative form discursive collective subject: “the ones below”.
As it was put in another 15M slogan: “we are nor right nor left, we are the ones below
and go for the ones above”. The ones below and from below, that is the definition of
a grassroots process such as 15M, as opposed to State or party organizations, or
even to some case of social movements, that tend to take an approach from above
to collective action. These tensions will become particularly obvious with the arrival
of the “electoral assault” and the party period within the 15M cycle, which analyze in
chapter 5.
4.3.2.2. The discursive critique of represented subjects, ethics and media
As a closing to this journey through some of the core semantics around May 15th, I
want to dig into an aspect frequently overlooked in other analyses (Toret et al., 2015,
Monterde, 2015, Gerbaudo, 2016), which was clearly present in the early stages of
15M and its cycle:  ethics. According to the DRY manifesto: “We need an ethical
revolution. Instead of placing money above human beings, we shall put it back to our
service. We are persons, not products. I am not a product of what I buy, why I buy
and who I buy from.” Beyond the denunciation of the commodification of the person,
of its reduction and identification with a commodity, this outlines an ethical dimension
that was relevant to the discourses and events around May 15th.
In its origin, the term “persona” was used to refer to theatrical masks. Masks also
allowed the one behind them (with whom the term eventually became identified) to
decide the mode of its manifestation229. In 15M, the concept of “person”, the idea of
relating to other as persons, served to conjure the political divisions in right and left,
somehow beyond the representation game that the slogan “they do not represent us”
229 The possibility of varying one’s own manifestation is key for being an actor, but also an author, the
person before and behind the mask, somebody who is more and less than its character and that is the
author of its actions (Goffman, 2002).
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had called to question.
There is a connection of some of these references to “ethics” surrounding the figure
of the “person” in the early days of 15M and some of the practices at the time. There
is  an  emphasis  on  “active  listening”,  “respect”,  “dialogue”,  key  notions  of  the
deliberative democratic model of the assembly as a political-ethical ideal 230, in 15M
guides  for  assembly  facilitation  (Comisión  Dinamización,  2011).  The  notion  of
“person” and ethics were raised in connection with both personal interaction in 15M
assemblies  and  camps,  as  well  as  in  connection  with  the  rejection  of  forms  of
economic objectivation (commodification) and political representation (The People,
parties, flags, etc.).
Ethics  and  morality  also  connect  to  one  of  the  terms that  gained  traction  as  a
collective  identification  of  15M  participants:  the  label  “indignados”  (indignant,
outraged). “Indignation” is a moral affect. Mass media231 crucially contributed to the
adoption of this term taken from a French bestseller, as a collective definition by
many. This is, again, a collective name of an antagonist character that is not in the
charts of modern discursive ontology.
As I show in part 5, the biggest innovation in terms of collective identity and subject
formation tough, was neither in the brief emphasis on the “person”, the new subject
of  “the  ones  below”,  or  even  the  collective  name  “indignados”,  but  rather  the
formation of networked and non-representational identities in social networks.
4.3.3.  The  discourse  of  the  alternative:  the  assembly  form  and  collective
intelligence
Above  I  showed  some  of  the  general,  alter-representationalist  and  anti-
representationalist  proposals  in  the  DRY manifesto.  But  these  proposals  took  a
whole new dimension after May 15th. They became a discourse not so much of
“demand”  towards  the  State  (in  the  populist  model)  but  of  practice  within  the
movement (in a more anarchist  and autonomist vein). At the camps, the ultimate
ideal  of  democracy  was  not  something  to  be  granted  by  the  government  but
practiced  and  constructed  by  the  movement.  The  practical  ideal  of  the  popular
assembly  and  the  participation  of  everyone  and  anyone  became  a  preeminent
leitmotiv within 15M. As noticed in a brief statement published in tomalaplaza.net
230 The value of these notions is clearly connected to ethics in the work of XXth century philosophers
that,  usually  with  more  of  a  theological  than  a  secular  vein,  also  insisted  on  “dialogue”,  “active
listening”, the “face-to-face” relationship, the “I-You”, “respect” etc.,  most clearly (and with obvious
difference among themselves) Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas.
231 Particularly, the mainstream journal El País (Ruiz Mantilla, 2011).
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(the web of the Sol Camp in Madrid) on June 3rd and read in the Sol assembly on
June 4th, entitled “What is going on in Sol?” and directed to any reader: “YOU ASK
US FOR SOLUTIONS.  The solution we give in  the face of  these problems also
remains the same than when we arrived: the inclusive participation of everyone in
the  construction  of  the  change  we want.”  Then  it  goes  on to  make discursively
explicit several widespread tenets of most camps: “THE TIME. We had internalized
their rushes, their rhythms, their speed. ENOUGH. We go slow because we go far.
We go slow because we want to go all together. We go slow because we want to do
it right. We go slow because the way is as important as the result.”
The last sentence is a clear example of “prefigurative” thinking (see chapter 2): “the
way is as important as the result”, and ultimately aims to embody it. The world to
come must be made present in the way towards it. But this emphasis appears as a
response to  public  critiques of  inefficiency and slowness towards 15M workings,
paradigmatically embodied in the assembly model of decision making. The critical
judgment, the passage suggests,  is based on the usual timing of politics, on the
chronopolitics  of  representation  and  media.  By  reducing  the  number  of  decision
makers, time is accelerated (as suggested by Latour, 2004b). But the text calls for a
break with the temporality of accelerating (and shrinking) representation, be it in the
form of representative democracy or representation in mass media. Such a break is
necessary  because  the  process  towards  a  real  democracy  must  be  radically
participatory if it is to arrive to its destination. If the current representative system
excludes most people of decision making, the first solution to such a problem is “the
inclusive participation of everyone”.
The primary model for how to do so was the assembly. Its principles appear neatly
resumed  in  a  text  by  the  Facilitation  Commission  on  May  31st (Comisión
Dinamización,  2011),  entitled  “Quick  Guide  for  the  Facilitation  of  Popular
Assemblies”. There is a discursive idealization of an assembly:
“A participatory decision-making organ that looks for consensus. The best arguments
are searched in order to make the decision that fits better with the different opinions,
rather than opposing positions, as it happens in voting.”
In  an  anarchist  fashion  (Graeber,  2013),  they  define  assemblies  as  primarily
practical: “An assembly must not focus in an ideological discourse but on practical
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matters ‘What do we need? How do we get it?’.” They also stress, also in a rather
anarchist style, free association: “The assembly is based on free association, if you
do not agree with what has been decided you are not bound to carry it on. Every
person  is  free  to  do  whatever  they  want.”  Furthermore,  they  stress  the  aim  of
collective  construction  and  dialogue:  “the  assembly  aims  to  generate  collective
intelligence, common lines of thought and action. It promotes dialogue, let's know
one another.”232 The document exposes some of the basic principles of 15M's ideal of
a direct and deliberative democracy. This model challenges the individualist ontology
of  the  modern  liberal  representative  model,  as  well  as  its  competitive  and
aggregative model of decision making, epitomized in voting. Instead, it proposes a
collaborative, processual and emergent view of collective decision making. As the
text makes explicit
“Collective thinking is completely opposed to the actual system that guides itself by
an  individualist  thinking.  The  objective  in  collective  thinking  is  to  construct  [...]
Therefore, it is not a matter of my idea or yours. It is the two ideas together that will
provide a new product that neither you nor I did know a priori.”
For this, it  concludes, “active listening” is key. In this text, there are some of the
central  discursive  tenets  of  15M.  There  are  central  leitmotivs  of  deliberative
democracy (dialogue, collective thinking, etc.) combined with others that came to be
idiosyncratic of the movement and even the cycle, such as “collective intelligence”
and “active listening”.
15M articulated a multi-directional, critical diagnosis of representation in politics and
media, and demanded more participatory alternatives in a normative fashion. But its
ultimate direct and deliberative model, anarchist in nature, based on the ideal of the
assembly,  was  more  clearly  seen  on  its  prescriptive-normative  discourses  on
practice, such as the one just analyzed. Even though references to direct democracy
and deliberation remained relevant in later stages of the cycle, this model of the
assembly as the paradigm of a more real  democracy was to  lose ground in the
months following the experience of the camps. Part of this decline had to do with the
practical results of the assembly form during the camping weeks.
232 In the translation, I have tried to preserve the punctuation style in the original text.
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4.4. Pragmatics/Practices
Part 3 analyzed the discourses on representation and democracy articulated by DRY
and the 15M camps in manifestos, documents, and slogans. This part is devoted to
see  its  experiments  with  technopolitics,  new  organizational  forms,
(anti)representation and alter-democracy in practice. The chapter is divided in three
main  parts.  The  first  attends  to  practices  of  anti-representationalism  and  alter-
democracy in camps and assemblies, touching upon some of the limits of the latter.
The second looks at technopolitical practices of media alter-representationalism and
autonomy. The third part analyzes the technopolitical assemblages of practice at the
core of 15M during the camp stage, which encompassed both digital networks and
squares.
This part looks at a movement that was able to mobilize thousands of people without
formal, representative organizations or figures. It analyzes the experimental modes
of organization and the practices that made it possible, and some of their limits. A
crucial element, secondary as a topic at the semantic or discursive level (part 3),
emerges as a result: technopolitics, otherwise, the entanglement of technology and
politics in movement practice.
The centrality of ICTs and practices related to them for 15M has been repeatedly
shown (Gerbaudo, 2012; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Toret et al., 2015; Monterde,
2015). Rather than trying to proof such centrality once again, I focus in some new
aspects  of  this  centrality,  and  relate  them  to  matters  of  representation  and
democracy233.
In synthesis, this fourth part outlines two key models of non-representational political
ontology: the assembly and the networked assemblage. The former speaks to the
alter-democratic  ontology of  deliberative democracy,  and appeals to  a dialoguing
citizenry;  the latter speaks of a form of autonomist democracy, and to networked
multitudes.  15M  is  presented  as  a  technopolitical,  multi-layered  assemblage
involving thousands of people, both locally and statewide, in political  actions that
mostly  sidestepped  representation  and  traditional  forms  of  organization  in  social
movements.
233 This means to take a look at the deployment of technologies for politics and not so much at the
politics of technologies.
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4.4.1.  Anti-representationalism  (and  presentism)  in  practice:  direct  actions,
camps, assemblies
Anti-representationalism  and  alter-democracy  in  camps  and  assemblies  had  a
twofold direction. It was headed outwards, towards the media and the institutional
political system (analyzed in section 4.1.1.). It was also headed inwards, it affected
the practice of representation within 15M, and was connected to alternative forms of
organization: assemblies (section 4.1.2.) and networks of assemblies (4.1.3.).
4.4.1.1. Anti-representationalism in images, direct action, and camps
Few images and symbols of 15M questioning of representation were more prominent
than the picture in the first big banner hung in Sol234. It was May 18th, three days after
the demonstration of May 15th and the decision of some people to stay overnight.
The banner displayed an image of the Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler, with a euro sign
and Mickey Mouse ears, with the heading “they do not represent us”. As commented
earlier, the DRY manifesto had presented a critique of the mainstream political and
media interpretation of  the crisis  as a somehow neutral,  quasi-natural,  economic
process.  Such  a  representation  was  denounced  itself  as  a  fraud,  a  fraud  that
covered the wider fraud of wealth extraction through the mechanisms of finance and
corrupt  politics.  This  impugnation  of  the  alignment  of  money,  politics,
commodification, and spectacle was clear in the materiality of the banner.
The next example is closer to direct action. On the night between May 20 th and 21st,
24 hours before the arrival of the election day, a huge multitude assembled in Sol.
The  Electoral  Junta  had  ordered  the  eviction  of  the  camps on  that  midnight,  in
preparation  for  the  “reflection  day”.  Reflection  day  is  a  spatial-temporal  practice
sanctioned by law: in the 24 hours preceding an election, no political propaganda is
allowed, so that a political silence leaves room for people to meditate on their vote.
At midnight, after a silence only filled with the sound of the twelve strokes of the
Puerta del Sol clock, hundreds of people waved their hands, and a deafening shout
234 The  process  of  banner  hanging  is  recorded  in  this  video  www.youtube.comwatch?
feature=player_embedded&v=h-Vxxa5a-4s (accessed on December 15th, 2015). Although, later on,
there would be many others, in a space saturated with slogans, proposals, and images, it remains
interesting the fact that the first banner, an element with great iconographic and symbolic charge, was
precisely  this  iconic  piece  of  iconoclasm and  iconogenesis.  The  image  of  Himmler  may  evoke,
perhaps, the kind of inversion of representation that, according to Pitkin, fascism embody. The Mickey
ears—mark of both the Disney Brand and American entertainment industry—seem to point to both
spectacle and entertainment, to political infantilization; the symbol of the Euro connects, in a rather
obvious way, to the economic powers and the European institutions ensuring the rule of markets,
capital and, within Europe, Germany—the figure of Himmler, after all, connects to the last German
Project for the domination of Europe.
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of joy followed suit. It was reflection day, the assembled multitude challenged the
rule of the State right before one of its self-celebratory days. Then, right after the
shout,  a  chant  by  hundreds  of  people,  at  unison:  “they  do  not  represent  us” 235.
Images such as this one were a representation in a theatrical  sense,  a massive
performance, a direct action trying to short-circuit the ritual of the elections, a key
authoritative and symbolic moment within the liberal representative democracy, its
legitimation  ritual.  Continuously  threatened  by  State  policing,  this  was  a
spatiotemporal  counter-practice,  a  different,  autonomist  way  of  assembling  the
multitude and the agora in an election day, in the day of representation.
The  demonstration  on  May  15th  took  advantage  of  the  political  process  (in  the
classical social movement theory fashion) to maximize public attention. By their very
existence, the camps short-circuited the ritual that they had taken advantage from:
they enacted anti-representation. Differently from earlier initiatives such as NLV, the
camps did not accept the representative circuit as the endpoint of the movement.
They did not ask for a change in the vote, rather, they first asked for reflection, and,
more importantly,  pointed elsewhere in the political  imaginary236.  As a well-known
slogan at Puerta del  Sol  pointed: “Our dreams do not fit  in your ballot  boxes” 237.
Elections are themselves an ontological performance of representative democracy;
they are their fleeting embodiment. The social multitude, constituted as “sovereign
people” and nation, mobilized, sociotechnical infrastructures deployed  ex profeso,
socioeconomic differences allegedly forgot or played out calmly, in a synchronized
common set of gestures and allowances, ultimately synthesized in the act of voting,
where  all  citizens  are  framed  as  equal.  A formal  process  where  all  get  formal,
although not material, equality. All of that was being questioned by the autonomist,
alter-democratic  performances  taking  place—taking  the  square—in  dozens  of
Spanish cities. 15M used the representation time, the election week, for displaying
235 The  video  capturing  this  moment  is  available  at  www.youtube.comwatch?v=xp1VIDEnM9U
(accessed on December 20th, 2015).
236 After the election counting it became clear that, despite some rise in white and null votes, and the
increase in  the minoritarian vote—the total  voting rate  actually  increased—the right-wing Popular
Party had won. This resulted, primarily, from the huge drop in support for the Socialist Party in office in
most of the regions and city councils in dispute (Alcaide, 2011). From the “NLV” viewpoint, this could
be considered a failure.  From the viewpoint  of the processes unleashed after 15M, the symbolic
objection to the performance and to the very essence of representative democracy was there to stay.
It became into a multiplicity of alternatives, in the form of both direct democracy and direct action,
which were to spread in the following months and years.
237 As noticed by Foucault in his Preface to Anti-Oedipus, “It is the connection of desire to reality (and
not  its  retreat  into  the  forms  of  representation)  that  possesses  revolutionary  force”  (Deleuze  &
Guattari, 2004: XV).
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self-organization,  for  assembling  autonomously,  for  constructing  an  anti-
representational  space  and  an  anti-representational  time,  a  presentist—albeit
problematic and hybrid—sociality.
On  the  squares,  things  other  than  discussion  of  elections,  even  other  than  the
deliberative discussions of the assembly, were going on. The camps were a huge
assemblage of autonomous performances, one big direct action with many others
within it. What blossomed inside that temporary autonomous zone were temporary
autonomous forms of life. One of the most powerful expositions on this regard is
Miguel Arana’s (2011) (later participation innovator for the Participation Council of
Madrid):
“That first week the government could fall. That first week squares all over the world
could  rise  up  and  start  something  different.  That  week  anything  could  happen
because the power was inexhaustible” [min 38]
“All  of  one's  own  worries,  all  the  problems,  all  the  minor  issues,  suddenly,
disappeared from your life. I recall the first days, evidently, nobody went to work. My
PhD director was hallucinated, “well, where is this guy?”. Suddenly, everything had
lost importance. It was like “we are changing the world, and we can change it for the
first time”. That feeling of hope, of, really, we can change it, anything can happen and
now the  matter  is  to  define  it...  that  is  something  unique,  something  that  is  not
comparable to anything I have lived” [minute 54]
The experience of those weeks was a life-changing process for many. For as many
as 95% of the respondents to our survey, 15M was an important relevant experience.
In  places like Sol,  personal  and communal  exuberance resulted in  a  plethora of
autonomous groups and structures that proliferated rapidly, from plastic arts to legal
services.
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       FIGURE 12. MAP OF ACAMPADASOL. 
                                                                 SOURCE: TOMALAPLAZA.NET.
4.4.1.2. Assembling people and decisions deliberately and democratically: problems
and solutions of deliberative alter-democracy in practice
One of the most celebrated practices within 15M camps was its experimentation with
the  practice  of  open,  deliberative  assemblies  at  a  mass  scale.  The  General
Assembly  became  the  embodiment  of  15M’s  alter-democratic,  deliberative  and
autonomist model (as seen in section 3.3.) and limits of the movement. 15M was an
experiment with massive participation in assemblies. Massive in terms of the number
of people that may attend any given assembly (20 Minutos, 2011), as well  as in
terms of the sheer total number (tens, if not hundreds of thousands 238) of people who
took part, many of them for the first time. It was an experiment and an experience.
According  to  the  definition  provided  in  a  reference  text  published  by  the
Acampadasol’s Facilitation Commission on May 31st (Comisión Dinamización, 2011),
entitled “Quick Guide for the Facilitation of Popular Assemblies”, a popular assembly
“Is  a  participatory  decision-making  organ  that  looks  for  consensus.  The  best
arguments  are  searched  in  order  to  make  the  decision  that  fits  better  with  the
different opinions, rather than opposing positions, as it happens in voting.”
238 Between 1,5 and 8 million participated either in demonstrations, the camps, or assemblies. Our
own survey suggests that 65.6% of 15M participants participated in assemblies. Just in Madrid, the
organizers estimated that the decentralized assemblies to decide what to do after the camp in Puerta
del Sol was dismantled gathered more than 10000 attendees (20 Minutos, 2011).
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Assemblies were oriented to let everyone speak and be actively listened to. They
were  meant  to  potentiate  equality  (the  ancient  Greek  isegoria)  and horizontality,
breaking  with  the  hierarchies  and  forms  of  power  that  DRY’s  and  camp's  texts
associated with the neoliberal  representative political-economic model  that turned
people  into  commodities  in  the  hands  of  politicians  and  banksters.  In  15M,  the
assembly was the primary method of discussion and decision making embedded in a
variety  of  settings,  not  only  the well-known general  assemblies.  As stated in  the
same  document:  “working  group  assemblies,  commissions  assemblies,
neighborhood  assemblies  (each  neighborhood,  town,  and  municipalities),
Acampadasol General Assemblies and Madrid General Assemblies.” In spite of the
appeal  of  the  direct  deliberative  model,  open and consensus based assemblies,
especially massive ones, proved to have plenty of problems in practice. These, in
turn, impacted the movement.
The range of these problems, which were explored in some journal articles at the
time (Sánchez, 2011b) was wide. An alternative to representation mechanisms, the
assembly had its own; anti-representationalism faced its own quandaries. One of
them, difficulty to find consensus, may derive from what Pickering (2014) has called
“the problem of the homeostat”  which points to the ontological and mathematical
difficulty of reaching stability (in political terms, consensus) among a big group of
actors, especially under an open, non-coercive and horizontal process, a difficulty
that increases when moving from simple homeostats to human differences in rhetoric
styles,  interests,  and  the  like.  Another  was  the  problem  of  decision  overload,
otherwise, the sheer quantity of matters to decide upon. A third, connected to the
previous two, was assembly exhaustion, otherwise, the excessive number and time
length of assemblies, with some discussions extending over different sessions and
days.
Some of these problems were partially and practically addressed by modifications in
the internal structure and facilitation of assemblies. For instance, as an attempt to
address  non-consensus  blockages,  especially  in  the  last  days  of  Acampadasol,
many defended moving from decision by consensus towards a majoritarian 80%
system239 (Comisión de Extensión Internacional, 2011). As a response to the problem
of decision overload, a good part of the collective decision making was by default
239 It is worth noticing that majoritarian systems were in place earlier in the assemblies at other camps
(Sánchez, 2011b).
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decentralized to semi-autonomous working groups and commissions, or even the
social networks associated with a given camp or city. This decision making usually
moved within the broad boundaries of what were considered the principles of the
movement. Formal working groups had internal forms of peer review and frequently
reported to and got  feedback from the assembly (Zulo, 2011),  but  there was no
centralized oversight of distributed collective action by any collective body. Forcing
all the relevant decision making to pass through the assembly was impossible. As a
response to the third problem noticed above, there were recommendations of clear
agendas  and  timings,  aiming  to  avoid  excessively  long  meetings  (Comisión
Dinamización, 2011).
While decentralization and assembly time limits were set up earlier, the change to
majoritarian rules was being debated at the time of the dismantling of the camps—
actually, the assembly decision to lift the camp was one of the drivers for the change
to  majoritarianism.  The  general  assembly  form  proved  to  be  a  block  to  many
innovative proposals coming from working groups240, as well as to general decision
making and action of 15M in Madrid (Sánchez, 2011b). So central was “process” and
its problems in 15M that some would affirm “what is about to break Madrid’s 15M is
not a matter of content (what to decide) but of system (how to decide)” (Sánchez,
2011b). Key debates moved from being debates in assemblies to be debates about
assemblies, within the “facilitation” working group. But the group suffered from the
same “unanimous consensus”  problem,  so that  a  participant  would  say:  “we are
trapped in our own dynamics and we are slaves of ourselves” (Sánchez, 2011b).
The combination of full  openness and full consensus proved to be an inoperative
one. A system of decision making more appropriate for smaller groups with previous
affinity and common goals showed its limitations when scaled up to bigger and more
heterogeneous  groups  (Gerbaudo,  2016)  (including  potential  saboteurs).  The
discursive call (seen in section 3.3.) for “the inclusive participation of everyone in the
construction  of  the  change  we  want”  was  appealing  in  principle,  but  frequently
brought practical problems to bring such a change.
4.4.1.3.  15M  meta-assembling:  anti-representationalism  and  practices  of
coordination and delegation
Popular  assemblies were first  and foremost  an alter-democratic,  deliberative and
240 Sánchez (2011b) noted: it  is enough to take a look at the proceedings of the commissions of
economy, healthcare, or environment to see that there is debate, that there are ideas, that there are
concrete proposals in the underground of 15M. They just never get approved”.
  
 
189
 
autonomist  space for  direct  participation  of  anyone and everyone.  But  they also
involved delegation.  Commissions and  working  groups usually  sent  delegates  to
them for reporting, discussing proposals, etc. Especially in assemblies devoted to
inter-assembly coordination, such as that of the APM (Popular Assembly of Madrid),
delegation was key (in my analysis I follow Comisión Barrios, 2011). The APM was
probably the most complex collective body generated by the 15M movement across
the country. It was attended by delegates from assemblies of all the neighborhoods
of the city and dozens of cities and towns of the province of Madrid.
Interestingly,  though,  the  emergence  of  fixed  representatives  at  the  APM  was
countered by different techniques. First, the spokespeople participating in them were
not only rotating frequently, even for every assembly (as were all of the roles of the
assembly organization),  but the spokespeople role was played by several people
(the recommendation was between 2 and 5 per delegation). Furthermore, one of its
relevant actors, the 15M Madrid Neighborhood Commission (Comisión de Barrios,
2011), saw the Popular Assembly of Madrid not as a supreme organ of decision but,
under the alter-globalization model, as “a space of encounter and coordination: the
important  thing  is  that  calls  spread,  that  we  put  things  in  common  with  other
assemblies,  that  we  knit  networks”.  They  saw  the  APM  working  “through  an
absolutely thick fabric of formal and informal interrelations between assemblies and
working groups, but also between the inhabitants of towns and neighborhoods”. 
This, according to them, is how the 15M network in Madrid looks like. Rather than
being at the peak of a hierarchic system of centralized decision making, the APM
  
 
FIGURE 13. 15M ASSEMBLY AND GROUP
STRUCTURE IN MADRID. SOURCE: COMISIÓN
BARRIOS, 2011
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“must not take the role of “mediator” with power; assemblies are autonomous, but
they can be the reflection of their collective will. We understand the APM is a tool
(among many others)”. Under a climate of anti-representationalism such as the one
described  throughout  the  chapter,  not  only  individuals  were  denied  authority  to
represent the movement as whole, but also assemblies241. No ultimate, centralized,
representative body emerged in Madrid's 15M structures (even if Acampadasol the
key  node),  but  rather  a  plethora  of  interlinked  spaces  coordinating  “in  order  to
facilitate  mutual  aid  and action”.  In  all  of  those different  bodies:  working groups,
general assemblies or inter-assembly gatherings, the assembly form appeared as
the preferred, alter-democratic decision-making form.
But if the local shape (the square level) was the assembly, the coordinating shape (at
the APM level) was the network or the rhizome. This implied a partial recognition of
an organizational dimension beyond the assembly itself, which was in practice as, if
not  more,  relevant  than  the  assemblies:  the  networked  assemblage.  But  the
normative,  deliberative  model  around  decision  making,  which  prioritized  the
assembly, was expressed in the coda to the text: “all power to the assemblies””.
4.4.2. 15M alter-representationalist media practices
In section 4.1. I’ve portrayed direct action, assemblies, and camps, as cases and
symbols of autonomist collective organization without representation; here the focus
is put on the media field, which centrally contributed to portray (or not) them as such.
As noticed in  chapter  2,  contemporary  political  representation,  and politics  more
broadly,  cannot  be  understood  without  media.  As  noticed  there  too,  neither  can
social  movements. Here I want to attend to two aspects: one is how 15M actors
related to mass media, challenging its current forms of representing (or constructing)
reality; the other is how they constructed their own media, its alter-representation
channels.
241 An example of  that  denial  can be found in  a  blog post  by Enrique Dans (2011) entitled “On
assemblies, camps and their representativeness in the 15M movement” where he explicitly denies
representativeness to people assembled in camps because “none has voted them [and] they lack
qualifications of any kind to discuss these topics, and have no more merit that having decided to stay
there sitting”. He further calls to “silence the assemblies. Let's deny all representativeness to their
proposals  because  they  simply  haven't  got  it,  they  never  had it”.  He  closes  suggesting  that  the
assemblies devote themselves to ensure the proper functioning of  the camps and to serve as a
people's agora, but not to try to amend the problems of the country or to represent the movement with
these  proposals.  He  demanded  something  that  the  assemblies  had  already  integrated  in  their
discourse: the rejection to be representing the movement.
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4.4.2.1.  Challenging  mainstream  media  representationalism  and  movement
representatives
Suspicion of media among 15M participants was widespread (as noticed in section
3.2.2. and explained here). A clear tension existed between media usefulness for
spreading  the  movement's  message  and  their  ability  for  co-optation  (Sánchez,
2013c). According to Sánchez, the three first reactions of mainstream media towards
the movement were to ignore the it, then, to instrumentalize it (to understand it as
something to be read only in terms of elections due on May 22nd—which included
right wing conspiracy theorists that saw a hidden Socialist Party hand behind it), and
then to over-cover it.
The camps and 15M anti-representationalism posed a challenge to traditional media.
A plethora of events were going on at the same time and messages were generated
and  distributed  through  heterogeneous  venues:  assemblies,  fanpages,  personal
profiles,  working  group  profiles,  etc.  Lacking  fixed  representatives,  mass  media
faced a situation that denied media representative totalization in practice, countering
the position of transcendence it tries to grant over the field of political practice. As
Sánchez  (2011d,  2013b)  recalls,  journalists  started  to  spend 8  hours  in  general
assemblies to  get  their  reports  right...  while  missing all  the  rest  going on in  the
camps. Neither could the activists, such as people in charge of press on information
sites, pretend to know everything242 that was going on in the camp, not to say on the
movement as a whole, which included social networks and other cities.
The  situation  challenged  the  usual  ways  of  media  reporting  today.  According  to
Stephane  Grueso  (Sánchez,  2011d),  15M  documentarist  and  streamer,  “it  was
difficult to interpret but what was needed was to take the time.” Sánchez243(2011d)
notices: “That is a luxury. We have taken the luxury of being hours in a square telling
what was going on.” Human Journalism came to be the journal of reference for and
about 15M (Periodismo Humano, 2011).  New media, new representative hybrids,
blossomed under these new conditions.
And yet, journalists “looked for structure” (Martínez, 2013), for referential figures that
would help them to frame 15M. In the camps and, especially, in DRY, the ultimate
strategy  wasn’t  to  deny all  interviews  but  to  make  faces exchangeable,  shifting,
242 As 15M activist Marga Padilla points out, “Nobody can see everything”.
243 Working as a journalist for “Periodismo Humano” (Human journalism), a “communication media”
with  emphasis  on human rights,  of  which he was co-founder  and that  was a reference for  15M
supporters in the times of the camps, he gained both a great knowledge and acknowledgement of
15M circles www.eldiario.es/autores/juan_luis_sanchez/
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never  able  to  pretend  to  represent  and  thereby  reify  15M.  Camps went  against
representation. If the concept of “person” was key in many texts and tweets since the
early  days  of  15M,  “personalism”  was  the  reverse,  the  attempt  of  stop  being
“anybody” and play under the coordinates of the modern politics of representation
and  leadership.  Collective  identities  rather  than  individual  ones,  tended  to  have
preeminence, nevertheless. The lack of long term public leaders of the movement
and the preeminence of collective profiles on social networks such as Twitter (Toret
et al., 2015) confirms this. On this regard, DRY and the camps tended to be different.
Members  of  the  first  gained  recognition  in  the  days  following  the  successful
demonstration on May 15th. It is because of this that, five years later, newspapers
could still talk of the “forgotten founders” of the 15M movement (Sáinz, 2016). But as
the title indicates, they have been forgotten, either because they were not interested
in  maintaining  such position  or  could  not  gather  sustained legitimacy or  prevent
attacks undermining it.
The questioning of leadership was both a practice and a symbol, a representation of
anti-representationalism, of the kind of forms of togetherness the movement aimed
to achieve. Anti-representationalism worked with limitations, since journalist practice
was hard to change (as commented by Martínez, 2013 and Sánchez, 2013c). Not
infrequently, irrepresentability was externally perceived as a cacophony.
4.4.2.2. Technopolitics for alter-representation: constructing autonomous media
But beyond cacophony, there was contention. As pointed by Quintana (2013): there
was  a  “battle  of  narratives”  around  15M,  what  amounted  to  a  conflict  around
representation and media discourse. 15M generated its own media, so much so that
some  have  spoken  of  15M  as  a  communication  media  (Serrano,  2013a).  15M
participants narrated and discussed what was going on the camps, on assemblies,
and  on  social  media.  It  is  appropriate  to  say  15M  generated  a  hybrid  media
assemblage within an emerging, wider hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013)244 in
Spain.  Section  4.3.  attends  to  15M  participants  deployment  of  social  media,
particularly,  Facebook  and  Twitter.  The  present  one  focuses  in  collective  and
personal projects of media channels (in the tradition of alter-globalization model of
alternative media, Kellner, 1999) aimed at bringing alternative representations of the
244 Castells  (2012)  contrasts  them to  networks allowing  mass self-communication,  such  as those
generated by 15M in Twitter or Facebook. In the camps, the question was probably more connected
with unmediated interpersonal communication.
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movement to the mainstream.
In most big camps Communication Commissions (or homologous structures)245were
created. The general rationale and aim of these commissions and groups can be
synthesized in the Agora Sol foundational statement: “the need to give voice to the
movement of the outraged. Especially, in light of how, many times, traditional media
ignored (when not blatantly deformed) a nascent movement that could not be easily
understood from the traditional schemes.”
I focus here one of the most innovative practices alter-representation popularized by
15M: streaming. Streaming is the practice of interactive audiovisual broadcasting,
frequently in real time, based on internet services. Streaming is key to understand
the  use  of  live  communication  in  15M.  Dozens  of  15M  streaming  channels  in
platforms such as Bambuser246 (others, such as Livestream or Ustream were less
relevant) were set up during 2011, 2012 and 2013, so much so that the growth of
this media was directly related to the movement (Pérez Rioja & Gil, 2014). In the
early days of 15M, this live and alive communication allowed Spanish emigrates to
“camp via streaming” (Nanclares, 2011). During the peak years of 15M, it allowed
between a dozen and two hundred profiles to  involve hundreds of  thousands of
people  in  augmented  events.  Some  indicative  numbers  can  be  found  by  the
hundreds of thousands of views of key 15M channels, ran by individual 15M activists
(such  as  @fanetin  and  @suysulucha)  and  by  collectives  (such  as  Audiovisol  or
Acampada Internacional Barcelona), or those gathered around web channels such
as TomaLaTele or People Witness. The streams of Periodismo Humano and later in
the camps web streams in the first days of the movement received thousands of
thousands of views (Pérez Rioja & Gil, 2014; Pérez Rioja, 2014).
Syntactically, streaming is primarily a one-to-many media: usually a streamer that
reports and interprets what she or he sees on the streets to an audience. And yet,
the interaction with users on the online chat of the streaming itself (or in combination
with other media, such as Twitter), which provide information, suggest, and discuss
245 In Acampadasol, the commission was created in relation to others such as the Commission for
Networked  Diffusion,  which  took  care  of  social  media  profiles  as  well  as  of  the
madrid.tomalaplaza.net blog. Other crucial groups working on communication were Agora Sol (radio)
and Audiovisol (audiovisuals),  as well  as, later,  Take the TV, which served to create a citizen TV
channel.
246 As a final note, it is worth noticing that Bambuser (as well as Ustream and Livestream) are for profit
companies,  and thereby fall  within the “Facebook” side of  the technopolitical  struggle around the
control of the technological media of political action. That said, debates in this case has been much
smaller than the ones around Facebook or Twitter.
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the events and the broadcasting itself, make for a multitudinous experience. 15M
activists  deployed different  forms of  peercasting,  “narrowcasting  or  broadcasting,
depending  on  the  purpose  and  characteristics  of  the  intended  communication
practice” (Castells 2009: 55).
                         
FIGURE 14. @SUYSULUCHA´S STREAMING OF THE #25S, 
SURROUND CONGRESS DIRECT ACTION. 
Streaming has contributed to articulate real-time, first person (both individual and
collective) narratives of events, sometimes used by mainstream media247.
Furthermore, in many cases, it has also contributed to register and publicize, defend
from,  or  even  prevent  police  abuses.  With  the  proliferation  of  smartphones  and
digital devices such as tablets, and broadband connection, recording and streaming
have contributed to different forms of distributed “sousveillance”, or vigilance from
below (as a symbolic and synthetic example, the following image).
247The image ran in the front page of the Washington Post, which helped to break the relative silence
of the Spanish mainstream media in the first days of the camp, was taken from Periodismo Humano's
stream (Pérez Rioja & Gil, 2014).
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FIGURE 15. BANNER WITH THE SLOGAN “REALITY IS YOUR ONLY WEAPON. 
THERE IS NO POSSIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST IT. RECORD, PICTURE, SPREAD”. 
SOURCE: PEOPLEWITNESS.NET.
What  may  be  defined  as  “multitudinous  sousveillance”  was  a  very  particular
enactment of the possibilities of self-communication, one that frequently combined
with  forms  of  direct  action  and  self-protection.  15M  technopolitics  included  an
attempt  at  democratizing  media  and  constructing  alter-representations  of  the
movement, the kind of technopolitics advocated by Kellner (1999, 2001). They were
inserted within a complex assemblage of practices that I briefly outline now.
4.4.3. Constructing networked assemblages in practice
Beyond  the  assembly,  the  key  alter-democratic  model  (autonomist,  rather  than
deliberative)  that  I  consider  idiosyncratic  of  the  15M  movement  is  that  of  the
networked assemblage. This implied forms of association that not only challenged
representative  politics  but  also  social  movement  forms,  it  generated  forms  of
collective  action  and  discourse  not  driven  by  personal  leaders,  established
organization or delegation but  by flows of communication and performances that
exhibited clearly cybernetic dimensions (Toret et al., 2015; Aguilera, 2015). I try to
describe some of its characteristics now.
As noticed in the introduction and shown elsewhere (Gerbaudo, 2012; Toret et al.,
2015),  the  construction  of  digital  networks  in  social  media  was  crucial  for  the
organization  of  the demonstration  on May 15th.  As noted in  part  2  above,  DRY
networks on the internet and in cities were over-flooded on that day. Then, events at
Sol square on the nights 15th-16th and 16th-17th amplified and were amplified by
those networks in social media (Borge-Holthoefer et al., 2011; Toret et al., 2015).
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This went hand in hand with the replication of camps all over the country from May
17th onwards. Different forms of representation have been used to visualize the type
of multi-layered network that emerged from and structured these dynamics. I present
some of those visualizations to sketch a systemic or panoramic view of the matter.
 
                
They respectively show a multi-layered network (fig. 19), the functional or dynamic
network of retweets (resending of users´ messages by other users) between May
15th and 22nd around key 15M Hashtags (fig. 16), the network of “following” relations
between different 15M fan pages on Facebook (fig. 17) and a crowdsourced map of
15M camps (fig. 18). 
  
 
FIGURE 16. 15M RETWEET NETWORK. SOURCE: PABLO ARAGÓN, 
2012, LICENSE CC-BY-SA WITH DATA BY M. LUZ CONGOSTO
FIGURE 17. 15M FACEBOOK FANPAGE NETWORK. 
SOURCE: ARNAU MONTERDE 2015, LICENSE CC-BY SA 4.0
FIGURE 18. CROWDSOURCED MAP OF 15M CAMPS.
SOURCE: IKIMAP.COM
FIGURE 19. MULTI-LAYERED NETWORK. SOURCE: 
DOMENICO DI MANLIO 2013, CC-BY-SA 4.0.
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In the following sections I describe key, non-representational practices which these
visualizations  somehow  hide.  The  two  more  general  types  of  practices  for  the
creation and maintenance of this assemblage were intra-layer interactions within a
given space (f.i.:  the retweets on Twitter, the mutual likes and crossed posts and
comments on Facebook, or the interactions on the streets and squares) and the
inter-layer interactions between different spaces (streaming from squares shared on
Facebook,  the  hyperlinks  to  webs  spread  on Twitter,  etc.),  which  also  reshaped
those  spaces  or  layers.  Earlier  movement  repertoires,  such  as  demonstrating,
assembling or camping (a practice already present, albeit with a different function, in
the alter-globalization movement), as well as more recent, networked ones (such as
posting on Facebook, tweeting, etc.) frequently operate in only one space or layer: a
given city space or digital media. In the case of digital-only actions, this ends up into
various forms of cyber-activism and clicktivism (as discussed on chapter 2).
           
In the formation of 15M, these mono-layer or intra-layer practices helped to construct
networks in social media that were crucial in the building up for the demonstration.
DRY twitter accounts and Facebook fanpages established structural and dynamic
relations with each other (through “liking”, “following”, resending messages, etc.). But
they  were  also  crucially  enriched  by  multi-layer  and  inter-layer  practices  that
connected or played in several spaces, digital and physical.
4.4.3.1. Tying the digital and the physical: multi-layered and multi-layering practices
and settings
Bennett, Segerberg & Walker (2014) have used the notion of “sticking mechanisms”
for labelling the links between digital spaces that help to tie networked assemblages
(which they call “crowd-enabled networks”). According to the results from our survey,
58.8% of  15M participants  used  social  media  while  being  in  the  camps or  in  a
  
 
FIGURE 20. TWEET BY THE DRY OFFICIAL PROFILE WITH A CALL TO
FOLLOW OTHER ACCOUNTS (ABBREVIATED #FF)
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demonstration. This type of practices may be defined as “multi-layered”248. A minimal
definition of multi-layer practices would group “performances involving (including or
connecting) people, things,  and technologies in  more than one media or  space”.
Streamings  such  as  the  ones  mentioned  in  section  4.2.2.  or  the  narration  of
demonstrations on Twitter are typical examples of these practices.
On top of practices of performing on several layers at the same time (f.i.: streaming
or tweeting from a demonstration), there were performances that explicitly pointed
towards a different layer from the one where they took place, which may be defined
as “multi-layering performances”249. Two key sub-types of multi-layering performance
can be distinguished, first, those that pointed from the net to the streets (which I may
define as “agoratropic”, since they pointed towards the open spaces of the squares
and streets), then, those that pointed from the streets to the digital networks, or from
one digital network to another (which I may define as “digitropic”, since they pointed
toward digital spaces).  
Among the most relevant cases of multi-layering performance in the formation of the
movement were the ones that pointed from digital networks towards the streets. A
paradigmatic example was the “Facebook event” for the demonstration on May 15 th,
setup on March 11th.
             
FIGURE 21. MAY 15TH DRY EVENT ON FACEBOOK.
The event included a list of local demonstrations planned for May 15 th, which grew to
more than 60 cities all over the State, as well as a link to the official DRY website.
248 A minimal definition of multi-layer practices could be “actions involving (including or connecting)
people, things, and technologies in more than one media or space”.
249 Interestingly,  different  from  multi-layered  practices,  these  inter-layer  links  could  not  only  be
articulated by human actors but also by nonhuman ones.
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The list grew as the dynamics on social networks and the local nodes multiplied.
Activity on Twitter also connected to other platforms such as webs, Facebook, or
blogs via links. These, in turn, aimed to connect and redirect people to the streets.
                         
FIGURE 22. TWEET BY THE DRY OFFICIAL PROFILE (WITH LINK TO OFFICIAL WEB).
TEXT: "REAL DEMOCRACY NOW! ON #MAY15 EVERYONE TO THE STREETS!
WE ARE NOT COMMODITIES IN THE HANDS OF POLITICIANS AND BANKERS"
                          
         FIGURE 23. TWEET BY THE DRY OFFICIAL PROFILE (WITH LINK TO YOUTUBE CHANNEL). 
TEXT: "WE HAVE BEEN THE CHANNEL WITH MOST FOLLOWERS IN SPAIN
 IN THE LAST MONTH!  LET´S GO FORWARD!! #MAY 15TH”
After this activity hit the streets, the flow also turned back. Internet language codes
were deployed in the square: cyber-symbols, “dislike buttons”, hashtags or internet
addresses  were  introduced  in  banners  and  redirected  by-passers  to  online
conversations  (Martínez  Roldán,  2012).  Twitter  narrations  of  happenings  on  the
streets were part of the common practices too (Toret et al., 2015). While commercial
social  media  potentiated  the  dynamics  of  diffusion  of  events  on  the  ground,
alternative social networks such as n-1 contributed to long term organization and
collaboration, and allowed uploading assembly notes and other materials (as noted
by  Zulo,  2011  and  systematically  analyzed  by  Gil,  2012).  Action  on  the  ground
pointed towards digital spaces; digital activity pointed towards the streets.
But these inter-layer links and flows were far from being a smooth online-offline loop,
as  various  works  (Gerbaudo,  2012;  Martínez  Roldán,  2012;  Toret  et  al.,  2015;
15M.cc) have shown (and I could corroborate in my personal experience). There was
concomitance (as when the setting up of the Sol camp ran hand in hand with the
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setting up of Twitter accounts such as Acampadasol), gaps (as when estimates on a
Facebook event did not match reality), exchange of properties (as when assemblies
and assembly techniques were brought online), feedback loops (as when a hashtag
invited people to the streets, and, once there, people used those hashtags again),
the  already  mentioned  multilayered  and  multi-layering  practices  (with  online
information serving activists on the ground or sending them there), circulation (as
when information  on the  ground was passed on via  social  networks),  autonomy
(many process in the camp, such as planting flowers, were rather independent of
dynamics on social media), several of these and more.
4.4.3.2.  A  network  of  connected  squares  and  technopolitical  modules  for  self-
organization
Even if differently enacted, many of the practices found in Sol were present in other
camps too.  Sol  was the first  node in  the constitution of  a network of  connected
squares (connected to the Internet and connected among themselves, through the
Internet). It contributed to such a network in a semiotic-material way (to put it with
Haraway,  1997),  as  an  initial  symbol  of  technopolitical  contention  and  center  of
technopolitical construction.
As an example of technopolitical construction, on the very first night of the camp,
from May 15th to the 16th, activists with a long hacktivist trajectory such as Daniel
Vázquez and Marta Franco bought the “take the square” domain and set themselves
to the task to create online spaces where other camps across the Spanish state and
beyond  could  share  information  and  coordinate  (Franco,  2011).  The  Extension
Commission at the Sol camp was devoted advance this task.
Technopolitical contention skyrocketed on the second night, from May 16th to 17th
(Sánchez, 2011a), around 5AM, May 17th, State police evicted the incipient camp,
where there were around 300 people sleeping, with a display of violence.
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FIGURE 24. YOUTUBE VIDEO OF THE FIRST EVICTION OF ACAMPADASOL.
The videos recording the violent eviction were first circulated by the profiles of those
present at the site, including alternative media such as Human Journalism (Sánchez,
2011a), then recirculated by networks created around DRY and related initiatives in
the previous months, jumping from there into still  other communities and circuits,
especially on Facebook and Twitter (Europa Press, 2011)250. A situated conflict in and
around a space, between opposed practices and matters of concern (which may be
synthesized as “policing” vs “politicizing”251), suffered a sudden shift in the length of
networks, it  mobilized and enrolled more and more actors.  This is what in usual
terms could be framed as a shift in scale, from a concrete physical node located in
Sol to a whole network with dozens of thousands of them. The event of the eviction
was “augmented” in a process of networking, commenting, sharing, discussing, by
thousands  of  people,  which  crossed  circuits  through  different  media,  Youtube,
Facebook, Twitter, alternative journals, community news platforms, and some TVs or
radios (as analyzed in Toret et al., 2015).
250  As of October 2016, the most diffused video counts almost 230000 views and was shared 663
times.  The  data  can  be  checked  in  the  statistics  of  the  video  https://www.youtube.comwatch?
v=_5Vm48Eeb_Y (accessed on January 20th, 2015) which also confirm how both the views and the
sharing took place in the first hours after the eviction.
251 State practices of policing a space defined for consumption (passing through, visiting, picturing,
buying  and  selling,  etc.),  and  the  counter-practices  of  a  bunch  of  demonstrators  aiming  at  the
temporal autonomization of Sol (for assembling, unauthorized demonstration, camping, etc.).
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   FIGURE 25. INCREASE IN SIZE OF THE 15M NETWORK ON TWITTER (FROM 0 TO 1) FROM 
12 DAYS BEFORE MAY 15TH TILL 12 DAYS LATER. SOURCE: GONZÁLEZ-BAILÓN ET AL., 2011.
 
                    
               
Earlier works (González-Bailón et al., 2011) indicate up to a six-fold increase in the
size of 15M networks on Twitter between May 15th and 22nd. Surely, the growing
coverage  of  mainstream  media  from  the  18th  and  19th  onwards  (when  15M
  
 
FIGURE 26. SPACE IN NEWSPAPER COVERS DEVOTED TO 15M BETWEEN MAY 15TH AND MAY
21ST. SOURCE: PABLO REY MAZÓN, 2011.
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appeared in the cover of international journals such as Washington post and Spanish
media begun to pay a much closer attention) played a relevant role there. But it was
a consequence rather than the driver of the exponential growth of online and offline
activity around the emerging networked assemblage, which it surely fed into. As an
example of that autonomist priority of the connection between networks and streets
can see that by comparing data from Twitter activity (González-Bailón et al., 2011)
with a study on the covers of the main Spanish newspapers (Rey, 2011). Networked
camps proliferated all over the country from May 17th onwards.
FIGURE 27. CROWDSOURCED MAP OF 15M CAMPS. SOURCE: IKIMAP.COM
Social  media  were  a  condition  of  possibility  of  this  sudden  proliferation  and
construction  of  a  network  of  connected  camps.  However,  differently  from  initial
readings that defined this as a quasi-organic “technologically structured contagion”
(Toret et al., 2015), I believe it is more interesting to speak of this process as one of
multitudinous re-production based on multi-layered construction and contention252. It
is this process and its results that justifies the definition of May 15th as a “networked
movement of the squares”.
Such a net-work was based on the frequent recourse to technopolitical modules for
self-organization. As noted by 15M activists Pablo Soto (2011) “it’s not just Google,
it’s  not  just  Twitter,  it’s  not  only the smartphones,  nor SMS, nor  Whatsapps,  nor
252 There are two key points to notice, the first is  that its character is obviously sociotechnical  or
technopolitical, and it is not a mere contagion: it is not an automatic process but rather an always
contingent process of contention, differently shaped on different sites (from those where camp was
crucial to those where it was not allowed). More interestingly, there was layered and multi-layered (as
well as multi-layering) contention: conflict between 15M activists and on the ground as well as on
social media. This is, in fact, a way to understand the dynamic around the eviction in Puerta del Sol.
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Google maps, nor n-1, it’s all  that, together”.  Key elements of this technopolitical
modules had solidified during the creation of the DRY network, since most nodes
had  a  Facebook  fanpage  and  group,  and  a  Twitter  profile  (Toret  et  al.,  2015).
Modules sometimes incorporated n-1 groups,  etherpad(s),  mailing lists,  or  blogs.
They usually went along with pragmatic rules or netiquettes. These were synthesized
on sites such as acampadasol.net (f.i.: its text on how to run an assembly, Comisión
Dinamización,  2011)  or  take the  square  (f.i.:  its  site  on  “how to  camp” 253)  which
included more elements in time, but, in my experience, were also shared by other
means such as activists circulating in camps or in online videos.
FIGURE 28. WEBSITE HOW TO OCCUPY.
The organization of 15M did not  rely on any assembly nor deliberative decision-
making process,  but  rather  on  heterogeneous forms of  multi-layered networking.
Deliberation and assembling, or even camping, was just one more practice among
many others. Our survey shows the preeminence of demonstrations (79.5%) as the
most frequent form of participation in the movement, closely followed by participation
in assemblies (65.6%) and digitally mediated practices such as signing an online
petition (63.3%), using social media (61.5%), and, as noticed, more crucially, using
social media while attending face to face activities (58.8%). These practices, many of
them technopolitical  in  character,  served to  outline  an anarchist,  autonomist  and
networked model of alter-democracy: the networked assemblage.
253  The site is accessible at www.howtocamp.takethesquare.net/. Accessed on December 3rd, 2015.
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4.4.3.3. Networks after camps: movement latency and a shifting cycle
15M digital networks were central to the success of the May 15th demonstration.
They were so after the camps were lifted up and the assemblies stopped, as well.
Concerns  have  been  raised  that  different  aspects  of  15M  technopolitics  at  the
syntactic level of infrastructure (f.i.: Facebook potentiation of real-time, continuous
renewal of content and facilitation of diffusion instead of organization), discourse (f.i.:
discourses related to concrete days, such as May 15 th, which connected to historical
claims),  and practice (f.i.:  calls trying to potentiate affects and enthusiasm, which
tend to fade away quickly) may promote evanescence (Kreiss & Tufekci, 2013) and
risk contributing to “rapid cycles of enthusiasm and disillusionment that might in turn
just end up reinforcing the present state of political cynicism” (Gerbaudo, 2016: 270).
And yet,  as shown in the following sections, as well as in chapters 5 and 6, the
networks generated around 15M, and many of the concrete people behind them,
found ways to not just to ““routinize” digital enthusiasm and turn it into a basis for
more durable organizational  structures and more lasting forms of “belonging and
commitment” (ibid.), but make those structures to mutate and change.
FIGURE 29. ACTIVITY OF KEY 15M ACCOUNTS ON TWITTER, IN RELATION TO PEAKS
OF CONTENTION (01/2011-05/2014). SOURCE: ARNAU MONTERDE, 2015, LICENSE CC-BY-SA 4.0
 
Networks  online  remained  active  and  were  at  the  center  of  periodic  outburst  of
activist  action.  15M’s  crystallized networks,  especially  the  digital  ones,  remained
active. They even displayed possibilities that challenge traditional tenets of social
movement theory, as I show in part 6.
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4.5. Syntax/Infrastructures
Before  mapping  those  challenges,  in  order  to  explore  an  aspect  of  15M’s
technopolitics,  its  syntax,  I  want  to  make  some  comments  on  the  digital
infrastructures  underlying  such  networks.  The  variety  of  digital  technologies
deployed  in  15M  was  remarkable.  According  to  our  survey,  both  commercial
services,  such  as  Facebook  (78,8%  of  participants  in  15M),  Twitter  (72%),  or
Youtube (46,9%), as well as alternative ones, such as n-1 (25%), etherpads (22,9%),
or Mumble (16,9%), were frequently used. Here I focus on two social networks that
were  crucial  for  the  15M movement,  which  embody  two  different  technopolitical
paradigms: Facebook and n-1. They differ both in their politics of infrastructure as
well as in their affordances as infrastructures for politics; since the latter aspect has
been analyzed in detail in other works (Gil, 2012) I focus on the first token.
4.5.1. Politics of technology: corporate vs autonomous
4.5.1.1. Corporate technopolitics: social networks for profit
                                
   FIGURE 30. FACEBOOK LOGO.
Facebook  is  today  a  company  that  owns  various  digital  applications  beyond  its
original, digital platform Facebook. As in any other capitalist enterprise, a (if not “the”)
key  reason behind  multiple  design  features  and affordances  of  Facebook  is  the
mediate or immediate increase of the company’s profit. Changes in the functioning
and architecture  of  the  site  are  decided in  the  typical  top-down,  non-democratic
manner. As an example of relevance from an activist viewpoint, in the last few years
Facebook has limited the reach of fanpage and group posts, allegedly, because of
the increase in content creation and the resulting need of selection. The result is that
the percentage of followers or the general Facebook community that any concrete
publication reaches is heavily affected by how much the sender pays (Boland, 2015).
This state of things severely limits the possibilities offered by the platform to activists
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such as 15M’s back in 2011. Furthermore, Facebook has enforced criticized policies
concerning activist page and post elimination (Malik, 2011; Heins, 2013). On top of
that, revelations concerning the collaboration of Facebook with the US government
in cases of surveillance have been brought to the fore in the last years (Greenwald &
MacAskill,  2013).  Finally,  Facebook  itself  operates  as  a  huge  field  of  social
experimentation, without the knowledge or explicit consent of its users (Gibbs, 2014).
All  of  these  issues  are  aspects  of  Facebook  syntax,  of  its  particular  politics  of
infrastructure, and characterize a corporate model that is far from the stated goals of
movements such as 15M.
4.5.1.2. Autonomous technopolitics: social networks of and for the people
N-1 was designed under an opposite model. This self-labelled “free social network”,
inspired by Deleuze's and Guattari's taking on n-1254, aimed to provide movements
with  an  autonomous  infrastructure  for  collective  action.  As  the  leitmotiv,  quoting
Audre Lorde, in its entry page, suggested: “For master's tools will never dismantle
the master's house… Social networks of the people for the people!”. For many 15M
hacktivists,  potentiating  technological  autonomy  was  part  of  the  creation  of
democracy (Randal, 2011; Fernández-Delgado et al., 2012), thereby, following the
classic Lincolnian saying about democracy as the government of the people, for the
people and by the people, the entry page of n-1 featured the slogan: “social networks
of the people for the people!”.
                                               
  FIGURE 31. N-1 LOGO.
254Passages such as: “The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but
rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has
available— always n-1 (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). Subtract the
unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at n - 1 dimensions” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:
6). The name was suggested by activist Javier Toret, one of its initial conceivers and promoters
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N-1  was  a  member-funded  platform  aiming  to  guarantee  privacy,  security,  and
adaptation  to  activist  needs,  oriented  by  values  such  as  horizontality  and  self-
management.  Furthermore,  unlike Facebook proprietary and closed software, n-1
was free software, as suggested by its logo, which includes the Creative Commons
syntax mark (cc). This clearly differentiated it from the non-democratic, free but for-
profit model of Facebook, free like in “free beer”, and not like in “freedom”, to use
Richard Stallman’s  formula.  This  model  combined the antagonist  and autonomist
views of democracy (see chapter 2) in practice, as a politics of infrastructure. N-1
was a  platform generated by  the  multitude  (or  some within  it)  for  supporting  its
processes of contention. Problems with issues such as resources for development or
management (f.i.: control of servers or definition of priorities), though, plagued the
history of n-1, which went down on 2016255. At the time, though, n-1 had passed to be
associated to 15M as its key alternative platform.
4.5.1.3. Two technopolitical paradigms of social networks: Facebook and n-1
It  is  thereby  possible  to  isolate  two  paradigms  of  syntax  operating  within  15M
technopolitics,  a  corporate  one  embodied  by  Facebook  and  an  autonomous  or
grassroots  one  embodied  by  n-1.  Combining  my  brief  review  of  the  politics  of
infrastructure of Facebook and n-1 with with Gil (2012)’s analysis of their different
infrastructural affordances for politics, I believe the Facebook model can defined as a
corporate and connective paradigm, characterised by its non-democratic character,
its  for-profit  purpose,  its  resourcefulness,  its  individual-centric  and its  information
diffusion orientation. On the other hand, n-1 embodies an autonomous and collective
paradigm, defined by its autonomist democratic character,  its activist  purpose, its
frequent lack of resources, its collective-centric and organizative orientation.
4.6. Alternatives
After  analyzing  key  discourses,  practices,  and  infrastructures,  otherwise,  the
semantics, pragmatics and syntax of 15M’s technopolitics, this section is devoted to
point  out  some of  the  challenges that  they posed to  both social  movement  and
political ontology forms. I take social movements first.
4.6.1. Challenges to the social movement form: multitudinous identities and
beyond
In the theoretical framework, I suggested two different paradigms could be found in
255 These are issues I cannot address here, though.
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the  social  movement  literature,  a  strategic  paradigm,  focused  on  resource
mobilization,  and  a  new  social  movement  paradigm,  centered  on  the  notion  of
collective  identity  (Cohen,  1985).  The  former  assumed  that  collective  action  is
possible  thanks  to  strong  organizations,  the  latter,  thanks  to  strong  collective
identities. From the viewpoint of my narrative on representation, both organizations
and  identities  connect,  albeit  in  different  ways,  with  delegation  and
(self)representation. I already noticed that a growing literature suggests ICTs may be
reducing costs of organization, to the point of making possible to organize without
organizations (Earl & Kimport, 2011). In a paper I co-authored, we showed how 15M
challenged  the  traditional  sense  of  collective  identity  by  both  opening  a  digital,
systemic  dimension  (which  brackets  semantic  identification  and,  thereby,  self-
representation)  and  challenging  the  idea  of  a  unified  movement  identity  (and,
thereby,  unified representation).  At  the same time,  it  revealed the existence of a
multi-polar,  temporally  shifting  leadership  without  strong  organizations.  Both  the
collective identity and the resource mobilization paradigms were thereby challenged.
For showing this, in the paper we deployed, first, a structural, and then, a dynamic
characterization  of  the  15M  connective  identity  on  Facebook.  The  structural
characterization served us to separate the 15M identity from its environment and to
outline some of its properties, such as its high level of robustness and integration;
the dynamic analysis served us to explore its performance in time.
For  the structural  (or  “static”)  analysis  we mapped the 15M fanpage network on
Facebook, extracting a network of the fanpages being followed by the 100 biggest
15M fanpages, as well as the one of those who were followed by former (what is
called an affinity “depth-2 network”). The result of the structural analysis showed a
differentiable, robust and integrated 15M network of networks (with unions CCOO
and UGT networks operating as both environment and comparison)256.
256 More details on methodology in Appendix I.
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FIGURE 32. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE 15M COLLECTIVE IDENTITY. VISUALIZATION OF THE 15M NETWORK
(GREEN), THE OCCUPY NETWORK (YELLOW) AND THE SPANISH UNIONS NETWORK (RED). SOURCE: XABIER E.
BARANDIARAN, ARNAU MONTERDE & ANTONIO CALLEJA-LÓPEZ 2015, LICENSE CC-BY-SA 4.0
Then, following the dynamic core hypothesis (Edelman and Tononi 2000; Tononi and
Edelman 1998), we suggested 15M’s identity emerges in time from the temporary
synchronization of the activity of nodes and sub-networks within the 15M network.
Analyzing  the  pattern  of  activity  synchronization  on  a  selected  sub-sample  of
Facebook fanpages we found that the nodes driving the dynamic varied in time,
which  justified  the  idea  that  15M  exhibited  patterns  of  temporally  distributed
leadership (Toret et al., 2015). This happened in a way similar to how consciousness
may emerge in the brain.
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FIGURE 33. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 15M COLLECTIVE IDENTITY. IMAGES SHOW LEVELS OF ACTIVITY (NODE 
SIZE) AND THE DIRECTION OF SYNCHROINZATION (DIRECTED LINKS) AMONG DIFFERENT FACEBOOK FANPAGES
IN DIFFERENT 15M EVENTS (15/05/2011-24/01/2013). SOURCE: MIGUEL AGUILERA, 2014, LICENSE CC-BY-SA 4.0.
Going beyond the interpretation in the paper, I believe these results show that 15M
generated: a) a form of what I would call “identity without identification” (at least, not
necessary identification), avoiding the closure around a single, self-representational
discourse,  and  b)  a  form  of  organizing  without  strong  organizations,  avoiding
centralized, representative structures and leadership by an organization or person.
The result is what, in the paper, we define as a multitudinous identity, an identity
emerging from both the structural and the dynamic interactions between thousands
of  autonomous  nodes.  This  is  a  clear  innovation  with  regard  to  previous  social
movement forms, an innovation that may be shared by emerging forms of connective
action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). The double undermining of strong organization
by the lowering costs of organization and of strong identities by the emergence of
forms  of  identity  based  on  digital  communication  affects  the  centrality  of
representation  in  social  movements  in  two  ways:  the  circumventing  of  strong
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organizations primarily relativizes the centrality of the authorization and substantive
senses of representation (as defined by Pitkin); the circumventing of strong collective
identities relativizes the centrality of the symbolic sense of representation. And yet,
despite the undermining, as I have shown throughout this chapter, massive collective
action took place, during the camp period and beyond. In 15M, networks were the
very structure of the multitude, of the emerging subject of an autonomist politics.
4.6.1.1. Recapitulating innovations
The main challenges to traditional social movement forms came not only at the level
of  multitudinous  identities.  They  can  be  grouped  in  four  interrelated  categories:
technopolitical communication, practices, organization, and identity.
In section 4.2.2. I noticed the experimentation with multitudinous self-communication
(social  media,  streaming)  in  15M,  a  feature  present,  but  surely  not  with  the
pervasiveness  of  15M,  in  earlier  movements  such  as  the  alter-globalization
(Gerbaudo, 2016).
Section  4.3.  was  devoted  to  describe  multi-layered  and  multi-layering  practices,
performances, and settings, which appear as an addition to repertoires of contention.
More interestingly, the addition of forms of participation implied a democratization of
sorts, since it multiplied and eased the ways in which people could enroll themselves
into social movements257.
In terms of organization tied to those practices, I have also described the emergence
of networked assemblages which, albeit a feature common to other movements in
the wave of  networked movements of the squares,  seems to have taken a new
dimension with 15M (and then, Occupy), as technological penetration in countries
such as Tunisia or Egypt was smaller. Temporally distributed leadership appears to
be a related innovation in dynamic organizational forms, coming with 15M. This fed
back with the rejection of the figure of the strong, representative organizations and
leaders (as mentioned above, reluctant ones continued to exist), although this has
been a gesture recurrent since the 60s. Finally, in 6.1 I’ve analyzed the shape of
15M connective,  multitudinous  identities.  Most  of  these  challenges  to  the  social
movement were non- or anti-representational, were autonomist in character, and had
technopolitics at their core.
257 Leaving out the evaluative question of whether these are click-only forms of participation or clicks
are just a complement or entryway into stronger forms of collective action, the main issue is that those
new venues were opened and widely explored.
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4.6.2. Ontology
What has been outlined throughout this chapter points towards an alternative form of
enrolling  in  political  life,  that  challenged  basic  practices  and  tenets  of  liberal
representative ontology. First, anti-representationalism. For thousands of people, the
activities on the election week before May 22nd, and the weeks that followed, did not
consist of the usual attention and discussion of pre-packaged political programs and
speeches, but of assembly discussions, demonstrations, activity in and out of social
media.  When  these  activities  looked  at  the  political  system,  it  was  to  launch
discursive and practical challenges to representative politics (section 4.1.). As shown
here also targeted mainstream media (section 4.2.). Furthermore, these challenges
were turned inwards and also challenged representation within social movements.
15M articulated a temporary autonomous ecosystem of anti-representationalism that
circumvented the liberal representative political ontology.
Simultaneously, 15M actors essayed alter-democratic practices (the assembly, direct
action,  networked  communication).  15M ignited  both  contention  and construction
around democracy. At the level of the discourse, the political figures of the “person”
and the “anybody”258 moved outside of the political ontology of “nations”, “the working
class” or even “The People”. The figures of the indignant or the common citizen,
different  from the  private  individual  of  the  liberal  representative  model,  gathered
some aspects of the critical condition being forged.
Nevertheless, even deeper innovations took place in practice. Assemblies rejected
the liberal-representative tradition that makes of zero-sum competition among fixed
individuals, interests and ideas the beginning and the end of all  political process.
Instead, they relied on rational  construction and dialogical transformation. On the
other hand, I noticed the emergence of networked assemblages and multitudinous
identities. These derived from technopolitical practices and networked interactions
rather than from representation or self-representation. The ontology was a hybrid of
the antagonist model, with common citizens demanding and challenging elites, and
of  the  autonomist  model  of  singularities  connecting  in  multitudes  that  generated
alternative forms of being together.
As  noticed  earlier,  two  different  alter-democratic  models  could  be  traced  in  the
around  the  camps:  the  deliberative  democratic  model  of  the  assembly  and  the
258 This notion is also connected with that  of transversality,  with that which allows many to come
together either in being or practice.
  
 
214
 
autonomist  of  the  networked  assemblage.  Both  were  tainted  by  the  antagonist
model.
TABLE 14. 15M: POLITICAL ONTOLOGY.
Model Political
ontology
Subject form Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Assembly Deliberative
Antagonist
Person
Indignant
Common
citizen
Popular assemblies
Citizenry
Dialogue, active
listening,
contentious
demanding
Networked
Assemblage
Autonomist
Antagonist
Singularities
Anyone
Multitudinous
identities
Networked
multitude
Networked,
technopolitical
communication &
collaboration
4.7. Conclusion
In  this  conclusion,  I  briefly  recapitulate  earlier  parts.  In  part  2  began  by  briefly
recounting  some  aspects  of  the  emergence  of  15M  and  my  entryway  into  it,
emphasizing the role of DRY and briefly commenting some details of the overflow
that  turned  a  networked  demonstration  into  an  augmented  event  and  then  a
movement. In part 3 I analyzed key discourses that preceded and defined 15M. I
showed how pre-15M and 15M actors outlined a critique of political representation
and its “subjects”, while proposing alternatives to both of them (as seen in sections
3.1 and 3.2). This critique included an attack to mass media representation and an
appeal to create alternative media (3.1.4). Furthermore, 15M discourses outlined an
alternative model, of anarchist inspiration, which combined deliberative, autonomist,
and populist democratic elements: the assembly (3.3). This discursive model was
practical, it was the one the movement aspired to embody, but also appeared as a
prefiguration of the real democracy to come. 15M actors' taking on representation,
democracy and technopolitics in practice was, in fact, much richer than its discourse.
Beyond  the  assembly,  practice  clearly  outlined  an  alternative  metaphor:  the
networked assemblage.
15M  embodied  anti-representationalism  and  alter-democracy  in  direct  actions,
camps and assemblies, which contested the legitimacy of the elections ongoing at
the time (4.1.). Furthermore, they internally challenged the primacy of representation
as  a  mechanism  for  collective  organization  and  decision  making  in  social
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movements.  The assembly,  though,  also displayed its own limits  (4.1.2.).  On the
plane of media, 15M actors both challenged media establishment and created their
own media, aiming at an autonomous alter-representation (4.1.3.). Perhaps the most
relevant  innovations  came  not  around  assemblies  but  around  the  networked
assemblages emerging with the movement (4.3.), which had multi-layered and multi-
layering  practices  (4.3.2)  at  their  core.  Interestingly,  even  after  the  camps were
dismantled and the assemblies stopped, multitudinous identities in digital networks
(4.3.3.) remained operative and enabling further collective action. Both multilayered
practices and multitudinous identities challenged previous social movement forms.
15M actors also challenged and proposed alternatives to some key elements of the
modern,  liberal  representative  ontology.  The  movement  articulated  critiques  and
alternatives  to  representation,  with  more  or  less  success,  both  in  discourse and
practice, outwards, towards the political system and media, and inwards, in its own
composition.
The camps were lifted in June 2011. But the movement maintained its public support
and  its  activity  thanks  to  the  numerous  networks  that  remained  active.  They
displayed  periodic  outburst  of  multi-layered  collective  action,  such  as  the  global
demonstration on October 15, 2011, the Valencian Spring and the 15M anniversary
in early 2012, or the action of Surrounding Congress on September 25th, 2012. The
limits of the assembly were found already in its first weeks of life. On the other hand,
the limits of the autonomous networked assemblage, tied to the self-limiting field of
civil  society  (Cohen  &  Arato,  1994),  were  to  be  diagnosed  much  later.  Such  a
discursive diagnosis was at the origin of a qualitative new stage of the 15M cycle, the
stage of the electoral assault, which explored in the next chapter. The contention
with  established actors  and social  forms did  not  stop,  quite  on  the  contrary,  the
challenges rose as 15M activists set up to themselves to “make a 15M” in institutions
that  were  created  to  prevent  such  alter-democratic  experiments  (as  noted  by
Graeber, 2013), such as the fields of representative politics and State institutions. In
those later stages, as in the case of 15M, it will be clear the centrality of innovative,
technopolitical  practices  of  and  for  alter-democracy.  Otherwise,  how  15M
experimented with alternative forms of (techno)political democracy.
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Chapter 5. The X Party: doing a 15M in the 
electoral space.
5.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes key aspects of the semantics, syntax, and pragmatics of the X
Party,  as  well  as  its  challenges  to  the  party  form and  the  liberal  representative
ontology.  The  X  Party  was  a  political  party  launched  on  January  2013.  Part  2
analyzes political conditions, within the 15M cycle, that made possible the launch of
such a party. The rise in protest from 15M onwards reached a peak of opposition to
the established representative system on the direct action “Surround Congress”, on
September  25,  2012.  On  early  2013,  the  X  Party  opened  a  (re)turn  towards
representation: it opened the “electoral assault”.
Part  3 attends to the key elements of its  discourse,  analyzing some of  its texts.
Section  3.1.  analyzes  its  political  program,  entitled  “democracy,  period”,  which
outlines some basic aspects of a new, alter-representational and alter-democratic
form of government. Section 3.2. attends to its self-reflective discourses around its
own organization and rules as a networked party.
Part 4 moves to scrutinize some of the key technopolitical  practices of the party,
particularly, attending to how it applied its “method” in its own internal processes.
Tensions emerged between the rules of the political field and some of its practices,
as well as between the latter and some of its own discourses. Section 4.1. attends to
the  media  attacks  for  combining  a  strong  discourse  on  transparency  with  anti-
representational  practices of visibility  and anonymity.  Section 4.2. moves into the
ways in which it applied its ideas on legislation crowdsourcing to the drafting of its
own political program. Afterwards, in section 4.3., I attend to the tension between its
internal meritocracy and its defense of democracy. Finally, section 4.4. looks at its
innovations in campaign crowdsourcing.
Part 5 looks at the X Party’s political syntax, concretely, to its organizational model.
Part  6  explores  how X Party  discourses,  practices  and  organizational  structures
challenged both the party form and some aspects of the modern political ontology.
Part  7  recollects  previous  parts  and  situates  them in  relation  to  the  15M cycle.
Looking backwards,  the  practices  of  the X Party  both  maintained and discarded
many of the ones essayed by the 15M movement; looking forward, some of its ideas
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(partly inherited from 15M) were implemented thanks to Decidim.barcelona (chapter
6).
5.2. The case and the cycle
5.2.1. 15M’s mutations: from movement to cycle
The two years following 15M saw a spectacular surge of social protest. 2012 was the
year  with  the greatest  number  of  demonstrations  on record in  Spain,  more than
40.000 (Martínez i Coma, 2014). With economic and employment data in a free fall,
an increasing debt, EU sponsored austerity policies under way, and the rising 15M
critique, the Socialist Party suffered a huge drop in votes in the State elections of
November of that year. The right wing Popular Party capitalized the fall  and, with
barely half a million votes more than three years earlier, got an absolute majority in
Parliament. The application of austerity policies, initiated by the Socialist government
of  Rodríguez Zapatero,  was radicalized by  the  Popular  Party  after  they got  into
government; so did social protest.
After the dismantling of the camps in June and July of 2011, 15M networks remained
active. An international demonstration on October 15th, promoted along with Occupy
Wall  Street activists,  gave the movement a global edge, and drew people to the
streets of Spain in the hundreds of thousands (Gabbatt, Townsend, O’Carroll 2011).
15M digital networks were active on a continuous basis, and operated as enabling
platforms for a number of initiatives (Monterde, 2015). 2012 and 2013 witnessed not
only an increase, but also a diversification of protests and protest repertoires, with
activist initiatives and protest movements emerging in different social sectors. Slowly,
from being a networked movement, 15M became the basis of a cycle, something
both more diffuse and richer. The following sections explore initiatives that turned
15M from movement into a cycle of contention.
5.2.2. 15MpaRato
On the first anniversary of the movement, celebrated from May 12th to May 15th
2012, numerous events were set up in various cities of Spain, with special intensity
in  some,  such  as  Madrid  and  Barcelona.  While  camps,  assemblies  and
demonstrations in the 15M style took place in cities such as Barcelona, new types of
initiatives popped up, as well. A key one was the 15MpaRato initiative. 15MpaRato 259
259 The direct translation of the expression is “15M for Rato”. Playing with the meaning of the word
“rato” (“a period of time”, “a while”), the initiative suggested it would give Rodrigo Rato a 15M, but also
that there would be 15M for a while. An expression of self-confidence for the first anniversary of the
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was a 15M citizen campaign launched on social media and the Internet to bring to
court  Rodrigo  Rato,  Ex-IMF director,  ex-minister  of  the  economy (symbol  of  the
economic model that generated the housing bubble described in chapter 3), and ex-
CEO of Bankia260. The lawsuit accused him of being connected to the falsification of
Bankia accounts and the fraudulent sale of shares in the stock market debut of the
bank in July 2011, which went bankrupt and was nationalized in 2012.
15Mparato  begun  with  a  call  out  on  Twitter  to  make  donations  through  the
crowdfunding platform Goteo261, in order to cover the lawyer costs of the trial. The
hashtag #15MpaRato was trending topic for hours on Twitter the day the campaign
was launched (it was trending topic 11 times and 55 hours in the following weeks,
Toret et al.,  2015), and the initiative exceeded the required funds in less than 24
hours. On its website and email, the initiative also gathered questions from people to
pose to Rato in court, as well as leaks and testimonies that may help to further the
cause against him. The lawsuit, which ramified in time, ended up getting Rodrigo
Rato and dozens of Bankia directives (including the CEO preceding Rato) on a trial
that  is  ongoing  as  of  late  2016. This  initiative  implied  a  mutation  of  the  15M
contention  repertoire,  which  completely  obliterated  the  camp  form  and  mass
demonstrations, but still  displayed a creative and an even more intensive use of
digital networks and social media. It was a clear example of the docracy, hacktivist
culture that characterized hacktivist and cyberactivist struggles preceding 15M and
that later defined the X Party, many of whose members were behind the 15MpaRato
initiative.
5.2.3. 25S: Surrounding Congress
Only three months after the launch of 15MpaRato, the platform En pie! launched a
call aimed to radicalize the protests, a call to “Occupy the Congress”. With a name
that clearly reflected the impact of the Occupy movement in the 15M discourse and
imaginary,  in  their  Facebook  fanpage262,  the  organizers  defined  themselves  as
“people  reunited  in  a  social,  anti-neoliberal,  anti-capitalist,  and  democratic
movement”, which included a “15M current” along with “Marxist”, “anti-patriarchal”,
“anarchist”,  and  “ecologist”  ones.  The  action  was  oriented  to  “demonstrate
movement.
260 More  information  is  available  at  www.auditoriaciudadana.net/en/2012/09/22/15mparato-second-
season-begins/. Accessed on November 17th, 2016.
261  The platform can be found at https://en.goteo.org/. Accessed December 18th, 2016.
262 The  fanpage  can  be  found  at  https://www.facebook.compg/OcupaElCongreso/about/?
ref=page_internal. Accessed December 13th, 2016.
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indefinitely  surrounding  the  Congress  until  achieving  the  resignation  of  the
Government and the opening of a Constituent Process”.
The initial call was “reinvented” as new 15M activists joined the initiative, forming the
Coordinadora 25S (25S Coordinator) and turned it into an “inclusive and horizontal”
action to surround Congress, with an explicitly pacific outlook263.  If during the 15M
period collective action in Madrid concentrated around Puerta del Sol and essayed
alter-democratic forms of being together,  frequently pressed by police forces and
opposed media, in this case the center of contention was displaced a few hundred
meters down the “Carrera de San Jerónimo”: the 15M multitude came to surround
the State Congress.
This clearly displaced the center of the cycle from the 15M logics of autonomy and
alter-democratic  experimentation  into  a  frontal  confrontation  with  the  symbol  of
representation,  otherwise,  into  a  logic  of  anti-representational  opposition  to
Congress. 25S may well  count as the peak of anti-representationalism within the
15M  cycle.  As  austerity  policies  were  accelerated  and  protests  more  strongly
repressed in 2012, the centrality of the political problem had become even clearer.
The idea that “they call it democracy but it is not”, that politicians “do not represent
us” but rather spurious economic interests, got at the center of the conflict. Political
representation was publicly  reduced to  its  bare  “authorization”  meaning after  the
Socialist Party introduced the first amendment to the 1978 Constitution in August
2011 in a summary process, without referendum, to ensure that payment of public
debt would be prioritized to any other budget concern (Cruz & Remírez, 2011); later
that year, the Popular Party used its absolute parliamentary majority to run policies
that contradicted their main electoral claims, policies that, through alternative forms
of representation (mainly polls) and contention (political  protest) were rejected by
much of the population (Ferrándiz, 2012). The 25S action was the embodiment of
such rejection.
The  demonstrations  on  September  25th  and  the  following  days,  especially,
September 29th, generated a politics of the visible (mass media images such as the
one above): the State framed in its essence as police, on one side; on the other side,
an  assembled  multitude  that  objects  to  such  a  legitimacy,  and  that  calls  for  a
263  The differences between the initial call and the one by the Coordinadora 25S can be found at
https://coordinadora25s.wordpress.compreguntas-sobre-el-25s/.  The  manifest  of  the  Coordinadora
25S  can  be  found  at  www.takethesquare.net/2012/09/25/democracy-is-kept-hostage-on-25s-were-
going-to-rescue-it-coordinadora25s/. Both links were accessed on December 13th, 2016.
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constituent process to recover sovereignty and remake institutions from the ground
up,  as  suggested  in  the  25S manifesto.  This  performative  politics  of  the  visible
displayed  the  space  of  representation  as  a  policed  void  confronted  with  the
presentation of the 15M multitude, gathering at the gates. Unsurprisingly, the cycle
ran into a moment of Hobessianization of politics. The day of the action ended with
heavy police  charges on an  overwhelmingly  peaceful  crowd (Wearden & Quinn,
2013). As we said, 25S may well count as the peak of anti-representationalism (anti-
representational  presentialism)  within  the  15M  cycle,  but  also  as  a  display  of
representation in its strongest Hobbesian sense.
5.2.4. The PAH: from mortgage victims to engaged activists
Another key process of the 2012-2013 period was the Popular Legislative Initiative
promoted  by  the  Plataforma  de  Afectados  por  la  Hipoteca  (Platform  of  People
Affected  by  Mortgages,  from  now  abbreviated  PAH).  The  initiative  reclaimed  a
number of law changes on the housing sector, primarily, the establishment of the
legal figure of the “giving in payment” (the elimination of any mortgage debt with the
turnover of the house). At its core, the platform gathered people either unable to pay
their  mortgages  or  under  an  eviction  process  as  a  result,  as  well  as  activists
concerned with the matter. The rise in numbers of people in this situation resulted
from the rising unemployment after the housing bubble burst and the ensuing crisis,
when many buyers found themselves unemployed and with a mortgage for a house
whose value  was plummeting (Alemany & Colau,  2013).  The platform had been
created in 2009, in Barcelona, in connection with earlier housing protests such as V
de Vivienda (H for Housing), but it was with the rise of 15M cycle that it reached its
highest level of social impact. This non-partisan social platform developed a rich and
evolving  protest  repertoire,  which  involved  the  promotion  of  citizen  legislative
initiatives, the stopping of hundreds of evictions, physical and digital campaigns of
shaming  (escraches)  as  well  as  charity  work,  which  included  the  reallocation  of
evicted families.
Its  spokesperson,  Ada  Colau,  was  to  play  an  even  more  important  role  in  the
following, electoral period of the cycle, and somehow anticipated it. For the first time,
an initiative associated with 15M had a very recognizable figure as its head.
The PAH's citizen legislative  initiative reached Congress on February  2013,  with
almost  1,5  million  signatures,  a  level  of  citizen  support  of  up  to  87%  of  the
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population,  and  connected  to  both  big  demonstrations  and  direct  actions  (20
Minutos, 2013). There, the Popular party used its absolute majority to change the
initiative  to  the  point  the  PAH  drew  it  back  (Castro  &  Román,  2013).  PAH
mobilizations did not stop, but the diagnosis around the closure of the representative
system was confirmed once again.
5.2.5. The (re)turn to representative politics
On January 8th, 2013 a year and a half after the beginning of 15M, after the 25S
action, and a year ahead of European Elections due on May 2014, a political party
deeply rooted in the 15M cycle was launched. The X Party never got any explicit
support from the movement, not only because 15M networks and projects remained
in the non-partisan disposition defended since the DRY manifesto, but also because
there was not a representation place, a spokesperson position, from which such a
support  may have  been univocally  expressed.  That  said,  the  party  was strongly
rooted  in  the  15M  cycle  in  several  senses.  Firstly,  because  this  anonymous
dispositive was composed by people that had been part of some of the Barcelona,
Sevilla and Madrid 15M hubs. The Barcelona X Party node, which led the initiative,
was rooted in  a  trajectory  of  activism,  especially  hacktivism and digital  activism,
dating several years back. X.net, initially an activist initiative working on free internet
and free culture issues (later came to cover areas such as network democracy or
anti-corruption), had been launched in 2008264. Its “X” is behind the “X” in the X Party.
                            
                                                 
FIGURE 34. X.NET LOGO 
264  This information can be found in its website https://xnet-x.net/en/. Accessed January 21st, 2017.
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   FIGURE 35. X PARTY LOGO
The  collective  played  relevant  roles  in  the  struggle  against  the  Sinde  Law  that
preceded  and  contributed  to  15M.  Conservas,  its  space  at  the  multicultural
neighborhood of El Raval, in the old city center, served as a meeting point for the
Real Democracy Now! node in Barcelona, as well as for many 15MpaRato meetings,
among other 15M initiatives. A second reason that justifies the connection is that (as
I show in the forthcoming pages) X Party members had relevant positions in 15M
social networks (on Facebook and, especially, Twitter) and they used those positions
to grant the project some recognition. Thirdly, because the project made much use of
the discourse and practices of 15M projects.
Unsurprisingly,  this  combination  meant  that  with  only  a  few  videos  in  Youtube,
launched in the early days of 2013, the project received massive attention on social
networks (especially among 15M communities), gained thousands of followers on
Twitter and Facebook, enough to get coverage in mainstream media, nationally and
internationally265. In its main video, full of jokes266, a man and a woman claim to come
from the future to announce that the “the party “X”, the party of the future, has won”.
Then  the  video  clarified  the  objective  of  the  party  was  “to  win  everything:
referendums,  right  to  real  and  permanent  vote”  and  the  rest  of  elements  of  its
political program, “Democracy, period”267 (from now on abbreviated DP).
265  A week after its launch, its account in Twitter reached 20000 followers, more than the rest of
Spanish political  parties except  for  PP,  PSOE,  IU (United  Left)  and UPyD (Union,  Progress  and
Democracy). By then it had also appeared in several dozen national and international mainstream
media.  A  dossier  of  TV  appearances  of  the  party  can  be  found  on  its  website,  at
https://partidox.org/prensa-videos-x/. Accessed January 15th, 2017.
266 After a while, both confess to be “unemployed actors” hired via a job announcement by an “X Party,
a party of the future which, since it is in the future, it cannot assist to its own press releases”. Jokes
included references to the high levels of youth unemployment in the country.
267 The document is available at https://partidox.org/pdf/democracia-y-punto.pdf. Accessed July 20th,
2016.
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FIGURE 36. X PARTY: DEBUT VIDEO268.
Reactions ranged from joy to wrathful attack269. Much of both can be explained by its
problematic relation to 15M. For many within the 15M ranks, the idea of a party being
associated to 15M was a completely unthinkable.
The spirit  of  the relation of  the party  to the movement,  though,  had been nicely
synthesized by a slogan proposed by Ciudadano Zero, 15M activist, in a general
meeting of the group in late October 2012, at Conservas, which I attended: the X
Party, the party of the future, planned to “to do a 15M in the electoral space” (“hacer
un 15M en el espacio electoral”)270. The first step was to launch the party, the second,
to  propose  a  political  program  with  “a  single  point:  Democracy,  period.”  This
somehow brought the discussion of representation where it was at the time of “No
les votes”, to the electoral arena, yet the changes in the terms of the discussion had
been radical. After 15M, the X party brought with it a strong view of what a “real
democracy” should look like.
5.3. Semantics/Discourses
In order to reconstruct the semantics of the X Party I divide this part in three main
sections. The first attends to the diagnostic discourse of the party on the 15M cycle,
the second, to its normative discourse on the democracy to come, the third, to its
prescriptive discourse on how the party itself should work.
268 The  video  is  available  at  https://www.youtube.comwatch?v=90deuJiQfTw.  Accessed  July  20th,
2016.
269  As can be appreciated already in the “comments” section of their videos, on Youtube, such as
https://www.youtube.comwatch?v=90deuJiQfTw. Accessed July 15th, 2016.
270 The  formula  was  eventually  discarded,  as  it  was  understood  it  suggested  an  illegitimate
appropriation of the 15M “meme” for a very polemical project.
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5.3.1.  The  X  Party's  diagnostic  and  prescriptive  discourse  on  the  cycle:
breaking the crystal ceiling
5.3.1.1. On the pertinence and problems of returning to representation
The idea was to do a 15M in the electoral space, to begin an “electoral assault” (this
was  another  recurrent  expression)  onto  the  representative  system.  The  cycle-
situated justification of the party, exposed in the video of its public debut271, was to
“break  the  crystal  ceiling”  that  many  15M  proposals  and  demonstrations  were
finding. The crystal  ceiling was the closure of the political  system and the State,
manifested in reactions ranging from police repression to parliamentary dismissal of
citizen demands (as seen in part 2, above). The X Party was also presented as an
attempt to do, in the game of political representation, what other projects aligned with
15M  were  doing  at  the  time  elsewhere:  the  “Plataforma  de  Afectados  por  la
Hipoteca” (PAH)  (Mortgage Victim’s  Platform),  in  the  sphere  of  housing;  different
“mareas”272 (tides) in the spheres of education (green tide), healthcare (white tide),
employment (red tide); and campaigns such as 15MpaRato in the sphere of justice.
To put it in terms of the FAQs in the official website of the X Party “from all the fronts
that society has opened to change things, this is the method that covers the front of
the  renewal  of  democracy273”.  The  X  Party  was  to  treat  representation  and  the
political system, to put it in Deleuzian terms, as part of a plane of immanence, as just
one more space for 15M logics and networks to cover in a rhizomatic way 274. In doing
so,  15M logics  and practices  were  “to  undergo a change in  nature”.  The liberal
271 The video, with English subtitles option, is available here www.youtube.comwatch?v=90deuJiQfTw.
Accessed on July 20th, 2016.
272 These were massive sectorial citizen mobilizations, the so called “tides”: green, in defense of public
education; white, in defense of public healthcare; blue, in defense of public water; purple, against the
emigration of the Spanish youth; and others. They involved massive mobilizations in late 2012 and
2013, and different processes of self-organization in spaces such as hospitals (Sánchez, 2013a).
273 This is a case of synecdoche, since “democracy” stands here for “institutionalized, representative
democracy”.
274 To put it in the words of Levi (2012: 3) in a somehow prescient text: “We occupy and operate in all
of the possible spaces, but we respect the identity formation that each dynamic requires.” In terms of
Deleuze & Guattari (1987): “The point is that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be over-
coded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is,
over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines. All multiplicities are flat, in the
sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency
of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this "plane" increase with the number of connections
that are made on it. Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or
deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The
plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a
finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary
dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight.” N.B.: Throughout this text  I
prefer the expression “plane of immanence” to that of “plane of consistency”. The choice is allowed by
Deleuze  (1987:  281),  which  consider  them  synonyms:  “But  on  the  other  plane,  the  plane  of
immanence or consistency”.
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representative model of democracy was also to be challenged in the process.
As recognized in the meeting in late October 2012 at Conservas, the project posed a
bi-frontal  challenge:  to  established parties  and to  15M itself.  For  the  former,  the
challenge resided in the kind of party and the kind of proposals (DP) it brought into
discussion; to 15M the challenge resided in the fact that it was a party, and thereby
reconnected the 15M cycle to the representative arena. But representative politics,
power,  and  corruption  were  exchangeable  for  15  M's  anti-representationalist
diagnostic. Some of the strands of 15M and the multicolor tides (Lara, 2013) seemed
headed towards a transformation of democracy in the sense of Hardt & Negri (2004),
towards  autonomist  forms  of  joint  production  and  decision  making  where
representation is either abolished or minimized. The logics of DRY and, especially,
the  camps,  oscillated  between  alternativity  and  opposition,  autonomist  alter-
democracy and anti-representationalism with respect to the political system. The X
Party logics was one of infiltration, “hacking” and “resetting”, to stir change from the
inside of institutional politics. Such an option faced many difficulties.
As noted, the first problem was that the idea of launching a party seemed against the
grain of many 15M explicit  principles and practices. To this question, the answer
agreed in the October 2012 meeting was that the X Party would not claim to be
representing the movement, so the launching video on January 2013 denied the X
Party “to be the 15 M's party”.
5.3.1.2. Catalyzing the electoral assault: discursive diagnosis and prescriptions
The discursive answer of Simona Levi (2014), tacit leader of the X Party, was more
developed, since it involved a rich construction of the stage of the cycle. In a talk 275
on July  2013,  Levi  articulated a strategic,  self-reflective  and historicizing  view of
15M.  Her  response  was  a  discursive,  diagnostic  reconstruction  of  both  the
contention  between  movement  and  political  system,  and  the  stage  of  the  15M
movement  itself.  In  there  she  distinguished  two  forms  of  15M organization:  the
275 She delivered it at the 15MP2P meeting in Barcelona (which I co-organized) on July 4th, 2013 at
the meeting 15Mp2p, and entitled it “Fight and let fight: observations on the life of hermit crabs”.
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herd276 and  the  catalyzer277.  The  former,  which  she  identified  as  the  mode  of
collaboration of many actors and networks around May 15 th 2011 and the following
months was defined by its multitudinous, powerful yet not very “agile nor precise”
character. The second form of organization took the form of “catalyzers”, defined as
small  groups able to accelerate certain processes, “focusing the attention” of  the
various  actors  and  networks  already  existing.  For  Levi, these  two  modes  of
organization corresponded to the first two phases of 15M, but there was a third. In
her politically strategic reconstruction of the 15M cycle, the first phase corresponded
to 2011 and implied to “meet each other and display potency”—under the herd and
beehive forms—, with DRY and the camps. In 2012, a number of initiatives to “attack
objectives”  was  launched,  which  included  PAH  (in  the  sphere  of  housing)  and
15MpaRato  (in  the  sphere  of  justice).  According  to  her,  these  initiatives,  which
followed the catalyzer model, were also successful. As of 2013, she believed, 15M 278
was in a third phase where “we have them surrounded” and “it’s time to reset the
system”279.  In her presentation, she launched her proposal for undertaking such a
resetting at the current stage of the cycle: the X Party.
Levi  stressed the need to work following a “method”280,  bracketing, in the vein of
some forms of anarchism (Graeber, 2009, 2013), free software culture (Kelty, 2008)
276 Levi (2014): “Herd (Wikipedia definition tuned by me): it is constituted by a great number of simple
agents  that  interact  among  themselves  and  with  their  environment.  Their  collective  behavior  is
decentralized and self-organized. The herd acts as a unity in continuous movement, but its function
emerges from the non-coordinated behavior of individuals looking for their own welfare. In the herd,
each individual finds spontaneously  and according to its aptitudes covering different  functions for
short periods of time. Each individual can be the leader for a few instants or center or can be the most
exposed  edge  for  a  few  moments,  until  another  individual  takes  the  place…  (See  also  ‘hive
intelligence’, although somehow different from the metaphor I want to use). The herd cannot act with
agility and precision, but it has great powers of expansion and aggregation.”
277 Levi (2014): “Catalyzer (definition from Wikipedia tuned by me): the term “catalyzer” is used to
design that agent or device that serves to accelerate a specific process. In chemistry catalyzers are
small  sets of  molecules that  alter the speed of  a reaction,  accelerating (or  retarding)  it.  Through
catalyzers, less energy is required for a given process. Catalyzers amplify power, they direct it. They
are small and agile groups that direct the “shared attention”. They are not composed by more than 20-
50 molecules. There are epochs when history asks us to be herd and epochs when we have to be
catalyzers. We must not fear to be few when we only can or must be few. Nor should we attribute to a
herd the qualities of a catalyzer. In this stage of 15M it is evident that the time has come to accelerate
processes working like many small nodes, independent and sovereign in their decisions, which know
what to do and that, when necessary, and only when necessary, support each other, knowing each
other by the results for the work of each one and basing on this their reciprocal trust.”
278 The  use  of  the  tag  as  referring  to  something  unified—in  this  case,  unified  as  a  process  or
movement with 3 stages—is frequent among both activists and others (journalists, for example).
279 Notice that the word “resetting”, coming from the computer language, appeals more to a kind of
“restarting” than to a “R-evolution”, another of Levi’s favorite word in some of her texts.
280 The notion of “method” is applied to the internal organization and the external staging of the work
and  the  political  program.  Surely,  this  term comes  from Nota,  who  has  used  it  profusely  in  his
conversations with me almost since we first  wrote to each other back in 2011. The X Party was
frequently defined in this way in its official website.
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or  even  15M assembly  documents  (Comisión  Dinamización,  2011),  questions  of
ideology and focusing on clear, pragmatic objectives. To her, those insisting in earlier
forms of organization (herd, beehive) and logics (opposition, alternative) that have
proven insufficient, or in commemorative rituals such as massive demonstrations for
15M anniversaries, are like hermit crabs, inhabiting dead shells.
5.3.1.3. Federations and dynamic nuclei for the electoral assault
In opposition to both 15M’s assembly and leftist parties’ organizational models, her
discourse (elaborated beyond that concrete talk281) underlined the need of exploring
new forms of collective organization for the electoral assault: on the inside, it insisted
in  meritocracy,  group  affinity  and  “competence  federation”  rather  than  on  the
horizontal, fully open, and assembly-centric principles of organization typical of the
camps  and  many  initiatives  connected  to  15M;  on  the  outside,  it  appealed  to
collaboration in networks without unification, preserving autonomy rather than stifling
diversity into narrow centralization around a wide electoral front led by the United
Left Party, main defenders of the idea282. In the talk at 15Mp2p, her final response to
those promoting the “left front” agenda was strong: “lucha y deja luchar” (fight and let
fight)283.
The idea of the unity of the left was also rejected by other actors close to the X
Party284, such as the Pink Noise collective, who questioned the operability and even
the very sense of the idea of “left unity”285. For the stage of the cycle as of 2013, they
proposed  a  model  of  organization  based  on  dynamic  nuclei.  Under  this  model,
281 During the Q&A after the talk, a target of her criticisms were those who, both from within (15M
assemblies,  collectives,  people,  etc.)  and  from  without  (parties),  reclaimed  the  constitution  of  a
transversal  electoral  front,  similar  to  SYRIZA in  Greece, in  order  to  gain power in  representative
institutions, starting with the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, in 2014. This proposal
came, especially, from Izquierda Unida (United Left), the traditional left in Spain, and, in her mind, it
repeated the old narrative of the convergence around the “left” and the “useful vote”.
282 A risk, noted by 15M activists Marga Padilla and followed up by Fernández-Savater, who was
among the public during her talk at 15Mp2p, concerned the nature of the electoral space, where there
seems to be a need to compete for a scarce resource: the vote. While software (the analogy she
used) is a non-rival  or non-exclusive good (people can share it  without  none of  the parts  losing
anything) that is not the case of the vote.
283 When,  back  in  2012,  Levi  was  talking  about  catalyzers  she  was  thinking  in  the  campaign
15MpaRato. In 2013, many of those ideas were applicable to the X Party.
284 The collective Pink noise revolution (a formula inspired in a study by Miguel Aguilera on patterns of
activity  and  synchronization  in  15M)  published  two  papers  exposing  these  theses  on  May
www.azofra.wordpress.com2013/05/26/pensar-y-actuar-mas-alla-de-la-unidad-de-la-izquierda-
creatividad-politica-distribuida-y-sin-etiquetas/)  and June, 2013 www.madrilonia.org/2013/06/unidad-
sin-convergencia-modelos-de-auto-organizacion-politica-de-multitudes-hiperconectadas/.
285 A key point of the attack underlines the multiplicity of irreconcilable views and groups identified with
the “left”, while the other criticizes the notion of unity understood as convergence, which implies forms
of organization through representation old banners and symbols, and that, more importantly, have a
centralized or, at least, hierarchical functioning that makes them undesirable and inoperative.
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varying sets of  nodes within a changing 15M network drive the dynamics of the
movement at different times, with the action of the rest of the network synchronizing
around  them.  This  was  interpreted  as  typical  of  dynamics  in  15M networks  (as
shown in chapter 4,  section 6.1.).  Ontologically,  the model was the decentralized
functioning  of  consciousness in  the  brain  (Tononi  & Edelman,  1998;  Edelman &
Tononi, 2000); politically,  the implicit  suggestion was that the X Party (along with
other  initiatives)  could  drive  the  dynamic  around  the  electoral  assault  without
centralizing  it.  This  approach  clearly  recalls  the  appeals  to  federation  and
decentralization of much anarchism and autonomism.
Behind the X Party there was a set of discourses that combined a diagnostic of the
situation of the representative system (a diagnostic to a good extent shared with “No
les  votes”,  DRY,  and  the  camps)  with  a  diagnostic  of  the  becoming,  modes  of
organization and limits of 15M itself. In relation these, the prescriptions were clear:
federation, autonomous action, decentralization.
5.3.2. A diagnostic and normative discourse for democracy: Democracy, period
In this section, I dissect the key X party text when it comes to its normative discourse
on democracy: its political program for the 2014 European Elections. The X Party
discourse  took  much  of  its  discursive  diagnostic  of  the  state  of  representative
democracy from hacktivist struggles and 15M, so, I only touch upon this aspect in
passing and instead focus on its normative discourse on what democracy should
become. Of its key four points, namely, first, “transparency in public management”,
second,  “wikigovernment  (Government  with  Citizen  Control)  and  wikilegislations
(Citizen Legislative Power)”, third, “Right to Real and Permanent Vote”, and fourth,
“Binding and Mandatory Referendums”, I will focus on the first three, especially the
second and the third, which are the most innovative ones.
5.3.2.1. Democracy, period: transparency
The first point of the X Party program is “transparency”. The opening of the point
regarding  transparency  in  the  DP text  says:  “The  essence  of  democracy  is  the
knowledge, by the citizenry, of the decisions taken on all questions that may affect
their  lives  as  well  as  of  the  process  of  that  decision  making,  of  the  data  and
circumstances that converge in their resolution.” This proposal, strongly defended by
Nolesvotes and DRY, can be understood as a call to make the State and, ultimately,
many of  the  practices  that  articulate  political  representation,  transparent  or  even
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representable, in a more epistemic sense, to the citizenry286.
In the text of DP, representative democracy is seen as a progressive reduction of
politics (of which different actors, including the citizenry appear as responsible) to a
punctual  voting  process  that  allegedly  provides  a  direct  connection  between  the
popular will and representative action. Against this, the text stresses that in its model
“the citizenry will be the necessary vigilant of all decisions that affect them and of all
public expenses. That is the only effective way of putting an end to corruption”, an
exigency that is surely not new in the tradition of modern democracies, and is rather
close  to  Jefferson’s  (1986)  formula  according  to  which  “the  price  of  freedom is
eternal vigilance.” The request for transparency is both an exertion of vigilance and
its future enabler, the possibility of its future, deeper exercise and advance. As the
episode of the Sinde Law made clear for Nolesvotes activists before 15M, under the
current  system  people  don’t  know  who  are  the  ones  represented  by  their
representatives, how decisions are made, or following what interests.
Against the rhetoric of democracy “ready-made” and ideal discourses that dwell in
the plane of authorization and symbolic legitimation of representation, transparency
appeals to the trackability of political representation in action: to the materiality (in
the monetary sense, especially) of political practices, to the processes of decision
making,  budget  allocation  and the  long etcetera  of  the political  and bureaucratic
machine of the State.
Transparency would help to see the complex fabric287, the reality (or the absence) of
the  kind  of  substantive  representation  that  Pitkin  spoke  about.  Some  of  the
asymmetries and deficiencies in representation (the over representation of powerful
minorities and under representation of majorities denounced by “No les votes”) can
be traced back to the types of practices allowed by public acquiescence facilitated by
opacity288. As an example, the actions of the Spanish government became clearer for
286 Independently from whether it ends the practice of corruption, which appears as one of the main
references for most 15M projects since the “No les votes” manifesto, it would potentially open the
space of a constructivism of representation of the sort essayed in much literature.
287 This could be considered as a step to bring political representation, at least formally, to a plane of
immanence  and  practice  instead  of  letting  it  rely  on  narrations  and  institutionalizations  of
transcendence, based on the obliteration of the real mediations, their short-circuiting in different forms
of corruption, and the quasi-metaphysical affirmation of the connection between representatives and
representation by voting.
288 When someone can, with relative easiness, hide details about party financing or the exact and
concrete influence of lobbies on public representatives, when the exact expenses are not known or
the concrete deliberations and reasons cannot be scrutinized, it  is  easier to operate arbitrarily  or
following private interests, to represent badly, represent interests other of those of the voters, or not to
represent at all. Today, the public in Spain is surely not a phantom, the point is whether government
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the  campaign  against  Sinde  Law  when  everyone  could  read  that  the  American
embassy was directly behind the pressures for the passing of the law. In a way, the X
Party  position  appeals  to  the  logics  of  the  Benthamian  panoptic,  now  definitely
turned towards those that  play the roles of power in a new State architecture 289.
However, this point of transparency, even if bringing about new forms of practical
realism with regard to political representation, will remain rather limitedly modern if
its focus only on knowledge, vision, surveillance and control, all of them oriented to
fix political representation by adding forms of inverted, alter-representation.
5.3.2.2. Democracy, period: wikigovernment and wikilegislation
The second point in DP proposed the idea of wikigovernment, “A wikigovernment
allows the citizenry to prioritize the different initiatives presented by governments or
state, autonomic, and local institutions. In the same way, it would allow the citizenry
to  have  the  venues  to  present  articulated  legal  initiatives  to  be  transformed  in
government  action.”  This  form  of  government  would  allow  the  citizenry  to  both
prioritize and elaborate executive and legal  initiatives. Prioritization is a top-down
mechanism; the latter, a bottom-up, both with feedback mechanisms.
The  correlate  of  a  wikigovernment  is  the  institutionalization  of  mechanisms  of
wikilegislation,  “laws  constructed  in  sight  of  everyone,  in  a  collaborative  and
transparent  way,  between  citizenry  and  government”  (idem).  This  would  be  a
“democracy  that  includes  the  participation  of  the  citizenry  for  elaborating  and
managing common matters” (idem).
These appear as complementary modes that outline different possibilities of relation
between  those  governing  and  those  governed,  to  the  point  where  those  two
categories  seem  to  lose  some  of  their  modern  traction,  a  closing  of  the
representation gap, anticipating a variety of possibilities.
5.3.2.3. Democracy, period: real and permanent vote.
A third  key innovation  in  DP lied in  its  third  programmatic  point.  It  was an anti-
will remain opaque. In 2012, the Popular Party launched a “transparency law” only after the pressures
from EU instances, since it was one of the few countries that had none on this point. The text has
been widely criticized for its many limitations by the X Party, 15M networks, and other political actors
in Spain.
289 Despite  Foucault’s  (1997)  suggestion,  no  architecture  would  be  enough.  As  the  quote  above
shows, the matter is not only creating new instances of control and citizen vigilance, but also ensuring
social articulation and participation. In this context, one could expect that, as happened with the costs
of political action (Earl & Kimport, 2011), the cost of vigilance will eventually be reduced too, that, as
the text suggests, the means for implementing could be granted by the State and distributed across
society, perhaps in different forms of crowdsourcing.
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representationalist  or  alter-democratic  mechanism  of  direct  democracy  and  “de-
representation” (as Jurado, 2014 calls it): “the real and permanent vote” (abbreviated
RPV). The core of this programmatic point can be synthesized in a formula included
within the “X Party definition” in its official website: “The only party that doesn’t want
to represent you. You won’t vote parties. You will vote and make laws”. According to
the text (DP: 21) “the citizens reclaim the right to vote in a permanent fashion, to use
it when we consider it fit.”  What happens under representative democracy is “not
voting but choosing. To choose, every four years, those that vote for us, without any
way of making them know our opinion in concrete voting: as a blank check” (ibidem).
The weak mandate that elections currently embody, especially in cases of absolute
majority, guarantees the possibility of unfulfilling every point of the political program,
a sort of almost arbitrary independence, as was Popular Party’s one from late 2011
to 2016.
To the current chronopolitics defined by “blank checks” and “turns” (as appeared in
the  NLV's  diagnostic  of  the  representative  system  in  Spain),  DP  opposed  the
following:
“voting  is  to  directly  show  a  political  will  on  a  concrete  issue,  be  it  approval,
disapproval or indifference. For making this possible, it is established the possibility
of voting all laws debated in Parliament, be it on the Internet using an electronic ID,
be it with the traditional vote in paper, in the voting points permanently habilitated in
towns and post offices.”
This proposal is an adaptation and renaming of the Demo 4.0 project, launched from
the Sevilla hub of Real Democracy Now in 2011290. It implies an additive combination
of representative and direct democracy in real  time291.  According to Juan Moreno
Yagüe292 and Francisco Jurado,  original  promoters of  both Demo4.0 and early  X
Party  promoters  explain,  that  is  exactly  what  this  proposal  does:  to  provide  an
290 For information on this point I have recurred not only to the official website of the initiative, but also
Jurado (2014), which presents demo4.0 in detail.
291 People that go from anarchists (Graeber, 2013) to defenders of technological fixes (Weinberg,
1967) have insisted in the value of a principle of political and social intervention: change only what is
strictly needed; to the extent possible, don’t subtract, add.
292 Juan Moreno Yagüe was the lawyer representing the accusation in the trial against Rodrigo Rato
launched by 15MpaRato, promoter of Demo4.0. and other 15M initiatives such as OpEuribor, that
denounced the fraudulent construction of the Euribor index, which has begun to get traction in courts
(Opeuribor, 2016).
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opportunity that first, fits with both the word and the spirit of the Spanish constitution
(therefore, there is no need to change it), second, may be technically feasible, and
third, does not detract anything from those who want to delegate in representatives
while it allows to those who prefer to directly express their will to do so via direct
vote. That is what the self-called “hackbogados” (hack-lawyers) define as a “juridical
hack”, but could also be referred as a “juridical fix”: it does not only allow new forms
of participation within the current juridical framework but also potentially makes the
increasingly  discredited  and  dysfunctional  representative  structure  to  survive  by
combining it with a direct democracy option293.
Taking  distance  from  the  15M  vocabulary,  the  discourse  around  the  real  and
permanent  vote  used  traditionally  modern  concepts  in  political  theory  such  as
“sovereignty”294. Unsurprisingly, this happened in connection with the attention to the
institutions of representation (primarily, Congress, but also parties). The traditionally
modern  notion  of  sovereignty,  profusely  present  in  the  Demo 4.0  proposal,  also
appears in different passages of the DP text, as an example of the ambiguous “hack-
fix” logics. The concrete formula used by Yagüe, is that of “sovereignty quota”, which
appeals to a strange, liberal individualistic view of sovereignty, where each citizen
becomes an infinitesimal  sovereign,  exercising  her  power  at  will295,  though direct
vote, in real time. At a time of authoritarian (at least, in the sense of authorization-
centric  in  Pitkin's  sense)  absolute  majority  of  the  Popular  Party  in  Spain,  the
possibility of having a real and permanent vote promised to put an end to the rule of
“formality”  (authorization  or  end-of-term  accountability)  and  its  “blank  checks”.  It
promised to allow the modern sovereign, The People, to emerge in ways that not
even the French philosopher considered. Such a recovery of sovereignty was a need
in the face of what Jurado (2014) called “sovereignty leaks”, which go “upwards, as
processes of political integration advance, as is the case of the European Union,
where the impositions from institutions such as the Commission or the European
Central Bank gain more and more strength” and “outwards, when the pressures of
293 Although I cannot discuss it here, underlying Yagüe’s and Jurado’s view of representation, which
can be hinted in the demo4.0. narrative, there are some arguments for direct democracy at play that
can be found in XVIII century authors such as Rousseau. Although it seems to fall out of the modes of
representation as normally understood (including Pitkin’s five senses), the process of expressing a
political will so that it can be counted in Parliament somehow enters into the logics of representation
and identification.
294 As appears in DP: “The point is to recover and exercise sovereignty, through the vote, whenever
we want.”
295 Some of the attacks to this position, concerning the formation of political agreement and groups,
have been partially (only partially) addressed by Jurado in his master thesis.
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organizations such as the IMF, the OECD, or the WTO are accepted by governments
in spite of coming from totally extra-democratic entities.”
While renovating the notion of sovereignty, the real and permanent vote proposal
challenged a central  aspect of  the political  ontology since XIX century.  Real  and
permanent vote means, according to Francisco Jurado (2014), an attack on deep
structures: it undermines what he defines as “the block politics” or logics settled by
modern forms of party-based representative politics. With RPV the voter wouldn’t
need to “select” every four years neither a closed package of political proposals (a
political  program)  nor  representatives  included  and  subordinated  to  a  party
discipline, who usually vote following directives from above296. Rather than choosing
representatives297, citizens could vote directly, law by law. Jurado believes this would
allow people to cut across the left-right divisions, embodied in the Spanish case by
the PSOE-PP distinction. Following the 15M diagnostic, this is today, to him, mostly a
symbolic distinction, which covers their basic agreement on policies usually dictated
by  lobbies  or  supranational  institutions—a diagnostic  identical  to  that  of  “No  les
votes”. To put it in Pitkin’s terms, the PSOE-PP difference is mainly played out at the
level of symbolic representation, rather than at the active-substantive one.
In my view RPV brings two new meta-logics: one that allows the choice between
representative and direct democracy logics, and one that allows the choice between
block and singular logics. One can not only choose something or someone or avoid
doing so (first order democracy), but also choose to delegate or to vote directly, to
select  a political  block or  a  concrete proposal  (second order  democracy).  In  this
sense, RPV generates a sort  of  alter-democratic meta-logics,  the possibility  of  a
choice of logics, which establishes a second order in the logics of choice of liberal
democracies298. This would be a new form of political freedom of the modern, that of
choosing between alternative (even if fixed) models of democracy to exercise.
Full transparency, wikigovernment and wikilegislation, and real and permanent vote:
DP outlined a radically new view of the relation between citizens and government.
296 In the current Spanish system, the so called “party discipline” usually implies different sorts of
penalties for representatives voting in Congress against the line decided by the party.
297 In the arguments crafted by Jurado for DP he carefully distinguishes between “voting”, what the
representative  does in  Parliament,  and  “selecting”  a  representative  that  votes,  which  is  what  he
notices electors do.
298 At the same time, ironically,  it  seems to leave the practice of representation un-thought, if  not
unchanged (structural changes as the ones described guarantee changes in the logic and practice of
representation).
  
 
234
 
5.3.3.  An  experimental,  networked  party:  networking  citizens,  federating
competences
5.3.3.1.  Representation  and anti-representation  in  one organization:  X party  and
communication guerrilla
The X Party aimed to be an experiment with the party form. It challenged or blurred
some  of  the  key  features  of  traditional  parties.  Conspicuously,  it  contested  the
centrality of public leaders. As stated in its FAQs, in its first definition presented itself
as a “method” for the instauration of DP and
“As a method, we are constituted by two entities:
1-the X Party, Party of the Future, is duly inscribed in the registry of political parties
of the Ministry of the State. This will allow us to concur to the elections, but for now it
is in latency.
2-the active, operative part, which you are seeing, the web, the twitter, the Facebook,
the citizen network, we are a working group of communication and action: a great
lobbying group specialized in matters of conquering a true democracy in the XXIst
century.”
In  more  normative  or  programmatic  terms,  in  the  same  FAQs  the  discourse
connected with some of 15M leitmotivs299:
“We want to depersonalize politics. We don’t want to fall in the personalist logic of
the parties, where only what the leader does and says matters. The important thing
are facts, not names. They have made us believe that the system of leadership in
parties is the only one, that there is no other possible, but that is not the case.”
Instead of leaders, names and words, the key is “solutions to problems”. According
to  X  Party’s  to  work  on  solutions,  to  fight  corruption  and  lobby  for  democracy,
required  anonymity  of  party  members.  Connecting  with  examples  in  the  hacker
culture running from Anonymous to WikiLeaks (an opaque dispositive except for its
main figure, Assange), the text adds: “transparency is a tool of control of the political
299 Although not included in the FAQs, a recurrent argument was: we know Rajoy’s name, and yet that
doesn’t make him any less corrupt.
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class by the citizenry, and anonymity reinforces the capacity of society as a whole to
exert it”.  With the relevance of personal figures in “audience democracy”,  such a
gesture represented an obvious challenge. The bottom-line of the discourse was that
while the “communication guerrilla” half of the project was, could, and even should
be anonymous, the “party” half of the dispositive (as was sometimes called), were it
to be activated, could be not. As I show in the pragmatics section, this remained a
controversial issue both outside and inside the X Party. Bringing the hacker and 15M
anti-representationalist logics of doing to the party form stretched it beyond its liberal
representative possibilities.
5.3.3.2. The citizen network model: federation of competences vs assemblies
Interestingly, the X Party model did not only reject representation, it rejected also
deliberation as crucial  to its construction. In that way it  explicitly broke, within its
internal functioning, with one of the two 15M models described in chapter 4: the
assembly. Instead, it proposed an autonomist, alter-democratic model. According, to
its FAQs, the party:
“...is  not  a  space  of  discussion.  It  is  a  network  of  co-responsible  citizens  who
federate their competences to be able to get out of the hole they had got us in… It is
not  a  hierarchic  functioning  nor  it  is  an  assembly  one;  it  is  a  federation  of
competences regrouped in nodes (as the nodes forming the structure of the Internet)
where priority is given to the competences and implication of people, on top of the
respect and trust on the work capacity and competence of the rest.”
The suggestion that there was no hierarchy or that the network had “the structure of
the  internet”  seemed to  be  in  tension  with  their  FAQs,  according  to  which  there
existed a “kernel”,  “a  group of  people that  carries on more work,  it  serves as a
support to the network and takes care of the coordination between different groups
and nodes, and watches over the accomplishment of objectives and deadlines.” The
“citizen  network”  valued  competences  and  implication  above  everything  else.  It
declared itself “meritocratic” (rather than “democratic”), a rule explicitly inspired in the
hacker or free software culture in which X.net had been so thoroughly involved.
5.3.3.3. A new discursive subject: a networked and federated expert citizenry
Probably  two  of  the  great  innovations  of  the  X  Party  in  terms  of  discourse  on
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organizational forms and political subjectivities were the twin ideas of federation of
competencies  and  expert  citizenry.  Both  outlined  a  new kind  of  alter-democratic
model with a primarily autonomist edge. On the plane of the party, the federation of
competences meant to give to each the task that she can do best, and to understand
the X Party as a space of political work and collaboration. Those participating in the
project  did  so  trying  to  contribute  in  certain  tasks  according  their  abilities  and
expertise. On the plane of the State, wikigovernment and wikilegistative forms of
governance  appealed  to  a  similar  form  of  organization  and  to  the  same  expert
citizenry. DP suggested that in society “exists a constructed knowledge, that must be
taken advantage of and potentiated. That is the function of the X Party. We are not
the solution, we are a catalyzer of the solutions”.
The figure of the expert citizenry is an autonomist contribution of the X Party to the
narratives around both forms of organization and subjectivities in the 15M cycle. The
proposal brings the figure of the expert citizen to the fore as the DRY manifesto and
the camps had brought about the primacy of the “person” or the “common citizen”.
Correlatively, it goes beyond the call for debate and responsible voting in “No les
votes” as well as the practice of direct democracy in the camps and other projects by
recognizing and stressing the need to mobilize citizens’ expertise and experience
around social and political problems.
The  X  Party  discourse suggested  that  “nobody knows of  everything  but  anyone
knows something”, and there is always somebody (other than formal, hired experts)
that knows about a given topic. In this light, the possibility of a double contribution,
both political and technical, by the citizenry, especially (and here the reading of the
social  conjuncture comes in)  in  a  time with  millions of  overqualified  unemployed
people, would be to waste those capacities.
5.4. Syntax/Infrastructures
This “syntax” section differs from the ones on chapter 4 and 6. Since the X party did
not innovate on the essential politics of infrastructures outlined in the 15M movement
period,  there is  no section devoted to  them here.  Instead,  I  focus on some key
structures and technologies in their affordances for politics. Attention is given at how
some  of  the  structures  and  infrastructures  denote  the  stage  of  the  15M  cycle.
Differently  from the 15M period,  in which the question of the organization of  the
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movement  could not  be “posed”300 and rather  emerged from the very networking
activity  of  the  movement  actors,  in  this  case  the  issue  of  organization  resulted
relevant  from  the  beginning.  If  within  15M  digital  networks  gave  the  structural
backbone to the movement, in this case digital networks appear within a well-defined
sociotechnical organization.
5.4.1. Organization and the technopolitical module
5.4.1.1. X Party’s experimental organization
In 2013, still in the building up towards the May 2014 European Elections, Miguel
Aguilera, researcher and X Party member, shared this image of the network:
   FIGURE 37. X PARTY: STRUCTURE. SOURCE: MIGUEL AGUILERA, 2013, LICENSE CC-BY-SA 4.0301.
The  image  shows  the  distinction  between  two  types  of  nodes,  thematic  and
territorial. Nevertheless, both types had a kernel or reduced group that carried the
300 There was no center from which to “design and implement an organization”, even if there was,
there was as an excess of complexity that prevented unifying representation, finally, there were forces
that  would  have  resisted  formalization,  as  happened  in  the  internal  conflict  around  the
institutionalization of a much better-defined entity such as DRY (Elola, 2012).
301 To have an idea of the basic shape of the X Party at the moment of its launch, the best drawing is
probably that of the local node appearing amplified, on the right side of the picture. Except for the
“Matrix” circle.
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most  work  and  that,  except  for  the  initial  nodes,  such  as  Barcelona,  Sevilla  or
Madrid, had to be approved by the citizen network’s kernel. Around the node kernel,
a “matrix” space was composed of collaborators. Every kernel also connected to a
“feedback  space”  of  more  external  collaborators.  Concrete  kernel  members
managed social media accounts in every territorial node; in the case of the whole
network,  some  members  of  the  “matrix”  did  so.  The  network’s  kernel  included
coordinators of territorial nodes and was thereby connected to all territorial nodes’
kernels. Differently from territorial node kernels, the X Party kernel was also tied to
an “oversight and assessment council”, as well as to thematic nodes. As the image,
inspired  in  the  structure  of  a  cell,  shows,  the  structure  of  the  party  was  clearly
concentric, with a Kernel 0 or “council of elders” at the center.
This  image  aims  to  depict  the  structure  of  the  party  at  a  late  stage  in  its
development. To have an idea of the basic shape of the X Party at the moment of its
launch, the best image is probably that of the local node as the one amplified in the
image.
5.4.1.2. X Party’s technopolitical module of infrastructures for organization
Most  of  these  spaces  were  built  on  the  basis  of  three  platforms:  mailing  lists,
Facebook groups, and WhatsApp groups. Almost  all  of  the internal  spaces I  just
mentioned had the first, and frequently the other two. Both the network and every
local  node  had  a  public,  outwardly  oriented  mailing  list,  Facebook  and  Twitter
profiles. This was the basic, X Party’s technopolitical module of organization (not of
“self-organization”, since the setting up of a node implied approval by the network’s
kernel).  Each  of  these  had  different,  sometimes  more  or  less  overlapping,
communities.
Two crucial and indicative variations with regard to 15M was the intensive use of
WhatsApp and, more importantly, the use of Co-ment. Co-ment is a “Web service for
submitting texts to comments and annotations”, based on free software. This is a
type of administered crowd-writing technology.
  
 
239
 
                 
        FIGURE 38. X PARTY: WIKIPROGRAM. TEXT: “WIKIGOVERNMENT AND WIKILEGISLATIONS OR ELABORATION
OF PARTICIPATORY AND TRANSPARENT LEGISLATION”.
A draft of the Party's political program elaborated by collaborators was uploaded to
the service for people to amend from January 29th to March 18th 2014. Anyone
could sign up in co-ment with an email address and comment on the draft of the
various sections of Democracy, period. They could even submit alternative drafts.
Nevertheless, this was no more a fully open space as etherpads302 were. It was an
infrastructure of mediated participation, deemed more appropriate for a party form,
for  an  electoral  assault,  for  a  different  stage  in  the  15M cycle  of  technopolitical
contention.
The technopolitical infrastructures just mentioned were crucial for the organization of
the X Party. Like in the 15M, they greatly reduced the costs of organization, but,
furthermore, they influenced the organizational forms and connected to the political
norms of the party (to put it with Juris, 2008), which we analyze in part 5. Unlike in
15M, they appeared within a consciously designed sociotechnical structure, included
in  an  organizational  syntax  that  situated  the  respective  syntaxes  of  every
technological infrastructure in a well-defined functional structure.
5.5. Pragmatics/Practices
In a party that, in line with the hacktivist tradition of the Sinde Law struggles and
Nolesvotes, stressed the value of doing, to analyze pragmatics is crucial.
302 As in earlier  initiatives within the 15M cycle,  etherpads,  fully  open crowd-writing technologies,
played a continuous role in the daily work of initiatives such as the X party.
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5.5.1. Transparency, visibility, and the practice of anti-representation
Ironically,  one  of  the  first  controversies  surrounding  the  X  Party  had  to  do  with
transparency. In the video recorded for the launch on January 8 th,  the characters
identified themselves, first and funnily, as people coming from the future to announce
the victory of the X Party, and then, in a joking/estrangement turn, as unemployed
actors that had been hired to present the X Party in a video. Being a party from the
future, it could not attend its own presentation. Ultimately, this representation game
connected with the tradition of theater and comedy, and with Anonymous LOL, rather
than with the usual political  one. The joke didn’t stop the questions, though, and
there was a rising (at points, hilarious) debate on social networks303 and mainstream
media304. The basic, serious question was: how can a legitimate party, especially in a
situation of widespread corruption, and furthermore, one making of transparency its
first programmatic point, present itself as an anonymous dispositive? The answers
were many by different public actors, more or less close to the group305.
Internally, people were afraid of the media heat that public exposition may mean.
Part  of  the  attacks  could  come  from 15M actors  themselves,  for  the  reasons  I
commented above, but the most feared were those of the press. As shown earlier, in
the FAQs section of the official website, the conciliation of anonymity and the party
form  was  primarily  organizational  and  sequential:  the  party  as  communication
guerrilla was to remain anonymous, the party as party, that would be activated only if
it was necessary, would be not. In so far as this second step had not been taken,
there was no need to give names.
In spite of these arguments, the controversy did not stop. In the first weeks, as media
attention  skyrocketed,  damage-control  operations  had  to  be  deployed  frequently.
Actually,  as  frequently  any  some  relevant  profile,  especially  in  15M  networks,
suggested not even who the X Party members were but even just to know them. As
internet devotees, X Party promoters came to believe keeping the secret promised to
303 The controversy contributed to the proliferation of profiles on Twitter with names such as the “Y
party”, the “Z party”, the “MDMA party”, and even the “Gauss party”, “the party of the inequations”.
Some of those were fostered by people close to the X Party itself.
304 On the other side, two quick serious reactions from two center-left media, the journal El País (with
an article entitled “the faceless party” on January 8th) and the radio channel Cadena Ser (with an
article on its website entitled “X Party supports transparency but hides its identity”) were among the
first in denouncing a contradiction. The number of articles and columns devoted to the party in the first
weeks were dozens, in national and international media.
305 For sociologist Manuel Castells (2013) (some of whose points are included in the PDF of DP itself
“if  there are no faces, what remains are ideas, practices, initiatives […] The X of the Party of the
Future is not to hide itself, but for its content to be filled by people projecting on this experiment their
personal dream of a collective dream: Democracy, Period”.
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be impossible. To this effect, a temporary solution was to, “no matter what”, deny
membership, even if  confessing sympathy; and, more importantly, avoid any leak
about the composition of the group.
Part of the controversy did not only come from the side of mainstream media, but
also from participants in the project itself. At the time of the launch, some of them
commented in  private  meetings as  well  as  in  a  thread in  the  mailing  list  of  the
“kernel”306 that  they  were  having  a  hard  time  justifying  the  position  of  the  party
regarding anonymity (to themselves and others) and being continuously associated
with it.
With  a more  propositional  tone,  Nota  entered the mailing  thread answering  to  a
comment  by  another  kernel  member,  who had suggested to  use the  expression
“anyone” (a 15M notion analyzed above and particularly popular among those in the
Madrid hub) rather than “anonymous” to define the status of those collaborating with
the party307. He then proposed the creation of “characters”, as interfaces with both
media and the public,
“to insist in the fact that our anonymity is not to be nobody’s, but to be anybody’s. On
top of  that,  using the resource to  cultural  critique to  humanize the party.  Create
characters with a bio, with a personality, that people recognize, but who are nothing
more than identities that we create collectively.”
The  question  of  anonymity  and  people,  provisionally  answered  during  the  camp
period  by  practices  such  spokesperson  rotation,  had  here  a  potentially  new
response:  individual  fictitious  identities  or  characters.  Nota  was  here  addressing
what  he  perceived  as  two  problems  of  X  Party’s  media  communication  for
“connecting with the target”, otherwise, the audience308, that the X Party wanted to
appeal to: those two problems were anonymity and jargon. On the same mail thread,
he  suggested  another  option  to  maintain  anonymity  without  making  it  nobody’s.
Taking a recommendation from a user of the X Party Facebook fanpage, a proposal
306 The kernel mailing list, the central list for those involved in the project, was one of the main ways of
internal communication.
307 “Collaboration”, rather than “membership” was the word of choice for defining their relations to the
party.
308 The “anybody” or even the “Cuenca Lady”. The second was a formula coined back in September,
2012, in a first operative meeting of the party (then only composed by the Barcelona and the forming
Sevilla nodes) for imagining character of a rural lady, which had to be appealed by the party. The
name is after a city in Castilla y La Mancha.
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inspired by the movements against the Sinde Law:
“I remember the initiative that Hacktivistas shot with the Sinde Law, which may work:
www.damoslacara.net/. It would be enough to say that the people that “make up” this
“party” show their face… so that the people who need to see faces see an avalanche
of them. Who will “you” be among so many faces? The question lacks meaning and
importance, when the proposal is to construct among all. This is democracy” 309.
This idea could be reconnected with both the figures of the “anybody” and that of
“people”,  but  even  more  with  that  of  a  multitude  of  faces  that  become  masks,
commented when discussing 15M emerging political subjects. The idea of creating
characters never quite took off,  while the idea of the “face avalanche” video was
dismissed  at  that  point.  However,  two  months  later,  in  March,  2013,  the  video
prepared for the launch of the final (participatorily drafted) version of DP included a
version of that: a variety of people, but with their name and professional or academic
credentials, in a video. In spite of this recourse to faces, in a conversation on early
July, 2013, Nota suggested that the X Party’s anonymity had indeed ended up being
nobody’s.  That  was precisely  the day when Levi  appeared in  a  meeting of  new
political initiatives in Barcelona as X Party collaborator, putting an end the anonymity
rule310. Seven months after the launch, after many anonymous written (I myself wrote
one for a Japanese journal) and spoken interviews (carried on by means of voice
distortion techniques311), after many discussions about how to manage the situation
and even more rushes to control potential leaks, anonymity was put aside. It was not
a matter of principle. The rationale for doing so was tactical: the rise of alternatives
309 Two references in terms of massive play with the idea of masks, faces, and political representation
is one of the final scenes (with the blasting of the building of the British Parliament) of the film V for
Vendetta, an iconic reference for the hacktivist group Anonymous. Some of the taints of that scene are
clearly with tendencies that draw from the same source as fascism in the XXth century. Years before
the launch of the film, the Zapatistas (and, especially, their figure of Subcomandante Marcos) played
with this possibility.
310 She had already appeared in the video announcing DP, on March, along with other core members
of the project such as Juan Moreno Yagüe. This was one of the first times that well-known persons (or
faces) associated to 15M appeared explicitly supporting the X Party. In the production, there was not
“an avalanche” technique, but rather an individual seriation, hybrid in the sense of mixing well-known
activists  with  unknown (not  anonymous,  since  each  participant  gave  her  name along  with  some
personal details) supporters.
311 The resource to these techniques resulted in particularly hilarious situations, where an anonymous
man speaking in the name of an X Party of the future addressed mainstream.
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competing for a similar space and for an overlapping electorate 312. The conditions in
terms of the rules of the political representative field (Bourdieu, 1991) was the main
driver for changing one of the more cherished tactical choices of the young party.
The conflicted history of anonymity within and without the network surely played a
role too.
Until  the  final  demise  of  this  position,  in  July  2013,  the  topic  of  anonymity  and
personalism was both a matter of innovation and concern, including personal friction
and  dispute,  externally  and  internally.  It  was  probably  so  because  anti-
representationalism was one of the recurrent zones of contention between 15M cycle
initiatives and the media establishment. Not having faces and clear representatives
was simply not an option for much of the media, and neither for many actors in the
political field.
5.5.2. A wikiprogram for an X Party
Another original, alter-democratic X Party practice was the application to itself of the
method it proposed for politics in general. In a recursive manner, the drafting of the X
Party program had itself something of the “wiki” and peer-to-peer character proposed
under the idea of “wikilegislation”. DP was developed as a wikiprogram, in a series of
“chess moves”313 between January 15th and April 5th, as detailed in the image below.
The first move was the launch of the draft of the political program on January 15 th.
This draft had implied a considerable amount of work and information gathered by
party314 collaborators, which complied with its own definition of how wikilegislation
should proceed315.
The second move, running from January 15th to 29th consisted in a call to interested
citizens to inform themselves, something that the party itself promoted and aided by
providing  information  and  discussion  on  social  networks,  primarily  Twitter  and
312 In an email to the kernel list in late June Levi pointed out: “We must say who we are, but not for the
spiel of anonymity and blablabla, but because this can go off hand, the rest start to be more than us
and if we don’t establish a moral and work superiority they will eat us.”
313 The chess metaphors, so beloved by people like Jurado and Yagüe, appealed to the notion of
politics as game, as a space of rules to be played with more than played within, and, finally,  not
without grandiloquence, to be turned against those in power. The checkmate was directed to “power”
(Jaque al poder).
314 People spent a considerable amount of work researching the most advanced democratic systems:
from the traditional European champion of direct and participatory democracy, Switzerland, to the new
forms essayed in Iceland or Rio Grande do Sul, a Brazilian state.
315 According to its definition of wikilegislation it “never must start from scratch. It always starts from a
draft elaborated by citizens and people who are experts on the topic (be it by government’s or citizens’
initiative) who have previously compiled the existing knowledge over a given issue.”
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Facebook, and its official website316.
On the third move, from January 29th to February 10th, an open invitation was made
to citizens (anybody, including political representatives) to participate, and a space
was  set  up  in  the  X  Party’s  website  to  introduce  comments,  amendments  and
general changes in the draft of DP. People used Co-ment to make amendments or
propose alternatives to the drafts elaborated by party collaborators.
                           
FIGURE 39. X PARTY: PROGRAM NETIQUETTE.
                 
FIGURE 40. X PARTY: PROGRAM IN CO-MENT.
A relevant  point  before starting the process was the show up screen with  some
“recommendations” on how to participate, which included a basic “netiquette” of how
316 This  step  of  citizen  work  is  also  present  in  the  step  for  the  exercise  of  wikigovernment  and
wikilegislation “it implies a mandatory work of information so that every person can get interested in
the addressed topics, document itself and understand, and that to participate as much as to observe
the process, if it wishes to do so.”
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to do so appropriately (see image on the left).
As a fourth move, from February 10th until  March 18th there was a folding of the
party to answer and “order all the feedback” provided by the citizenry. I took part in
the  process  of  reviewing  and  answering  comments,  whose  approval  ultimately
depended  on  the  justified  and  reasoned  criterion  of  both  reviewers  and  review
supervisors.  The  reasons  for  such  a  review,  which  was  centralized,  are  many.
Probably the crucial one was not to let proposals frontally opposed to core member’s
preferences to pervade the program.
Then, in the beginning of March, the fifth move was the publication of a definitive
version  of  DP,  the  new  wikiprogram.  Showing  the  care  for  licenses  and
acknowledgement  typical  of  the  free culture  movement  in  which  X.net  has been
deeply involved, the document was to be cited and “licensed” as “authorship by the
citizenry through an X Party method”.
5.5.2.1. X Party free licenses: democracy for any party
The sixth movement317 coincided in time with the fifth and was the launch of a public
invitation to other parties to use it. This was a particularly original move, to call for
any party (an “X” party) to appropriate it, “with the only condition that they accept it
as a whole, without manipulations” (as stipulated in the poster below). The discursive
suggestion was that the “X” in the name of the party appealed to an incognita: any
party (the correlate of 15M’s political figure of the “anybody”) could be the X Party,
any of them could implement DP and win the elections in the future. This taking on
intellectual  (or  political)  property  was  planned  to  expedite  licenses  analogues  to
those use in free software. One of the tasks of the X Party would be to evaluate
different  political  projects  following  its  participatorily  developed  standard.  Anyone
could take; the X Party would share.
317 At  the  time  of  the  launch,  in  early  January,  the  objective  was  to  get  it  discussed  on  the
Parliamentary session on April 5th.
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FIGURE 41. X PARTY: CHECK-MATE STRATEGY. 
At the end of the first game (they called it  check-mate),  the idea was to get the
program discussed in  the  Spanish  Parliament,  on  April  5th,  2013.  Out  of  the  six
moves, only this last point was not achieved.
5.5.3. Meritocracy, democracy and net-work: X Party rules
From informal conversations and email exchanges in the X Party kernel’s mailing list,
it seems that by March 2013, some members had come to believe that the party who
called for a break of the block logics and party discipline in the political field may be
falling into a trap similar to the one it was trying to solve. Some, like Nota, asked for
a break, a stand aside. Most of  the people from the Madrid hub had also taken
distance318.
A key point of friction concerned modes of organization, work and decision making.
The form of allocating responsibilities and decision power within the network was, in
principle, meritocratic. As suggested by Levi in her texts, this is a rule taken from the
hacker or free software culture. The kernel was the core space for work, discussion
and decision. According to the definition in the FAQs, mentioned above, the kernel
was “a group of people that carries on more work.” According to the party web FAQs,
the  evaluation  of  such  work  resulted  from “taking  into  account  the  weighting  of
commitment, peer recognition over the realized work, the proven competences in a
318 Albeit no open statement was made, the fact can be deduced from the shrinking number of their
contributions to the kernel mailing list, as well as to the “pads” or working documents of the party.
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given field of work, the rigor shown in the achievement of common objectives, the
respect for the work method and the antiquity.”
A  strict  meritocratic  rule319 meant  decision  making  was  progressively  more
concentrated, as newcomers could not equal the merits of early participants, which
were  continuous  committed  contributors. Under  the  rule  of  meritocracy,  as  time
passed,  people  in  the  Barcelona  hub  became  the  ultimate  decision  makers,
especially,  the most committed. There emerged the growing grip of the so called
“iron law of oligarchy” (Michels, 1915).
The effects of this derive were manifold. Although conversation and discussion, even
heated, was common, if not always welcome, in most of the meetings of the Party I
attended between Autumn 2012 and early 2013, as work exigencies grew, some of
the principles tended to solidify into a harder organizational and work culture320.
An increasing emphasis on the idea that “this is not a space of discussion”, as well
as in value of forking321, meant anybody was free to disagree, and leave. As many of
the initial collaborators distanced themselves from the party322, the alignment of the
rest around these principles was reinforced323. The question of who could give and
fight for a position, when, with what legitimacy, etc. became better defined. Even if,
at the time before and after the launch (late 2012 and early 2013), rules were not
exactly  implemented  in  the  way  the  FAQs  suggest,  these  texts  were  a  form of
confirming in discourse a way of doing things after it had won the day in practice.
As the rule of meritocracy and its multiple corollaries (the compulsion to measure it,
appeals to it for enforcing rules, and the like) gained strength within the project, other
principles of the hacker culture lost it.  One of them was the one that appeals to
enjoyment  and  fun324 (Himanen,  2003;  Kelty,  2008),  connected  with  the  already
mentioned creativity.  In  a  group where  most  members  are  so  only  voluntarily,  a
319 For some, it was difficult to completely measure merits, however.
320 The exigency of respect for the work method partly conflicted with the idea of a “permanent beta”
for the organization; stressing antiquity, although duly rewards long term commitment, also impedes
forms  of  innovation  that  take  place  precisely  when  one  is  not  yet  antique.  Furthermore,
acknowledgement and rigor depend on people’s perception which, in small group, can depend on
many interpersonal factors, sometimes connected with the previous criteria.
321 In the context of cyberactivism and 15M, “forking” means, basically, “splitting”.
322 Lack of entries, lack of emails, end of mumble meetings.
323 As the number points of agreement grew, the federation came to be more like its ideal: one of
competences more than of competencies.
324 For a party that started with a launch video with several highly humoristic moments, which had
officially registered as a president and vice-presidents three people over 65 years old that knew rather
little about the project (two of them living in the countryside) and presented itself to other parties by
quoting them in a tweet saying “Ola k aseis?” (“Hey, what’s up?”) one can safely say that the primacy
of fun and humor receded as the investment in the party half and the political field increased.
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special zeal in vigilance and recognition of hierarchy can very easily come to exclude
many. To put it in a hyperbole, in the period from January to June 2013 (June was
the moment  when a  stage of  escalation  in  number  of  participants  and territorial
nodes started) the increase in the number of orders was inversely proportional to the
number  of  key  people  in  the  project325.  Meritocracy  and  democracy  are  not
necessarily in conflict, while certain forms of horizontality and assembly-centrism can
be antidemocratic.  But  an excessive emphasis on strong alignment of  merit  and
decision making can stifle diversity:  of  commitments,  of  opinions, of  positions, of
knowledge and practice, and, ultimately, of values and possibilities too, such as fun,
creativity,  or  even  representativeness.  Variety  (and  certain  forms  of  focused
disagreement) had proven one of the initial  strengths of the party326.  Following its
own parameters around the need to mobilize expertise, it  could be said the core
group progressively lost diversity and collective intelligence in the period between
early and mid-2013.
5.5.3.1. From free licenses to organized franchise.
Another example of the transition from November 2012 (and even up to early Spring)
to June 2013, when a growth process started, are the X Party licenses I mentioned
above. Differently from the initial idea of X Party licenses inspired in the free software
model,  the  surviving  model  became  in  practice  closer  to  that  of  an  organized
franchise. Under the final model, a party or a group of people could not just go, take
the  key  ideas,  and  became  itself  an  X  Party.  Instead,  it  had  to  pass  a  strong
screening process and become incorporated into the structure described in part 4.
In the process of activation of the initially latent part, the party side, in mid-2013, the
X  Party  had  become  an  organization  with  a  very  concrete  structure,  stages  of
development, and objectives. The first of such objectives was to hit the elections to
the European Parliament on 2014327. When Podemos was launched in early 2014,
325 The fact that there was a demand suggests there also was a shared agreement that some form of
reclamation was appropriate. This was a coauthored situation: someone reclaims a job to be done
because someone did not (could not, did not know how, did not want to) do his or her part.  The
concrete dynamics, though, are very case, situation-specific.
326 As  shown  in  different  studies,  diversity  and  the  presence  of  brokers  mediating  among
heterogeneous communities or networks is key for enabling creativity (Burt, 2004; Barábasi, 2002).
This was something characteristic  of  many 15M projects and the X Party itself,  especially in the
beginning. It guaranteed contact and influence upon multiple communities, the respect attached to
(diverse) personal capital, a catalytic surplus.
327 The story of how this became an objective is an interesting one. It had to do, among other things,
with the representation of  the current political  conjuncture both in Europe and Spain. A four-hour
presentation  in  May,  2013,  by  an  electoral  analyst  collaborating  with  the  party  convinced  key
members that the “space of rupture in the countries of South Europe” was the X Party’s opportunity.
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the X Party first reaction was to offer collaboration and shared its “method” (practices
such  as  the  elaboration  of  wikiprograms,  use  of  crowdfunding,  etc.  Giménez  &
Vargas,  2014).  This  was  a  new  way  of  understanding  the  electoral  field,  using
cooperation as  a competitive advantage.  But  as elections  approached,  the  party
needed (as Bourdieu, 1991, indicates) ways of further distinguishing itself from other
options, especially, from those appealing to 15M ideas, networks, or audiences, as
was the case of Podemos328 (El Diario, 2014). As it got deeper into the political field, it
applied many of the rules that are thought to define political organizations.
After a national “X tour” in June 2013, the members of the Party rose steadily, nodes
started to be formed in over a dozen cities, and the new people had to be trained.
This process would take place this time under a fully developed methodology and
projected structure, which I have shown above. The shape and composition of the
party was to be deeply different from the one it had in the months preceding and
right after its launch.
5.5.4. Collaborating and crowdfunding a campaign
The party still had two key innovations reserved for the electoral period preceding
the May 22nd-25th European Elections.
5.5.4.1. Collaborative listing
The first was its launch of fully open and collaborative lists329. This basically meant
anyone could propose and support anyone as a candidate of the X Party for the
elections. There were surely discursive indications of the kind of profile desired, but
in the web enabled for the process there was no a priori closure around who could
become candidate.
328 This was clear in various calls to debate (El Diario.es, 2014) and posts in the X Party’s website,
such as one that differentiated the X Party from Podemos https://partidox.org/en-que-son-diferentes-
el-partido-x-y-podemos/. Accessed April 6th, 2016.
329 The  process  is  explained  in  the  Party’s  website  https://partidox.org/metodo-listas-abiertas/.
Accessed on April 3rd, 2016.
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FIGURE 42. X PARTY: CALENDAR FOR COLLABORATIVE LISTS.
The first step of was the open proposal of pre-candidates, from March 1st to the 7th,
with every voter choosing up to 5 competent people they considered would be willing
to  defend  the  roadmap  and  methodology  of  the  X  Party.  Then,  a  period  of
prioritization of pre-candidates ran from March 7th to 9th. A voting web was set up
where users could evaluate candidates on the basis of factors such as “knowledge
and affinity with the program of the X Party” and its “work method”, “expertise of the
person in its field”, “proven trajectory of work for the common good”, “capacity to
speak  on  topics  out  of  their  field  with  responsibility,  humility  and  without  lying”,
“knowledge of the European Institutions”, etc.  Those receiving 25% of support  or
more in comparison with the most supported pre-candidate were publicly contacted
between March 11th and 13th330.
On March 22nd-23rd, pre-candidates accepting the nomination begun a screening
process  that  included  a  public  Q&A with  questions  proposed  and  prioritized  by
internet users.
Then, a final voting of candidates took place by “X Party users” on March 24-25th.
Party users were defined as “any proactive person in the project”, without limits for
the  number  of  candidates  to  be  voted.  Candidates  with  25% of  the  most  voted
candidate got into the final list.  Adjustment in the list were made on the basis of
gender. Furthermore, the final order required an alternation of candidates between
330 This practice generated conflicts with those that disliked the idea of being associated with the X
Party and even considered it an infringement into their privacy. The X Party answered suggesting it
was a “citizen call”.
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those  “internal”  to  the  Party  and  those  “external”  to  it.  The  definitive  list  was
announced on March 31st.
Here there are at work both the fully open and radically democratic and the highly
exigent and meritocratic styles defining the X Party’s method. The proposal period
was more open than anything done by any traditional party, while the forthcoming
screening was tight. Perhaps more relevantly, the final voting was exclusive for those
that  had  “earned”  it,  not  by  having  some  formal  accreditation  but  by  actively
contributing to the network.
5.5.4.2. Campaign crowdfunding
A second campaign innovation was the use of crowdfunding to finance it. With the
humorous slogan “He would never do it” and an image of Rodrigo Rato, target of the
15MpaRato campaign also led by X Party members, they made a call to the citizenry
to fund the campaign (Partido X, 2014a)331. It underlined the X Party would not be a
campaign financed by the big banks they were fighting against, so they asked for an
extra effort  to the people to fund “solutions based on citizen work”.  It  included a
detailed budget and, after the fact, a cost document was uploaded to the web.
The campaign, called the “X tour”, was primarily based on small events with local
nodes across Spain. They insisted in being the “no party” and having invented the
“no meeting”. Rather than a big final display, its final event took place on Twitter,
were they pushed the hashtag #YoVotoPartidoX up to the top of the list of trending
topics the day before the elections.
The  results:  100.000  votes,  far  from  the  300000  of  the  last  party  reaching
representation  in  the  European  Parliament.  This  came as  a  big  disappointment.
Another initiative associated with the 15M cycle, Podemos, got 1.250.000 votes and
came to inaugurate the new stage of the cycle. In the evaluation of the results, X
Party representatives put the stress on the role that TV had on the elections, “the tv
won” they sentenced. Podemos’s leading figure, Pablo Iglesias, had ample time in
mainstream tv  channels,  especially  of  the  left  and  extreme  right  of  the  political
spectrum. 
5.6. Alternatives
This part is devoted to resume the key challenges and changes that the X Party
posed in both discourse and practice to  the party form, as well  as to the liberal
331 The call can be found at https://partidox.org/financiacion-ep2014/. Accessed on January 10 th, 2017.
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representative ontology more broadly.
5.6.1. The party form.
In order to see the challenges that the X party posed to usual party forms, I recur to
the threefold cited in chapter 2. According to Gunther & Diamond, parties can be
distinguished by their  organization (thin/thick,  formal/informal,  etc.),  their  program
(stable/dynamic, principled/pragmatic, etc.), and their relation to the polity as a whole
(integrated/subversive).  On  his  side,  Manin  defined  democracy  from  the  60s
onwards  as  “audience  democracy”,  with  the  catch-all  party  as  a  party  model  of
reference.
Looking at its own self-definition as a citizen network and its reliance on the internet
and  social  media  for  its  structuration  and  functioning,  the  key  point  to  make  in
organizational  terms  is  to  stress  its  condition  of  “networked”  party.  Surely,  its
structure was thin and informal. With no physical structures, fixed official roles, or
formal membership (cards, registry, or the like), it was enough to get enrolled in a
given mailing list or group (on Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.), and contribute some work
to be an X party collaborator (not a “member”). Its rejection of assemblies clearly
distinguishes  it  from the  movement  party  of  the  90s,  even if  it  shared  with  it  a
discursive rejection of  representative party  hierarchy in  the old mass party  style.
Nevertheless, the appeal to strict meritocracy ended up recovering classical forms of
work-based  evaluation,  in  this  case,  freed  from  their  bureaucratic  and  formal
structure;  this brought both the benefits  of  flexibility  and the risks of opacity  and
informal leaderships with undefined powers. Taking into account that there are other
parties that may be included within the “networked” genre, such as the Pirate Party,
the X Party specific difference depends on the rest of its characteristics.
When it comes to its wikiprogram, as we noticed in section 5.3., it resulted from a
moderated collaborative process. The party insisted it was “non-ideological” and that
its guidelines were a “minimum agreement”. In that sense, its program was variable.
At  the  same  time,  the  method,  the  procedure  for  creating  it,  was  well  defined.
Differently from the catch-all party, this was not a result of the decision of leaders and
media strategists, but rather the outcome of a strict process of guided collaborative
construction. However, the basic document proposed by X party initial members, DP,
had a clear democratic center. For this I classify the X Party as both procedural and
democratic.
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Finally, when it comes to its relation to the political system, it seems clear that its
position was one of subversion. Its situation with regard to the hegemonic-pluralist
axis is difficult to draw as it claimed to aim to kick old parties from Parliament (a
hegemonic  gesture,  according  to  Gunther  &  Diamond,  2003)  while  appealing  to
federation in a rather pluralist view.
Networked, procedural, democratic, and subversive seem appropriate qualifications
for defining the X party under Gunther and Diamond classification332. In a synthetic
label, it could be defined as “network-democratic”, or “wiki-democratic”.
But there was more to the X Party that Gunther & Diamond’s schema is able to
qualify. Two aspects that were passed on to Podemos and other initiatives rooted in
the 15M cycle (even if in slightly modified versions), were its wikiprogram and its
open and collaborative listing of candidates. They came to potentiate the internal
democracy in the party form. So it did the crowdfunding method, which was a mode
of  strengthening  the  party’s  economic  independence  in  relation  to  banks.  These
advances  in  both  internal  democracy  and  economic  self-sufficiency  reflected  the
alter-representational  demands  (the  calls  for  better  forms  of  representation)
launched during the 15M movement period towards mainstream parties.
Another idiosyncratic feature was its operative division into a latent formal party and
an operative communication guerrilla and lobbying team, which made of it a schizoid
or amphibian organization. Much of this resulted from its complex relation to 15M
and the 15M cycle,  to  the more or  less explicit  anti-representationalism that  has
marked it. This also reflected a continuous desire to remain a civil society form of
collective action (thereby its long self-labelling as “citizen network, X party”, or its
suggestion  that  the  X  was  the  citizenry  itself)  while  being  a  representative
organization.  The  party  aimed  at  undermining  the  (representative)  form  that  it
needed to embody to carry on such undermining: “you won´t vote parties. You will
vote and make laws”, it promised. The peak of the tension between representation
and anti-representationalism resulted in sentences such as its self-presentation as
“the only party that doesn´t want to represent you”.  The mediation between anti-
representation (f.i.: in anonymity), alter-democracy (f.i.: in wikilegislation and the real
332 Each of these terms implies more than Gunther and Diamond may imply, though. Within the 15M
cycle they are tied to particular political cultures. “Networked” is not only an organization form but
also,  as  Juris  (2008)  saw,  a  set  of  political  norms  and  technological  (in  our  case,  rather,
technopolitical) practices. It connects with the culture of anonymity, which as we saw brought many
problems to the Party and was one of its most idiosyncratic features in its origins.
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and  permanent  vote),  alter-representation  (f.i.:  in  the  collaborative  listing  of
candidates), and representation (f.i.: in its inevitable evaluation in terms of votes in
the European Elections) was a key unsolved problem of the Party. Such tensions
posed a clear challenge to the party form
5.6.2. Ontology
Looked through the glass of  political  ontology,  the X Party  can be tagged as an
innovative, imperfect and conflicted project of internal docracy or wikicracy333 (at the
party  level)  and  external  networked  democracy  or  wiki-democracy  (at  the  State
level). The more innovative edges of its model were outlined in its discourse of an
expert  democracy in which a networked citizenry would collaborate and federate
their  competencies  to  solve  social  problems.  This  aspect,  particularly  well
synthesized in  the idea of wikigovernment and wikilegislation,  would be primarily
driven by a model somehow inspired in Wikipedia, in which “those that know of each
topic” (as announced in the party’s launch video) would look for the best solutions to
common  problems.  That  exhibited  its  wikicratic  character.  The  holders  of  such
knowledge and, more importantly, the ultimate deciders, though, were the citizenry at
large, thereby its democratic or wikidemocratic character.
Another  innovative  element  of  this  discourse and practice  of  democracy was its
particular  combination  of  the  notion  of  the  citizenry  and  that  of  expertise.  This
generated the subject form of the expert citizen. This implied an attack on one of the
bases  of  the  aristocratic  tradition  of  western  democracies:  that  of  the  distance
between the aristoi and the hoi polloi. Unlike what the tradition since Plato suggests,
in X Party’s texts knowledge, expertise and experience are distributed among the
citizenry. In this sense, this idea plays in an area next and beyond the third wave of
science  studies  (Collins  &  Evans,  2002),  recognizing  informal  knowledge  and
expertise and, more importantly, assuming that either everybody has some or can
develop it. The party stretched the notion of what expertise is, and, especially, that of
who  holds  it.  This  form  of  “citizenism”  (Gerbaudo,  2016)  relied  on  a  renovated
participatory ontology combined with antagonistic elements (clear in the X Party’s
declaration of its intention to evict politicians from Parliament or its framing of the
citizenry as the actor that would resolve the problems generated by Establishment
333 This could be understood as a system of organization and decision making in which collaboration
in concrete tasks on the basis of expertise is at the center, and asymmetries between people (f.i., in
decision making) are generated and accepted on that basis.
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actors—as stated in its debut video) while avoiding populism334 in its univocal focus
on the “common citizen”. The expert citizenry that contributed to draft the X Party’s
program and that  features  prominently  in  it  as  a  subject  of  wikigovernment  and
wikilegislation  breaks  with  the  idea  of  the  selfish  individual  of  the  liberal
representative ontology.  It  connects  and innovates upon participatory,  autonomist
and antagonist ontologies.
The X Party reserved a very special place for expertise and knowledge, but also for
practice  and  doing,  within  its  normative  discourse.  In  the  style  of  the  so-called
hacking culture, there was an attempt at bracketing debates on ideology and trying
to establish relations based on problem solving. The primary forms of relationship
were thereby collaboration, knowledge sharing and autonomous work under the idea
of expertise federation. Its ideas of wikigovernment and wikilegislation broke with the
division of labor of modern political thinking (as per Brown, 2009: 85): the one that
first separates sovereign and government, and then makes of the former the agent of
political will and of the latter the agent of political knowledge and action. In this case,
DP offers a venue for the direct intervention of a peer reviewed expert citizenry on
various aspects of politics. This frontally breaks with the privatization of collective life
in the market and the primacy of representation as aggregation of interests under the
liberal representative ontology. One may re-describe this as a form of hollowing out
the Leviathan, especially its political system, turning politicians into something closer
to bureaucrats now deprived from any definitive epistemic superiority. In this case,
the hollowing out seems to not go in the neoliberal direction, to potentiate the market
and the consuming individual, but rather a new public sphere and citizenry defined
not  so  much  by  dialogue  (as  in  the  deliberative  democracy  model)  but  by
collaboration. The key is not the competition or representation of interests but the
federation of competences for problem solving. The wikidemocratic ontology outlined
by  the  X  Party  primarily  relied  on  the  combination  of  a  participatory  and  an
autonomist approach to politics, which also involved an element of agonism in its
frontal opposition to the political status quo.
To  resume  what  I  just  exposed,  I  can  bring  back  the  basic  scheme  of  political
ontology that I discussed in chapter 2 and resume the political model outlined by the
X Party in its discourse and practice.
334 Levi stressed the relevance of occupying the space of bipartidism and explicitly  warned about
“populist formulas” (Riveiro, 2014).
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TABLE 15. X PARTY: POLITICAL ONTOLOGY.
Political
Ontology
Subject form Collective
Form
Modes of political relation
Autonomist
Participatory
Antagonist
Expert citizen
Networked
(expert) citizenry
Collaboration
meritocracy
federation of competences
5.7. Conclusion
As a conclusion, I recapitulate previous parts, essay some reflections, and prepare
what comes next. As I showed in part 2, the X Party was a project deeply rooted into
the  15M  cycle.  It  crucially  contributed  to  open  a  new  stage  of  that  cycle:  the
“electoral assault”. In part 3 I showed how the X party articulated a discourse on the
15M cycle (3.1.), a discourse on democracy (3.2.), and a discourse on itself (3.3.). I
in section 3.1, I outlined its reconstruction of the cycle, which made of the party the
appropriate  to  break the  “crystal  ceiling”  of  State  power  by  entering  the  political
system to “do a 15M”. In section 3.2. I showed how the party outlined an alternative
model  of  democracy that  implied  several  challenges to  the  liberal  representative
model, particularly to the executive and legislative branches of government. Its ideas
on wikilegislation, wikigovernment and real and permanent vote (particularly, the last
one, which connected back to the 15M project of democracy 4.0) outlined a form of a
primarily wikidemocratic (rather  than representative) politics.  As shown in  section
3.3., it also elaborated a discourse around its condition as a party, half anonymous
communication  guerrilla,  half  party.  Both  halves  were  defined  by  a  method  for
federating competences and promoting action, rather than representing people.
In its technopolitical syntax (analyzed in part 4) it was clear the inheritance from 15M
and hacktivist struggles preceding it. Interestingly, it introduced a new infrastructure
into the technopolitical module of organization: co-ment, a software for moderated
crowd-writing,  which  epitomizes the  shift  from the full  openness of  15M into  the
tamed participation of the representative field.
The tension of this transition is fully present in the various practices described in part
5. In section 5.1 I described how demands for transparency were turned against it by
mass  media  when  its  members  (in  a  typical  anti-representationalist  gesture  of
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hacktivism and 15M) rejected visibility and remained anonymous for several months.
Much less publicized but also symptomatic was its essay with the crowd-sourcing of
its political program: anticipating what may be practices of wikilegislation, it recurred
to  forms  of  moderated  crowd-writing.  Section  5.3.  showed  the  internal  tensions
generated by the modes of application of meritocracy and do-cracy, which showed a
peculiar hybrid of hacktivist and party practices. Finally, in section 5.4. I recounted its
innovation in the use of crowdfunding (used earlier by X.net activists to fund their
15MpaRato campaign) for its political campaign.
Part  6.1 showed how the X party,  even if  somehow being a case of “networked
party”, had idiosyncrasies that defined it, including its emphasis on democracy
In section 6.2. I recount how its discursive and practical construction of an expert,
networked citizenry into a federation of competences implies a new, technopolitical
version  of  the  participatory  ideal  of  democracy,  which  challenges  the  liberal
representative  ontology,  defined  by  the  gap,  frequently  legitimized  in  terms  of
knowledge,  between  those  who  know  (representatives)  and  those  who  do  not
(represented).
While  discarding  many  characteristic  practices  of  the  camp-stage  of  15M
(particularly, assemblies), the party displayed many recognizable ones. The X party
carried into its electoral assault many technopolitical practices defining the hacktivist
struggles of the previous decade, in which X.net intervened heavily, while connecting
with  earlier  positions  by  DRY  and  the  most  technopolitical  strands  of  15M:  a
meritocratic  and  internet-centric  discourse  and  practice  combined  with  a  radical
democratic  one;  emphasis  on  expertise  and  problem  solving  over  ideology;
decentralized collaboration; questioning of traditional leadership, use of anonymity
and collective identities, etc.
The  X  Party  crucially  opened  a  new  stage  in  the  15M  cycle  of  technopolitical
reassembling of democracy, and brought to it the discourse of an alternative future,
one that, after its humble results in the European Elections on May 2014, was not to
be realized by the X party itself.
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Chapter 6. Networking democratic cities: the 
rise of local “governments of change”, 
common digital infrastructures, and new 
codes of technopolitical participation.
6.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the technopolitics (syntax, semantics, and pragmatics) around
the  project  Decidim.barcelona,  as  well  as  its  impacts  on  institutional  forms  and
political ontology. Decidim.barcelona is the digital platform for participation of the city
of Barcelona, launched on the Spring of 2016. The chapter covers a period that goes
from the Autumn of 2014, peak of popularity of Podemos after its success in the May
2014 elections, and the Winter of  2016, date of the participatory process for the
democratic  (re)design  of  Decidim.barcelona.  Part  2  analyzes  the  technopolitical
networks and political conditions within the 15M cycle that made possible the launch
of  such  a  platform.  These  conditions  included  15M  inspired  citizen  candidacies
winning governments in cities such as Barcelona and Madrid in May 2015, 4 years
after the peak of the movement, a victory that opened an institutional moment. The
success of the “electoral assault” at the local level allowed the formation of teams of
innovation in democracy within the Participation councils of big cities. These teams
were composed by 15M activists and hacktivists, which found in technopolitics a key
element  for  the  realization  of  alter-democracy,  and  came  to  design  participatory
platforms such as Decidim.barcelona and Decide.madrid. This appeared as a step
forward towards institutionalizing the “real democracy” reclaimed by 15M.
Part  3  maps  the  discourses  on  democracy  and  technopolitics  around
Decidim.barcelona.  In  this  case,  the  role  of  alter-democratic  motives  clearly
predominates over alter- or even anti-representationalist themes. Like in the cases of
15M and the X party, there appear two strands of discourse: a normative discourse
towards  what  democracy  should  be,  the  other,  prescriptive  and  practical,  on  its
embodiment in the projects to get there. Part 3 moves between the micro level (texts
about organization and production of the Decidim.barcelona team) and the macro
level  (ideas about  democracy beyond representation).  Section 3.1 attends to  the
(self-referential)  discourse  of  technopolitical  production  that  underlies
Decidim.barcelona, driven by key notions such as “technopolitical democratization”.
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Section  3.2.  discusses  central  narratives  on  emerging  alter-democracy  and
technopolitical participation, which confront two paradigms at stake: the commons
government  and distributed democracy aspired  to  by Decidim and the corporate
open  government  model  embodied  in  the  Civiciti  platform,  sponsored  by  giant
Spanish telecom Telefonica.  Both  of  them say to  come to transform the existing
representative democracy, but they do so in rather different ways. Section 3.2. also
outlines  the  differences  among  two  15M  inspired  models  for  technopolitical
participation  and  alter-democracy,  namely,  the  critical-substantivist  (stronger  in
Barcelona, around the Decidim platform) and the proceduralist (stronger in Madrid,
around Decide.madrid platform).
Part 4 explores the technopolitical syntax of Decidim. Divided in two halves, the first
is  focused  on  the  politics  of  infrastructures,  while  the  second  attends  to  the
infrastructures for both technology (the technopolitical  production of Decidim) and
politics (the technopolitical participation on Decidim). As part of the exploration of the
politics  of  infrastructures  within  the  Decidim.barcelona  case  (section  4.1.)  I  dig
further into the contraposition of the Decidim and the Civiciti models. Then, in section
4.2.1. I analyze the organizational structures and key technological infrastructures
that were deployed in the development of Decidim. Finally, in 4.2.2. I analyze some
actual  and  forthcoming  affordances  of  the  platform,  otherwise,  its  technopolitical
syntax for alter-democracy.
Part  5  focuses  on  the  technopolitical  pragmatics  (that  is,  key  technopolitical
practices)  around  Decidim.  Section  5.1.  describes  some  key  practices  of
technopolitical production of the platform, which displayed a progressive process of
technopolitical  democratization  between  late  2015  and  late  2016.  Section  5.2.
describes a participatory process in Decidim.barcelona, MetaDecidim, which serves
to illustrate different aspects and challenges of technopolitical participation.
Then comes part 6. Section 6.1 describes some of the transformations in the State
form that derive from Decidim.barcelona. Section 6.2 attends to the challenges to the
modern liberal representative ontology coming from the processes of technopolitical
production and participation associated to it.
In the conclusions, I try to outline the how Decidim.barcelona accomplishes some of
the recurrent aims of the 15M cycle, how it faces old and new technopolitical and
democratic challenges, and what may come next.
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6.2. The case and the cycle
6.2.1. Let's hack
By the Autumn of 2014, months after the European Elections that brought Podemos
to the spotlight of Spanish and European politics, the party was soaring in voting
polls and media attention: the end of PP-PSOE bipartidism seemed near (Castro &
Picazo,  2014).  Podemos’ leading figure,  Pablo Iglesias,  professor  at  the Political
Science school  of the Complutense University in Madrid and political  media star,
appeared  as  the  representative  of  a  “new politics”.  The  return  of  representation
inaugurated by the X Party was in full sway.
The  weekend  of  October  17th and  18th was  the  date  of  the  party’s  constituent
assembly,  designed and expected to  be a public  display of  force.  The party  still
preserved a fresh appearance in the public eye. In spite of the tensions between
different sectors inside it, the hopes were many, not only among the growing rank
and file, but also among many activists who had taken part in the initiatives emerged
within the 15M cycle. Others were less optimistic.
A critical but hopeful position could be found in some technopolitical and hacktivist
quarters. Articles such as 15M hacktivist Isaac Hacksimov’s piece entitled “¿Quiénes
Podemos?  Nos  jugamos  un  partido”  (Who  can?  A party  is  at  stake),  published
coinciding  with  Podemos'  constituent  assembly,  questioned  the  “we”  behind  the
slogan “we can” (English translation of “Podemos”) and made a techno-anarchist
proposal  of  political  organization. Albeit  it  had no impact  on debates around and
within the constituent assembly, it  played a relevant role in the coalescence of a
technopolitical network that later came to play key roles in the democratic innovation
within Participation councils of the main “cities of change”. Synthetically: the writing
of the article, in which I collaborated, fostered the creation of a mail thread devoted
to criticisms and alternatives to the positions of Podemos's leadership on internal
organization of the party, and broader democracy issues. The thread included 15M
activists such as Miguel Arana (at the time key member of the Podemos Participation
Team, who later came to be part of the core of the Participation Council of the city of
Madrid) and Xabier Barandiaran (later on appointed Chief of Research, Development
and Innovation in Democracy of the Participation Council of Barcelona). The thread
evolved into the creation of a mailing list, called “Panic”, in November of that same
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year, and a Telegram335 group, called Hackeemos336 (Let's Hack), on November 3rd.
                       
 FIGURE 43. TITANPAD FOR THE TEXT "WHO CAN?"                                FIGURE 44. HACKEEMOS: TELEGRAM
On top of Barandiaran and Arana, these groups involved Pablo Soto, hacktivist and
15M activist, who on May 2015 became Participation Councilor of the city of Madrid.
As in the case of the X party, the connection to 15M and to the 15M cycle of the
people who came to be heads of departments of innovation in democracy of key
Spanish cities, who coordinated the development of new participatory platforms, was
clear.
6.2.1.1. Let’s win
The general outlines of how Soto, Barandiaran and Arana, 15M activists, came to
occupy those roles in municipal institutions within the two biggest cities in Spain is a
process that deserves at least a note here. It involves some of the central landmarks
of the 15M cycle of contention in political terms. It begins with the formation of two
citizen platforms: Guanyem Barcelona (Let's Win Barcelona) and Ganemos Madrid
(Let's  Win  Madrid),  which  later  became  Barcelona  en  Comú337 (Barcelona  in
Common) and Ahora Madrid (Madrid Now) respectively. These initiatives followed
the opening of the “electoral assault” by the X Party and Podemos; differently from
them, they did so with a “confluence” model that incorporated new and old actors in
335 Telegram is an instant messaging application.
336 The name followed the “we” logic of Podemos (we can) and Ganemos (Let's win).
337 The  confluence  candidacy  was  initially  named “Guanyem Barcelona”,  but  on  February  10 th it
officially changed its name to “Barcelona en Comú”. An individual had registered the name “Guanyem
Barcelona” on August 26th, 2014, blocking the use by the confluence, and the proceedings of the
Ministry of Home Affairs did not conclude in time for the candidacy to take it back in time for the May
2015 elections, in what Colau considered a sabotage by the Spanish elites (Europa Press, 2015).
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the field of left politics.
On May 24th, 2015, Barcelona en Comú (from now on BeC) won the local elections
of Barcelona earning 11 out of the 41 seats of the city council. PAH spokesperson
and 15M activist  Ada Colau was declared Major  on  June 12 th.  BeC was mostly
composed by young formations lacking an established structure, but it was able to
win the local elections of Barcelona with a participatorily written and ratified political
program338. Surely, technopolitical innovations played a role in it339, as they probably
did  in  the  case  of  Madrid340.  Ahora  Madrid  came  second  in  the  local  elections,
winning 20 out of the 57 seven seats in the local council, with the Popular Party
winning 21. Ahora Madrid got  an agreement with the Socialist  party to invest its
candidate, Manuela Carmena, as Madrid's new major.
With  or  without  pacts,  similar  confluence  candidacies  won  the  governments  of
relevant  cities  such  as  Zaragoza,  Valencia,  Cádiz,  A  Coruña,  Santiago  de
Compostela, or Iruña/Pamplona. This gave way to a municipalist wave on several
fronts. Surely in that of participation.
6.2.1.2. From hacking Podemos to hacking government
As the closing process of Podemos around a classical populist and hyper-leadership
structure accelerated (Sáenz de Ugarte,  2014) and the strength of the municipal
initiatives  grew,  the  attention  of  most  members  of  the  Hackeemos  group
progressively shifted from the former to the latter341. By March 2015 a new affinity
338 The collaborative writing and validation of Guanyem Barcelona's ethical code used dispositives
designed by 15M technopolitical activists and hackers (as explained in Toret, Aragón & Calleja-Lopez,
2014). Some of them, such as Javier Toret, were first involved in DRY and 15M, then on the X Party;
others, such as Andrés Pereira, came later to design Decidim.barcelona.
339 From a  technopolitical  standpoint,  it  is  worth  noticing  the  symbiotic  relation  on  social  media
between its key spokesperson, activist Ada Colau, the party, and the various communities composing
its technopolitical networks or “digital guerrilla” (in the words of Sandiumenge, 2015b). As analyzed by
Aragón et al.  (2016).  The communication networks of BeC were divided in two big sub-networks:
Colau's and the party's Twitter profiles built a highly centralized communication network around them
(which, interestingly, included the profiles of Ahora Madrid and Ahora Podemos), composing what has
been  defined  as  the  “party”  network  or  “front-end”  of  the  BeC  digital  communication  network;
connected to it  via bridges such as 15M activist  Toret's twitter profile, a decentralized network of
networks  and  communities  emerged  around  the  Twitter  profiles  of  BeC's  communication  team,
constituting the “movement” network or digital “back end” of the BeC digital communication network.
The performative symbiosis of this double end (a terminology used by Toret, 2015), between a party
or front-end, centralized sub-network,  and a movement or back-end, decentralized one, may well
have been one of the bases of the preeminence of this young and poorly funded citizen candidacy on
a relevant social media such as Twitter throughout the campaign.
340 Like in the case of Barcelona en Comú, they recurred to social media in intensive and innovative
ways during the campaign for the municipal elections. Particularly, the art and social media campaign
“Madrid  con  Manuela”  (Madrid  with  Manuela)  represented  a  landmark  of  multitudinous,  creative,
technopolitical practice after 15M, as described by Gutiérrez (2015).
341  Initiatives by other  collectives to  change Podemos from within  and without,  such as Occupy
Podemos, launched on November 2014, slowly lost traction in 2015. Their profile can still be found at
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group, broader than Hackeemos but with a similar composition and interests, was
created on Telegram. It was called Demons and involved hackers, academics, and
activists, some of which later became Participation counselors or advisors of cities
such as Zaragoza, Barcelona, A Coruña or Madrid, frequently. The paradigm on this
regard was anti-Sinde law hacktivist, and 15M activist, Pablo Soto, who came to be
Madrid's “hacker councilor” (or “concehack”, a wordplay with the Spanish term for
municipal councilor, “concejal”).    
Soon after forming the government cabinets in the summer of 2015, it was confirmed
that two Demons members, Soto in Madrid, and Gala Pin in Barcelona, would be in
charge of Participation. The expectations were high.
6.2.1.3. On the conditions of technopolitical production: a tale of two cities
If the trajectories of Barcelona en Comú and Ahora Madrid were close during the
“electoral assault” represented by the local elections, they remained connected as
this gave way to an “institutional assault” after May 25th: municipal institutions were
to be both governed and transformed. In terms of democracy and technopolitics, the
trajectories of different cities partially approached or diverged in the following year
and a half as a result of factors such as the position, vision and power of Demons
members within their municipalities. At this stage of the 15M cycle, technopolitical
becomings came more closely associated with institutional power.
With a clear plan and determination, Soto began to work from day one on a “Citizen
Participation  and  Open  Government  Application”  named  “Consul”342,  having  15M
activists  Miguel  Arana  and  Yago  Bermejo,  founders  of  the  democratic  software
organization Labodemo343, as his direct collaborators, with a group of programmers
under  their  command.  As  a  result,  they  had  their  digital  democracy  platform
Decide.madrid operative on September 7th, 2015, less than three months after Ahora
Madrid's government official investiture.
Differently,  in Barcelona,  Gala Pin charged with both Participation and the Ciutat
Vella District, had to devote much of her work to District issues. With delays directly
related to political and institutional conditions, it was only on April 2016 that Xabier
https://twitter.com/occupypodemos. Accessed on January 15th, 2016.
342 The developments of Consul in the last year are available at the open software repository Github:
https://github.comconsul/consul. Accessed on January 15th, 2017.
343 “Labodemo (abbreviation of Democratic Laboratory) is a tool for change for the new democracy
that wait for us in the XXIst century. Our goal is to open up institutions and organizations in order to
create a more participatory and democratic world”. This text and more information can be retrieved at
www.labodemo.net/es/acerca-de-labodemo/. Accessed on January 13th, 2017.
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Barandiaran (professor at the Basque Country university, hacktivist and 15M activist)
arrived in the city to coordinate a network that involved Arnau Monterde and myself
(members of the Networks, Movements, and Technopolitics research group, based
at the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute of the Open University of Catalonia), as well
as Andrés Pereira (from the web development association Alabs344 and Codegram (a
young startup company of a nearby city345).
Except  for  Barandiaran,  the  team  had  been  formally  collaborating  with  the  city
council since the Autumn of 2015, working on the production of Decidim.barcelona.
Decidim was launched on February 1st 2016, as a fork of Madrid’s Consul code. In
the process, Pereira, Barandiaran, Monterde and myself, along with Pablo Aragón
(15M  activist  and  data  researcher)  and  Javier  Toret  (DRY,  15M,  and  X  Party
participant and collaborator at NMT) had created to form a Telegram group named
“Compas”346, which is referred to in this chapter.
Similar  processes of  construction  of  development  teams and  digital  platforms of
participation have taken place in other “cities of change” in 2015. Frequently, but not
always, these platforms have been based on the Consul code347. Most of the groups
behind those deployments were coordinated by, or involved, earlier  15M activists
and Demons members.
On  May  2016,  during  an  event  on  “Democratic  Cities”348,  the  networks  around
Demons  coalesced  into  “Democomunes:  red  de  comunes  para  la  democracia”
(Democommons: network of commons for democracy).
344 Alabs is  a web development  association,  focused on free software and politically  progressive
projects. More information can be found at https://alabs.org/. Accessed on January 15th, 2017.
345 Codegram  is  a  startup  company  devoted  to  web  consultancy  and  development,  and  more,
including building a Ruby community in the Barcelona area www.codegram.comabout-us. Accessed
on January 16th.
346 “Compas” means “fellows” in Spanish, and was frequently used in 15M context.
347 The code can be accessed at https://github.comconsul/consul. Accessed on January 5th, 2017.
348 This  event  was organized as a  closure to  the European project  D-cent,  oriented towards the
development of digital tools for democracy and economic empowerment. More information on the
open  workshops  and  the  Democratic  Cities  event  can  be  found  here:  www.democratic-
cities.cc/sessions/creando-una-red-de-comunes-democraticos/. Accessed on January 20th, 2017.
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FIGURE 45. DEMOCOMUNES: TERRITORIAL AND THEMATIC NETWORKS, INCLUDING THE DECIDIM NETWORK.
SOURCE: ANTONIO BLANCO, XABIER BARANDIARAN & ANTONIO CALLEJA, 2016, LICENSE CC-BY-SA 4.0.
The image shows how the Democomunes’s statewide territorial network has its own
subnetworks at the local level. At the local level, Democomunes members connect
with  public  institutions,  development  companies,  academia,  as  well  as  activist
collectives. On the other hand, the “thematic” differentiation brings people to work on
concrete areas of interest for the network.
If, for 15M, the enemy was the political and the financial system, and the X party
focused its attack on established parties, for technopolitical participation projects the
rival position has been primarily occupied by big corporations trying to benefit from
“the massive business of government” (Montgomery, 2015).  In the Spanish case,
Open Seneca, the result of a joint venture of the giant Spanish Telecom Telefonica,
and the Catalan leading e-democracy company Scytl, each of which has invested 35
million (El Economista, 2016) for creating its main product:  Civiciti, a “platform of
continuous democracy”. This is the technopolitical alternative to the projects I have
been  mentioning  so  far,  which  will  recurrently  appear  as  a  potential  threat  and
counterpoint  in  the  economic,  technological  and  technopolitical  realm,  as
representative democracy appears in the political one.
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6.2.2. Teasing out the technopolitical threads of the chapter
In  order  to  understand the technopolitics of  democracy at  this stage of  the 15M
cycle,  the  chapter  focuses  on  three  collective  assemblages  and  three  general
matters of concern connected to them.
The first of those collective assemblages is composed by Compas (which could be
understood as the Barcelona node of the Democomunes network) and the Office for
Research,  Development  and Innovation in  Democracy (from now on abbreviated
“ORDID”),  both  based  in  Barcelona;  the  second,  which  appears  only  in  the
background,  is  the  Democomunes  network  (which  includes  participation  teams
similar to Compas or the ORDID in other big cities, such as Madrid); the third is the
active  citizenry  who  have  participated  in  the  first  processes  mediated  by
Decidim.barcelona.
When  it  comes  to  matters  of  concern,  the  first  is  networks  of  technopolitical
production  (in  this  case,  the  ones  around  Decidim.barcelona):  their  discourses,
practices, infrastructures, organizational structures, and governance. The second is
technopolitical participation or multitudinous technopolitical participation, and has to
do  with  models  and  experiences  of  multitudinous  digital  and  technopolitical
democracy in the city of Barcelona. The point in this case is to take a brief look at the
some  of  the  city  participatory  processes  that  have  taken  place  around
Decidim.barcelona. I connect these with a third matter of concern, namely, broader
discourses around common government and distributed democracy, and how this
model opposes to others such as the standard, liberal open government model or
the continuous democracy idea advocated by Civiciti.
In synthesis, three key actors of the 15M cycle: Compas, democomunes, and active
citizenry.  And three issues: production, participation, and democracy in a broader
sense.  These are  the  two triads to  be  attended at  this  stage of  the 15M cycle,
probably  the  one  in  which  the  question  of  technopolitics  has  gained  as  much
centrality as the one of democracy. The institutionalization of the discourses (ideas,
demands, etc.) and practices reaches here a step further, deeper into the structures
of the State than what 15M or the X Party (or even Podemos) had been able to
reach, posing the practical problem of the assault and transformation of institutions.
Interestingly, far from getting farther from civil society into the State, the idea behind
Decidim.barcelona has been to erase the modern walls separating the two neatly.
These are,  even if  not  exclusively,  from the 15M cycle  perspective,  the walls  of
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representation.
6.3. Semantics/discourses
After this simplified reconstruction of the becoming of various 15M networks working
on democracy and technopolitics and their main matters of concern, I attend to the
discourses  on  technologies,  democracy,  and  their  relationships,  that  they  have
produced.  First  (section  3.1.),  attention  is  put  on  discourses  on  technopolitical
production. If 15M defined its own modes of organization and aimed to prefigure in
them  the  democracy  to  come,  and  the  X  Party  essayed  internally  a  model  of
federation of  competences and participation that  had its  correlate  in  the broader
political field, Compas and the ORDID have also generated narratives around their
own functioning that try to prefigure and figure out how technopolitical aspects of
democracy  could  work.  Then  (section  3.2.)  I  look  at  their  discourses  around
Decidim.barcelona both on technologically mediated participation as well as around
democracy in a broader sense. First (3.2.1.) attention is devoted to some points on
participation  in  Decidim.barcelona.  Then  (3.2.2.),  the  alternative  model  of
“continuous”  democracy  advocated  by  the  corporation  Open  Seneca  is  outlined.
Finally (3.2.3.), the differences between the critical substantivist approach tied to the
idea of a distributed democracy and the positivist proceduralist one tied to the open
government model in Madrid are discussed. This last point is particularly relevant,
since it points to two different models of democracy within technopolitical networks
connected to  15M at  this stage of  the cycle.  As shown in part  5,  this has been
connected to differences in practice too.
6.3.1. Discourses of technopolitical production
6.3.1.1.  From  Compas  to  MetaDecidim:  technoacracy,  technopolitical
democratization and participatory commons
Compas has no public interface349.  The group exists only for the few people who
belong to or know about it, which overlap for the most part. It is what I may call a
“group of technopolitical affinity”. Its members share projects and general discursive
coordinates on issues intermingling politics and technology, as well as a personal
affinity tied to the previous two aspects. The affinity in terms of vision is especially
tight among the four of us who co-work at the ORDID: Xabier, Andrés, Arnau, and
myself. For Barandiaran, the group is a “hacker collective, technopolitical ninja team,
349 It  has no external, discursive collective identity: no web, no Twitter,  no Facebook account, nor
anything of the sort.
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and psychotherapy group, all-in-one”.
                                             
FIGURE 46. COMPAS INFORMAL LOGO.
Compas’ logo, reminiscent of the anarchist “A” symbol, is a multi-layered semiotic
game implicitly connecting technology, participation, commons, and anarchy 350, that
appropriately  symbolizes  what  may  be  defined  as  “technoacracy”.  A technoacrat
could be defined as an expert or technical practitioner in a given field (particularly,
that of formal politics) that actively works to subvert the hierarchies and forms of
power operating in that field and, potentially, others, by producing and enacting new
mediators for, and forms of, collective organization and decision making.
Compas's technoacracy is deeply rooted within the current state of the 15M cycle. It
roots itself  in the institutional  assault,  and is oriented to  put  the conditions for a
“distributed seizure of power” tied to, if not identified with, its radical redistribution 351.
If Podemos represented a populist assault to the heavens (as formulated by Iglesias
in his speech at Vistalegre on October 2014) by a few avantgarde leaders, Compas’
vision is that of a self-governed multitude retaking and remaking State institutions
350 In its original shape, this figure, reconfigurable and available online under a creative commons
license, displays a Compass. The first visual wordplay is clear: the Compass in the figure (in Spanish,
“Compas”)  stands  for  “Compas”,  which,  as  mentioned  above,  means  “fellows”  in  Spanish.
Furthermore,  it  can  also  function  as  an  acronym  for  “COMunes  PArticipativoS”  (participatory
commons). Furthermore, by moving the angular shape of the Compass downwards, an “A” emerges
that evokes the traditional anarchist sign, an association aided by the black and white of the design.
This suggests the affinity of the core group with the tradition of anarchism in a city like Barcelona. In a
more complex way, the figure of the Compass gives to it a “technomasonic” edge (as we commented
while having lunch on the day we began to internally use the logo), and freely associates it to the
mathematics of coding, one of the main tasks of the group. The figure may also resemble the multi-
stable image of a person from a frontal and a side- perspective, waving an arm.
351 Ideas around democratization and participation are connected to a crucial discursive tenet for the
group: to nurture a radical redistribution of power. In this light, and beyond the idea of “taking power
for redistributing it”, suggested by Toret (2014) during a public talk and others later on (Castro et al.,
2016), for Barandiaran political participation should be thought as a “distributed seizure of power” (as
he responded to Toret after his talk).
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and the city.
One may say technoacrats aim to end with, to be the end of, technocrats. Not of
technicians, but of technicians as ultimate decision makers. This includes to abolish
themselves as a closed group of political planners centralizing decision making on
technical public issues. The ORDID documents have as a key goal to democratize,
on the one hand, political decision making (this is a key task of Decidim.barcelona)
and, on the other, the products and the very task of democratic innovation. Much of
Compas'  and  ORDID's  work  is  oriented  to  produce  the  legal,  organizational,
discursive  and  technological  codes  (what  may  be  called  “technopolitical  codes”)
necessary for such a democratization to happen.
This  is  discursively  clear  in  a  variety  of  ORDID  texts,  particularly  around
MetaDecidim.  MetaDecidim  is  a  space  in  Decidim.barcelona  were  processes  to
“participatorily redesign” Decidim.barcelona will take place periodically. The first was
initiated on November 2016. The process is analyzed in section 5.2. As defined in
the “Decidim Decalogue”, which I heavily contributed to write down352
“MetaDecidim is a place to decide the democracy we want. MetaDecidim is an open
space and process to decide how we decide, a place enabled in Decidim.barcelona
(and face to  face events)  for  the citizenry  to  build,  watch over  and improve the
platform. Code is law, it defines what can or cannot be done in a concrete digital
space, and Decidim's is decided by everyone. MetaDecidim also aspires to be a
community  and a  production  ecosystem,  as  well  as  a  lobby,  able  to  define  and
reclaim  new  standards  of  democratic  quality.  A  community  that  takes  care  of
Decidim.barcelona. Because democracy is more if we build it together.”
The ideas behind this  and other  ORDID texts cannot  be understood without  the
practices and discourses of the technopolitical cycle opened in 2011. They tie the
discursive  fabric  of  Decidim.barcelona  to  hacktivism,  15M  activism  and  the
institutional  assault.  However,  differently  from  earlier  initiatives,  the  connection
between democracy and technology is brought to the center of the discourse, which
352 In terms of internal, discursive interpretation, the difference between Compas and the ORDID and
the personnel associated to the latter can be synthesized in a comment by Barandiaran in Telegram
indicating that “we are core ninja, but we begin to have an army”. The former has its own fight tactics,
codes,  practices,  oaths,  aims,  visions,  experiences,  skills,  and  resources.  While  the  ninja  image
evokes a silent, fast, artsy, flexible, informal, underground collective, the army still maintains a public
form, hierarchy, pay-per-work, formality, duty, bigger numbers, brute force, material resources, etc.
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was not the case neither in 15M nor in the X Party, where this link remained under-
discussed (with the exception of discussions around n-1).
The  text  outlines  what  may  be  defined  as  the  “spiral  of  technopolitical
democratization”:  a  recursive,  growing  loop  of  deployment  of  technology  and
technologically  mediated  processes  for  furthering  political  democratization  (which
may be considered the political reading of technopolitical democratization) tied to the
articulation of processes of democratization of technology (which may be labelled as
its  technological  reading).  Decidim  is  presented  as  a  technology  for  the
democratization of democracy, bringing it beyond the liberal representative model,
MetaDecidim  is  a  space  and  process  for  democratizing  technology  (concretely,
Decidim.barcelona)  bringing  it  beyond  the  technocratic  model  of  design,
development and management.
The text speaks of a code and a community open to anyone and everyone, rather
than closed to most, as both private and public-technocratic projects are, either in
their production, their management, or their profits. MetaDecidim would thereby be a
step  towards  technoacracy,  towards  the  democratization  of  technology  and
technological innovation. Furthermore, by doing so, MetaDecidim would become an
open community that decides what democracy should be and how to get there by
redesigning a power mediator such as Decidim. These are the coordinates of the
normative discursive around MetaDecidim.
6.3.2. Discourses on technopolitical participation and alter-democracy
6.3.2.1. Decidim.barcelona: digital infrastructures for alter-democracy
At this stage of the 15M cycle, discourses on participation and democracy become
connected to institutions, generating both new political opportunities and tensions.
Furthermore, as I noticed, technologies move to the center of the discussion. They
become a central source of discourse on the new forms of democracy. I will begin
with the Decidim.barcelona web, whose texts are indicative of the ORDID discourse
on democracy in relation to Decidim.barcelona353.
353 I take texts from Decidim.barcelona as of December 15th, 2016.
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FIGURE 47. DECIDIM.BARCELONA HOMEPAGE. 
    TEXT: "WE DECIDE/LET´S DECIDE THE CITY WE WANT".
The biggest caption on the web homepage says “Let's decide the Barcelona we
want”.  The  sentence  clearly  connects  with  the  calls  “let's  win”  of  the  citizen
candidacies or the “let's hack” of the technopolitical networks mentioned in Part 2. It
is an interpellation to the citizenry to decide how it wants things to work, as Miguel
Arana reclaimed five years earlier (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, it is formulated from
a citizen viewpoint, as citizenry interpellating citizenry, a “we” that is to answer and
constitute itself in the call354. In this the call follows the X party approach of appealing
to  the  “citizenry”  status  of  the  people  behind  the  initiative,  to  deny  the  neat
separation that the representation system imposes between institutions (be it parties
or municipal offices) and their constituents.  With Decidim this aims to go beyond
discourse  and  semantics,  and  be  translated  infrastructurally,  into  a  new
technopolitical syntax of participation.
The discourse at the website Decidim.barcelona thereby institutionalizes the 15M
cycle’s  discourse  of  democracy  (“real  democracy”,  in  the  DRY  case,  and
“democracy, period”, in the X Party case). If one of the initial demands of Nolesvotes
and 15M was to bring about a more real democracy, to transform institutions and
354 In  the  Catalan  context,  it  also  reverberates  with  the  debates  around  the  “right  to  decide”  of
Catalonia concerning its political relation with Spain. The centrality and double sense of “Decidim” is
inscribed in the very name and URL of the platform “Decidim.barcelona”, which can be translated as
either “let's decide Barcelona” or as “we decide Barcelona”. The “we” and the “decision” are put at the
center of the discourse around the platform, and is turned into the very core of its linguistic substance:
its name.
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make them closer to the people, Decidim.barcelona tries to embody and achieve that
in the institutional sphere. In the 15M fashion, it aims to open up public institutions
and their very “code” to participation (open source democracy, in terms of Rushkoff,
2003, used by the Deputy Mayor to describe the platform, Asens, 2016).
As synthesis of this, in the Decidim Decalogue, it is stated that “Decidim is a political
network for a transparent, multi-mode, multitudinous, and multi-scale participation”.
Much of what Decidim.barcelona is expected to do is synthesized in this sentence.
Its political function is to serve as a platform for collective intervention into public
policies, from legislation to action, from budgets to government agendas. But beyond
this,  Decidim  aims  to  be  a  reconfigurable  software  enabling  collective  self-
organization,  decision  making  and  action,  as  well  as  empowerment,  across  the
social field. Otherwise, a digital infrastructure for alter-democratic governance within
and beyond the municipal government. A technopolitical version of the participatory
democracy, and a new version of the autonomist democracy model (see chapter 2).
6.3.2.2. Civiciti: the corporate open government model of technopolitical participation
Since my focus here lies with projects within what I have called “the 15M cycle of
technopolitical reassembling of democracy”, I cannot devote much time to present
and study the central,  corporate alternative to the Decidim model,  Civiciti.  Some
comments are in order, nevertheless.
       
FIGURE 48. CIVICITI HOMEPAGE.
As I  mentioned,  Civiciti  is  a  platform developed by  the  company Open Seneca,
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funded by Telefonica and Scytl. Civiciti presents itself as a “platform for continuous
democracy”. What this means is clarified by its official website355 self-description:
“We  help  citizens,  public  administrations  and  organisations  around  the  world
discover, discuss and decide on the issues they care about.
In the age of Facebook and Twitter, citizens don’t want to wait four years to give their
leaders thumbs up or thumbs down: they want their voices heard before, during and
after elections. At the same time, public administrations want to be more attentive to
their citizens’ needs by being more transparent, accessible and inclusive [...] Civiciti
is an online community to connect local governments with their citizens. We provide
a neutral, secure and independent platform for public participation and continuous
democracy [...] Civiciti is about more than just your city: it’s a network of communities
all around the globe”
This is a neat synthesis of the Civiciti approach, which I define as a “corporate open
government model”. In the text just cited, the three cornerstones of open government
(Lathrop  &  Ruma,  2010),  namely,  transparency,  participation,  and  horizontal
networked collaboration (between citizenry and government and within government
itself)  are  discursively  present.  The  “corporate”  adjective  serves  to  stress  the
production, property and management model behind this infrastructure, and is to be
distinguished  from  “common”  or  “public-common”  models.  I  further  explore  this
distinction in section 4.1.2.
To begin to understand its main differences with the Decidim approach, it is enough
to look at the image above, which presents its main website. The text is rhetorically
oriented  towards  city  governors:  “don't  wait  till  the  next  election  to  listen  to  the
people”.  Compare this with the leitmotiv in the Decidim platform, which is clearly
directed to the people and formulated from within it: “let's decide the city we want”.
The Civiciti  text clearly shows its dependence of a representative model of digital
democracy,  even  if  it  is  combined  with  aspects  of  a  participatory  (or,  rather,
plebiscitarian) model.
The  formula  “continuous  democracy”,  taken  from Rodotà  (1997),  is  the  word  of
choice to define a democracy open to people’s intervention in “real time”. This is a
feature shared by Decidim. Nevertheless, the discursive differences appear quickly:
355  The can be accessed at https://www.civiciti.com/home. Accessed on January 20th, 2017.
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citizens are presented as giving “thumbs up or thumbs down” to their “leaders”. The
image of the “thumb” connects with the “appellative politics” typical of clicktivism or
what we may call “click-participation”. Furthermore, the reference to leaders confirms
the primacy of the representative model,  but with a technoplebiscitarian turn: the
language  in  the  text  substitutes  “representatives”  with  “leaders”  which  seems to
stress the authority of the latter. The text also includes the classical references to
“transparency” in open government discourses, which fit neatly with traditional liberal
representative democracy.
In synthesis, coming back to the heading of the Civiciti platform and recurring to a
wordplay, I may say the difference in vision between Civiciti and Decidim is between
a liberal representative call to “leaders” to “talk to your city”356 and a participatory-
autonomist call by the citizenry to the citizenry to decide and take the city 357 (and, as
we see in MetaDecidim, to become recursive). Decidim’s call roots itself into the 15M
cycle, and some of implications of this can be seen in the differences in semantics
just noticed, as well as in syntax and pragmatics.
6.3.2.3.  Democomunes:  two  15M  models  of  technology  and  democracy  (critical
substantivists vs positivist proceduralists)
However,  the  unfolding  of  the  15M cycle  has  not  been  univocal,  as  if  it  had  a
necessary direction and a unitary reading. By late 2016 it was possible to find clear
differences  in  views  of  both  technologies  and  democracy  within  15M  inspired
projects themselves. Two (at least, two) clearly differentiable positions on this matter
could be found within the Democomunes network. Simplifying the various nuances, I
will divide the discursive field in two: the position predominant in Madrid, especially in
the discourses of Miguel Arana and Yago Bermejo, founders of Labodemo, and the
predominant position in Barcelona, in the discourses of the Decidim team.
Analyzing different texts of their website and exchanges within the Demons and the
Democomunes telegram groups, it seems appropriate to suggest such a distance.
Interventions by Yago Bermejo in a discussion on technology and democracy in the
Demons telegram group illustrates Madrid’s position: “a tool requires a user. Which is
the population. And nobody says that this participation driver begins to walk with a
tool alone. But I believe that something like Consul is part of the basic kit.” Later in
356 The use of the pronoun “your” makes the sentence especially problematic from a political viewpoint
after 15M and the municipalism of change.
357 As suggested by Javier Toret, “take the city” seems a logical discursive and practical step to pose
in 2016 for actors within the 15M cycle of contention, after taking the streets, digital networks and the
squares, in 2011, the electoral space in 2014, and municipal institutions in the Spring of 2015.
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the conversation, he added: “when I think in “population” I think of this 1-2% (open to
anyone). The participative population (dozens of thousands of people) representing
the whole and substituting representatives.”
This is obviously not a theoretical elaboration, and yet, it is indicative. There appear
the generic “people” or “participative population” (a term frequently used by Bermejo
that  can  be  found  in  Labodemo’s  website358 too),  the  “tool”  (a  software  such  as
Consul) and the digital processes in which the former use the later for deliberation,
decision making, etc.
There are three key discursive points that are to be attended and that distinguish this
view from the approach of the Decidim team in Barcelona: the first is an approach to
participation defined by a typically modern view of the social, which recurs to notions
such as “population”, tied to the emergence of statistics and State census (Porter,
1996), as well as to the study of population dynamics by mathematical biology in the
XVIII century. The second is the view of participation technologies as “tools”, which
connects  to  the  instrumentalist  view of  technology as  a  decontextualized,  value-
neutral, transparent and controllable mean. The third, probably the most crucial one,
partly connected to the second point, is the focus on democratic procedures over its
conditions, principles or results.  As Arana already pointed out in his interview for
15M.cc back in 2011,
“We could decide that what we want is to put a tax to transactions, that we want to
rise up the basic income, that we want to do something with renewable energies...
that, for me, is a step afterwards. Because they are concrete victories that are lost as
soon as they are gained. I believe we should focus on the essential: that they stop
deciding for us, that people begin to be the ones who decide how they want the
world to work”.
These  points:  populationism  (rather  than  populism  as  defined  in  chapter  2),
instrumentalism, and proceduralism are connected to the Open Government model
to which the Decide.madrid project abides to. An open government model that in
Decide.madrid is defined by “participation, transparency, and open data”.
An alternative narrative to these four points can be found in texts by the Decidim
358 These  terms  can  also  be  found  at  Labodemo’s  website  www.labodemo.net/what-do-we-do/.
Accessed on January 15th, 2017.
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team.  I  will  take  the  question  of  the  subject  of  participation  first.  As  noted  by
Barandiaran in response to Yago Bermejo on the Demons group:
“for me the problem here is the abstraction “the population”. That population is not a
subject, it is a statistical mass. There always exists an organic organization of that
“population”, even in 15M, what there is a multi-scale structure, inter-communitarian,
the social structured in multiple layers and collectivities. There wouldn't have been
15M (in Madrid, for instance) without the interconnection between already existing
communities such as Patio Maravillas, DRY, neighborhood assemblies, etc. It is not
true that there exists “the population” and “a tool” and that such a relation is enough
for articulating a democracy. It is necessary to recognize and allow the community
and mesoscopic articulation of the social (nor micro nor macro). In that, right now, I
believe the difference between Decidim.barcelona and Decide.madrid is important,
and it will be even more so as the development plans grow further apart”.
If that leaves clear the differences when it comes to the ways of thinking about the
subject  of  participation,  namely,  a  discourse  that  thinks  in  terms  of  populations
against one that thinks in terms of multitudes (as exposed in Monterde et al., 2015
and suggested above, when discussing 15M’s identity), a similar difference (already
insinuated in Barandiaran's quote above), has to do with the view of technologies.
Contrary to Bermejo's view of them as “tools”, the Decidim Decalogue notes:
“Decidim is not a digital tool, it is the seed of a new type of democratic institution, a
technopolitical infrastructure of the democracy of the future, a space of construction
and conflict, a community and a growing ecosystem of participation”
Surely  the  technopolitical  approach  at  the  Decidim  team  results  from  a  critical
reading (by that I understand the tradition of political philosophy and philosophy of
technology  from  Marx  to  Langdon  Winner)  of  both  politics,  the  social,  and
technology. That is a key difference with the Madrid group.
To close this portrayal of differences within two technopolitical teams within the 15M
cycle, it is worth to dig into the idea of alter-democracy proposed by the ORDID. It
appears not only as an alternative to representative democracy but also to both the
corporate open government model of Civiciti as well as to the “technoproceduralist”
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open  government  paradigm in  Madrid.  It  outlines  a  position  may  be  defined  as
“technosubstantivist”,  and  is  tied  to  what  may  be  defined  as  a  “distributed  and
augmented democracy” model.  Here I quote the ORDID’s Development Strategic
plan  at  length,  since  the  text  outlines  many  of  the  keys  of  this  alter-democratic
model:
“according to this model [open government], democratic institutions and processes
must be transformed in order to increase their level of transparency, participation,
and  horizontal  networked  collaboration,  internally  as  well  as  in  relation  to  the
citizenry (Lathrop & Ruma, 2010). However, as it already happened in the debate
between  Richard  Stallman  and  Eric  S.  Raymond  around  the  paradigms  of
development of free software (Kelty, 2008), the open source model is compatible
with neoliberal modes of production, management, and appropriation of democratic
infrastructures.  [...]  in  its  reduced  version  (the  most  extended  one),  the  Open
Government model ends up confused with and reduced to transparency policies [...]
the paradigm of Open Government is compatible with a more efficient, sustainable
and, on that regard, perfected neoliberal system, albeit equally unequal in economic,
political, symbolic, cultural or other terms.
Democracy is not only a matter of forms of government. As noticed by Rosanvallon
(2008), in a deeper sense “democracy” names a civic activity, a regime, a form of
society,  and a  mode  of  government.  An  active  and  distributed  democracy,  that
supports itself on ICTs and the practices associated to them in order to potentiate
and innovate in their different dimensions (direct, deliberative, etc., Pindado, 2012),
that extends these practices to a growing number of social spheres (including the
design  and  management  of  technologies  themselves,  thereby  democratizing  the
“second constitution” of society),  is also an “augmented” democracy”. Democracy
today  implies  a  critical  technopolitics  and  a  continuous  innovation,  in  a  public-
common key, as conditions for its deepening and widening. The Open Government
paradigm,  especially  when  it  leans  on  services  from big  corporations,  is  clearly
insufficient on this regard.”
The document goes further, stating that the model of a distributed democracy
[...]  is  based on a set of  institutional  actions explicitly oriented to redistribute the
economic, political, symbolic and cultural capitals (otherwise, a transformation of the
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power  relationships)  in  the  city  (Castro  et  al.,  2016).  This  model  leans  on  the
coproduction  of  public  policies  (articulated  through  participatory  organs  and
processes oriented to share public power), community strengthening (embodied in
public-communitarian action, which implies the transfer of public power to common
spaces, but without reducing the public contribution of resources) and citizen control
(which makes use of mechanisms such as recalls or transparency laws in order to
control public power).”
The discourse in Madrid and Barcelona holds many differences: a different view of
the subject (population vs multitude), technologies (instrumentalism vs criticism), the
core (proceduralism vs substantivism), and the general model of democracy. There
is a model of direct digital democracy and open government and one of distributed
and augmented democracy as well as (what I may call) common government. While
the former connects with the idea of a participatory population involved in democratic
procedures, the latter is tied to the discourse of a recursive multitude democratizing
the material conditions of society, under a critical pro-commons view359, starting with
the infrastructures of democracy themselves.
The  views  of  both  technology  and  society  in  Madrid  were  inspired  by  modern
positions: social and technological progressive positivism. This implies a view of the
social  and technological  fields as somehow pacified,  value-neutral  and intelligible
realities.  An updated version of  the Enlightenment’s  optimist  views of technology
(Mitcham, 1994). In Barcelona, the views drew much more from critical theories of
both technology and society, from Marx to Langdon Winner. One may say Decidim
is,  very  explicitly,  a  case  of  applied,  critical,  philosophy  of  technology.  A critical
progressivism that  considers  the  social  and  technology  as  fields  of  political  and
ontological, value-laden construction and conflict (what Papadopoulos 2011 defines
as “grounded”).
These differences between Madrid and Barcelona, though, grow on the basis of a
common allegiance to the main 15M discourses and practices.
359 Here I use the formula “common” rather than “commons” to: 1- emphasize its critical approach to
many existing economic practices, which is not necessarily present in discourses and practices of the
“commons” literature (Laval & Dardot, 2014); 2-underline the centrality of “common people” in it and
separate it from the usually economic-centric discourse around the commons; 3-connect it with the
emerging discourse around “the common” in initiatives such as Barcelona en Comu.
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6.4. Syntax/(Infra)structures
All  the  cases  analyzed  in  this  dissertation,  Decidim  is  the  best  example  of  the
complex connection between technopolitics and democracy. For this reason, unlike
in the previous two cases, I carry on a full syntactic analysis: the first half of this part
is  devoted to  the  analysis  of  the  politics  of  infrastructures  (or  technologies);  the
second, to (infra)structures (or technologies) for politics (otherwise, some of its key
affordances and performances). The first half (4.1.) explores in some detail some of
the comments on part 3 on Decidim.barcelona as a public-commons infrastructure
for  democracy,  and compares it  to the proprietary model  of  Civiciti,  showing key
aspects  of  technopolitical  contention  at  this  stage  of  the  15M  cycle.  This
contraposition both repeats and variates the contraposition between autonomist and
corporate social networks back in 2011 (as analyzed in chapter 4).
The  second  half  (4.2.)  describes  the  technopolitical  syntax  of  Decidim  as
infrastructure  for  technopolitical  participation  (connecting  to  discourses in  section
3.2. and the practices described in section 5.2.).
6.4.1.  Politics  of  infrastructures:  Decidim.barcelona,  Decide.madrid,  and
Civiciti
6.4.1.1. Decidim.barcelona: public-common political networks for democracy
The politics of Decidim.barcelona has already been partially indicated in section 3.1.
It has multiple facets, which I try to briefly synthesize here. In a sentence, Decidim is
a  political  network  developed  as  a  free  software  project,  a  publicly  funded
infrastructure  and  a  commons-based  (participatorily  designed  and  managed)
technology, that aspires be a model and source code for similar platforms oriented to
potentiate alter-democracy.
In a tv talk, Barandiaran (2016b) presented Decidim as a political network, to be
distinguished from the existing social networks, such as Facebook or n-1 itself. In the
latter, the forms of association are broader, in the corporate case, usually of either
individual  or  interindividual  character,  with  a  clear  nexus  to  entertainment,
commodification and prosumption processes (consumption of products and of other
users’  content)  usually  of  apolitical  nature.  Differently,  according  to  the  Decidim
Decalogue, political networks built on and around Decidim would have the “political
bond”, collaboration and collective decision making on the common good as their
central  purposes.  This  difference  outlines  a  displacement  from the  more  diffuse
social sphere in 15M towards a new landscape of clearly political associations in the
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institutional  one.  As  suggested  by  Barandiaran  in  that  same  interview,  while
Facebook  is  a  book  of  faces  with  the  self  at  the  center,  platforms  such  as
Decidim.barcelona and Decide.madrid serve to decide in common.
Furthermore, Decidim is a publicly funded digital infrastructure. It is developed as a
free  software  project,  which  means  its  code  is  freely  accessible,  modifiable,
shareable, and reusable, even more so under the new modular development model
(Pereira  &  Blanco,  2016)  that  will  make  it  even  more  adaptable  to  other  social
settings and institutions. But the Decidim model goes much further than the open
source  or  even  the  free  software  models.  Thanks  to  MetaDecidim,  it  will  be
participatorily designed and managed. By opening its features to citizen redesign,
the  platform  is  becoming  an  experiment  in  democratization  of  technology.
Furthermore, this implies to democratize the design of the participation processes
running on it too (how this may work is described in section 4.2. below). With public
funding  but  participatory  design  and  management,  Decidim  is  called  to  be  an
experiment of a new model of democratic, public-common infrastructure. This is a
form of technopolitical commoning that moves from a free software model (usually
driven by elitist ideas of meritocracy) to one of democratic software, in the double
sense  of  its  shape  being  decided  by  anyone  and  everyone  (and  their  needs,
regardless of expertise) and by being software for democracy.
This  view connects  with  the  participatory  politics  of  technoscience  presented  by
Papadopoulos (2011), nevertheless, in its connections to critical discourses around a
distributed democracy and the commons it seems to point towards autonomist alter-
ontologies. If the Lorea networks and n-1 aimed to be social networks of and for the
people, Decidim aims to be a political network of, by, and for the multitude: the basis
for a recursive and augmented democracy. The combination of the characteristics
enumerated above make of it a project clearly distinguishable from the one exposed
in the following section.
6.4.1.2. Civiciti: closed proprietary software for a corporate open government
Since, at the time of writing this section, Civiciti  is not openly accessible online, I
base the analysis of  its technopolitical  syntax on the contents in its website and
some fieldwork materials. I combine some notes on its politics of infrastructure and
its  infrastructural  affordances  (or  what  these  may  be,  in  principle)  into  a  single
section.
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Civiciti works under a typical service for profit model360. Open Seneca, the company
behind it, develops the platform and offers a closed package. Civiciti is announced to
work under a “freemium” model in which a number of services are free while others
such as participatory budgeting and secured citizen consultations will require paid
subscription.  The  concrete  free  services  and  their  temporal  extension  are  not
specified in its website. Neither is the ownership of the data introduced and produced
in the platform. At a time when data has been dubbed “the new oil”, this is obviously
a key issue.
Civiciti presents itself as a solution for the insufficiencies of democracy in the “age of
Facebook and Twitter”. The instrumentalist and techno-solutionist (Morozov, 2013)
rationale for why a continuous democracy has not been possible until now is that the
tools were “incomplete,  complex or cost prohibitive”.  As my reconstruction of the
15M cycle shows, things are usually more complicated.
More  crucially,  Civiciti  presents  itself  as  a  “neutral,  secure  and  independent
platform”. An episode may serve to situate the intention of such a claim. In an open
debate between an Open Seneca representative, Barandiaran, and representatives
from several  free software projects,  the former asked the audience whether they
would trust an independent company or the Popular Party to be in charge of the
software of democracy. This was a thinly veiled attack against Decidim, created by a
public  institution,  sponsored  by  a  given  party  government361.  On  the  spot,
Barandiaran  essayed  two  counter-arguments:  neutrality  and  security  can  be
ascertained by anyone by looking at the code (otherwise, what could be defined as
the interdependence, rather than independence, of free software development362). At
this  point,  Barandiaran  took  advantage  to  denounce  that  Civiciti's  code,  albeit
allegedly already operative, was nowhere to be found, and thereby “Open Seneca”
was not open at all. The second counter-argument, which unleashed the laughs in
the auditory,  was (checking at his smartphone on the go) to read the number of
360  All the quotes in this section are taken from the official Civiciti website https://www.civiciti.com.
Consulted on December 15th, 2016.
361 This attack is technopolitical (technocratic) version of classical neoliberal argumentation supporting
the privatization and externalization of municipal services and infrastructures.
362 Months later,  MetaDecidim opened a further  check to  guarantee no only  the neutrality  or  the
independence of  the platform, but to potentiate its democratic character.  The key of  the Decidim
model is to make the platform not independent but interdependent, to connect it to a growing number
of actors in society, rather than reducing them to a selected set of representatives, technicians and
corporate actors. The key is not to pretend a political neutrality but rather a form of recognized and
democratic  pluralism.  That  is  guaranteed  by  the  definition  of  the  platform  as  a  public-common
resource.  The  platform  is  to  be  owned  and  managed  by  public  servants  and  citizens.  Such  a
management is a form of constructing a civic common, in terms of Rosanvallon (2013).
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members of the Popular Party seating at the Council of Telefonica, co-financer of
Open  Seneca.  In  a  typical  15M  gesture,  the  pretension  of  “independence”  and
distance between big corporations and mainstream parties was reframed as a fake.
Moving from Civiciti’s politics of infrastructure into its affordances, it is relevant to
note  how  a  key  difference  with  Decidim  seems  to  lie  in  Civiciti’s  anticipated
connection to physical spaces and processes. Against the Decidim model in which,
under  15M inspiration,  multi-layered and multi-layering  participation  is  key,  in  its
website Civiciti makes no articulated references to the operative connection between
digital and face to face spaces. If not deeply thought and articulated, a gap between
digital and physical participation potentially opens: continuous democracy may well
become  a  discontinuous  one.  Judging  by  its  website,  Civiciti's  democracy  is
primarily,  if  not  merely,  digital.  A risk  is  to  potentiate  what  may be called  “click-
participation”.  Multilayered  dynamics  are  crucial  if  democracy  is  not  to  become
merely  digital,  but  rather,  as  in  the  proposal  by  Barandiaran  and  Calleja-López
(2016), “augmented”.
In spite of the apparent similarities due to the discursive emphasis on issues such as
participation or open software (which remains unfulfilled in Civiciti's case), and the
unfinished state of both projects, Decidim’s public-common and Civiciti’s corporate
model can now be clearly distinguished. The Decidim model of technopolitical syntax
points towards a new technopolitical regime (to use Hecht's, 1998 expression) that
takes distance from corporate  infrastructures  and relies on public-common ones.
This decreases the technological dependence on commercial platforms, an objective
central to n-1 and the Lorea network at the time of 15M; furthermore, it prevents
them the closure of new forms of democracy under a corporate open government
model.
6.4.2. (Infra)structures for technopolitical democracy: Decidim.barcelona
Beyond  its  code,  Decidim.barcelona  is  a  much  broader  project  for  the
democratization of democracy, for its technopolitical democratization. But what does
this mean in terms of technopolitical affordances and syntax? Although they are in
continuous flux, I will describe some of the main ones as of December 2016.
Decidim allows, for the first time, to have both a space and a shared structure for all
the participatory processes sponsored by the City Council of Barcelona.
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FIGURE 49. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: PROCESSES.
The main page includes a screen with “salient processes” and a link to all the rest.
This means the city counts now with a space where one can find and participate in
all public participatory processes.
FIGURE 50. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: PROCESS STRUCTURE.
Each  process  has  a  homepage  with  a  timeline  of  its  phases  and  its  stage  of
development. The kinds of activities allowed to users are multiple, primarily: to make
proposals  (with  attached  descriptions  and  documentation),  to  comment  them (in
favor, against, or neutrally), to evaluate those comments (positively or negatively),
and to vote the proposals.
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FIGURE 51. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: PROPOSALS.
Users can navigate through the  proposals,  choose to  follow them,  or  filter  them
according  to  different  categories363.  While  most  functions,  such  as  making  and
commenting proposals,  are allowed to all  users,  only those registered in the city
census can vote. Users have a customizable profile that allows a fully anonymous
activity in the platform.
In order to potentiate hybrid, multi-layered dynamics, of the type described in 15M
(the inspiration is explicitly recognized in Monterde et al, 2015b), the platform has
been designed to allow geolocalization of physical events, which are displayed in a
map. In the next months, it will also allow to geolocalize proposals364.
363 Some of them are provenance (City Council, individuals, organizations, physical meetings), area
(City, District), thematic axis (which vary among processes), and date.
364 Currently, they are already tagged and filtered as connected to face to face meetings.
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FIGURE 52. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: MAP.
Furthermore, as part of the technopolitical, multi-layering model of participation tied
to Decidim, proposals, discussions, and information from physical meetings are to be
uploaded to the platform365; reciprocally, content generated online can be brought into
face to face meetings for discussion.
In  order  to  potentiate  multi-layer  dynamics,  the  platform  has  also  made  every
process or  proposal  easily  shareable  on social  media.  Furthermore,  a  profile  on
Twitter was set up under the name “Decidim barcelona” (@Decidimbcn).
                    
FIGURE 53. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: PROPOSAL SHARING SCREEN.
365 Information including place, time, number of people and organizations attending,  minutes,  and
other relevant information is uploaded into a “face to face” meeting register.
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FIGURE 54. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: TWITTER PROFILE (@DECIDIMBCN).
After noticing some of the key features of the platform, I want to comment some of
the key innovations under development. Decidim is bringing a digital layer to all the
participatory  processes organized by  the  town hall  (and,  potentially,  other  social
organizations). A challenge associated to this has been to define the basic elements
of  participatory processes.  The result  has been a “process configurator”  that  will
provide a step-by-step process for designing a process366.  This clearly implies an
effort  in  technical  standardization,  and  somehow  turning  the  platform  into  a
customizable assembly line for participatory processes.
This  process  of  standardization  is  connected  to  a  number  of  steps  oriented  to
radically and recursively democratize participation. The first is the intention, in the
mid-term,  to  develop  an  interface that  allows  anyone  and everyone to  set  up  a
participatory process on Decidim (unlike the current restricted format, in which only
public servants can do so). The configurator is a way of making it both equal and
easy for everyone to set them up. As a proleptic solution to the potential overloading
of processes, the informal idea is currently to develop ranking and filtering enabling
collaborative filtering and prioritization of participatory processes.
Another relevant element in the Decidim development plan for the next months367 is
366 As  it  stands,  the  stages  (some  of  which  may  not  be  activated  at  a  given  process)  will  be
“information”,  “diagnostic”,  “contributions-decision”,  “return”,  “evaluation”,  “follow  up”,  and
"accountability”.  The components or functionalities that can be activated for a given stage are the
following: “debate”, “face to face meeting”, “proposals”, “polls”, “questions”, and “collaborative texts”.
367 This has been included among MetaDecidim's most voted proposals and will  most probably be
carried on.
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to introduce a “module for citizen calls to face to face meetings”, which will allow
people to organize and use the platform to publicize their face to face participatory
meetings on municipal facilities.
In  synthesis,  Decidim’s technopolitical  syntax will  promote a democratization and
distribution of the power to design, organize, and prioritize participatory processes.
This  emphasis  on  self-organization  and  autonomy  connects  in  practice  with  the
technoacratic redistribution of power commented in section 3.1.1. Certainly, though,
the  ultimate  contribution  to  such  a  redistribution  depends  on  the  weight  that
participatory processes have in public policy (a recurrent question has been whether
processes are binding or not), and the weight that public policy has in society more
broadly.
Decidim's technopolitical syntax affords many of the possibilities reclaimed by 15M
and the  X Party  of  an  alter-democracy in  which  the  government  of  anyone and
everyone becomes, unlike in the existing neoliberal representative model, a reality
under construction.
6.5. Pragmatics/practices
Part  5  shows  how  the  discourses  analyzed  in  part  3  and  the  structures  and
infrastructures described in part 4 are enacted in concrete practices and processes.
This part is devoted to explore key aspects of the technopolitical pragmatics around
Decidim.barcelona and Democomunes. In 5.1.1. the focus is placed on the practices
of  technopolitical  production  within  the  Decidim.barcelona  team  and  how  these
processes moved from the traditional stance of free software and agile development
towards  what  may  be  defined  a  project  of  “technopolitical  commoning  for  alter-
democracy”:  MetaDecidim.  Among  other  things,  I  point  out  how  the  notion  of
MetaDecidim came out from practice. Then, 5.1.2. continues the narration initiated in
5.1.1. and explores key aspects of the MetaDecidim process itself. This process is a
humble example of how Decidim.barcelona works: its combination of digital and face
to face interaction, its open and participatory character, as well as of some of its
potentials and limits.
6.5.1. Practices of technopolitical production
6.5.1.1. Decidim’s open programming.
The  development  of  Decidim.barcelona  has  been  a  free  software  development
project from its inception: “the biggest free software project of the Barcelona City
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Council”,  according  to  Barandiaran  (2016a).  All  of  Decidim  code  is  and  will  be
covered  by  a  free  software  license  Affero  GPLv3368 or  later  in  the  case  of  new
developments, or licenses compatible with this one in case of reusing other codes.
Resuming the four basic freedoms of the GNU licenses369, this means the user can
use the code any way she likes and for what she likes,  that she can study and
modify  the  code,  and  that  she  can  redistribute  copies,  including  copies  of  the
modified  software.  Furthermore,  it  requires  to  recognize  the  use  of  the  original
software (in this case, Decidim) and to maintain the same (or a compatible) license
and related freedoms.
As another practice typical of free software development (Kelty, 2008), the whole
process of programming, which begun on July 2015, has been open and visible, on
the Github repository370 of the Barcelona city council, set up ex profeso371.This means
anyone could work and see how others work on the code. The systematic use of
Github during development brings transparency (or, in a more precise term, visibility)
to the programming process, a new form of technopolitical visibility to public projects
that  innovated  on  previous  practice  at  the  Barcelona  Municipal  Institute  of
Informatics (from now on IMI). Thanks to the Github metrics it is possible to see the
different  periods  and  peaks  of  activity,  and  the  list  of  contributors,  which,  as  of
December 8th 2016, amounts to 34.
368 The  specifics  of  this  license  can  be  found  at  https://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.en.html
Accessed on January 19th, 2017.
369 A  synthesis  can  be  found  at  https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html.  Accessed  on
February 13th.
370 Github is an open code repository service, where users can upload, share, and work on code.
371 The  repository  can  be  found  at  https://github.comAjuntamentdeBarcelona/Decidim.barcelona/.
Accessed on January 18th, 2017.
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FIGURE 55. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: GITHUB.
  
As  is  typical  of  free  software  development  projects,  many  of  those  contributors
intervened pro bono. The overwhelming majority of the workload, though, has been
mostly carried on by a young startup, Codegram. The choice of Codegram as main
developer, rather than the usual big companies (mainly Indra) subcontracted by IMI
had  to  do  with  a  variety  technical,  political  and  straightforwardly  technopolitical
reasons. Some of them are relevant because of what they say of the potentials and
difficulties of the inter-municipal, institutional assault within this 15M cycle.
The main technical reason was the need to have programmers proficient in Ruby
programming  language.  This,  in  turn,  resulted  from  the  will  to  build
Decidim.barcelona on the basis of Consul, Madrid's open government application.
This will was based on several rationales. One was somehow technical: building on
Consul  meant  much  of  the  work  for  building  Decidim  was  already  done,  which
helped to reduce costs and, more importantly, to comply with the political calendar in
Barcelona (which required Decidim to be operative on February 2016). There were
also political reasons to do this: to build on Consul contributed to the discourse and
practice of building a “network of cities of change” or “rebel cities”, as commented in
part 2. Finally, there were utterly technopolitical reasons, as well. First and foremost,
the idea of collaborating, sharing code and the conversation around the new digital
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infrastructures of democracy and participation was a strategic goal for the Demons
network  and  its  local  node,  Compas.  Otherwise,  was  a  way  of  feeding  into  the
emerging network of cities in a technopolitical way.
The process of setting up a development team showed to us (Compas members) the
depth of the process of emptying out of public institutions and their reliance on big
corporations. Under normal circumstances within the existing neoliberal model of the
public, the programming of a platform such as Decidim would have been coordinated
and supervised by the IMI but subcontracted to Indra Sistemas, a big Spanish IT and
defense systems corporation. Given the non-acquaintance of the IMI-Indra team with
Ruby  language,  the  alternative  found  by  Compas  was  a  small,  local  start  up
proficient in Ruby. Even if this did not change the neoliberal externalization model, it
is conceived as a step towards the constitution of a local-based, public-common led
ecosystem of technopolitical production. Ideally, this ecosystem would be integrated
by  public  institutions,  small  and  mid-size  companies,  hackers,  the  MetaDecidim
community  and  the  citizenry  in  general  (Barandiaran,  2016a).  The  choice  of
Codegram  was  to  have  not  only  economic  and  political,  but  also  creative
consequences (the MetaDecidim concept resulted from them).
If the production necessarily involved a private company, it presupposed a commons
(the Consul code) and generated a new one (the Decidim code). Since its launch in
February 2016, Decidim.barcelona has grown as a publicly funded, free software
project  that  presupposed  and  nurtured  technopolitical  commoning:  forms  of
collaborative production and use of the code.
Free  licensing,  open  programming,  sharing  source  code,  and  technopolitical
collaboration and commoning.  These were practices  of  technopolitical  production
operating within the Decidim project from the beginning.
On March of that 2016, a practical step towards technopolitical democratization took
place.  Codegram  developers  proposed,  on  the  Decidim  development  group  on
telegram, as a half joke, what later came to be MetaDecidim.
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“Hahaha
LOL Codegram guys just proposed something very funny,
www.meta.Decidim.barcelona
For people to propose improvements in the platform
And vote them
hahaha”
The idea may have been no more than a joke. Within the Compas group, it was
received with applause. The idea, commented on March 2nd, 2016, would see the
light eight months late.
6.5.2. Practices of technopolitical participation and alter-democracy
Decidim aspires to become the base of a renewal of  municipal  participation and
democracy. I comment upon a practical case of technopolitical participation mediated
by Decidim and some mid-term projects of the ORDID for the fulfilling of such a
promise.
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6.5.2.1. MetaDecidim: process and practice
MetaDecidim is planned to be a permanently open space (with periodic cycles of
development)  where  (according  to  its  page  in  Decidim)  anyone  will  be  able  to
“participate in the design of Decidim.barcelona, proposing changes in functionalities,
prioritizing development lines, deciding upon them, and deliberating on the uses and
possibilities of the platform”.
This brings the Github open source development model one step forward, to the
extent  that  it  aims  to  make  democratic  and  “user  friendly”  the  possibility  of
suggesting  amendments  to  technopolitical  infrastructures  and  participation
processes.  Doing  so  at  the  level  of  code  on  Github  requires  a  level  technical
competence and knowledge of  the  platform unusual  among the  citizenry.  In  this
sense, MetaDecidim is a dispositive for the multitudinous re-appropriation of Decidim
in practice372. This connects back to the politics of technology discussed in section
4.1.
As indicated in the subtitle of the web of the I MetaDecidim hackathon (celebrated in
Barcelona  on  November  25-26th,  2016),  MetaDecidim is  a  call  to  “Decidim  com
Decidim la Barcelona que volem”, “let's decide how we decide the Barcelona we
want”. The humorous tone with which MetaDecidim was conceived remained present
in its first participatory event. A prime example were the slogan and images used for
372 I use the expression “multitudinous”, not “massive”, as the singularization of the proposals and
types of activities, and thereby of users’ interventions, is very high.
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the web of the event.
Semantics and semiotics of technopolitical communication in practice
As a first step, participation requires citizens to know that participation is happening,
what  it  is  about,  and  why  they  should  participate.  Participation  is  tied  to
communication. For this reason, a website was set up for the MetaDecidim process.
Communication of arcane technopolitical matters, though, is problematic.
The  image  of  the  web,  above,  exemplifies  various  aspects  of  the  lived
communicative pragmatics of technopolitics. Below the #MetaDecidim hashtag, the
site asks readers “Do you want to design the Facebook of democracy?” Behind, in
the  background,  there  is  the  image  of  Anonymous  protesters  with  banners
demanding “hands off my internet!” or, even more provocatively “The internet, tool of
the people,  do you really  want your government to  control  it?”.  For the Compas
team,  always critical  of  big  corporations on the digital  realm,  the combination  of
“Facebook”  and  “democracy”  in  the  slogan,  was  provocation.  The  appeal  to
Facebook was a way to reach a wider audience, and get them to understand what
the  event  and  MetaDecidim  more  broadly  were  about:  it  was  about  building
something as big as Facebook. Speaking of a “Facebook of democracy” implied to
somehow turn Decidim into something both significant and insignificant, democratic
and not so much. Facebook is a successful business, a common experience (for
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good and bad), and the target of much technological critique, especially, from the
left.  Facebook  is  a  relevant  socio-economic  phenomenon  of  our  time  and  yet
criticized for turning everything (starting with human relationships) into the shallows
and irrelevance of an ever-shifting news feed (Carr, 2011). Facebook is surely a non-
democratic  space  and  it  is  far  from being  “a  tool  for  democracy”,  as  has  been
repeatedly noticed (Morozov, 2011, 2013). We at the Decidim team share most of
those critiques. We expected some backlash, which was part of the prank: to get
attention by annoyance.  For  me it  was also a way to  challenge our  view of  the
platform: perhaps Decidim actually ends up turned into a Facebook, in a space of
more or less stimulating irrelevance. It is technopolitical contention and multitudinous
appropriation (or the lack thereof) that will be the ultimate decider.
The second provocation was on the other background: the use of the Anonymous
image was a way to play with what is supposed to be acceptable in an institutional
setting. To put the image of a group of publicly declared dangerous, anti-government
hackers  into  a government  web,  with  an  image calling  for  the  people  not  to  let
government take their internet, was another step into the prank. As in a message I
circulated internally: Decidim and MetaDecidim would be useful infrastructures for an
“Anon government, a-non-government”. So, the small prank was directed towards
certain profile of both liberal and conservative mindset, but also towards the Anon
crew too. The question of how Anons would react to their appearance into such a
web was a matter of guess and fun: will they interpret it like a victory or like a co-
optation? And, more relevantly for our interest: will they decide the joke is not good
and  take  down  the  web?  This  small  technopolitical  (perhaps  more  accurately,
technopopulist)  prank  displays  relevant  references  and  aspects  of  the  lived
pragmatic of technopolitics in a project like Decidim.barcelona, it displays some of
the convictions, the tensions, and the lulz373 of the project.
All these layers of democracy, technology, symbols and power display some of the
typical  features  of  technopolitical  pragmatics,  in  this  case,  of  technopolitical
communication of participation.
Technopolitical  participation  in  practice:  assembling  proposals  in  multi-layered
processes and events (with some caveats)
Then, the MetaDecidim meeting happened, on November 25th and 26th, 2016. It is a
373 “Lulz”  is  the Anonymous version of  the abbreviation LOL, or  “laughing out  laugh”,  a common
expression in internet chats and social media.
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humble  example  of  a  multi-layered,  hybrid,  online-offline,  participatory  process
enabled by Decidim.barcelona.
                         
FIGURE 59. METADECIDIM: MAP.
The event was publicized and narrated on Twitter in real time too.
        
  FIGURE 60. METADECIDIM: MULTI-LAYERED.                       FIGURE 61. METADECIDIM: TWITTER374.
  SOURCE: LAURA COVARSÍ, 2016.                                      SOURCE: ARNAU MONTERDE, 2016.
LICENSE CC BY-ND 2.0                                                         LICENSE CC BY-SA 4.0
Almost 300 people attended at some point at the face to face meeting, which was
considered a satisfactory number for this type of event: a participatory process to
design a digital platform for participation. Of those 300, more than half were involved
in  the  various  creative  sessions  and  hacking  groups  that  were  set  up  for  the
afternoon  of  the  25th,  devoted  to  generate  proposals  and  initiate  collective
374 These are retweet networks during the #MetaDecidim event. The network was created and shared
on the Compas telegram group soon after the event by Arnau Monterde.
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explorations on different areas that are relevant for the development of the platform.
Reflecting the hybrid,  technopolitical  nature of Decidim.barcelona, there were two
main strands: a series of open sessions with working groups and a hackathon. The
titles of  the sessions map what  are some of  the key institutions and aspects of
democracy to take into account for Decidim: functionalities for groups (associations,
cooperatives, collectives, etc.); direct democracy and popular initiatives; participatory
processes;  participation and territory; participation organs (neighborhood councils,
plenaries, etc.); privacy, security and digital rights.
The hackathon was divided in four sections: web programming; web design; user
experience, gamification and enriched profiles; and a datathon. These topics help to
map the areas of concern for technopolitical participation and alter-democracy, at the
local level and, in some cases, beyond.
Several  visualizations and close to 80 proposals for modifying Decidim.barcelona
were generated, which have gathered several hundred votes in the following days,
as part of a process of prioritization.
                  
FIGURE 62. METADECIDIM: PROPOSALS.
In  the session I  took part  in,  several  people were members of  associations and
institutions  with  a  clear  analogical  background,  while  others  were  seasoned
technopolitical activists. The three main proposals concerned the construction of a
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module for citizen initiatives, and three types were differentiated: one of questions for
the municipal hall, a second one for concrete municipal or district policies, and a third
one for legislative initiatives at the local, regional or state level375. Conversations were
intense and engaging, displaying the possibilities of collaborative production of and
deliberation around proposals.
After the prioritization moment, the most voted proposals are to be studied by the
Decidim team, to prepare an evaluation of the cost (discarding technically infeasible
ones) in advance of a final voting. As we see, the process moves through several
iterations  of  collaborative  evaluation.  Crucially,  the  results  of  the  process will  be
binding,  which  is  rarely  the  case  among  the  processes  running  on
Decidim.barcelona. This amounts to a form of direct democracy over the design of
the  code:  the  politics  of  infrastructure  of  Decidim  thereby  displays  a  clear
participatory, direct democratic element.
If the collaboration around the Decidim’s code on Github was a case of free software
development,  and  collaboration  around  the  Consul  code  was  a  case  of
technopolitical  commoning,  MetaDecidim  moves  further  into  technopolitical  alter-
democratization. It does so when looked from both syntactical sides, as politics of
infrastructure and as infrastructure for politics.
The  MetaDecidim  process  serves  to  illustrate  some  of  the  main  practices  of
technopolitical  participation,  such  as  collaborative  production  and  evaluation  of
proposals, multi-layered communication, or collective deliberation.
Some caveats are in order concerning the MetaDecidim event, though. One of them
is the reappearance of the gender gap within technical meetings, a gap that was
particularly  manifest  at  the  hackathon  (working  groups  were  more  equilibrated).
Similarly, in a city as diverse as Barcelona, there were very few participants from
backgrounds  outside  Europe  or  Latin-America.  Neither  there  were  many  people
under 20-25. The question of inclusion of more and more diverse people remains
crucial. The generation of hybrid processes are a partial step in that direction, since
they entice people that may be excluded of digital spaces for various reasons or just
may prefer face to face events. But there´s still a long way to go.
Building new communities and cultures of technopolitical  participation: challenges
ahead.
If  Compas  was  a  ninja  team,  Decidim  expects  to  build  a  series  of  citizen
375 In the discussion it was noticed how, although the town hall has no power to legislate at the State
level, legislative citizen initiatives could gather force by using platforms such as Decidim.
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communities. The first and key one is a community of use. More than 40000 people
are registered in the platform as of early 2017, 25000 with a right to vote, composed
by  what  may  be  considered  an  active  citizenry,  participating  individually  or  in
organizations,  which  may  democratize  public  agendas  and  policies:  this  is  the
Decidim.barcelona  community.  A  second  community  is  composed  by  people
intervening in MetaDecidim processes and channels, a community of technopolitical
design and production, which may become a recursive citizenry, deciding over the
shape of Decidim itself, democratizing the infrastructure (and helping to define a new
institution of democracy): this is the MetaDecidim community376. A third community (or
view of the Decidim community) is a community of knowledge, a cognitive citizenry
that  shares  knowledge and expertise  (in  the  X Party  style)  generating  collective
intelligence. Finally, Decidim may operate as the kernel for a community of influence,
a democratic lobby, reclaiming new democratic standards. Resuming, Decidim is a
platform  open  to  a  multitude  that  may  define  democratic  policies,  technologies,
intelligence and standards.
Technopolitical participation also brings new issues and challenges, such as digital
privacy, security, data ownership, licensing, or digital rights, as discussed in some of
the  sessions  at  MetaDecidim.  The  sessions  called  for  collective  deliberation
(collective intelligence, in 15M terms) in areas barely uncharted in previous stages of
the  15M  cycle,  areas  related  with  the  conditions  and  institutionalization  of  a
networked democracy, a key part of the construction of 15M’s real democracy in XXI
century.  The work at  MetaDecidim was oriented to  begin the construction of  the
communities (rather than expert committees) that may democratically explore such
new areas and take control of the infrastructures around which they will be played
out and through which they may be decided.
But to increase inclusion and to mobilize people to participate is a traditional and
ongoing challenge among individuals, associations and public institutions interested
in doing so. Contributing to the self-construction of an active, mobilized citizenry as
well  as  an  inclusive  and  deliberative  culture  of  participation  are  two  relevant
challenges that the ORDID shares with the Participation council.
376 The  other  two  potential  communities  would  be  one  of  influence  (or  lobbying),  of  active  and
demanding  citizens  reclaiming  and  overseeing  the  new  standards  of  democracy.  The  third  is  a
community  of  knowledge,  sharing  information,  techniques  and  contributing  to  each  other
competences,  generating  collective  intelligences.  Obviously,  some  of  these  may  be  the  same
community looked at from different perspectives.
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This  is  one  of  the  rationales  behind  the  formative  workshops  on  secure  digital
citizenship that have been designed in late 2016 and are expected to be carried on
in  dozens  of  locations  of  Barcelona  in  2017.  Similarly,  ORDID’s  plan  for  2017
includes the launch of a Decidim.lab within a wider citizen laboratory, oriented to
potentiate face to face dynamics that can benefit from the distributed expertise and
practices of the citizenry while contributing to new ones, particularly, among groups
devoted to participation (for details of the plan, Barandiaran & Calleja-López, 2016).
Like in 15M, the aim is, with all its limits and contradictions, to construct a more real
democracy, and to enact it in the way there.
6.6. Alternatives
As in previous chapters, this part looks at the challenges and changes that Decidim
brings to both a given sociopolitical form, in this case, the State at the local level, and
to the liberal representative ontology. This part also serves to synthetically illustrate
the shapes of alter-democracy at this stage of the 15M cycle.
6.6.1. The State and the representative government form
Institutionally,  Decidim  poses  a  challenge  to  two  structures  of  the  State  at  the
municipal  level.  The  Barcelona  city  council  recognizes  two  basic  structures  of
functioning and organization377: a political structure and an executive structure. While
the former gives general political  orientations, the latter can execute policies and
stablish rules (not laws, since the autonomy of the local level is administrative, not
legislative  strictu sensu).  Even if  with limited autonomy, these functions resemble
those of the powers and functions of the State. Decidim may affect them directly.
Actually, the possibilities and challenges posed by Decidim in practice, for the State
form at the local level, are similar to those posed by Democracy, Period in discourse,
to the State form at the national level. Decidim has already operated as a platform of
“wikigovernment”, otherwise, as a mediator that allows the co-production of a policy
agenda between citizenry and the executive, in the development of the Strategic
Plan of Barcelona for the current political term. It was the very first process ran in the
platform, in the Spring of 2016378.  In the Spring of 2017, it  will  be deployed as a
“wikilegislation”  (or  better,  wiki-regulation)  mediator  for  the  co-production  of  the
377  A detailed map of the structure of the city council and the functions of its organs can be found at
www.ajuntament.barcelona.cat/es/organizacion-municipal. Accessed February 18th, 2017.
378 Information on the process available at https://Decidim.barcelona/processes/1. Accessed February
15th, 2017.
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norms of participation of the city of Barcelona379. Wikigovernment and wikilegislation
were the two aspects of the second point of Democracy, period.
Modules for citizen consultations and citizen initiatives are in  the horizon for  the
current political  term of Barcelona en Comú (municipal  elections are due in May
2019). Here again key limits lie with the limited autonomy of the local entities. For
instance, only the national executive power can call for a referendum, a mayor can’t.
That said, practices in Madrid, where the government of Ahora Madrid is committed
to  support  in  the  municipal  plenary  any  citizen initiative  which  gathers  a  certain
amount  of  support380,  shows  that  steps  can  be  taken  towards  a  more  direct
democracy, even within a clearly representative framework.
Transparency  (point  1  of  Democracy,  period)  is  also  increased  by  Decidim.
Concretely, in two basic forms: around participation processes, in terms of proposal
and process visibility and trackability, and around the governmental reactions to it (of
both representatives in power and in the opposition); more importantly, this will soon
be applied to the implementation of projects coming out of participatory processes in
new forms of  accountability.  Surely,  other mechanisms of transparency (or,  more
precisely,  visibility)  are required or already operative for other aspects of  political
functioning. An example is the anonymous anti-corruption mailbox set up by X.net
members in early 2017 for the Barcelona city council.
Finally, Decidim also opens the technical possibility, albeit, surely, not without issues
of privacy or security, of walking towards the implementation of Democracy 4.0 or
“real  and permanent  vote”  (the third  point  of  Democracy,  period).  This  option is,
nevertheless, much more complex, since the changes to the existing forms political
and administrative power would be deeper. As they exist (in the two processes just
mentioned above, of the Municipal Action Plan and participation norms), and to the
extent that they are fully binding, mechanisms of wikigovernment and wikilegislation
can be ultimately be filtered by the government in place (as happened, not without
controversy, in the case of the most voted proposal for the Municipal Action Plan last
year381). A real and permanent vote would imply an actual limitation of the power of
the executive and legislative power of representative government at the level of the
379 Even if these are not “laws” strictu sensu, they operate as such at the local level. Information on
the process available at https://Decidim.barcelona/processes/5. Accessed February 15th, 2017.
380 More details on the process can be found at  https://Decide.madrid.es/proposals_info. Accessed
February 16th, 2017.
381 Even though 72% of the thousands of citizen proposals were accepted, the most voted was not (El
Periódico, 2016).
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national State or its minor equivalents at the regional or municipal level. It thereby
poses a bigger political and institutional challenge. It would mean for an incumbent
government  to  limit  its  own  power,  to  change  the  proximate  source  of  decision
making  in  everyday  politics,  and  potentially  to  drastically  transform  the  liberal
representative scheme. Here again, the power to do so does not lie at the local but
at the national level, and is unlikely that such a policy will be agreed by a majority
anytime soon.
While  Decidim  currently  falls  short  of  the  demands  of  Democracy,  Period  for  a
transformation of the State, it also goes beyond it by addressing institutions other
than  representative  powers.  Concretely,  municipal  public  institutions  (from
bureaucracy to participation organs). As noted when describing the working sessions
in  MetaDecidim,  these  included  participation  bodies  of  the  city:  Decidim  would
potentially  bring  new  spaces  and  democratic  possibilities  to  these  traditional
institutions, with a long tradition in Barcelona. MetaDecidim itself is, as I have noted,
an attempt at democratizing public innovation in democracy, thereby challenging the
primacy of usual bureaucratic-technocratic modes of organization, embodiments of
the representation paradigm that overlaps with governmentality (Rose 1999, 2006).
Here, as in the case of 15M and, partially, the X Party, the modes of organization and
practices around Decidim (particularly, MetaDecidim) prefigure and connect with key
aspects of the alter-democracy advocated for the whole of the polity.
Resuming, Decidim brings two institutional challenges to both municipal government
and public institutions: 1-the challenge of an alter-democratization by participation
and  distribution  of  public  power  (as  formulated  by  Castro  et  al.,  2016);  2-the
challenge of institutional incorporation of technopolitics (with its increase in possible
performances, visibility, trackability, etc.).
Decidim thereby connects with the project of redistributing the social and collective
power  accumulated  in  the  State,  a  key  aspect  of  “distributed  democracy”  (see
section  3.2.3.);  furthermore,  it  connects  with  the  workings  of  an  augmented
democracy,  defined  by  new layers  of  collective  action,  by  possibilities  (and new
limits) of acting together in a multitude of variable configurations, as seen in the 15M
case as well as in the first Decidim processes. In this case, distribution is not the
“emptying  out”  of  the  State  and  democracy  that  15M  diagnosed  in  neoliberal
representation, but rather a form of transforming the State to potentiate democracy,
opening  up  to  the  various  models  I  have  discussed  throughout  the  thesis.  15M
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diagnosed neoliberalism has not only “emptied out” the State (specially, the Welfare
State) but also filled it in with lobbies and money politics, thereby its corruption: “they
call it democracy, but it is not”. The aĺter-democratic model behind Decidim points to
a  process  combining  new  forms  of  emptying  out  (by  diminishing  the  power  of
representation) and filling in (by increasing the power of direct participation), filling in
with an active citizenry rather than corporate influence. As suggested in the Decidim
Decalogue and the Strategic Plan of the ORDID, this implies to retie the link back to
movements, to de-State the State without privatizing it, otherwise, to get out of the
liberal representative model in which the public is always a representative translation
of the private field and its power asymmetries.
This project is full  of challenges itself. Even before the launch of Decidim for the
elaboration of the Municipal Action Plan, many practical discussions moved between
two twin concerns, the Scylla of lack of mobilization (and how this sometimes seems
to result from factors such as a lack of trust in government and public perception of
depotentiation  of  participation  processes)  and the  Charybdis  of  the  legitimacy of
mobilization (f.i.: governmental fear to outcomes of a given process frontally opposed
to its policies for the city,  or  the legitimacy of limited groups of citizens to make
binding  decisions for  the  whole  of  the  city,  Pindado,  2012).  Decidim and similar
projects have to face problems not present during the 15M stage, not so much the
fear for the lack of participatory mechanisms (surely increasing in the last years) but
the  potential  proliferation  of  fake  or  flawed  processes  under  slightly  more  open
models (Castro et al.,  2016).  Thereby the interest of  distinguishing the commons
government  and  distributed/augmented  democracy  model  from  the  usual  open
government one, in earlier parts of this chapter.
6.6.2. Ontology
The challenges to the liberal representative ontology posed by Decidim.barcelona
can  be  found  at  two  levels:  that  of  technopolitical  production  and  that  of
technopolitical  participation.  It  is  particularly  at  the  first  level  where  the  most
innovative  forms  seem to  have  emerged.  It  is  worth  stressing  the  figure  of  the
technoacrat (section 3.1.1.) and the collective form of the recursive citizenry (section
5.2.1.2) as two forms that go against the figure of the representative (in this case, the
traditional bureaucrat or public servant) and the represented in modern democracies.
As  a  subjective  form,  the  technoacrat  emerges  as  a  counterpoint  of  both  the
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technocrat and “enforced” representation more broadly (to put it in Jurado’s 2014
terms). The collective form of the recursive citizenry is a technopolitical version of the
classical  active  citizenry,  now  applied  to  the  construction  of  the  technological
conditions of its own citizenship.
Crucially, these two images converge in the idea of a common government, a new
public-commons alliance that shatters the preeminence of the private-public model
under  neoliberal  representative  democracy.  After  the  neoliberal  debunking of  the
Welfare State,  the model  for  the reconstruction of the public  in projects such as
Decidim.barcelona is to be articulated through participation and collaboration, and
thereby  by  the  becoming-commons  of  the  old  public  sector.  Synthetically,
Decidim.barcelona is funded with public money, universally accessible and working
as  a  public  service,  its  code  free  for  anyone  to  take  and  modify,  designed and
managed  by  an  ecosystem  including  public  servants  (such  as  participation
technicians), academics (such as the IN3-UOC), small and medium-size enterprises
(such as Codegram), and citizens (such as the Decidim and MetaDecidim incipient
communities).  Otherwise:  this  model  involves  platforms  with  public  funding  and
public-common ownership,  design,  and  management.  This  goes  first  against  the
neoliberal  representative model  of  privatization  of  the public  sector,  in  which  the
market and the profit-driven logics pervades ever more fields of society. It also goes
beyond  the  model  of  the  public  as  pure  service  under  the  so  much  criticized
paternalist  model  of  the  Welfare  State,  in  which  the  political  and  bureaucratic
apparatus of the State “perforce” (to put it in Jurado's, 2014 terms) represents the
interest  of  a  disempowered  multitude.  Combining  these  various  factors,  the
predominant democratic model operative at the level of technopolitical production is
a new combination of the participatory and the autonomist model of alter-democracy,
defined by an active and collaborative citizenry that generates new commons.
In the field of technopolitical participation, the main challenge seems to be to bring
the  classical  figure  of  the  active  citizen  and  citizenry  into  a  new  technopolitical
version: a networked or technopolitical citizenship. This makes possible new modes
of participation, but also poses issues of security, privacy or new rights. Here the
ontological or normative model is the participatory one, actualized in a technopolitical
shape. Co-production of public policies and norms (in the forms of wikilegislation and
wikigovernment)  becomes a new collective practice. One that,  like technopolitical
commoning,  becomes a key part  of  the construction of  alter-democratic life after
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15M.  These  new  possibilities  and  ontological  constellations,  though,  remain
dependent on a wider representative framework.
These are some of the challenges and changes in terms of political ontology, and the
models they are tied to:
TABLE 16. DECIDIM.BARCELONA: POLITICAL ONTOLOGY.
Practice Political
ontology
Subject form Collective
form
Modes of political
relation
Technopolitical
production
Autonomist
Participatory
Technoacrat
Recursive citizen
Recursive
citizenry
Commoning,
networking
collaboration
Technopolitical
participation
Participatory Technopolitical/
networked active
citizen
Technopolitical/
networked
active citizenry
Co-production
Co-decision
6.7. Conclusions
This  chapter  has  explored  the  discursive  and  practical  experimentations  with
technopolitics  and  alter-democracy  essayed  around  Decidim.barcelona.  It  begun
with a reconstruction of the stage of the 15M cycle in late 2014 and the roots of the
Decidim project within it. Particularly, in part 2 I showed how the institutional assault
(resulting from the arrival to municipal power of citizen candidacies tied to the 15M
cycle) opened an opportunity for existing 15M networks of technopolitical activists
and hacktivists to form teams of innovation in democracy within the Participation
councils of big cities such as Barcelona and Madrid. They created technopolitical
platforms  for  alter-democracy  such  as  Decidim.  With  this  they  brought  both
technopolitics and alter-democracy within the 15M cycle one step further.
In part 3 I showed how these innovation teams (not unlike discourses within 15M
itself or the X Party) articulated a whole semantics around how democracy should be
and how to  get  there.  The normative  discourse  of  a  distributed and  augmented
democracy  was  tied  to  prescriptive  discourses  on  both  the  new  forms  of
technopolitical production and the new forms of technopolitical participation based on
Decidim.barcelona.  In  sections  3.1.2.  and  3.1.3.,  distributed  and  augmented
democracy  appeared  contraposed  to  the  corporate  open  government  model
embodied by Civiciti. While the former is oriented to redistribute capitals in society,
the latter fits nicely within the neoliberal framework that has been a target of critique
for different projects within the 15M cycle. A key concept for how to advance towards
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a  distributed/augmented  democracy  is  that  of  “technopolitical  democratization”,
understood  as  the  deployment  of  technological  infrastructures  for  political
democratization  (its  political  reading)  as  well  as  the  deployment  of  democratic
processes  for  the  construction  and  management  of  such  technologies  (its
technological reading). Decidim has been shown to be an example of the former;
MetaDecidim, of the latter. Democratization in these cases has not been driven by,
but mostly opposed to, representation, and thereby I consider the Decidim case a
clear one of technopolitical alter-democratization. In section 3.2.3. I also showed the
relevant  distance  between  the  critical  substantivist  approach  to  democracy  and
technopolitics  held  in  Barcelona  and  the  positivist  proceduralism  preeminent  in
Madrid, showing differences within 15M quarters as well.
Part 4 explored the technopolitical syntax of Decidim. Divided in two halves, the first
focused on Decidim’s  politics of  infrastructures,  while  the  second attended to  its
value  as  infrastructure  for  politics.  As  part  of  the  exploration  of  the  “politics  of
infrastructure” (section 4.1.) I looked further into the contraposition of the Decidim’s
model of public-commons infrastructures for alter-democracy (and advance upon the
autonomist  n-1  model)  and the  closed proprietary  software  for  a  corporate  open
government of Civiciti. Then, in section 4.2. I analyzed key actual and forthcoming
affordances  of  Decidim.barcelona,  otherwise,  its  technopolitical  syntax  for  alter-
democracy.
Part  5  focused  on  the  technopolitical  pragmatics  (otherwise,  key  technopolitical
practices) within the Decidim case. Section 5.1. described some key practices of
technopolitical production of the platform, which displayed a progressive process of
technopolitical  democratization  between late  2015,  when its  development  begun,
and 2016, when MetaDecidim was launched. Section 5.2. described a participatory
process  in  Decidim.barcelona,  MetaDecidim,  which  serves  to  illustrate  different
aspects and challenges ahead for technopolitical participation.
Part 6 recapitulated some of the key alternatives posed by Decidim to the State form
as well as to the political ontology of liberal representation. Section 6.1 described
how Decidim potentially affects two of the branches of government (executive and
legislative)  as  well  as  public  institutions  (such  as  bureaucracy  and  participation
institutions),  especially  potentiating processes of  co-production  (what  the  X party
called wikigovernment and wikilegislation), some forms of transparency, and easing
the  conditions  (albeit  with  considerable  security  limits)  of  binding  referenda  and,
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much more problematically, the 15M idea of a democracy 4.0. and the X Party´s “real
and permanent vote”. Furthermore, Decidim brings a digital layer to both government
and public institutions that opens opportunities and challenges, which in many cases
will  depend on what roadmap is taken: the corporate open government model of
Civiciti, the positivist and proceduralist 15M version of open government preeminent
in  the  Madrid  Participation  council,  or  the  critical  and  substantivist  model  of  a
common government and a distributed and augmented democracy defended by the
ORDID.
Finally, section 6.2 attended to the challenges to the modern liberal representative
ontology coming from the processes of technopolitical production and participation
associated to Decidim. I showed how new subject and collective forms such as the
technoacrat or the recursive citizenry, and modes of relation such as co-production
and commoning,  as well  as the central  figure of the technopolitical  active citizen
exercising  radical  (deliberative,  direct)  participation,  stretch  the  frame  of  liberal
representation.
Decidim.barcelona appears as the final  point  in a  still  open trajectory.  It  partially
accomplishes some of the recurrent aims of the 15M cycle: opening new modes of
being  together  and  taking  part  in  politics,  partially  going  beyond  representation,
constructing infrastructures of decision making that are more direct, transparent, and
deliberative. Decidim institutionalizes and affords key 15M practices, among others,
multi-layering, networked collaboration, or collective deliberation, and the intensive
use of ICTs more broadly, etc. With the new stage of the cycle, there has also been
new  practices,  such  as  co-production  or  technopolitical  democratization.  New
challenges have emerged too:  the ever-repeated problem of the lack or flaws of
collective  mobilization  and  participation,  the  tension  between  new  practices  and
institutions  and  existing  ones  (the  representative  block  to  many  of  these
innovations), the reproduction of the gap between represented and representatives,
etc.
At this stage of the 15M cycle, Decidim is a technopolitical institution in the making,
waiting for a multitudinous taking that may force structural changes. A MetaDecidim
community  defining  the  new standards  of  democracy  and  a  Decidim community
taking advantage of them to democratize politics and society. The challenges ahead
are and will be many.
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Chapter 7. Conclusions
7.1. Introduction
Real  democracy,  now! reclaimed the DRY slogan.  Democracy 4.0.  will  take forty
years to implement, assumed Yagüe. In the end, it was more and less than that. As I
showed, under very concrete conditions, the 15M movement opened a cycle that
brought many discourses and practices of democracy and technopolitics from the
fringes to the mainstream, up to key public institutions of representative democracy,
in around four years382. In this conclusion, I want to address head on the three main
questions around this cycle posed in the introduction. The first was:
what  are  the  discourses  on  democracy  and  representation  from  15M  to
Decidim.barcelona?;
the second:
what  are  the  key  practices  of  democracy  and  technopolitics  from  15M  to
Decidim.barcelona?;
the third:
how does the reassembling period 2011-2016 look like from a sociopolitical  and
ontological perspective?”.
In this conclusion, I devote a section to each of these questions.
7.2. 15M cycle discourses on democracy: between 
representationalism and alter-democracy
In the empirical chapters I differentiated various discursive strands on representation
and democracy. Concretely, I distinguished between three main types of discourses:
anti-representational  (discourses  calling  for  practices  or  processes  against
representation), alter-representational (discourses calling for practices or processes
modifying  representation)  and  alter-democratic  discourses  (discourses  calling  for
382 As an example, Yagüe himself is currently third vice-president of the Andalusian Parliament with
Podemos.
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alternative  models  of  democracy,  such  as  the  participatory,  the  deliberative,  the
autonomist,  etc.).  These discursive  positions  both  reappeared and varied  across
circumstances,  actors  and  time.  They  frequently  displayed  a  threefold  thread:  a
diagnostic thread on the problems of democracy or of the cycle itself, a normative
thread on what democracy should be, and a prescriptive/practice thread on how to
get there. They combined all of them with a motivational or mobilizing thread that
appealed to affects.
7.2.1. 15M’s discourse on representation and democracy
7.2.1.1. Pre-15M critique of representation
In  chapter  4,  part  3,  I  analyzed  in  detail  the  15M (and  pre-15M)  discourses  on
democracy. A key pre-15M diagnosis, which was shared in its main lines by all the
projects within the cycle, was the one formulated by the NLV Manifesto. It presented
a critical  view of  the state of  representative democracy in  Spain.  It  lamented its
corruption, bipartidism, inegalitarian electoral law, particracy, closed electoral lists,
useful vote, blank checks, and turnism, factors that fed into each other.
In normative terms, the Manifesto made calls for a more participatory democracy, but
the main point of its prescriptive/practice discourse was not very radical: “do not vote
for them”. “Them” were the parties that had approved the Sinde Law (a pro-copyright
legal disposition), otherwise, the Socialist Party, the Popular Party, and the Catalan
Convergencia  i  Unió.  Other  NLV texts  frequently  suggested to  “vote  for  others”,
smaller parties. But this means NLV kept the representative field as its central point
of  reference  for  action,  it  remained  either  purely  representationalist  in
prescriptive/practice  terms  (vote,  but  for  others)  or  alter-representationalist  in
normative  terms  (let's  construct  a  representative  democracy  without  the  defects
diagnosed in the Manifesto).
7.2.1.2. Critiques of and alternatives to representation
In chapter 4 I showed how a radicalization of these suggestions came with DRY and
15M. The main manifestos, texts, and slogans around May 15th preserved the NLV
critique  of  representative  democracy,  but  went  several  steps  further.  The  key
diagnostic slogan on this regard was “they do not represent us”. It was opened to
several interpretations, of which I underlined two: the alter-representationalist and
the  anti-representationalist  readings.  Depending  on  the  interpretation  of  the
diagnosis, two normative discourses were constructed. The alter-representationalist
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interpretation called for an improved representative democracy. Differently, the anti-
representationalist  reading called for  forms of  politics,  in  government  but  also  in
media and even social movements, that circumvented representation, many of those
interpretations pointed towards form of alter-democracy.
Going beyond the NLV manifesto, 15M discourses openly attacked the economic
system  and  mass  media.  They  stressed  the  connection  between  political
representation and economic expropriation of agency: “we are not commodities in
the hands of politicians and bankers”, said DRY’s slogan for the demonstration on
May 15th. Modern political divisions within the representative field were presented as
obsolete: “to enter in “right” or “left” is a semantic debate. While political marketing is
payed by the banks there will be neither.” Stripped from those tags, participants in
the movement aimed to meet each other as “persons” and “indignant citizens”.
Similarly, other slogans targeted representation in media: “television, manipulation”,
“then you will say we are five, or six”, people chanted at demonstrations and camps.
In  this  case,  the  attack  was  also  connected  to  a  diagnostic  of  media
misrepresentation as tied to corporate money. As stated in Agora Sol’s foundational
statement, “traditional  media  ignored  (when  not  blatantly  deformed)  a  nascent
movement”. This diagnostic was tied to a prescriptive/practice discourse calling for
alter- and self-representation by movement media “to give voice to the movement of
the outraged”. 15M’s anti-representationalism was usually tied to alternatives.
7.2.1.3. Alter-democracy and assemblies
Probably the most innovative, alter-democratic proposal in 15M discourse was that
of  de-representation  around  Democracy4.0  (Jurado,  2014),  which  proposed  to
combine representative mechanisms with direct democratic ones at the level of the
nation-State. But perhaps more relevantly, in 15M the discourse on practice became
the core of an emerging normative discourse. Differently from NLV, in the camps the
invitation was not to vote for others but rather to join assemblies to voice, discuss
and  propose  alternatives  to  the  existing  problems  of  the  country.  After  the
demonstration on May 15th, with the rise of the camps, the assembly became a
prefigurative embodiment of alter-democracy both in discourse and practice. DRY
had not mentioned it as central in any of its texts. Part of this new emphasis went
hand in hand with a turn from a normative discourse about the State to a discourse
about practice with broader normative implications. While the DRY manifesto and
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proposals made general normative calls for an improved representative democracy
(f.i.: transparency, internal democracy in parties), as well as new participatory and
direct democratic forms (such as binding referenda for all relevant matters), the call
of the Neighborhood Commission (2011) was a prescriptive/practice-normative call
to give “all power to the assemblies”, a symptom of the displacement. Spokespeople
were rotatory and subordinated to assembly processes and decisions.
However, the limits of the assembly form as a multitudinous decision-making process
made themselves clear in the few weeks of May and June that the camps lasted. A
growing diagnostic discourse about the condition of the movement begun to emerge:
“We are trapped in our own dynamics and we are slaves of ourselves”, a participant
in the Sol camp said. In chapter 4 I showed how big popular assemblies showed
incapacity to move the movement further into mid and long-term action. Consensus
appeared as a problematic requisite for a fully open decision-making process within
a multitudinous and internally heterogeneous movement.
7.2.1.4. Beyond the limit of assemblies: from herds to catalyzers
The limits of assemblies and networked camps was something much discussed at
the time of 15M’s first anniversary, moment of the launch of 15MpaRato. Simona
Levi (2012), coordinator of the initiative, distinguished, in a strategic and diagnostic
reconstruction of the political conjuncture, between “herds” and “catalyzers” as forms
of collective action. Both were non-representational forms of politics. The former she
saw as typical of the camp period, the latter, of the new stage opening with initiatives
such as 15MpaRato and the advances of the PAH. While the former were “not agile
nor precise”, the latter allowed “focusing the attention” of the various 15M actors and
networks already existing.  She called to  stop  repeating earlier  gestures  such as
camping or assembling, to stop living like hermit crabs in the “dead shells” of 15M,
and embrace innovative forms of collective action, such as 15MpaRato and, later,
the X Party.
7.2.1.5. 25S and the peak of anti-representationalism
The increasingly recognized limits of the assembly and, thereby, the challenges of
alter-democracy, did not dispel anti-representationalism, though. Quite the opposite,
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key political383 and economic384 events taking place after 15M hardened the discursive
diagnosis: political representation was a key part of the problem of the country, a
mechanism for wealth extraction and non-sovereignty. That affirmed the manifesto
inviting to “Surround Congress” on September 25th, 2012, which called to liberate
democracy  from  a  political  and  economic  system  that  had  “kidnapped”  it.  The
practical  call  to  surround  Congress  was  tied  to  the  expectation  to  force  the
resignation  of  the  Popular  Party’s  government  and the  opening of  a  Constituent
process. This displaced the center of the cycle from the 15M logics of autonomy and
alter-democratic  experimentation  into  a  frontal  confrontation  with  the  symbol  of
representation,  otherwise,  into  a  logic  of  frontal  opposition  to  Congress.  The
presentation of the 15M multitude aimed at the symbolic delegitimation of the space
of representation.  The numbers for the action were smaller than expected, even if
demonstrators gathered in the tens of thousands. However,  25S made visible the
peak of anti-representationalism within the 15M cycle.
I want to synthesize key 15M movement positions on representation presented so
far. I present below a graphic that shows the differences and overlaps between anti-
representational, alter-representational and alter-democratic positions.
383 A key event was the approval of the first constitutional change since the approval of the current
Constitution in 1978, to prioritize public debt payment to (usually international) creditors over all other
budget expenditures. This modification was passed without referendum, by the Socialist party, with
support from the Popular Party, in August 2011. Then, the absolute majority of the Popular Party in
November 2011 was followed by a strengthening of social cuts initiated by the Socialist Party, as well
as repression of protest, among other things.
384 Growing unemployment, social cuts, worsening economic conditions, in general (chapter 3 for a
more detailed reconstruction).
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FIGURE 63. 15M DISCOURSE: REPRESENTATION.
7.2.2. X Party’s discourses on representation and democracy
7.2.2.1. The return of representation
By the time of the 25S direct action, a turn was in the wings. 15M technopolitical
activists, especially in Barcelona and Sevilla, were preparing the launch of a party.
Levi (2014) further elaborated her 2012 idea on organizational forms and resituated
it within a politically strategic, discursive reconstruction of the 15M cycle. According
to her,  the first  phase of the movement corresponded to DRY and the camps, it
implied to “meet each other and display potency”, under the herd and beehive forms.
In 2012, a number of initiatives to “attack objectives” were launched, including PAH
(in the sphere of housing) and 15MpaRato (in the sphere of justice). For Levi, these
initiatives, which followed the catalyzer model, were also successful. As of 2013, she
diagnosed, 15M was in a third phase where “we have them surrounded” (in a wink to
the 25S action) and “it’s  time to reset  the system”. Her prescriptive and practice
proposal for undertaking such a resetting at that stage of the cycle was the X Party.
This brought a (re)turn of representative politics. But the changes since the time of
Nolesvotes had been drastic. Differently from 2011, in the new stage, the “electoral
assault”, as X Party’s texts defined it, people could choose and enroll parties that
emerged from the 15M cycle of contention, prominently, the X Party and Podemos.
The former was especially radical in its anti-representationalist and alter-democratic
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discourse and practice. The X party shared with 15M the diagnostic that “they do not
represent us”, and its anti-representationalist reading made of it a very particular kind
of party, one that defined itself as a “citizen network”.
As noted in chapter 5, its initial program, “Democracy, period”, outlined a discourse
that  called  for  forms  of  networked  participatory  democracy  (wikilegislation,
wikigovernment),  networked  direct  democracy  combined  with  representative
structures (real and permanent vote) into de-representation (Jurado, 2014), as well
as  alter-representation  mechanisms  (such  as  candidate  crowdsourcing  or  full
transparency of public administration).
7.2.2.2. An anti-representationalist and wikidemocratic party
Like  in  the  15M  case,  a  double-sided  discourse  was  articulated  around  how
democracy should be (normative) and how to get there (prescriptive/practice). The
former was primarily formulated in DP, the latter,  on statements around the party
itself. As the X Party’s discourse normatively questioned the role of representatives
within the State (mere “civil servants”) so it did the same in practice, within the party,
especially in its first period. It articulated an anti-representation discourse that called
for  “de-personalizing  politics”  (against  the  audience  democracy  model,  in  which
political  media  figures  are crucial)  and it  was launched as  an anonymous party.
When  the  time  came  to  choose  representative,  it  elaborated  an  alter-
representationalist  discourse  that  emphasized  ideas,  methods,  and  the
crowdsourcing of candidates as the way to go beyond the personalist model politics.
Furthermore,  it  developed a discourse around the idea of  the networked “expert
citizenry” as a key subject in the construction of a new democracy based on radical
decision making and the “federation of competences”, in parties and institutions, to
solve social problems.
The X Party thereby outlined a discourse on the party form (a meritocratic citizen
network  as  a  federation  of  competences),  the  subject  of  democracy  (networked
expert citizenry) and democracy itself that combined anti-representationalism, alter-
representationalism, and alter-democracy.
This discourse both connected with and differed from those circulating around 15M.
The emphasis on the centrality of democracy and the right of the citizenry to decide
over their lives remained. Alter-representation calls for transparency (point 1 of DP)
and alter-democratic ones for more frequent and binding referenda (point 4 of DP)
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were  already  present  among  DRY’s  proposals  and  even  in  the  Nolesvotes’s
Manifesto.  The  alter-democratic  (or  de-representational)  idea  of  a  real  and
permanent vote (point 2 of DP) was only a re-labelling of the Democracy 4.0. idea
already  promoted  during  15M.  Finally,  the  participatory,  alter-democratic
mechanisms of wikilegislation and wikigovernment were an innovation with regard to
the  state  of  the  discussion  on  democracy  during  the  DRY  and  camp  period.
Interestingly, this idea was among the first to be implemented in the following stage
of the cycle.
I synthesize some key X Party’s discursive points on representation and democracy
in the following schema.
FIGURE 64. X PARTY DISCOURSE: REPRESENTATION.
7.2.3. Decidim’s discourses on democracy and representation
7.2.3.1. The anti-representationalist discourse
With the victory of citizen candidacies in the local elections on May 25th 2015 (4
years after the emergence of 15M), the electoral assault gave way to a new moment,
that of the “institutional assault”. The center of the discourse in this third case was
displaced from parties and still  broad claims about democracy towards questions
concerning how to create technopolitical infrastructures and participatory processes
to nurture a more real democracy. The focus moved to Decidim.barcelona.
The diagnostic discourse of the Decidim team takes most of the pre-15M, 15M and X
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party  narrative on representative democracy, with  one relevant  addition:  the new
centrality of the discourse on the politics of technologies. The Decidim team shared
with some (usually, technopolitical) 15M currents, as well as with the X Party, the
anti-representationalist and alter-democratic reading of the “they do not represent
us” slogan. But like the discourse calling for autonomous media in 15M, the Decidim
diagnosis on alter-democracy criticizes not only traditional representative institutions
but  also  corporations  operating  in  the  field  in  question.  In  this  case,  the  Civiciti
corporate  open  government  model.  According  to  the  Decidim  team’s  diagnostic,
under  the  corporate  open  government  model,  technological  platforms  for
participation  are  neither  designed  nor  managed  by  the  people,  but  rather  by
corporations with  a profit  purpose.  As we see below, in  its  prescriptive, practical
discourse  the  Decidim  team  reclaims  digital  infrastructures  must  be  democratic,
democracy must become recursive.
7.2.3.2. Alter-democratic production and participation
Anti-representationalism  runs  strong  as  well  in  the  prescriptive  and  normative
discourses around Decidim, but the most relevant and innovative features are those
concerning how to institutionalize alter-democracy. Like in previous cases, a double
discourse has been built: a normative one around how democracy should be and a
prescriptive/practice one around how to get there.
In this case, the “how to get there” has been sub-divided into two connected lines:
discourses on technopolitical  production of  Decidim.barcelona and discourses on
technopolitical  participation  through  Decidim.barcelona.  A  key  alter-democratic
concept for conceiving both of these lines in their relation to democracy is that of
“technopolitical  democratization”,  understood  as  the  deployment  of  technological
infrastructures  for  political  democratization  (its  political  reading,  connected  to
participation in the platform) and as the deployment of democratic processes for the
construction  and  management  of  such  technologies  (its  technological  reading,
connected to the production of the platform). As I showed in chapter 6, Decidim is
discursively constructed as an example of the former; MetaDecidim, of the latter.
The  MetaDecidim  prescriptive  discourse  on  the  conditions  of  alter-democratic
technopolitical production presents the platform as a public-common infrastructure,
which  means  it  should  have  public  funding  and  ownership  and  public-common
design  and  management.  The  MetaDecidim  prescriptive  discourse  has  thereby
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underlined the relevance of democratizing Decidim qua technology.
On the other hand, the Decidim prescriptive discourse on technopolitical participation
emphasizes  a  diversity  of  participatory  processes,  such  as  citizen  initiatives,
wikilegislation, or debates with representatives (these are what I define, respectively,
as Decidim A, B, and C in the figure below). The emphasis in on innovation and
radicalization of democracy.
FIGURE 65. DECIDIM.BARCELONA DISCOURSE: REPRESENTATION.
7.2.3.3. On distributed and augmented democracy
But  what  model  democracy  is  to  be  reached?  When it  comes to  the  normative
discourse on the democracy to come, the model has been that of a distributed and
augmented democracy, which puts social and political equality at the center. Three
key practices (based on Castro et al., 2016) of this model would be the coproduction
of  public  policies,  involving  participatory  institutions  and  processes  designed  for
sharing  public  power;  community  building,  involving  public-community  action  that
transfers public power to the commons; and citizen control,  which makes use of
transparency (or, rather, visibility) and other mechanisms to control public power. In
Bourdieu’s  terms,  these  mechanisms connect  the  distribution  of  public  power  to
processes of redistribution of capitals in society (political, economic, cultural, etc.).
In relation to these ideals, but moving them forward, the alter-democratic, normative
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discourse in the Decidim Decalogue presents Decidim as designed and calling for its
re-appropriation by organizations at every social  scale, from networks of cities to
small neighborhood organizations, in order to potentiate their internal democracy and
capacity for action in both the social and the political-institutional sphere. Otherwise,
Decidim aims to potentiate democracy not  only  in relation to  the State,  but  also
across the social field.
Here, again, the antagonist model is no more simply the traditional representative
institutions, even if they remain so, but also the corporate open government model
embodied by Civiciti. While the idea of a distributed and augmented democracy is
oriented to redistribute capitals and thereby to forward social and political equality,
the latter fits nicely within the neoliberal framework that has been a target of critique
for different projects within the 15M cycle and that has potentiated inequality for the
last several decades in many countries (Piketty, 2014).
Decidim’s  discourse  is  a  clear  case  of  15M  inspired  technopolitical  alter-
democratization. It shares much of its approach with the work at the Participation
council of Madrid, another 15M inspired project. Nevertheless, as shown in section
3.2.3. there is a significant distance between the critical substantivist approach to
democracy and technopolitics  held  in  Barcelona and the  positivist  proceduralism
preeminent  in  Madrid.  While  in  Madrid  the  active  citizenry  is  thought  under  the
statistical concept of the “participatory population”, technologies are envisioned as
neutral  tools  under  the  traditional  instrumentalist  model,  and  democracy  is
understood as  a  procedure,  in  Barcelona the  active  citizenry  is  thought  of  as  a
complex multitude, technologies are seen as institutions in the making (as spaces of
construction  and  conflict),  and  democracy  is  conceived  as  including  substantial
rather than only procedural elements.
By noticing this distance, I wanted to differentiate the view of technopolitics and alter-
democracy  around  Decidim.barcelona  from  traditional  representative  institutions,
corporate alternatives, as well as 15M inspired partners.
7.2.4. Resuming discourses on democracy and representation in the 15M cycle
Through this reconstruction it becomes clear the persistence, with transformations,
of discourses on democracy within the cycle.  The triple discourse of diagnosis of
democracy and the cycle itself, the normative discourse around the democracy to
come, and the prescriptive one around how to get there, was recurrent and variable
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within  the  15M cycle.  It  progressively  portrayed  an  image  of  the  whole  field  of
politics, from civil society to the State: it mapped democracy as a discourse of both
desire and practice.  At every stage, discourses pointed to various aspects of the
polity,  but  their  focus  seemed  sharper  when  speaking  of  the  practice  at  hand,
otherwise, when it had to do with the field where actors were operating: civil society
and movements in the case of 15M, political parties in the case of the X Party, public
institutions  in  the  case  of  Decidim.As  I  just  recollected,  the  leitmotiv  of  real
democracy  and  threads  of  anti-representationalism,  alter-representationalism and
alter-democracy were present in every case. This supports the idea that there was a
connected cycle, in this case, a discursive 15M cycle on democracy, with reiterated
topics and variations upon them. Variations were associated with the transformations
of the cycle itself, as actors explored different territories, the reality of democracy, in
their way towards a more real one. Here we can synthesize innovative discourses
during the 15M cycle. 
FIGURE 66. 15M CYCLE DISCOURSE: REPRESENTATION
7.3. What are the key democratic and technopolitical practices from
15M to Decidim.barcelona?
The second question formulated in the introduction concerned key practices within
the cycle. I broke it down into various sub-questions, which I use here to help in my
exploration. I first describe what I believe are key practices of each stage (social,
electoral, institutional) and then explore different aspects of them. Following the two
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key “matters of concern” of our exposition, democracy and technopolitics, throughout
the exploration I will differentiate democratic practices and technopolitical practices,
and  will  stress  when  they  are  clearly  interconnected.  In  the  case  of  democratic
practices, I also clarify the variety of democratic models (participatory, autonomist,
deliberative,  etc.)  with which they can be associated,  as well  as their  relation to
representation  (anti-,  alter-,  non-representational).  I  choose  and  enumerate  only
paradigmatic practices, going case by case first (sections 3.1., 3.2., 3.3.) and then
noting some continuities and commonalities of the cycle (section 3.4.).
7.3.1. 15M: democratic and technopolitical practices
In  chapter  4,  part  4,  I  described  some  key  15M democratic  and  technopolitical
practices.  I  recapitulate  them here.  I  will  comment  first  on  some that  concerned
democracy but not technopolitics.
The alter-democratic practice par excellence during the 15M period was that of the
open, popular assembly. The key one from the viewpoint of democracy. This was a
genuine addition of the camps to the previous Nolesvotes’s cyberactivist repertoire
and DRY’s technopolitical one. The alter-democratic practice of gathering in squares
to voice one’s personal situation and position on collective issues, as well as to listen
to others,  followed by deliberation,  combined elements of the deliberative (in the
open  dialogues  between  people),  autonomist  (generating  temporary  autonomous
zones), and the antagonist (by appealing to the citizenry and opposing the political
Establishment) models. The practice of assembling included sets of other practices,
from using hand signals to turn taking and waiting. Probably the most paradigmatic
one  was  that  of  active  listening,  based  on  an  openness  to  others  against  the
competitive thrust of modern life, or even the agonistic model of the ancient Greek
assembly.
Two other paradigmatic examples of 15M practices, camping and direct action, could
rather be taken as examples of anti- or non-representation: forms of doing politics
directly, against, or without reference to representation.
Then, the continuous renewal of spokespeople, a form of delegation subordinated to
forms of direct  involvement in politics during the camps (such as the assembly),
could be categorized as a mixture of anti- and alter-representationalism.
A  whole  complementary  set  was  composed  by  paradigmatic  technopolitical
practices. Alter-representation was essayed in the field of media by streaming and
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social  media  narrations  carried  on  by  15M  activists.  This  was  a  form  of
democratizing  information  and  communication  (Cardon  &  Grandjou,  2004;
DellaPorta,  2013).  Direct  participation  in  events  (analogous  and  connected  to
camping or demonstrations) was also carried on through in social media by those
that were not present at the squares (used by 61,5% of 15M participants, according
Monterde et al., 2017). People could act without representative mediators, and to do
so  in  multiple  ways:  voicing  opinions  and  dispositions,  interacting  with  others,
recording or uploading videos (11,6% of participants used video, according to the
same survey), etc. Differently from talk of “de-intermediation”, it is worth stressing
that,  even  if  the  number  of  representative  mediators  declined,  the  number  of
technological mediations increased with regard to previous movements, making of
social media a new condition of possibility of emerging forms of collective action.
Forms  of  non-  and  anti-representation,  on  the  other,  were  typical  of  the  radical
community management of key 15M accounts: the goal was not to represent others
but rather to enroll them, to mobilize affects, to gather and circulate information and
arguments.  People  behind  those  accounts  were  “reluctant  leaders”  (Gerbaudo,
2012): they held positions that generated asymmetries of power, but not resulting
from representative leadership. Finally, multi-layer practices (58.8% of participants in
the cited survey) resulted from the multiple hybridization of direct participation in and
between digital and urban spaces.
I want to synthesize now the list of practices mentioned so far from the viewpoint of
representation and democracy.
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FIGURE 67. 15M PRACTICES: REPRESENTATION.
It  is worth stressing that non-representational practices (distinguishable from anti-
representational  and  alter-representational  ones),  otherwise,  practices  without
regard  or  reference  to  representation,  occupy  a  bigger  role  than  they  did  in
discourses, where they were not centrally thematized. Thereby, I include now a new,
yellow circle to the scheme of analysis. As a second innovation in the analysis, here I
present a map of key democratic and technopolitical practices and their overlapping.
I situate them in one circle or another depending on the weight of each of these two
central poles.
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FIGURE 68. 15M PRACTICES: DEMOCRACY & TECHNOPOLITICS.
All  of  the  mentioned  practices  converged  into  the  multitudinous,  multi-layered
assemblage that 15M was.
As  I  show  in  the  following  scheme,  they  covered  a  variety  of  alter-democratic
models.  15M demonstrations  and citizen legislative  initiatives such as the  PAH’s
were  forms  of  contention  that  may  be  situated  within  the  republican  and  the
antagonist models. Differently, networked camps and popular assemblies connected
with both the autonomist and the antagonist models, with a deliberative element in
the case of the assemblies. Manifestos had the strongly discursive, affective, and
articulating  elements  valued  within  the  antagonist  model,  while  the  networked
communication fell more into the autonomist one.
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FIGURE 69. 15M PRACTICES: ALTER-DEMOCRACY
7.3.2. X Party: democratic and technopolitical practices
Although numerous democratic and technopolitical practices remained, many others
changed  drastically  from  15M to  the  X  Party.  As  noted  in  chapter  5,  the  party
explicitly  defined itself  as  a  space for  method-driven federation  of  competences,
collaboration,  and  problem solving,  not  a  space  for  discussion  or  ideology.  This
reflected the influences of free software and hacktivism cultures that preceded 15M
and wiped out the “assembly” element that had become so prominent in the square
period. In the X Party, the most innovative practices from the viewpoint of democracy
and representation were almost always connected to technopolitics. As I noticed in
chapter 5, this betrays the fact that key people behind the X Party were seasoned
15M technopolitical activists385.
Probably the most controverted X Party practice was the anti-representationalism of
anonymity in communication. This practice, maintained only during the first months,
385Among them, Javier Toret in Barcelona, involved in setting up the DRY Barcelona node, Francisco
Jurado,  responsible  for  doing  the  same  in  Sevilla,  or  Simona  Levi,  X.net  head  already  in  the
cyberactivist struggles of the late 2000s.
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showed the tensions between 15M cycle experimental  practices and mainstream
representation logics in politics and media. When the time came to give concrete
party representatives, X Party practices were oriented towards alter-representation:
candidates  were  collaboratively  listed  and  filtered  (section  5.4.).  Anyone  could
propose anybody as a candidate, and then vote to prioritize them. Under the X Party
model of meritocracy, active members of the network had some privileges to both
being elected and voting, but the process was probably the most open for selecting
candidates of a party ever occurred in Spain.
Probably its most interesting alter-democratic (actually, wikicratic) practice was that
of  crowd-writing  its  political  program,  which  enacted  its  ideas  around  how
wikilegislation should work. It showed how the knowledge and expertise of hundreds
of people could be put to work into a collaborative effort: the collaborative writing of
Democracy, Period. The process was open but also filtered: it begun with a draft, and
the  process  of  approval  of  amendments  was  carefully  moderated  by  X  Party
members.
Another  innovative,  non-representational  technopolitical  practice  deployed  by  this
initiative, crowd-funding its campaign, was surely an innovation with regard to both
15M and established party repertoires, and was oriented to potentiate transparency
and independence from banks, as reclaimed by 15M three years earlier.
Differently, other technopolitical practices such as multi-layering, streaming, radical
community  management  or  general  intensive  ICT  use  for  organizational  and
communication more broadly were passed on from 15M struggles into the everyday
work of the party. This showed the practical continuity of the cycle, while practices
such as moderated crowd-writing or anonymity translated into the new stage earlier
practices of fully open crowd-writing and spokespeople rotation.
I resume now the situation of X Party practices with regard to my representation and
democracy schema.
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FIGURE 70. X PARTY PRACTICES: REPRESENTATION.
With  regard  to  relations  of  technopolitics  and  democracy,  the  map  shows  a
considerable growth in  technologically  mediations of  key practices.  I  leave many
earlier practices in the figure and include the new ones in bold.
                 
FIGURE 71. X PARTY PRACTICES: DEMOCRACY & TECHNOPOLITICS.
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The  various  practices  of  the  party  fell  within  various models  of  alter-democracy,
usually combining several of them. It is relevant to stress that, differently from the
15M case,  the  X  Party  processes  implied,  more  or  less  strongly  depending  on
whether  we  are  talking  of  the  “communication  guerrilla”  or  the  “party”  side,  a
reference to modern political  representation. The internal elaboration of the party
program implied collaboration in an autonomist fashion, with the public part implied a
distance  between  insiders  and  outsiders  that  gave  it  a  participatory  touch.
Deliberation played its role in both the internal and external part. Similarly, the crowd-
sourcing and filtering of political candidates implied such participatory elements. Like
in the 15M case, the deployment of social media and networked communication fell
clearly within the autonomist model while the communication guerrilla combined it
with an antagonist element.
FIGURE 72. X PARTY PRACTICES: ALTER-DEMOCRACY.
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7.3.3. Decidim: democratic and technopolitical practices
In the case of Decidim, practices of democracy and technopolitics were tied even
closer together.  In chapter 6 I  underlined three sets: practices of technoacratism,
practices of technopolitical production, and practices of technopolitical participation.
As  noticed  there,  these  sets  of  practices  combine  different  cultural  repertoires,
primarily, those of free software, ICT use, and political participation.
Among the practices of technopolitical production that I listed there were the sharing
and collaborative  production  of  source  code in  real  time,  the  application  of  free
licenses,  the  design  of  new  participation  infrastructures  and  processes,  or  the
articulation of practices of coordination.
Technoacratic  practices  focused on constructing  the  conditions  for  democratizing
many of these processes, otherwise, to open them to anyone and everyone, which
has already been achieved via events such as MetaDecidim in the area of the design
of  participation  infrastructures  and  processes,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  via  free
programming.  Processes  such  as  MetaDecidim aim to  question  the  technocratic
governance  of  digital  infrastructures,  frequently  connected,  in  the  case  of  public
institutions, with representative structures.
When it comes to technopolitical participation, the Decidim project has displayed as
many varieties of alter-democracy as afforded by the hybrid processes built on top of
it. Key practices of technopolitical participation have included multi-layering action,
collective deliberation, collaborative production and evaluation of proposals, as well
as  making  things  visible  and  traceable.  Here  the  hybridization  of  practices  of
participation  and  deliberation  combine  with  technopolitical  ones,  bringing  new
possibilities and challenges.
The  following  map  outlines  practices  ranging  from  anti-representation  to  alter-
representation  in  the  production  and  participation  around  Decidim.  Collective
deliberation is a typical  example of alter-democratic practice. Visibilization, as an
example  of  alter-representation,  and  free  licensing,  of  non-representational
practices.  Others,  such  as  democratic  design  or  the  collaborative  production  of
proposals mixed various types.
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FIGURE 73. DECIDIM.BARCELONA PRACTICES: REPRESENTATION.
The  following  map  shows  the  level  of  overlapping  between  democratic  and
technopolitical practices.
               
FIGURE 74. DECIDIM.BARCELONA PRACTICES: DEMOCRACY & TECHNOPOLITICS.
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Finally,  I  want to situate Decidim in relation to the various models of  democracy
analyzed in chapter 2. Instead of concrete practices I use processes in which they
are incorporated. Wikigovernment is a participatory possibility afforded by Decidim,
while wikilegislation is already being deployed. Debates (a deliberative functionality)
and  networked  communication  (an  autonomist  feature)  are  also  included  in  the
project as of late 2016.
FIGURE 75. DECIDIM.BARCELONA PRACTICES: ALTER-DEMOCRACY.
7.3.4. Practical commonalities of the cycle
After  recapitulating practices in each case, I  want  to bring a combined map that
displays some representative practices in connection to the various alter-democratic
models analyzed in chapter 2.
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FIGURE 76. 15M CYCLE PRACTICES: ALTER-DEMOCRACY.
This map shows how practices in 15M displayed multiple combinatorial possibilities
of alter-democratic models. It shows the richness of the cycle. A key issue emerges:
that of what, if anything, they had in common. There are a number of commonalities
and continuities that are worth stressing.
Alter-democratic  discourses.  The first,  most  obvious one,  is  the  continuity  of  the
contentious  discourse  around  democracy  and  the  alternatives  to  the  existing
neoliberal representative model.
Alter-democratic  and  technopolitical  practices. What  I  have  called  technopolitical
reassembling  of  democracy  was  operative  at  the  movement  stage,  during  the
electoral assault, as well as during the institutional one. As shown in the empirical
chapters,  practices  connected  to  democracy  and  representation  and  practices
hybridizing technologies and politics, otherwise, technopolitics, were crucial on every
stage of the cycle. These experiments opened new venues for taking part and, to
that extent, one may say they launched experiments in democratization in various
spheres of political life, be it social movements, parties, or institutions. This is true
even if many of the new initiatives, channels or practices, taken in isolation, had their
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own  limits  from  a  democratic  perspective.  Concrete  practices  were  maintained
throughout the cycle, and their general types did so too.
Technopolitical actors. A number of actors, with whom I have collaborated through
much  of  the  5-year  period,  participated  in  numerous  initiatives  within  the  cycle.
Hacktivist  and  technopolitical  activists  like  Simona  Levi  or  Javier  Toret  have
reappeared as participants in  pre-15M struggles,  15M projects,  as well  as the X
Party. Francisco Jurado or Moreno Yagüe took part in various 15M initiatives as well
as in the X Party. Others such as Arnau Monterde have participated in all of these,
as well as in Decidim, making him not only a recognized researcher of the cycle
(Monterde, 2015) but also a transversal participant. Technopolitical activists such as
Madrid  participation  councilor  Pablo  Soto,  or  innovators  in  democracy  such  as
Xabier Barandiaran or Miguel Arana did also participate in all  of these initiatives,
except for the X Party. These people are only a few, but they embody appropriately
the technopolitical networks and trends within 15M.
Democratization  from  below.  The  15M  cycle  has  not  only  challenged  relevant
features,  attributes,  or  practices  of  liberal  representative  democracy  (and  its
associated idea of representative democratization), but also the list of driving actors
and factors to look at in these processes. We have shown how key challenges and
changes have been driven by citizen initiatives (and, perhaps, subaltern elites) rather
than by established elites.
Action and participation over representation. It is also worth stressing the priority of
participation and doing. Most of these practices involved a tendency towards new
forms  of  taking  part,  otherwise,  of  participation,  opposed  to  representation  (or
associated practices,  such as delegation).  Doing and taking part  were prioritized
over, generated or defined being (identity), and challenged representation. This can
be appreciated in examples ranging from the emergence of multitudinous identities
out of communication in 15M, in the discursive centrality of “doing” in the X Party, or
the idea of a recursive active citizenry in the Decidim case.
Conditions  of  possibility  and  conditions  of  reality/existence.  ICTs  were  not  only
conditions of possibility, they rather operated as conditions of reality (or existence):
they crucially contributed to the new shapes of collective identities, organization, and
action.  Multitudinous  identities,  networked  assemblages  and  augmented
communicative  events  were  an  example  in  the  case  of  the  15M movement.  An
anonymous citizen network, a federation of competences, and collaborative work
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were  examples  in  the  case  of  the  X  Party.  Finally,  communities  of  active  and
recursive  citizens,  networks  of  technopolitical  production  and  participation,  and
collective decision making in the Decidim case.
Common problems.  Nevertheless, it  is also relevant to notice that many of these
experimental  forms had  problems  to  accomplish  the  goals  set  up  for  them and
thereby to endure in time. The assembly was a paradigmatic case in the 15M period:
a few weeks showed its limitations for collective decision making. Interestingly, parts
of  the  networked  assemblage,  particularly  digital  networks,  endured  in  time  and
remained  operative  well  after  15M  decayed  qua  movement  and  gave  way  to
alternative projects. In the electoral assault, the networked citizen network form also
fell short of its stated goals and was deactivated for the most part. Part of its limits
had to do with its controlled growth strategy, its hard and yet informal system of
meritocracy, and its lack of access to key media spaces which may have reinforced
its multi-layer communication dynamics. Finally, Decidim faces the double challenge
of  mobilizing  citizenry  as  well  as  institutional  actors  (politicians  and  technicians,
mostly). To connect to processes of an agonist nature may be crucial for its success.
Common  challenges. Finally,  traditional  challenges  of  movements,  parties,  and
public institutions, which are challenges of collective action, remained present. One
was  to  achieve  the  required  levels  of  WUNC,  worthiness,  union,  numbers  and
commitment across time, even if these may have been redefined by ICTs and the
reduction of costs of collective action. A second one was to keep in check different
forms of power asymmetries and exclusion. The third, to achieve social wider social
transformation.  As  shown in  the  empirical  chapters,  each  of  these  three  points,
especially the last two, remained open in the projects analyzed.
7.4. How does the reassembling period 2011-2016 look like from a
sociopolitical and ontological perspective?
The  third  and  last  general  question  formulated  in  the  introduction  of  this  thesis
concerned  the  transformations  associated  to  the  15M  cycle’s  reassembling  of
democracy. The first sub-point of this question concerned the key changes in social
movements’, parties’ and State institutions’ forms. The second sub-point concerned
changes in political ontology. I address these two sub-questions now.
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7.4.1. Transformations in sociopolitical forms
7.4.1.1. Social movements within the 15M cycle
The challenges and changes with regard to social movements can be synthesized in
four interrelated categories: communication, practices, organization, and identity.
In chapter 4, section 4.2.2. I noticed (rewording Castells, 2012) the popularization of
multitudinous (self)communication in 15M: the ecosystems of peer-to-peer, one-to-
many, and many-to-many communication afforded by social  media,  streaming,  or
etherpads was a novelty with regard to earlier movements.
In section 4.3. I noticed how these new forms of communication were involved in
multi-layered and multi-layering practices, performances, and settings, which appear
as  a  central  addition  to  previous  repertoires  of  contention.  The  combination  of
multitudinous  self-communication  and  multi-layered  practices  were  two  core
elements  of  15M technopolitics.  This  addition  implied  a  democratization  of  sorts
(irrespectively of the degree of commitment they required or their internal democratic
character), since it multiplied (and frequently eased) the ways in which people could
enroll  themselves  into  social  movements.  It  also  blurred  the  in-out,  participants-
audience, boundaries of movements, as suggested by Monterde (2015).
In terms of the types of organization, in section 5.1. of that chapter, I described the
emergence of networked assemblages that represent an innovation with regard to
movements in the previous decade (Gerbaudo, 2016). On the other hand, temporally
distributed  leadership  may  be  a  related  innovation  in  movement  organizational
forms. More comparative research is needed.
Finally, also in 5.1. I analyzed the shape of 15M connective, multitudinous identities,
and  how  they  pose  challenges  to  the  tradition  of  collective  identities  in  social
movement theory.
Opening  new  forms,  venues  and  practices  of  information,  communication  and
participation,  allowing  a  temporally  distributed  leadership,  or  constructing  non-
identification  based  multitudinous  identities  contributed  to  both  challenging
representation and even democratizing some aspects of social movements. Most of
these  challenges  to  the  social  movement  form  had  technopolitics  (as  a  syntax,
semantics and pragmatics) at their core.
When  combined  with  practices  such  as  the  general  assembly  form  or  its  anti-
representationalist  challenges  to  (internal  and  external)  representation,  many  of
these features seem to outline a peculiar technopolitical and alter-democratic model
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that  challenges  and  changes  the  social  movement  form.  Some of  its  innovative
features have become characteristic of an emerging genre of networked movements
(conspicuously, within the wave of networked movements of the squares), but rarely
in a more developed, anti-representationalist and democracy-centered shape than in
15M (for comparison, see Gerbaudo, 2012, 2016). All that said, much comparative
research is required.
7.4.1.2. Political parties
When it comes to political parties, in chapter 5 section 6.1. I recurred to Gunther &
Diamond (2003)  triple  axis  for  party  classification,  which attends to  organization,
program and disposition towards the system. I noticed how the structure of the X
Party was thin and informal in comparison to mainstream parties in Spain, and how
its reliance on ICTs justifies qualifying it as “networked”. Then I noticed how its core
program had a democratic element but was open to variation because it depended
on the results of a process of collaborative writing. The method was the key of that
process and thereby I have defined the party as “procedural”. Finally, the party had a
clearly  subversive  disposition  towards  the  status  quo.  Networked,  democratic-
procedural, and subversive seem appropriate qualifications for defining the X Party
under  Gunther  and  Diamond  classification.  Innovative  practices  such  as
wikiprograms,  crowd-sourced  candidates,  and  campaign  crowd-funding  seem  to
herald the advent of transformations in the party form. In some cases, these are
similar  to  those  happening  in  social  movements  and  connect  with  some  of  the
prognostics  by  Bimber  (2003)  and  Castells  (1996)  about  post-bureaucratic  and
networked organizations.  Within  what  may be labelled  as  the  “networked parties
genre”386 (in which others such as the Pirate Party may be situated), the X Party
would  count  as  “networked  democratic”,  or  “wiki-democratic”.  The  distance  with
earlier party types, such as the catch-all and the cartel party forms (with examples
like PP and PSOE, in Spain), which are based on a clear top-down hierarchy, closed
programs and candidacies, and well-defined media figures, is marked. The X Party’s
emphasis in “doing”, its lack of interest in “constituency representation” (many of the
X Party  processes were  opened to  anyone,  and its  elaboration was oriented by
“doing” and merit) also distances it from the movement party form as described by
386 Some of these elements are proper of a rising genre of networked parties, but others, such as its
practices of anonymity, the centrality of the democratic question, or the subversive character, all of
them connected with a movement such as 15M, were a rather idiosyncratic combination.
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Kitschelt (1989).
Like  in  15M,  these  changes  came  connected  to  technopolitical  practices,  a
questioning of  traditional  representation, new forms of participation,  as well  as a
strong alter-democratic discourse. These last points, as well its situation within the
15M cycle, make of it a very particular case within the emerging networked party
genre.
7.4.1.3. State/public institutions
In section 6, chapter 5, I noticed how Decidim brings two institutional challenges to
both  municipal  government  and  public  institutions:  the  challenge  of  an  alter-
democratization by participation and the challenge of institutional  incorporation of
technopolitics (with its increase in possible performances, visibility, relationality, etc.).
I would synthesize the former as its “distribution” challenge, and the second as its
“augmentation” challenge.
The challenge of alter-democratization resulted from specific possibilities such as the
wikigovernment and wikilegislation (or co-production of public policies and norms)
afforded by Decidim387.  Decidim has been discursively  and practically  oriented to
promote a distributed democracy insofar as it aims to potentiate forms of control of
public power by, sharing of public power with, and transference of public power back
to,  social  actors.  Building  beyond this  suggestion,  as  a  public-common software
open to reutilization and redesign by any other organization, Decidim is also oriented
to potentiate democratic forms of organization and decision making in wider society
(rather than only on the sphere of the State and its relations to society).
The challenge of augmentation comes from the institutional and cultural innovation
that technopolitical discourses and practices associated to ICTs, as well as the new
possibilities they open for acting together (as seen in the first Decidim processes)
pose to traditional ways of institutional and bureaucratic functioning.
As I noted in chapter 6, social-democratic as well as neoliberal models of the State,
but also more recent open government models, are challenged by the idea of public-
common model of what I have defined as “common government”, oriented towards
the reconstruction and redistribution of  public  power and resources through new
forms of (technopolitical) participation and autonomous self-organization. This still
forming model,  (connectable to the normative discourse around a distributed and
387 Whether these forms should remain merely consultative or become binding, in what cases and
under what conditions, has been a debate that remains open as of late 2016.
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augmented  democracy)  must  be  differentiated  from  the  usual  open  government
models, which still move within a model of State and democracy fully compatible with
neoliberalism. It has been suggested that State democratization is one of the biggest
and systemic potential impacts of movements (Amenta & Caren, 2004, Amenta et
al., 2010). Initiatives within 15M cycle may be advancing, albeit with many limits, on
this front.
7.4.1.4. Resume
A key matter of concern both in discourse and practice throughout the 15M cycle
was democracy and its reassembling. A thread that runs through the various cases
analyzed. This was a struggle for a different model of democracy, a democratic and
meta-democratic  contention.  During  the  cycle,  the  movement,  the  party,  and the
State forms (as well  as the relations between the three) were tinkered with, in a
process of pre-figuring out what democracy may be, both in discourse and practice.
By running through these three fields,  the 15M cycle amounted to  a longitudinal
experiment into alter-democratization. As shown in previous sections, technopolitical
practices were central to this reassembling.
To provide a provisional situation of the transformations experimented through the
cycle within a wider historical scheme, I may recur to Manin’s (1997) scheme on
types of  representative government,  combined with  Gunther  & Diamond’s  (2003)
classification of parties, as well as Kellner’s (1999) and Bimber’s (2003) notes on
information technologies. The issue is whether projects and possibilities in the 15M
cycle  point  towards  a  fourth  model  of  representative  government  (after
Parliamentarianism, party democracy, and audience democracy) or, rather, towards
alternatives to  representative government and the liberal  representative ontology,
more broadly. Another option is that they do both. I suggest that, under the crisis of
neoliberal  representation,  processes  such  as  the  15M  cycle  imply  an
experimentation  with  alter-democratic  subtypes  of  an  emerging  networked
democracy, at least, at the local level. The 15M cycle, its failures, successes and
challenges, may give a push to, and a shaper of, a new model of democracy in
Spain.
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TABLE 17. 15M CYCLE AND SOCIOPOLITICAL FORMS.
Types of
representative
government
PARTY
GOVERNMENT
1850s-1960s
C
AUDIENCE
DEMOCRACY
1970s-1990s
C
NETWORKED
DEMOCRACY
2010s
Types of Party
Mass Party:
class mass;
Leninist; pluralist
nationalist, etc.
Electoralist party:
personalist, catch-all;
movement party
Networked parties:
wikidemocratic
Types of
movements
Worker's movements
Civil rights
movements
New social movements:
ecologist, feminist,
indigenous, etc.
Networked social
movements: networked
social movement of the
square
Types of State/
government
Bureaucratic
representative
Neoliberal representative
vs Social-democratic
Networked government:
Open government vs
Common government
Relations Society-
Party-State
Party penetration of
society and State
Media politics and
society
Networked mediation of
society and participation
Information &
communication
technologies
PRESS, RADIO TV ICTs
Political information
& communication
structure
Mass communication
One to many
Mass
communication
One to many
Multitudinous self-
communication
Peer to peer
One to many
Many to many
7.4.2. New forms of political ontology within the 15M cycle
As I systematically showed in part 6.2 of every empirical chapter, each stage of the
cycle implied a challenge of sorts to the modern political ontology and an exploration
of  alternative  ones.  According  to  our  reconstruction  in  chapter  2,  the  liberal
representative ontology, as a model, is populated by selfish individuals that try to
primarily forward their private interests in their relations to others, with markets as a
prime mode of association and State representation (allegedly oriented to aggregate
interests) as a secondary and subordinate one, which must primarily guarantee the
rule  of  private  property  and free  exchange.  This  is  the  model  of  a  depoliticized
society  that,  according  to  15M  denunciations,  ended  up  making  of  people
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“commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers”.
As  an  alternative,  the  15M  cycle  has  generated  a  changing  and  expanding
ecosystem  of  technopolitical  discourses,  practices  and  infrastructures  that  point
towards hybrid, alter-democratic ontologies. They promiscuously combined elements
coming  from the  participatory,  autonomist,  antagonist  and deliberative  models  of
democracy. In the case of the X Party and Decidim, these actually combine with the
representative framework too. This suggests the question of political ontology may
not  be a binary,  “yes or  no”,  “this world  or that world”,  a cosmopolitical  “choice”
(choice  being  a  typical  liberal  concept)  as  suggested  by  some  STS  scholars
(Woolgar & Lezaun, 2013). Rather, it seems to be an anarchic matter of practice, in
which new worlds may begin to emerge without being able to break (at least, not in
principle) the shell of the old. Such hybridization has generated many tensions, the
paradigmatic one being the struggles around representation throughout the cycle,
from 15M to Decidim.
7.4.2.1. 15M’s political ontology
As seen in chapter 4, there were two central models to think the politics and ontology
of  the  movement,  both  in  discourse  and,  especially,  in  practice:  the  networked
assemblage and the assembly. Under the model of the network assemblage, 15M
exhibited  clearly  autonomist  aspects  in  the  emergence  of  subject  and  collective
forms that  questioned representation, self-organized as polycentric multitudes via
networked communication, and were characterized by their affectivity388. Concretely,
the actors generated multitudinous identities, a complex and non-identification based
collective form, emerging out of networked communication. Furthermore, a line of
discourse and practice around the politics of infrastructure, concretely around n-1,
also  displayed  a  clearly  autonomist  perspective  (or  constituent,  to  put  it  in
Papadopoulos’, 2011 terms), which partially oriented 15M technopolitics towards the
construction of alternative material conditions for collective action.
Differently,  under  the  assembly  model,  we  could  see  aspects  closer  to  the
deliberative democracy ontology. In a humanist fashion (clearly distinguishable from
the post-humanist one around the network assemblage), the assembly model was
associated to face to face deliberation and active listening between persons in open
squares.
388 One of those affects was “indignation […] the raw material of revolt and rebellion”, according to
Hardt & Negri (2009: 236).
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It is worth noticing that autonomist and deliberative aspects can be connected into
what Gerbaudo (2016) considers the “anarchist” thread of 15M. I believe it is this
thread  where  the  deeper  challenges  to  the  existing,  representative  model  of
democracy,  were  explored.  Then  he  correctly  notices  the  presence  of  another,
populist thread (as discussed in chapter 2). This can see appreciated in the DRY
manifesto’s references to “the common citizen” and how this common citizenry is
discursively constructed in antagonistic opposition to the political and financial elites.
All  these elements (autonomist,  deliberative,  antagonist)  were present  during the
15M period and suggest an anarchic and hybrid ontology (or constellations of them).
7.4.2.2. X Party’s political ontology
In  the X Party’s  case,  the most  innovative collective form both in  discourse and
practice was probably that of the networked expert citizenry, able to define a new
model  of  democracy  and  to  address  social  problems.  Rather  than  markets  or
representation (like in the liberal representative model) or discourse in civil society
(like in the deliberative one), the primary form of association in this case was the
federated networking of competences, something that the X Party aimed itself  to
embody. The primary relation was not of competition nor assembly deliberation but of
direct collaboration in common problems. This case shows, again, a clear influence
of  an  autonomist  ontology.  It  also  embodies  a  slightly  different  version  of  the
“anarchist thread” of the 15M cycle, less deliberative and more action-oriented. Like
in  the  case of  the  15M movement,  it  is  easy to  find  an antagonist  (or  populist)
element in the X Party’s discourse, which confronted the networked expert citizenry
that  solves  problems  and  the  political  and  economic  elites  who  generate  them.
Finally,  the  X  Party’s  discourse  also  included  a  participatory  element
(wikigovernment,  wikilegislation) that resulted from the tension between a deeper
autonomist  tendency  and  the  need  to  address  (in  Democracy,  Period)  the
institutional space of representative democracy.
7.4.2.3. Decidim’s political ontology
In  the  case  of  Decidim,  there  are  various  subject  and  collective  forms  being
contentiously constructed in discourse and practice. They are different for the case of
the  technopolitical  production  of  Decidim and  for  the  case  of  the  technopolitical
participation through Decidim. In the case of technopolitical production I underlined
the twin figures of the technoacrat and the recursive citizenry. While the former is an
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institutional  technician  that  tries  to  network,  distribute,  and  democratize  its  own
function (while constructing infrastructures and practices that may potentiate similar
democratizing processes elsewhere in society),  the latter is a citizenry that takes
over  some of  those  functions  and  helps  to  define  the  infrastructures  that  made
possible  its  own  exercise  of  citizenship  in  a  networked  democracy.  This  case
combines  elements  of  the  autonomist  and  participatory  ontologies  of  democracy
within  software  production,  design  and  governance.  Decidim  advances  into  the
technopolitical  practice  of  constructing  alternative  materialities  for  democracy
essayed in 15M with n-1, now in a problematic yet also powerful alignment with the
paradigm of representation, the State form.
Differently, in the field of technopolitical participation, the preeminent ontology is the
participatory one. Decidim is oriented to nurture the construction of a technopolitical
active citizenry, which can experiment with new forms of multi-layered participation
and self-organization involving digital platforms. New infrastructures, practices, and
cultures  will  have  to  be  constructed  for  this  to  consolidate  and  spread,  thereby
initiatives such as the formative courses for a digital  citizenship. Under the State
form,  the  participatory  ontology  is  limited  by  the  representative  one,  while  is
stretched  into  alter-democratic  directions  by  it’s  the  autonomist  and  deliberative
possibilities afforded by (or planned for) Decidim. These alter-democratic possibilities
connect, perhaps strongly than ever, to technopolitics.
7.4.2.4. Resume
I present now a table that somehow recapitulates the key elements of the ontologies
posed in discourse and practice by projects within the 15M cycle. It shows how each
case performed various ontological models, generating new potentialities, tensions
and  limits.  The  result  was  an  emerging  ecosystem  of  practices  and  discourses
outlining hybrid ontologies in a landscape that was primarily anarchic in character.
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                       TABLE 18. 15M CYCLE: HYBRID AND ANARCHIC POLITICAL ONTOLOGIES.
Model Political
    ontology
Subject form Collective
form
   Modes of     
     political       
      relation
15M/Assembly
Deliberative
Antagonist
Autonomist
Person
Indignant
Common citizen
Popular
assemblies
Dialogue, active
listening,
contentious
demanding
15M/Networked
Assemblage
Autonomist
Antagonist
Singularities
Anyone
Networked
multitude
Networked/
technopolitical
communication
X Party Autonomist
Antagonist
Participatory
Expert citizen Networked
(expert)
citizenry
Collaboration
meritocracy
federation of
competences
Decidim/
Technopolitical
production
Autonomist
Participatory
Technoacrat
Recursive citizen
Recursive
citizenry
Commoning
Networked/
technopolitical
communication
Decidim/
Technopolitical
participation
Participatory Networked
active citizen
Networked
active
citizenry
Coproduction
Self/governance
7.4.3. What have been the characteristics of the process as a whole?
7.4.3.1. How and why did discourses and practices change?
Seen retrospectively, various aspects of the discourses and practices within the 15M
cycle did indeed change. A key question connected to the previous two sections is
that of how and why these discourses and practices changed. On the basis of the
analyses  in  chapters  4,  5,  and  6  I  will  first  resume  what  I  see  as  the  general
directions of the cycle I reconstructed. Then, I will recapitulate some factors driving
those changes.
Directions
Pre-figuration and realization of democracy.  A continuous thread was that of pre-
figuring out and realizing what democracy may be. In this case, “realizing” has the
double sense of  exploring  various key forms of  liberal  representative democracy
(society, parties, State) and enacting various forms of anti-representationalism and
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alter-democratization in each of them.
Institutionalization.  In  this  sense,  a  general  direction  in  my  reconstruction  was
towards  institutionalization,  albeit  not  towards  representation.  The  peak  when  it
comes to representation, actually, came with the electoral moment and the X Party.
With Decidim, as with the advent of the institutional moment more broadly, the key
question becomes how to transform and create new institutions, as well as how to
connect  back  with  living  movements  so  that  the  whole  process  of  democratic
reassembling finds a wide base for its deepening and maintenance in time.
Learning.  Through  this  process  there  was  an  increase  in  discursive  memory,  in
learned lessons, and in the repertoire of practices available for later action (as seen
in  sections  3.1.  to  3.3.  above).  There  was  also  a  process  of  partial  forgetting,
discarding and even rejection of earlier positions389 (primarily, when it comes to the
DRY and 15M anti-party and anti-representational theses).
Factors
After noticing some of the main directions of change in discourses and practices
within the cycle, I want to mention some of the factors driving them.
Hysteresis. The  becoming  of  the  cycle  was  marked  by  its  own  history.  Earlier
discourses, practices and stages were key for later ones.  Hysteresis,  that is,  the
active  traces,  within  a  given  event,  process,  or  collective,  of  previous  events,
processes  and  collectives,  operating  in  narratives,  habits,  technological
infrastructures, or other factors becomes crucial to understand the 15M cycle. To use
DeLanda's (2006) expression, early phenomena became “contingently necessary”,
historical conditions of possibility,  and frequently operative factors,  for  later ones.
15M for the X Party, the X Party for Podemos, Podemos for the local candidacies,
and  these  for  platforms  such  as  Decidim.barcelona  operated  as  conditions  of
possibility, sometimes in unanticipated and even conflicting ways. Furthermore, as
noted above with regard to social, political or technological conditions, they operated
as conditions of reality, that is, they contributed to give a concrete shape 390 to the
processes coming after them.
Cycle,  discourse and practice  frames.  A key factor  was ongoing discourses and
framing on the state of both the cycle and politics in general.
“Failure”  and  “success”. Failure  and  success  interpretations  of  practices  and
389 This was sometimes interpreted in terms of “betrayal”, but such a judgment can only be formulated
from a concrete interpretation of 15M, politics, and the cycle itself, which actors themselves did.
390 I could say an “haecceitas”, an individuating form, in an heterodox reading of Duns Scotus.
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discourses drove many of the changes. That was particularly clear in the case of the
transition from the social  movement to the electoral stage. Since this step was a
strong break with some of the key initial tenets of the movement, it implied quite a bit
of discursive elaboration on the side of X Party actors.
Construction  and  contention. Failure  and  success  were  frequently  defined  as  a
function of two basic criteria: construction (primarily, of more democratic practices,
relations, infrastructures and institutions) and contention (victories against status quo
actors and structures, such as PPSOE, corporations, or representative institutions).
Fields. Another factor that recurrently re-appeared in the empirical chapters affecting
change was the variable structures and cultures of the various social fields in which
15M activists got enrolled. Many of the tensions within and around the X Party, such
as  the  practice  of  anonymity  or  its  conflicts  with  Podemos,  resulted  from  the
representative and competitive character of the political field (Bourdieu, 1991).
Political, economic, social conditions. Then, 15M cycle actors’ actions and strategies
were also tied to the becoming of the socioeconomic and political crises. Many of
these  occurred  with  little  direct  relation  to  the  action  of  the  cycle’s  actors  (f.i.:
international pressures over the Spanish debt in 2011 and 2012), while others may
have been connected to it (f.i.: the progressive unearthing of more and more cases
of political corruption as 15M initiatives and a growing percentage of the population
demanded  judicial  investigation).  Other  conditions  such  as  ICT  penetration  or
innovations  (f.i.:  launch  of  Telegram)  played  their  role,  albeit  in  a  more  diffused
manner. These conditions, resulting from the activity of millions of actors, compose a
diffuse yet active setting for the action of the key actors of the cycle.
7.4.3.2. Synchronic and diachronic axes of construction and contention: continuity,
discontinuity, blocks and overflows.
As I noticed in chapter three, a number of socioeconomic and political conditions
remained operative during the 2011-2016 period,  such as social  cuts,  corruption
revelations, and unpopular policies. These operated as continuous conditions that
favored many of these initiatives and to which these initiatives responded. The basso
continuo  of  the  political  and  socioeconomic  crises,  critically  constructed  by  both
mainstream  and,  especially,  alternative  and  social  media,  offered  a  continuous
source  of  discontent  that  was  organized  into  new  forms  of  collective  action.
Contention affected and was affected by the existing social, economic, political and
technological conditions.
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Nevertheless,  key  innovations  were  tied  not  primarily  to  the  variations  in  these
conditions but to the creativity and becoming of the contention between established
sociopolitical actors and 15M cycle contenders, which involved discourses on the
past, present, and future of the cycle articulated at each stage. By focusing on 15M
initiatives I have shown how these reacted to both the becoming of the cycle and
their discursive interpretations of it.
After  the  reconstruction  in  this  thesis,  I  believe  there  is  a  double  axis  to  think
contentious  politics  in  the  15M cycle:  on  the  one  hand,  a  vertical,  structural  or
synchronic  axis,  which  presents  a  shifting  but  stable  basso  continuo  of  social,
economic, and technical conditions as a ground resource for technopolitics, which
exhibits, in turn, a constellation of syntax, semantics and pragmatics at any given
point in time; on the other hand, an horizontal, dynamic, or diachronic axis, which
displays  the  becoming of  those  various conditions  and  aspects  of  technopolitics
across times.
If the technopolitical triad, in connection with sociopolitical conditions, serve to think
the vertical axis, otherwise, the structures of technopolitical contention, Pickering's
(1995) notion of “the mangle of practice” as a decentered dance of resistance and
accommodation between humans and non-human agents is an interesting one in
order  to  understand  the  horizontal  axis,  otherwise,  the  dynamics  of  contentious
technopolitics. Every stage served as a “surface of emergence” from which actors
could initiate a course of action, forcing others to resist or accommodate.
Clear discontinuities in the cycle can be found in the transitions from demonstration
to movement, from movement to parties, from parties to institutions. 15M broke the
street block of previous cyberactivism, which remained limited to the internet, but
later faced the crystal ceiling of the political system and the State, given by its own
self-limitation to the realm of civil society. The X Party broke with such a limitation,
while Podemos begun a successful assault on the electoral field; nevertheless, the X
Party suffered various media, discourse, and organizational limits and blocks that
only  Podemos was able to  overcome into  electoral  success.  Citizen candidacies
went  a  step  further,  gained  elections  and  begun  opening  institutional  blocks  to
participatory  democracy.  Decidim  advanced  in  creating  a  new  technopolitical
institution  in  the  making.  Then  Decidim itself  has  faced  the  limits  of  those  very
institutions, the existing, representational culture.
At the core of the overcoming of some of these blocks there were what some 15M
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actors defined as “overflows”. These are processes that exceed the expectations
and the conditions (organizational structures, particularly) of the key actors at a given
moment. 15M close analysts have stressed the relevance of such overflows (Petit,
2011; Gil & Jurado, 2015), and even the need to set up what may be defined as
political and technopolitical “infrastructures of overflow”. This could be understood as
setups calling for the unanticipated, the construction of structures that are open to be
re-appropriated by others in innovative ways, unfinished dispositives (Padilla, 2013)
or generative conditions and structures (Zittrain, 2008), so to speak. If pre-figuration
somehow anticipates the future, these infrastructures and overflows open it up.
Rather  than  as  a  channeled  dialectics,  or  only  as  a  game  tending  towards
homeostasis,  the  logics  of  the  overflow  fits  better  with  the  image  of  “excess”
suggested  by  Bataille  (Botting  &  Wilson,  1997),  a  multiplication  game,  which
emphasizes  the  surprisingly  constructive  performance  of  actors  and  initiatives
involved in the 15M cycle.
Events of excess and overflow prevent any account based on a continuous image of
time without necessarily implying a denial of the conditions from which they emerge.
An  event  always  takes  place  in  relation  to  those  conditions391.  And  yet,  new
possibilities break into the fabric of the political.  Sometimes they come to taint a
whole period. In this case, the 15M movement did so with a whole cycle.
Emergence vs planning, pre-figuring vs spontaneity, anticipated vs unintended.
It  is  relevant  to  stress,  as  I  did  in  the  introduction,  how the  cycle  was  not  the
unfolding of a plan, but neither the result of spontaneous processes. Rather, it was a
work of contention and construction, of  reassembling of democracy. This brought
many surprises. None expected that May 15th would turn from a demonstration into
a movement. Few could have foreseen that parties would end up being formed out of
the  dynamics  of  a  movement  that  was,  at  the  very  least,  suspicious  of
representation. Few could have hoped that 15M cycle initiatives would win the local
elections of May 25th 2015, surely nobody expected that in 2011, not even in 2014.
Clearly,  many of  these processes were unanticipated. In  some cases,  they were
intended, in others they were not only unintended but even fiercely opposed by key
actors within the cycle. For instance, the rise of the X Party was heavily criticized by
many  actors  coming  from  the  15M  movement.  The  local  assault  launched  by
391According to Alain Badiou (2011), a political event is characterized by an intensification, localization,
and contraction—the situation contracts in a representation of itself, as a kind of metonymy of the
situation of the whole— as well as by the emergence of a subjectivity that speaks universally.
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Guanyem  Barcelona  and  Ahora  Madrid  was  seen  with  doubts  by  Podemos's
leadership in its foundational assembly in October 2014 and finally embraced in the
Spring of 2015.
7.4.3.3. On non-linearity
It  is  relevant  to  underline  that  my main  narrative  tended to  present  linearly  and
sequentially  what  were  not  merely  sequential  processes.  Projects  such  as
15MpaRato begun when 15M was still strong as a movement, continued for most of
the  X Party’s  life  and also at  the  time of  creation of  Decidim.  The same actors
(groups such as X.net) were involved in several of these projects at the same time.
Similarly, practices common at the time of the Sinde Law struggles came back with
strength with the X Party.  The cycle allowed to go back and forth and sideways
among practices. From that viewpoint, time was not a line but a network, which could
be traversed in various directions. However, to narrate the opening up of new stages
and strands of practice it was preferable to articulate a somehow linear discourse
around them. This was an approach the actors themselves essayed (f.i.: Levi, 2014).
7.4.4. On technopolitical alter-democratization
The final of the sub-questions within the third question posed in the introduction was
whether  the  cycle  was  one  of  technopolitical  alter-democratization.  The  general
answer is that the 15M cycle could be understood as one of alter-democratization: it
brought new democratic ontologies to various spheres of politics under the liberal
representative  model.  These  experiments  had  technopolitics  as  one  of  its  main
drivers and shapers.
That said, a precision may be pertinent. I believe the first stage of the cycle was not
so  much  of  democratization  but  of  demodynamization  (Levy,  1997).  Beyond  the
boundaries of  traditional  “democratization”,  usually  a matter  of  new elites getting
institutional  power  “for”  the  people  over  the  State,  15M  opened  a  time  of
demodynamization, an increase in the potency of the demos, a democratization from
below.  15M  was  a  complex  and  multitudinous  process  of  empowerment  in  its
multiple  senses  (power  to,  with,  and  within,  Veneklasen  &  Miller  2002),  which
emerged before and beyond both the State and representative politics.   As some
have  suggested,  15M  was  not  a  social  movement,  but  society  in  movement.
Especially  for  its  first  two  years,  it  had  something  of  that  redistribution  of  the
sensible, that reordering of places, that Rancière (1999) identifies with politics and
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democracy.  What  was thinkable and say-able,  visible  and invisible,  possible  and
impossible, shifted. Since 2014, with the rise to prominence of the electoral logics,
the balance between dynamis and kratos changed.
Democratization, took the form of a process oriented to increase the power of the
demos  in  the  existing  order,  to  get  things  under  people's  control  (retaking  the
destinies  of  our  lives,  as  suggested  by  Arana  in  the  introductory  quotes  of  this
thesis), but in order to increase what can be done (potency, demodynamization) and
what  is  actually  done  (energy,  demoenergizing).  Democratization,  like
demodynamization, is both  potentia and actus: democracy is not primarily an ideal
ahead but, as Karl Marx said of communism, the “real movement which abolishes
the present state of things”.  Both in its demodynamizing and democratizing forms,
the  reassembling  process  opened  by  15M  challenged  key  tenets  of  neoliberal,
representative democracy.
And yet, as noticed in the introduction, it had both remarkable and yet limited effects.
“Everything is the same, but everything is different” said Marga Padilla. Neoliberal
representative democracy still  remains the main paradigm in Spain, but  the 15M
cycle brought new discourses, practices and infrastructures for democracy to the
mainstream.
Recurring to counter-factual argument, beyond what happened, it is worth stressing
what did not happen. 15M actors gave a clearly progressive reading of the crisis,
which may have prevented the rise of the ultra-right happening elsewhere in the
West.  Others may say it  prevented a deeper progressive revolution. Some of its
most  radical  proposals  (such  as  Democracy  4.0)  have  remained  incomplete,
although  clearly  innovative  possibilities  are  being  essayed  in  projects  such  as
Decidim or Decide Madrid. The cycle somehow democratized social movements and
institutions,  not  so much the party  form,  where  the  X Party  experiments  did  not
always emphasize internal democracy.
In the following table, I essay a systematic recapitulation of various aspects of the
cycle  that  I  have  mentioned.  The  table  includes  key  elements  of  the  cycle  of
reassembling such as the main action space, the main collective subject behind it,
the key alternative form brought about, the sphere in which it operated, the main
enemy,  the  targets  of  transformation,  the  scale  of  action,  the  relation  to
representation,  the  type  of  technological  infrastructure,  and  the  blocks  it
encountered.
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TABLE 19. 15M CYCLE: REASSEMBLING PROCESS.
Case DRY-15M X Party Decidim.barcelona
Action space Movements Parties State/Public institutions
Collective form Multitudinous citizenry Networked expert
citizenry
Recursive citizenry
Alternative
Networked movement
of the squares
Wikidemocratic
networked party Common government
Sphere Civil society Party system State
Enemy
Political/economic
system
PPSOE
Party system
Corporations
Mere representation
Main target of
transformation
Apathetic society
Political culture
Party form Bureaucracy
Public institutions
Scale Networks of squares Nation-state City, network of cities
Representation Presentation
Anti-representation
Alter-representation
Alter-representation
De-representation
Anti-representation
De-representation
Technological
infrastructures
Movement/Social
infrastructures:
n-1
Partisan
infrastructures:
Co-ment,
crowdfunding
State/Social
infrastructures: Decidim
Blocks
Broke street
mobilization block
Suffered from a
political crystal ceiling
block
Broke political crystal
ceiling block
Suffered from media
ceiling and
organizational blocks
Broke institutional block
Suffered from
representative politics,
institutions and culture
blocks
Technopolitical citizenship
Cycle of technopolitical contention
Reassembling of democracy
7.5. Future research
Multiple aspects of the 15M cycle have remained unexplored in this work. I list them
now as they may show how this research could move forward.
A first one is obvious. The cycle is not over. There are ongoing processes that may
bring  about  new  democratic  and  technopolitical  innovations,  which  should  be
attended in further developments of this work.
A  second  point  concerns  key  examples  within  the  cycle  that  have  remained
untouched. That is particularly the case of Podemos, which I decided to leave for
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further research.
A third point is to explore many other dimensions of technopolitics which I haven’t
touched upon, such as affects.
A fourth point is to carry a more systematic situation of the 15M cycle within the
historical coordinates of historical politics and the network society.
A fifth point is to articulate further the notion of technopolitics and its various aspects
as a field of exploration and as a toolkit for analysis.
7.6. Final remarks
My analysis  of  the  cycle  has shown how democracy is  forged in  the  contention
around  it.  “Democracy”  does  not  exist  as  a  singular  model,  but  rather  as  a
constellation of discourses and practices that are contested and shifting in time, as
assemblages embodying various ideals. Both the institutions and the ontologies of
democracy, what is and what can be done in democracy, are opened to contentious
transformation. Thereby, a conclusion around democracy and democratization after
15M is that they must be figured out piecemeal, space by space and initiative by
initiative, rather than through a judgment in bulk. This is a failure-prone process: the
answers to democratic issues were in many cases insufficient by the actors' own
criteria  and  evaluations.  However,  experiments  were  run,  problems  addressed,
advances made.
There is  always a long way ahead.  The work of  reassembling the vita  activa in
technopolis will require new practices, new technologies, new paideias. Nothing is
granted. The challenge to construct a real democracy remains open, ground and
ever receding horizon of a common journey into the future.
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Appendix I
Network (structural) and synchronization (dynamic) analyses
The network  analysis  is  divided in  two steps.  The first  is  the structural  or  static
approach, which is aimed to define the boundaries of 15M’s connective identity using
standard network metrics, namely,  strongly connected component and modularity.
This first step includes the characterization of the 15M network structure using k-core
decomposition (a technique used for finding cohesive subsets of nodes within the
network, as explained in Seidman, 1983, and Dorogovtsev, 2006) in order to see
whether  it  exhibits  a  centralized  or  distributed  structure.  The  structural  or  static
analysis uses a big dataset of Facebook activity, including 4957 fanpages connected
to the 15M movement as well as other ‘external’ social actors such as trade unions,
which are analyzed as a boundary contrast. 15M fanpages were selected beginning
with two original samples of 100 representative fanpages, the first related to 15M
and the second to trade unions CCOO and UGT. These 100 representative fanpages
were selected as a result of qualitative analysis. A Facebook Query Language script
extracted a list of fanpages ‘liked’ by the original sample (Facebook allows fanpages
to create lists of other pages that present affinity to them). The process is repeated
on the set of extracted pages, from which a larger (second order) network of 15M
related pages is obtained.
The second step of the analysis, the dynamic one, takes 14 key fanpages from the
previous dataset and looks at the level of activity of their users (in terms of posts,
comments and likes). On the basis of this, it conducts a synchronization analysis
based on Phase Locking Statistics (Lachaux et al., 2000) that allows to observe the
dynamic structure of activity underlying the sub-network of fanpages, noticing which
one is the most active and what the direction of the synchronization is between them
at different points in time.
A note on networks
From a  systemic/panoramic  viewpoint,  I  work  with  two  basic  types  of  networks:
functional  and  structural.  Functional  networks  are  those  generated  by  brief
interactions among nodes (e.g., “retweets” and “mentions” in the case of Twitter).
Structural networks are those displaying long term links between nodes, which are a
key, although not exclusive, enablers of functional networks (e.g.: a friendship on
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Facebook means an open channel of direct interaction between two users). These
networks show the interactions among nodes.
From a more “practical” perspective, or that of “user experience”, actors in social
media such as Twitter or Facebook have two primary interfaces: the key one, where
they can see the aggregated and serialized activity of other users in real time (this is
frequently called “news feeds”, and displays the activity of nodes with which a given
user has a “structural” or “functional” relation to), as well as the user profile interface
(what is called the “wall” on Facebook, and “timeline” on Twitter), where much of a
given  user's  activity  is  registered.  To  take  an  ideal  case:  when  a  user  does
something  (say,  generating  a  message),  the  message appears  by  default  in  the
news feeds of all the users “structurally” related to him, as well as on those of many
that are only “functionally” related (e.g., they are structurally related to someone who
has shared the original message).
When it  comes to the sample of nodes (profiles or pages) to look at on Twitter,
Facebook,  and the web,  my selection resulted from a superposition of  analyses,
which usually begun with qualitative data about the main actors or hashtags in the
movement  (a  list  resulting  from  fieldwork,  interviews,  media  analysis,  previous
network analyses, etc.) and then was connected to, reinforced, or corrected by the
digital network topologies emerging from functional and structural network analyses.
This is what turns my analysis from “big” into “deep” data, otherwise, analysis of big
datasets feeding back with an insider's perspective.
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Survey
Questionnaire and fieldwork
The survey was based on an electronic questionnaire set up on a web server. A self-
selected, non-probabilistic sample was constructed by launching an open invitation
through digital media. Most of the circulation channels for the survey were tied to
15M,  thereby,  we  expected  respondents  to  mostly  identify  themselves  as
participants. The three key channels to circulate the survey were email, Twitter and
Facebook. For every channel, a specific hyperlink to the questionnaire (which was
anonymous) was generated.
The survey was run between May 13th and May 22nd, 2014. The Survey Manager
NetQuest was deployed for data collection. We received 1,330 responses (434 via
email, 797 via Twitter, and 99 via Facebook). After cleaning up, the final sample size
was of 1,320 observations. The database, the data dictionary, and the questionnaire
are  accessible  under  an  open  license  at
www.tecnopolitica.net/encuesta15m2014_datos.
A similar online survey conducted a year earlier 2013 (Linares, 2013) showed that it
was  possible  to  gather  in-depth  information  on  15M  participants  through  non-
randomized  online  surveys.  Our  survey  relied  on  a  similar  strategy:  firstly,  we
enrolled  15M  participants  in  the  design  phase  via  survey  pilots,  secondly,  we
launched  the  survey  through  15M  key  information  channels  and  social  media
networks, in which members of our research group are deeply involved. We are
aware of the limits of online surveys based on a snowball sampling strategy in terms
of representativeness. However,  we are confident of its potential  to approach the
targeted  universe,  namely,  15M  movement  participants.  We  assume  the  survey
primarily enticed 15M participants and supporters, given that it was mostly publicized
via key 15M accounts, generating a trust-network effect. The dissemination strategy
is central  to understand the success of  the survey,  which gathered more than a
thousand  answers,  in  a  few  days.  This,  in  despite  of  its  length  (20  minutes  in
average).
Basic characteristics of the sample
Table 1 below presents the basic socio-demographic characteristics of respondents.
Unsurprisingly,  those  characteristics  differ  from  the  country  population.  Gender
distribution is unbalanced, with more men (59.8%) than women (39.5%). Educational
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level  is  above  the  Spanish  average,  since  72.9%  declares  holding,  at  least,  a
university degree. With ages ranging from 17 to 75 years old, the median age of
participants is 36. The sample primarily includes young and medium-age adults: 25%
of participants is  under  30 years old  and 75% of  the sample is  under  46.  Most
respondents were born (92%) and live (93%) in Spain. Finally, 65.8% of respondents
indicate  they  currently  participate  in  the  labor  market.  They  do  so  as  paid-
employees,  self-employed,  or  business  owners.  Up  to  18.6%  report  being
unemployed.
Up to 76.8% of the respondents participated in some way in the movement (see
table 2). Personal identification with it is also high, but with some nuances: 87.7% of
the sample identifies itself with 15M; however, the proportion rises to 91.6% when
identification refers to the movement’s demands and proposals, while it decreases to
71.1% when it  refers  to  its  actions and strategies.  Lastly,  77.1% of  respondents
remain linked to and/or interested in 15M, while 16.3% already lost their interest.
Due  to  the  sampling  technique  and  the  resulting  characteristics  of  the  targeted
universe,  respondents  exhibit  a  high  degree  of  support  towards  the  movement,
which  is  above the  Spanish  average indicated in  other  surveys launched at  the
moment we conducted the survey (see, for instance Ferrándiz, 2014).
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